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Vorwort 
Zu Beginn der 80er Jahre stand die Europaische Union vor groBen 
i:ikonomischen Schwierigkeiten, insbesondere unzureichender 
Wettbewerbsfahigkeit und wachsender Arbeitslosigkeit. Der Handel 
zwischen den Mitgliedstaaten wurde immer noch durch vielerlei 
Hindernisse beeintrachtigt, die es der europaischen Wirtschaft nicht 
ermi:iglichten, von der fortschreitenden Integration in vollem Umfang zu 
profitieren. Vor diesem Hintergrund wurde 1985 die Schaffung eines 
groBen Binnenmarktes beschlossen. Ende 1992 sollten alle Hindernisse 
fiir den freien Verkehr von Gtitern, Dienstleistungen, Kapital und 
Personen beseitigt sein. 
Vier J ahre nach 1992 ist der GroBteil der dazu ni:itigen rechtlichen 
Norrnen in Kraft. Unionsweit haben Untemehmen diesen Schritt begrtiBt. 
Der Binnenmarkt ist heute eine der gri:iBten Errungenschaften auf dem 
Weg zu einem vereinten Europa. 
Auf der Grundlage der bisherigen Erfahrungen hat die Kommission eine 
Studie zu den wirtschaftlichen Auswirkungen dieses ehrgeizigen 
Programms erstellt, deren detaillierte Ergebnisse in dieser Ausgabe der 
Europiiischen Wirtschaft zu finden sind. 
Der Binnenmarkt ist, wie zahlreiche Kriterien beweisen, ein groBer 
Erfolg. Zunachst hat er die Union wohlhabender gemacht: Schatzungen 
zufolge ist das BIP der Gemeinschaft um mehr als I % hi:iher, als es ohne 
den Binnenmarkt gewesen ware. Es wurden zwischen 300 OOO und 
900 OOO zusatzliche Arbeitsplatze geschaffen. In einer Zeit, in der die 
Arbeitslosigkeit das wichtigste politische Problem in Europa darstellt, 
zeigen diese Zahlen, daB die europaische Integration konkrete, sptirbare 
Ergebnisse bringt. 
Weiterhin hat der Binnenmarkt einen Anstieg des innerge-
meinschaftlichen Handels um 20 bis 30 % bewirkt. Gleichzeitig nahmen 
die Direktinvestitionen stark zu: Zu Beginn der 90er Jahre flossen 44 % 
der weltweiten Direktinvestitionen in die EU, ein Beweis fiir die 
Attraktivitat der Gemeinschaft. Diese Steigerung unserer Wett-
bewerbsfahigkeit ist ein entscheidender Vorteil in einer immer globaleren 
Wirtschaft. 
SchlieBlich hatte der Binnenmarkt zwei vorteilhafte Effekte mit Blick auf 
die Vorbereitungen zur Wahrungsunion. Anstelle einer verstarkten 
Spezialisierung der nationalen Industrien der Mitgliedstaaten hat er ganz 
im Gegenteil zu einer verstarkten Angleichung der Industriestrukturen 
gefiihrt. AuBerdem hat er den AufholprozeB der armeren Mitgliedstaaten 
beschleunigt. Er ist somit eine treibende Kraft hin zu wirtschaftlicher 
Konvergenz in Europa. 
Schon bald wird durch die Wirtschafts- und Wahrungsunion die 
notwendige Erganzung zum bereits zur Zufriedenheit funktionierenden 
Binnenmarkt erfolgen. Der Euro wird diejenigen Unsicherheiten und 
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Transaktionskosten reduzieren, die heute noch Entscheidungen der 
Marktteilnehmer behindern. Er wird die Transparenz und die Liquiditat 
der Miirkte verbessern und die vorteilhaften Effekte des Binnenmarktes 
verstiirken. So wird eine einheitliche Wiihrung zu einem Anstieg unseres 
Handels, unserer Investitionen und somit zu Wachstum und 
Beschaftigung fiihren. 
Yves-Thibault de Silguy 
Mitglied der Europiiischen Kommission 
Foreword 
In the early 1980s, the European Union faced severe economic difficulties, notably 
weak competitivity and growing unemployment. Trade between Member States 
was still impeded by numerous obstacles which prevented the European economy 
profiting fully from its progressive integration. This explains why in 1985 it was 
decided to create a large single market: by the end of 1992, all barriers to the free 
circulation of goods, services, capital and persons were to be eliminated. 
Four years after that deadline, the vast accompanying legislative programme is 
largely in place. Businesses around the Community have warmly welcomed the 
changes introduced. The single market is today one of the greatest achievements in 
the construction of Europe. 
Based on the few years of experiences so far, the Commission has carried out an 
in-depth economic study of the consequences so far of the ambitious programme. 
This edition of European Economy presents the detailed results of that study. 
The single market is a major success story judged on the basis of various criteria. 
Firstly, it has made the Union richer: estimates put the Community's GDP as being 
1 % higher now than it would have been without the single market. Meanwhile, 
employment is higher by 300 OOO to 900 OOO jobs than it would have been 
otherwise. At a time when unemployment has become the most acute political 
problem facing Europe, such figures show that European integration is already 
providing concrete and valuable results. 
Secondly, the single market has fuelled an increase of trade between Member 
States, up by 20 to 30%. At the same time, foreign investment has also strongly 
grown: at the start of the 1990s, the EU was the location for 44% of worldwide 
foreign investment flows, proving how attractive our Community has become. This 
improvement in our competitivity is a crucial advantage in an increasingly 
globalized economy. 
Finally, the single market has had two beneficial effects in the context of preparing 
for monetary union. Far from leading to an increased specialization of national 
industries across Member States, it has, on the contrary, led their industrial 
structures to become increasingly similar. Furthermore, it has helped accelerate the 
catch-up of the least advanced Member States. It constitutes therefore, a force for 
economic convergence within Europe. 
Tomorrow, economic and monetary union will bring the necessary complement to 
the satisfactory operation of the single market. The euro will reduce the 
uncertainties and transaction costs that still hinder the decisions of economic 
agents. It will accentuate the transparency and the fluidity of markets. It will 
amplify the beneficial effects of the single market. Thus will a money for Europe 
contribute to an increase in our trade, our investment and, therefore, to growth and 
employment across Europe. 
Yves-Thibault de Silguy 
Member of the European Commission 
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Preface 
Au debut des annees 80, !'Union europeenne faisait face a de severes difficultes 
economiques: faible competitivite, chomage croissant. Les echanges entre Etats 
membres etaient encore freines par de nombreux obstacles, ne permettant pas a 
I' economie europeenne de tirer profit de son integration progressive. C' est 
pourquoi ii a ete decide, en 1985, de realiser un grand marche interieur: a la fin de 
1992, toutes Jes barrieres a la libre circulation des biens, des services, des capitaux 
et des personnes devaient etre eliminees. 
Quatre ans apres cette date, ce vaste programme legislatif est largement en place. 
Les entreprises ont accueilli tres favorablement Jes changements introduits. Le 
marche interieur est aujourd'hui l'une des realisations Jes plus achevees de la 
construction europeenne. 
Forte de ces quelques annees d' experience, la Commission a conduit une etude 
economique approfondie sur Jes consequences de cet ambitieux programme. Cette 
edition d' Economie europeenne en presente les resultats detailles. 
Le marche unique est un vrai succes, et ce a plusieurs titres. En premier lieu, ii a 
suscite une elevation du niveau de richesse de !'Union: on estime que le PIB 
communautaire est superieur de plus de I% ace qu'il serait sans marche interieur. 
De meme, le nombre d'emplois est superieur de 300 OOO a 900 OOO ace qu'il serait 
autrement. A l'heure ou le chomage est le probleme politique le plus aigu en 
Europe, de tels chiffres montrent que I' integration europeenne donne deja des 
resultats concrets et sensibles. 
En second lieu, le marche interieur a logiquement accru Jes echanges entre Etats 
membres, de I' ordre de 20 a 30%. De meme, Jes investissements etrangers ont 
fortement augmente: au debut des annees 90, !'Union a absorbe 44% des flux 
d'investissements etrangers mondiaux, ce qui prouve l'attrait de notre zone. Cette 
amelioration de notre competitivite est un atout crucial dans une economie de plus 
en plus mondialisee. 
Enfin, le marche interieur a eu deux effets benefiques notables dans la perspective 
de I' union monetaire. Loin de conduire a une specialisation des industries 
nationales, ii a au contraire suscite un rapprochement des structures industrielles 
des Etats membres. En outre, ii a permis d' accelerer le rattrap age des Etats 
membres Jes moins avances. II constitue done un moteur de la convergence 
economique en Europe. 
Demain, !'Union economique et monetaire apportera le complement necessaire au 
bon fonctionnement du marche interieur. L'euro reduira Jes incertitudes et Jes cofits 
de transaction qui pesent encore sur Jes decisions des agents economiques. II 
accentuera la transparence et la fluidite des marches. II amplifiera Jes effets 
benefiques du marche interieur. La monnaie europeenne contribuera ainsi a une 
augmentation de nos echanges, de nos investissements, done de la croissance et de 
l'emploi en Europe. 
Yves-Thibault de Silguy 
Membre de la Commission europeenne 
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Executive summary 
1. Introduction 
In the early 1980s, the European Union (EU) was suffering 
severe economic problems, including rising unemployment and 
poor competitiveness in high-tech activities. Diagnosis of the 
European malaise pointed to a central cause: market rigidities, 
responsible for the sluggish response of European economies in 
the 1970s and 1980s to rises in the oil price, globalization of 
the world economy and the information technology revolution. 
Rigidities pervaded all European markets, whether for products 
or production factors. Curing such 'Euro-sclerosis' required 
structural reforms aimed at enhancing market flexibility and 
reducing barriers to mobility within the EU. 
Discussion within the Community on these problems 
culminated in the 1985 White Paper on completing the internal 
market, which spelled out a programme and a timetable for 
unifying European markets. It proposed that Member States 
abolish, by the end of 1992, all remaining barriers to the free 
circulation of goods, services, persons and capital (the four 
freedoms). The economic aim of the single market programme 
(SMP) was to implement structural changes designed to restore 
the capacity of the EU to generate growth and employment. 
At the end of 1992, just as the single market was supposed to 
become reality, Member States charged the Commission in 
Council resolution 1218/92 with reporting before the end of 
1996 on its overall effectiveness and impact. The relevant 
passage from the resolution invites the Commission 
'to provide an overall analysis of the effectiveness of measures 
taken in creating the single market, taking particular account of 
promoting throughout the Community a harmonious and 
balanced development of economic activities, sustainable and 
non-inflationary growth respecting the environment, a high 
degree of convergence of economic performance, a high level 
of employment and of social protection, the raising of the 
standard of living and quality of life, economic and social 
cohesion and solidarity among Member States. This analysis 
could, in addition, consider the impact of improving the 
competitiveness of European business in world markets'. 
In response to this invitation, the Commission is producing a 
number of related publications, each with a different function 
and all available from the Office for Official Publications of the 
European Communities (OPOCE). This edition of European 
Economy concentrates on assessing to the extent possible the 
economic impact of the single market so far. The other 
documents available are: 
(i) Communication on 'The impact and effectiveness of the 
single market' [COM(96)520, 30 October 1996] 
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(ii) Monti Report (1996) 
(iii) Commission Staff Working Paper, [SEC(96)2378, 
16 December 1996] 
(iv) individual background studies and business survey. 
The scope of the SMP extends beyond the nearly 300 specific 
measures listed in the White Paper for removing physical, 
technical and fiscal barriers hindering trade and factor 
movements within the EU. It covers two additional areas, 
because the Community has always taken the view that the 
abolition of obstacles to the freedom of movement of goods, 
services, capital and persons is a necessary, but not sufficient, 
condition for a truly single market. The first of these two areas 
are the two particularly important flanking Community policies 
of competition policy and regional policy. There was a danger 
that completion of the single market would be accompanied by 
private or public measures aimed at reducing competition, such 
as cartels and State aids. This led to a strengthening of 
Community competition policy, especially in the domain of 
merger concentration with the adoption of the Merger 
Regulation in 1989. Similarly, the combination of the single 
market and the enlargement to Spain and Portugal in 1986 
created the risk of reduced cohesion within the EU. To counter 
this possibility, an extension of Community regional policy, 
involving the doubling of structural funds, was enacted in 1989. 
The second area concerns a number of sectors (such as energy) 
which were not covered by the White Paper but have since 
become the target of liberalizing measures. 
The first step in assessing the SMP's economic impact is to ask 
to what extent it has actually been implemented and is really 
effective in removing obstacles to the four freedoms. In terms 
of the White Paper alone, nearly 93% of the associated single 
market measures had been transposed into domestic legislation 
by mid-May 1996. Meanwhile, a survey of 20 OOO enterprises 
around the Community by Eurostat on their perceptions of the 
impact of the SMP, provides generally positive responses, 
especially in the manufacturing sector. In other words, although 
problems remain which need to be tackled, the SMP is 
becoming a reality. 
According to the most recent economic thinking, the SMP can 
be expected to produce three types of economic effects: 
allocation effects, accumulation effects and location effects. 
The first consists of the impact of integration on the static, 
short-run allocation of resources, i.e. on economic efficiency. 
The second effect encompasses the impact on the accumulation 
of productive factors and covers both medium and long-run 
growth effects. The third effect refers to the geographical 
allocation of resources across Member States and/or regions of 
the EU. 
Previous analyses of the SMP focused entirely on allocation 
effects, adding to classical analysis on comparative advantage 
an innovative approach that highlighted economies of scale and 
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increased competition. The removal of barriers implied by the 
SMP was expected to produce an improved allocation of 
resources through the fuller exploitation of comparative 
advantage and specialization. In addition, in many sectors of 
the European economy the SMP was expected to improve 
efficiency by rationalizing of production associated with a 
fuller exploitation of scale economies. Great emphasis was laid 
on efficiency gains from economies of scale at the plant or firm 
level associated with the size of the EU market. However, as 
economies of scale inevitably lead to concentration in 
production, the potential impact of the SMP on competition 
was also emphasized. It indicated that the removal of barriers 
was likely to produce strong 'pro-competitive' effects, although 
it recognized also the need for a strong Community competition 
policy. Provided greater competition was obtained, the lower 
production costs associated with the efficiency gains from the 
SMP were to translate into lower consumption prices. 
Clearly, the potential efficiency gains from the SMP require 
reallocation of resources within the EU: reallocation within and 
across firms, reallocation within and across sectors, and 
reallocation within and across regions or even Member States. 
Such reallocation may imply more or less adjustment costs 
depending on its nature and on the functioning of factor 
markets. As the Cecchini report (published in 1988 as an ex 
ante assessment ot the cost of not having a single market) 
indicated: 'let there be no mistake, the [SMP] is a medium-term 
therapy; it will take time for its benefits to become apparent, 
and patience and political determination will be required if we 
are not to change course'. 
The accumulation and location effects are likely to require a 
longer time span to materialize than the allocation effects. The 
SMP can boost accumulation, and thereby contribute to higher 
growth rates in the EU, in two manners. On one hand, the 
static, efficiency gains of the SMP translate into higher 
incomes, which may generate higher investment and raise 
growth in the medium term. On the other, the SMP could 
improve the benefits and reduce the costs of producing new 
innovations in the EU, which would boost growth in the long 
run. The SMP is also likely to affect the geographical 
distribution of production within the EU. The economic 
literature has noted that the degree of specialization in Europe 
is far below what is observed in the United States. Some 
ascribed this situation to the existence of trade barriers in 
Europe and predict, therefore, that the SMP could increase 
geographical specialization in the EU. 
Related to the issues of growth and location is the question of 
the impact of the SMP on real convergence between the 
Member States and the regions of the EU. The expected effect 
of the SMP on convergence is complex. On the one hand, the 
SMP should favour convergence of per capita income levels 
across Member States via greater mobility of goods, services, 
capital and labour. On the other, increased geographical 
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specialization could lead to increased polarization between 
richer and poorer countries or regions. 
Earlier studies attempted to estimate the ex ante, potential 
economic effects of the SMP. The purpose of the present Report 
is to provide an evaluation of the ex post, actual effects. This is a 
challenging task for several reasons. Firstly, the period which has 
elapsed since the beginning of the SMP is extremely short. It is 
unreasonable to assume that economic operators integrated the 
SMP into their decisions before 1987 or even 1988. Furthermore, 
many of the measures were put in place recently. At the same 
time, much of the necessary statistical information is only 
available up to 1994 or even 1993. As a result, the period of 
analysis is in many instances too short to carry out a full 
evaluation of a structural transformation on the scale of the SMP. 
Secondly, the SMP is an extremely complex process: it has been 
implemented at varying speeds and intensity in different sectors 
and different Member States; it potentially affects the entire 
chain of most economic activities: and it removes different 
barriers to different extents. Lastly, the period of investigation 
has been an extremely eventful one for the global economy. 
Europe itself witnessed not only the implementation of the SMP, 
but also the enlargement of the EU to Spain and Portugal, 
German re-unification, and the economic transformation in 
Central and Eastern Europe. All this is against the background of 
a globalizing world economy and the information technology 
revolution. For all these reasons, the ex post economic evaluation 
of the SMP should be viewed as a highly tentative exercise. 
2. SMP - Integration and welfare gains 
According to economic literature, trade expansion is held to be 
welfare-increasing because less efficient domestic production is 
replaced by imports produced more efficiently. The SMP, by 
removing trade barriers between countries, was expected to 
expand trade among EU Member States and thereby improve 
welfare. There was clearly a possibility that increased trade 
amongst the Member States could be at the expense of trade 
with third countries or, on the other hand, that the SMP could 
have the effect of improving market access for third country 
imports into the EU market, thus to some extent reducing the 
welfare gains just discussed. 
For the period between 1985 and 1995, the share of intra-EU 
imports in total manufacturing imports has increased on average 
by 6.7 percentage points from 61.2% in 1985 to 67.99c in 1995. 
For services during the same period 1985-95, the share of intra-
EU imports in total services imports has increased on average by 
3.1 percentage points from 46.9% in 1985 to 50.0% in 1995. 
Intra-EU import penetration also increased significantly in the 
EU for manufacturing as a whole. However, there are 
significant differences amongst sectors within manufacturing. 
Intra-EU penetration ratios increased much more in the 15 
manufacturing industries particularly sensitive to the SMP than 
in the rest of the manufacturing sectors. Econometric 
assessment provides clear evidence on the direct effect of the 
SMP on intra-EU trade flows. It shows that the SMP has 
created trade within the EU. Direct and pro-competitive effects 
of the SMP on trade explain 80% of the change in the market 
share of intra-EU imports. Such effects are also higher the 
higher the sensitivity of the sectors to the SMP. 
The SMP has also led to external liberalization towards non-EU 
countries, because market access is easier with a single system. 
Concerns about the SMP creating a 'Fortress Europe' have 
proved to be unfounded. There is no evidence at all in the 
studies that increased intra-EU trade has been at the expense of 
trade with non-EU countries. The overall estimated impact of 
the SMP accounts for 70% of the observed change in the 
market share of extra-EU imports. Again, the impact of the 
SMP is larger the higher the sectoral sensitivity to the SMP. 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) can take the form of 'greenfield' 
investment ( establishing a new company from scratch) and 
cross-border mergers and acquisitions of existing firms. Trade 
and FDI are different ways of supplying international markets. 
Multinational companies are the main source of FDI flows, and 
the sales of multinational foreign affiliates are now by some 
estimates worth double the value of world exports. 
The expected impact of the SMP on foreign direct investment 
is ambiguous. On one hand, because the single market lowers 
cross-border trade costs, it could increase trade relative to FDI. 
Conversely, for Member States whose locational advantages 
are significantly improved by the SMP (because of market 
integration and the dynamic impact on economic growth), FDI 
will increase relative to trade. 
In fact, the SMP impact on FDI seems to have been even more 
positive than its impact on trade. The European Union absorbed 
44.4% of FDI inflows from all countries in the world at the 
beginning of the 1990s, compared to 28.2% in the period 1982-
87. Moreover, the intra-EU FDI has increased four times faster 
than intra-EU trade in the period 1984-92. 
A study based on a model which tries to explain the geographic 
distribution of FDI outflows from the largest EU Member 
States suggests that the SMP has had very substantial positive 
effects on their FDI flows to the rest of the EU; results which 
are confirmed by another study using a different methodology. 
Between 1984-85 and 1992-93, EU FDI inflows from all 
sources increased five-fold (seven-fold for intra-EU inflows, 
i.e., flows between Member States). 
3. Specialization, adjustment costs and location 
3.1. Trade, specialization and adjustment costs 
Originally, the common market consisted of six Member States 
with roughly comparable industrial structures, productivity or 
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capital/labour ratios. Entry of the southern European countries 
to the EU brought partners for integration in intra-Community 
trade with quite different industrial structures and productivity 
levels. These southern Member States, with low labour costs 
and relatively high capital costs, specialized in industries with a 
commensurately high labour content but low technology and 
skill content. The northern Member States, with high labour 
costs and relatively low capital costs, specialized in industries 
with a high technology, capital and skilled labour content. 
The effects of the SMP and economic integration on trade are 
complex. In the traditional analysis of international trade, the 
SMP should lead to greater specialization by countries on the 
basis of their respective comparative advantages. The SMP 
would, in that case, favour an increase of inter-industrial trade 
with each Member State specializing primarily in the sectors 
where it is relatively efficient. However, if we take into account 
economies of scale, imperfect competition and product 
differentiation, the SMP could increase intra-industry trade, the 
simultaneous import and export of similar product lines 
between Member States (e.g. cars for cars). 
The gains from economic integration differ between these two 
modalities (inter-industry trade and intra-industry trade). Inter-
industry trade between different countries carries efficiency 
gains, with each country specializing in those activities in 
which it is relatively more efficient, and consumers benefit 
from lower prices as a consequence. However, this implies a 
deeper specialization between Member States, each country 
experiencing a contraction of some of its sectors and expansion 
of others (e.g., clothing vanishing in high-labour-cost countries, 
and high-tech in low-skill ones). 
By contrast, intra-industry trade benefits the consumer by 
leading to a much wider variety of products, whilst producers 
face lower adjustment costs. Here, adjustments take place 
amongst firms inside industries rather than among industries. 
As Member States' industrial structures remain roughly similar, 
the EU becomes more diversified and is therefore less 
vulnerable to sector-specific shocks (e.g., increases in the price 
of oil, etc.). The effect of a shock does not vary by Member 
State (no asymmetric shocks). This is particularly important, of 
course, within a monetary union. 
At the beginning of the 1980s, most trade within the 
Community could be classified as inter-industry 1 corresponding 
to specialization based on comparative advantages (around 
45% of total manufacturing trade), but this started to decline in 
the mid-1980s. The preparation phase of the single market was 
' We have inter-industry trade between two countries when one country's trade 
flow (import or export) with the other in a sector represents less than IO'k of 
the other country's trade flow (import or export) with it in the same sector. 
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accompanied by a decrease in the share of inter-industry trade 
in Europe and a rise in intra-industry trade. However, intra-
industry trade can be further subdifferentiated: either intra-
industry trade in similar products in terms of prices and quality 
or intra-industry trade in products differentiated by price and 
quality (for example, one country exporting brand-name 
expensive shirts and the other inexpensive low quality shirts). 
The rise in intra-industry trade has predominantly been the 
latter type (from less than 35% of total manufacturing trade in 
1985 to more than 42% in 1994 ), whilst intra-industry trade in 
similar products 1 remained rather stable (around 20% of total 
intra-EU manufacturing trade). The SMP has therefore 
increased the range of products available to consumers in terms 
of prices and quality, and encouraged differing business 
strategies: either emphasising design, Research & 
Development, and advertizing in some cases (high price-
quality) or production cost-minimizing in others. 
The increase of intra-industry trade in price differentiated 
products implies larger adjustment costs than intra-industry 
trade in similar products, but still much lower adjustment costs 
than an increase in inter-industry trade would have produced. 
Its benefits are a much wider range of products in terms of 
prices and quality for consumers, as well as efficiency gains 
due to specialization on the basis of relative comparative 
advantages within sectors (innovation, design, distribution). 
3.1.1. The country dimension 
In the period 1985-94, all EU countries experienced a decrease 
in inter-industry trade, in particular Spain, UK, France and 
Germany. Nevertheless, in 1994, inter-industry trade 
corresponding to specialization based on comparative 
advantages still accounted for over 58% of Greece, Portugal, 
Ireland and Denmark's total manufacturing trade. At the same 
time, conversely, intra-industry trade in price-quality 
differentiated products represented over 42% of total trade for 
the UK, Germany, France, Belgium, Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands, a share which grew between 1987 and 1994 for all 
this group of countries plus Spain and Portugal. 
Analysis of price quality differentiated intra-industry trade 
shows a striking difference between northern and southern 
countries. Scrutiny of the contribution to the trade balance of 
low, medium and high-price quality product ranges highlights 
different country groupings. Germany has a comparative 
advantage in high-price quality product ranges, France in 
medium to high-price quality ranges, the United Kingdom, the 
Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg and Denmark in medium-
price quality ranges, Spain in medium to low-price quality 
1 We have intra-industry trade in similar products when export and import unit 
values differ by less than 15% and we have intra-industry trade in 
differentiated products when unit values differ by more than 15%. 
4 
ranges, and Greece and Portugal in low-price quality ranges. 
These specializations have been unaffected by monetary 
fluctuations. 
In the period 1985-94, the share of medium-price quality 
products in overall intra-EU trade has declined (by some 10 
points) in favour of high-price quality products (plus 7 points) 
and low-price quality products. This is especially so for the 
most advanced European economies. However, also for 
southern Member States, specialization has changed and the 
share of low-price quality products generally has fallen whilst 
the share of high-price quality products has increased. 
The SMP has therefore contributed directly, via the removal of 
border formalities and reduction of cross-border transportation 
costs, and indirectly, via growing income convergence between 
EU Member States, to a growing share of intra-industry trade. 
Growing intra-industry trade with price differentiation implies 
that Member States are more and more specialized inside 
industries on products with differing price level ranges, 
importing low-price quality ranges and exporting high ones, or 
vice versa. Of course, the situation could differ for different 
sectors: one country could import high-quality clothing and 
export high-quality cars. For most advanced countries such an 
evolution implies growing intangible investment in R&D, 
training, innovations to compete in traditional mature 
industries, and for less advanced countries, the possibility of 
entering high tech and high value added sectors and competing 
on price. 
3.1.2. The sectoral dimension 
However, manufacturing sectors are not all comparable in 
terms of the nature of trade (intra versus inter-industry trade) 
and therefore in terms of adjustment costs and efficiency gains 
resulting from the SMP. 
In terms of inter versus intra-industry trade, manufacturing 
sectors can be broadly divided into two groups: firstly, in food 
and beverages, mining, textiles and non-metallic minerals, 
trade is mainly inter industrial. These sectors represent about 
one third of total manufacturing value added. Secondly, in non-
electrical machinery, professional goods, electrical machinery, 
motor vehicles, chemicals, wood and paper, trade is mainly 
intra industry differentiated by price and quality. These sectors 
represent about two thirds of total manufacturing value added. 
In general, for all sectors between 1985 and 1994 intra-industry 
trade in price quality differentiated products increased whilst 
inter-industry trade decreased. In particular. for sectors 
traditionally characterized by high inter-industry trade, the 
implementation of the single market is characterized by a 
steady increase of intra-industry trade, notably due to an 
increase of trade in price quality differentiated products (food 
and textiles). 
3.2. FDI, specialization and adjustment costs 
FDI (whether 'greenfield' or M&A) can raise welfare in 
aggregate terms. For the destination country, the foreign 
affiliates may provide new products and processes, methods of 
superior management and so on. For the source country, 
domestic multinationals will only invest abroad rather than 
supplying overseas markets from local plants through exports if 
the decision is expected to be beneficial to profits and 
efficiency-enhancing. 
With the removal of market fragmentation and the dynamic 
impact on economic growth of the SMP, FDI will increase 
relative to trade to Member States whose relative locational 
advantages are significantly improved by the SMP. 
3.2.1. The country dimension 
The impact on the domestic economy of FDI (FDI inflows to 
GDP) differs widely amongst Member States. At the beginning 
of the 1990s, annual Irish FDI inflows were worth over 9% of 
GDP. In Belgium and Luxembourg, the ratio was 4.7% a year. 
The Netherlands (2.7%) came third, then Portugal (2.6%), the 
UK (1.8%) and Spain (nearly 1.8%). By contrast, in Germany 
(less than 0.4% ), Italy (0.4%) and Greece (0.6%) these figures 
were very low. Over the period 1986-93, two Member States 
(Belgium and Ireland) gained considerable ground in terms of 
attractiveness as locations for FDI. Taxation also plays an 
important role in this. 
As hosts for FDI from other EU countries, 
Belgium/Luxembourg and France have become increasingly 
important since 1986, so that each absorbed some 18 % of total 
intra-EU FDI in the period 1992-93. Whilst the UK share of 
FDI from other EU countries has declined (9% of total intra-
EU FDI in 1991-93) over the period 1986-93, for extra EU 
FDI, however, the UK dominates (37% of total extra EU FDI), 
with France second, receiving 16% over the period 1990-93. 
The extent and direction of the SMP impact on FDI in the EU 
Member States has been estimated using different approaches 
(a 'gravity' model and an econometric assessment). The results 
of the studies are consistent. For example, the results suggest 
that the SMP may have raised the constant price stock of UK 
investment in the EU by some USD 15 billion as of 1992, 
around 31 % of the UK's aggregate stock at that time. 
3.2.2. The sectoral dimension 
For sectors subject to technical economies of scale, the SMP 
will lead to relatively more trade than FDI, because economies 
of scale due to concentrating production at a single plant tend 
to discourage dispersed production. However, for sectors 
characterized by knowledge-based assets, FDI will increase 
relative to trade (better approach and access to consumers in 
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particular, importance of after sale services, and to facilitate the 
deployment of technological assets). 
The ratio of intra-EU trade divided by FDI flows has fallen 
substantially during the period of the SMP, from 240 in 
1984-86 to 61 in 1990-92 for manufacturing industries. This 
decline, corresponding to an increased importance of FDI 
relative to trade flows, was most marked in the food sector, a 
sector where knowledge-based assets are typically important 
(differences in tastes, importance of advertising). The food 
sector is also the one which has increased most in terms of the 
share of total manufacturing intra-EU FDI (from around 10% in 
1984-86 to 22% in 1990-92). 
The sectoral breakdown of inward FDI flows may reflect the 
comparative advantages of different Member States. In 
northern Member States, cross-border manufacturing M&A 
activity is mainly in technology intensive sectors (engineering, 
transport equipment, machinery) whilst in southern Member 
States, cross-border M&A activity is mainly in relatively basic 
products (textiles, clothing, timber and wooden furniture). 
However, the bulk of FDI to the EU as a whole is targeted at 
the service sectors. In the 1980s, 63% of FDI cumulative 
inflows went to service sectors, whilst only 31 % went to 
manufacturing sectors. This partially reflects the fact that 
service sectors are the largest and fastest growing part of 
advanced economies, but also that service sectors are generally 
less tradable than manufacturing sectors (so FDI tends to be the 
only way to supply foreign markets), that they are characterized 
by significant firm specific assets and by the importance of 
proximity with consumers. Of the estimated increase of UK 
and German FDI stocks in other EU Member States due to the 
SMP, the largest gains have been in financial services. Of 
course, services may also have been the most affected by the 
SMP because of the hitherto high level of barriers which the 
SMP has been systematically removing. 
3.3. The location issue 
One question is whether the SMP has induced more 
concentration of EU industry around an industrial core (which 
can be central or peripheral in terms of geography) or a more 
even dispersion amongst the Member States. Such evolution is 
not expected to affect all industrial sectors in the same way. 
Economic integration entails, in principle, a concentration of 
industries characterized by economies of scale in the economic 
core region and therefore, for those sectors, a decline in intra-
industry trade. As has already been said, however, 
manufacturing as a whole inside the Community has actually 
experienced an increase in intra-industry trade, with Member 
States trading in products from the same industries 
differentiated by price and quality. This implies that countries 
broadly produce the same type of goods, but with different 
price-quality characteristics. In other words, a process of 
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specialization is occurring, but within industries. Nevertheless, 
for a limited number of sectors with large potential scale 
economies, a certain concentration may still develop in the 
future. 
The process of industrial specialization inside the EU on the 
basis of price and quality differences has certain consequences 
for the cohesion and convergence of richer and poorer Member 
States, an issue which is treated in point 5 below. 
4. Efficiency and competition effects of the SMP 
Much of the beneficial effects of the SMP for the European 
economy should result from competitive forces unleashed by 
integration. The ex-ante analysis of the impact of the SMP 
forecast substantial gains for the European economy from 
increased efficiency, with lower costs and prices, and increased 
product variety. The main channels through which these 
benefits were to be reaped throughout the economy were the 
exploitation of scale economies by firms, and increased 
competition. 
As argued below, the European economy has indeed benefited 
from gains in efficiency and competition due to the SMP. 
These gains have been possible to a large extent thanks to a 
substantial restructuring of European industries, even if the 
specific forms in which the SMP has spread through the 
economy do not always exactly coincide with what was 
forecast in advance. In particular, cost reductions related to size 
achieved over the period 1985-93 have been mostly the result 
of exploiting scale advantages linked to fixed investments in 
marketing, brand development, R&D spending and 
development of new production processes. Few efficiency 
improvements have been the consequence of exploiting purely 
technical efficiency gains related to the size of establishments. 
4.1. Changes in the structure of European industries 
The removal of barriers due to the SMP has affected the 
structure of both trade and production. The previous section 
highlighted important changes in trade and investment flows 
between Member States. In this section, we look at the shifts in 
domestic production and market structure that accompany such 
changes. 
4.1.1. Mergers and acquisitions 
In recent years, the EU has witnessed rapid growth in mergers 
and acquisitions (M&As) activity. This growth has been 
particularly strong in cross-border activity, which is one of the 
main components of the wave of FDI analysed above. 
However, the bulk of M&A operations are still overwhelmingly 
domestic, indicating that the restructuring has taken place, at 
least initially, through changes to domestic market structures. 
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For the EUR 15 over the period 1990-95, more than 70% of all 
operations were domestic, a proportion which was roughly the 
same over the period 1986-90. 
The domestic nature of the restructuring process is especially 
significant in countries such as Germany, Spain and Italy and, 
in general, it is a feature of the largest economies in the Union. 
Small open economies in the Union tend to have a larger share 
of cross-border M&As. This is particularly true for Austria and 
Ireland. As mentioned before, cross-border M&As are 
increasingly Community M&As (18. 7% between 1990 and 
1995). Operations involving firms from the rest of the world 
continue, however, to be important for countries such as the 
UK, Ireland, Sweden and Austria. 
The extent of industry restructuring that has taken place over 
the SMP implementation period varies by Member State. This 
may be due to differential effects of the SMP, but to a large 
extent it is related to national differences in financial and 
regulatory systems. Amongst the largest economies in the 
Union, restructuring via M&As has been especially important 
in the UK, whilst Italy and Spain have registered rather low 
levels of operations when compared to the importance of their 
economies. 
Interestingly, companies from the Nordic countries, the 
Netherlands, France and the UK have predominantly taken the 
bidding role in the M&A process. Conversely, companies in 
countries such as Italy, Spain and Germany have usually been 
the targets of acquisitions. 
At the sectoral level, restructuring has taken place both in 
manufacturing and in services. Manufacturing was the more 
active target over the period 1988-92, possibly even in 
anticipation of the removal of barriers by the SMP; in the latter 
period, 1993-95, services have taken the lead, in accordance 
with the delayed introduction of SMP measures in these 
sectors. Between 1986 and 1995 the number of operations has 
grown from 720 to 2 296 in manufacturing, and from 783 to 
2 602 in services. 
The importance of domestic operations in the M&As process is 
particularly significant in the case of services, where 
institutional restrictions may have prevented the extent of intra-
European cross-border operations which has been observed in 
manufacturing. In 1995, 70% of all deals were domestic in 
services, and the figure was 63.5% in manufacturing. 
Incomplete adoption of SMP regulations in services could 
therefore prevent some beneficial cross-border restructuring 
(for example, in the banking and transportation sectors). 
M&As have allowed both external firm growth and internal 
restructuring as demanded by the new post-SMP scenario. 
Next, we review how this has translated into changes in market 
structure and efficiency. 
4.1.2. Concentration 
In manufacturing, restructuring has led to significant increases 
in the concentration of European industry. For industry on 
average, the share of total sales by the four leading firms 
increased from 20.5 to 22.8% between 1987 and 1993, 
although in France, Belgium and the UK, domestic 
concentration actually decreased. Only Germany over this 
period experienced a tendency towards increasingly 
concentrated industries. Such a tendency is at the root of the 
increasing gap between the average size of manufacturing firms 
in Germany and the size of firms elsewhere in the EU. 
Many industries have experienced increases in concentration 
exceeding five percentage points. The most significant 
increases have taken place in industries related to public 
procurement, (in telecommunications - wires and cables, 
transmission equipment - or transportation - aerospace, rail 
stock), in food sectors sensitive to the SMP (pasta, starch, oils 
and fats) and in other sectors such as electrical machinery, 
domestic electrical appliances and measurement equipment. 
Overall, the trend towards increasing concentration at the EU 
level is especially significant in technologically intensive 
industries. These are industries which were particularly 
sensitive to the SMP, and where the efficiency gains from an 
enlargement of market size and an increase in scale are both 
particularly important and seem to have been reaped by the 
sectors' leading firms. 
In industries where advertising, brand name and marketing are 
important (such as mass consumer goods like food products, 
consumer chemicals, consumer electronics and motor vehicles), 
the increase in EU wide concentration is more moderate, and 
fundamentally at the national level, suggesting the 
predominance of domestic restructuring. This is consistent with 
the industries' characteristics where the diversity of preferences 
and distribution channels across the EU might still be partially 
segmenting national markets. Leading firms do deploy their 
marketing skills Europe-wide, but most of the increased 
concentration is the result of increasingly concentrated 
domestic markets. In this type of industry, the average share of 
the four leading firms went up on average between 1986 and 
1992 by 2.9 percentage points in Germany, 1.3 points in France 
and 3.2 points in the UK. 
The impact of the SMP on concentration in market services has 
been very much affected by the nature of each service. Sectors 
such as distribution and road freight transport - which were 
very sensitive to the SMP (by virtue of direct regulations or 
indirectly as in the case of distribution) but now face relatively 
light regulation - have registered substantial restructuring, 
involving both domestic and EU increases in concentration. 
The improved efficiency of these sectors has had a significant 
effect upstream on manufacturing industries and downstream 
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on final consumers, to the extent that significant cost reductions 
in distribution have been achieved (see below). 
In road freight transport, the industry has segmented with an 
increase in both large and small specialized competitors, but a 
declining share for intermediate firms. In distribution, increased 
EU-wide concentration by manufacturers and retailers has 
reduced wholesalers' market share. New firms providing 
logistic services throughout the distribution chain have gained 
substantial ground in the industry. 
Highly regulated services, with large potential gains from scope 
and network economies (economies tied to the simultaneous 
exploitation of several businesses or a distribution network) 
such as telecommunications, airlines or retail banking, have 
observed smaller increases in EU-wide concentration. Quite 
often, due to institutional constraints, the benefits that can be 
derived from a wider EU market have been exploited by 
alliances and not M&As. Increased concentration has been 
observed only at the domestic level, selectively and very much 
depending on the extent to which some of these sectors had 
restrictions on entry before the implementation of the SMP, 
(i.e. the market share of the leading firms has increased slightly 
in banking, but declined in airlines and telecommunication 
services, where entry regulations had artificially kept 
concentration ratios high). 
4.1.3. Firm size and efficiency 
According to previous analyses, the SMP was greatly expected 
to improve efficiency by making it possible and worthwhile to 
exploit previously unexploited economies of scale, thereby 
producing an increase in plant size. There is no empirical 
evidence so far in support of this view. The available empirical 
evidence indicates that firm size has increased, not however in 
sectors sensitive to SMP. 
Data on the distribution of firms by size, however, is not 
gathered on a consistent and timely basis, and even simple 
information on average firm size is only available after a 
considerable delay. In any case, average firm size is an 
indicator to be interpreted with great caution. 
One of the remarkable facts of the European manufacturing 
sector is the significant difference between average firm size in 
Germany, and other countries such as France or the UK. In 
1985, gross value added per firm in Germany was ECU 
7.4 million (1990 prices), a third higher than in the other two 
countries. The data show that manufacturing firm size in the 
largest EU countries increased between 1985 and 1992 by 
between 8% in France and 15% in Germany and Italy. The 
overall period increase was 11 % for the four countries (D, F, I, 
UK). Amongst them, the UK did not experience an increase in 
firm size. 
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This means that after the implementation of the SMP, this 
structural characteristic of the European manufacturing sector 
has remained unaltered. If anything it has been reinforced given 
the comparatively weak growth of firm size in France and, in 
particular, the UK, compared to Germany. 
At the sectoral level, the large size of German firms is 
particularly significant in motor vehicles, chemicals and 
engineering industries, but also in more traditional industries 
such as textiles and timber. Over the SMP' s implementation 
period, the size gap between Germany and the other countries 
has increased in sectors such as office machinery, measurement 
equipment and transportation equipment; but also in the food, 
textile and clothing industries. 
However, the SMP does not seem to have had a differential 
effect in terms of its impact on firm size across sectors. The 
strongest growth in firm size has actually been in the set of 
industries which were not SMP-sensitive. Sectors where the 
SMP was supposed to have a stronger impact already had a 
larger firm size on average, and growth has lagged behind. 
Changes in firm size have therefore not been fundamentally 
linked to the impact of the SMP, but rather to the nature of 
competition in each industry. Strong growth of the average size 
of firms has been detected in advertising-intensive industries in 
Germany, France, Italy and the UK. This trend is consistent 
with the data on national concentration and confirms that in 
these industries firms are increasing their size, so as to reap 
dynamic scale economies linked to the creation of strong brand 
names, new product development and heavy up-front 
advertising investments. 
The performance of sectors where R&D is important has not 
been as impressive in terms of the size of the average firm but 
nevertheless, as argued above, the data on concentration does 
indicate that R&D intensive industries have taken advantage of 
an EU-wide market and spread across the Community their 
large up-front fixed costs. Moreover, the firm size indicator is 
particularly inappropriate in this kind of sector, which is 
subject to entry by new innovative firms and which tends to 
diminish the observed average firm size. 
In sectors where scale economies are linked to establishment 
size (technical or engineering economies) we also observe an 
increase in the average size of firms. However, there is no 
systematic evidence yet that firms have indeed profited from 
the SMP by reorganizing production across Europe and 
increasing the size of their establishments. 
The efficiency gains associated with implementation of the 
SMP in manufacturing have also been confirmed by firms' 
perceptions, as reflected in the Eurostat business survey. 
Overall, the survey records more positive than negative 
responses about cost reductions, especially when stratified by 
enterprise size. Large firms appear to have benefited most from 
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unit cost reductions associated with the SMP. According to the 
survey, the gains in terms of lower unit costs were mostly due 
to reductions in raw materials costs (new sourcing 
opportunities), the costs of operations and distribution costs. 
Efficiency gains in service sectors associated with the SMP 
have been harder to detect due to the nature of service activities 
and the problem of measuring outputs and inputs in these 
sectors. 
In sectors such as distribution and road freight transport, some 
indicators show remarkable productivity gains. For example, 
improvements in the distribution sector over the period 
1987-93 led to logistic costs declining as a proportion of total 
revenue for a large sample of 1 OOO European large firms by 
30%. Other gains have been a reduction in the number of days 
between order placement and shipment receipt (from 21 to 15 
days) and an increased quality of service (a decline of 31 % in 
the service failure rate). In road freight transport, the SMP has 
reduced the cost of cross-border transport by an estimated 6%. 
However, the harmonization requirements imposed on this 
sector by the SMP have also led to cost increases for 
international transport ranging between 1 % and 2.5%. 
Productivity and efficiency gains in the more regulated sectors 
(telecommunications, banking, airlines) have been less 
pronounced and, in general, it is uncertain whether the 
observed changes can be linked to the SMP. Large gains have 
been observed only in liberalized telecommunication services. 
In this case, the SMP has indeed promoted rapid technological 
change (for example, in cellular telephony through the adoption 
of the GSM standard) which is the main source of efficiency 
gains in such a dynamic sector. In airlines and banking the 
evidence is less comforting. For airlines, labour productivity 
has increased ahead of labour costs, although this is basically 
due to the reduction of the labour force directly employed by 
airlines. In banking, no significant improvements in 
productivity or efficiency are reported. Staff costs in banking 
have declined but these reductions may have been compensated 
by increases in non-staff costs related to investments in 
information technology. These trends, however, do not appear 
to be the direct result of the SMP measures adopted in the area 
of banking. 
4.2. Competitive conditions in European markets 
The promotion of active competition is particularly important 
because, as described above, the European economy has 
undergone a process of increased industrial concentration as a 
result of the SMP. Such an increase in concentration and firm 
size could result in reduced economic welfare were it to stifle 
competition. However, evidence on price-cost margins and 
business perceptions seems to indicate that the efficiency gains 
associated with large size have been passed on to consumers 
and users thanks to increased competition associated with the 
SMP. 
Implementation of the SMP has had a significant positive effect 
on the degree of competition in manufacturing sectors. Over 
the period 1980-92, European manufacturing industry 
registered a trend recovery of price-cost margins, at a yearly 
rate of about 2%, controlling for the evolution of the economic 
cycle and the diverging industrial structures of the EU Member 
States. Within this overall trend, the statistical analysis of price-
cost margins confirms that implementation of the SMP imposed 
increasing pressure on price-cost margins, thus ensuring that 
cost reductions have been passed on to consumers and 
downstream users. The data indicate that the SMP has led to a 
significant reduction of price-cost margins, with a yearly 1 % 
reduction in margins as of 1986/7. That is, in the absence of the 
SMP, margins would have grown faster over the period. The 
relative decline in margins triggered by the SMP has been 
particularly important in some of the manufacturing sectors 
most sensitive to the SMP. Namely, industries in high tech 
public procurement sectors (i.e. office machinery) and sectors 
which had moderate non-tariff barriers before the SMP 
(consumer electronics, motor vehicles, textiles and clothing). 
The effect on other SMP-sensitive sectors (traditional or 
regulated public procurement markets such as pharmaceutical 
products, electrical equipment, etc.) does not appear to have 
been significant. 
The increased competitive pressure revealed by margins data is 
confirmed by the perceptions of firms reflected in the Eurostat 
business survey. 
Competitive conditions in services have also been significantly 
altered by the SMP. A significant increase in competition is 
noticeable in sectors such as telecommunication services or 
retail banking, but also in airlines, where implementation of the 
SMP has only been partial so far. Overall, however, the 
increase in competition seems to be less strong than in 
manufacturing sectors, reflecting that many regulations are still 
maintained on services and that the SMP has not been fully 
implemented in several domains. This difference in the reaction 
of manufacturing and services is also consistent with the results 
obtained by the business survey. Business perceptions also 
indicate that the increased competitive pressures in services is 
mostly due to the behaviour of domestic competitors, which is 
in tune with the predominantly domestic nature of restructuring 
due to the SMP (highlighted above in the analysis of M&As). 
The change in the degree of competition in services has been 
prompted by new entry in certain markets 
(telecommunications, airlines) but also by the elimination of 
conduct regulations which restricted firms' marketing strategies 
(airlines, banking). 
Increased competition has resulted in substantial and quite 
general reductions in prices in sectors such as 
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telecommunications, and a more selective decline of prices in 
segments of the airline and banking industries. In airlines, 
margins in real terms declined by almost 20% between 1986 
and 1994. In banking, intermediation margins have also 
declined, reflecting increased competition in some segments of 
conventional retail banking markets (i.e. high-yield cheque 
accounts, etc.). Prices have declined for selected products such 
as credit cards, corporate loans and some deposit products in 
most EU countries. 
In road freight transport, the margins for cross-border traffic 
have declined sharply over the period 1986-94. The result has 
been a reduction in real transportation prices which, together 
with efficiency gains in the distribution sectors, have led to 
substantial changes in the sourcing patterns of manufacturing 
and retailing firms. A wider range of sourcing possibilities 
explains the decline in input costs, one of the key components 
of costs reduction due to the SMP as reported in the business 
survey results. 
Finally, competition in some service sectors has been distorted 
by the existence of restrictions which have prevented market 
adjustment. State aids and other government interventions or 
regulations have prevented the complete restructuring of some 
industries - such as airlines or banking - to face the new 
competitive environment created by the SMP. 
The pro-competitive impact of the SMP has expanded beyond 
the sectors which were targeted by SMP measures. Through 
market interactions and strategic reactions by firms, changes in 
competitive conditions in one sector have spilt over to related 
sectors, such as clients or suppliers. For example, SMP-driven 
changes in the glass sector have led to upstream restructuring in 
the soda ash industry; similarly, the liberalization of telecom 
services has had a profound impact on the telecommunications 
equipment market. This spreading of the SMP effect means that 
the linkage between SMP sectoral sensitivity and changes in 
performance - for example, prices - is not simple, since 
many non-sensitive sectors end up being affected by the SMP. 
Conversely, the pro-competitive impact of the SMP may have 
been dampened by the behaviour of firms and/or governments. 
In the case of firms, it could help explain the de facto limited 
changes following the liberalization of public procurement 
markets. In the case of governments, State aids still play a role 
in certain sectors. Note also that these markets have registered 
remarkable increases in concentration and firm size through a 
process of mergers and acquisitions, and only limited declines 
in price-cost margins. 
4.3. Price convergence across the European Union 
The changes in structures and the degree of competition of 
European markets prompted by the implementation of the SMP 
have also resulted in increased price convergence across the EU 
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between 1985 and 1995. For certain goods, no additional 
convergence of prices is expected, as existing levels of price 
dispersion are the result of structural sectoral characteristics 
fully compatible with the achievement of an integrated pan-
European market, such as differences in taste and culture, in 
income levels, etc. 
Most price convergence is observed in consumer and 
equipment goods, particularly those that are highly traded 
within the EU and with the rest of the world. Convergence in 
consumer goods has been accelerated by the SMP. In 1993, 
within the EU 12, the price variation 1 (including taxes) of 
identical products and services in different Member States 
were: 19.6% for consumer goods, 28.6% for services, 
respectively down from 22.5% and 33.7% in 1985. However, 
energy and construction price variations respectively increased 
from 21.1 and 22.1% in 1985 to 31.7 and 27.4% in 1993. 
In services, price convergence is also observed and has been 
accelerated by the SMP, although less convergence is to be 
expected in non-tradable services as the degree of price 
dispersion is basically correlated with the dispersion of 
incomes per capita. No convergence is observed, however, for 
energy and construction. 
Taxation (in particular, excise duties) and regulatory 
intervention are significant determinants of exceptionally high 
levels of price dispersion. This is observed, for example, in 
sectors such as energy and - for manufactured goods - in 
sectors related to the health care industry. These sectors have 
not been affected by implementation of the SMP. 
Finally, price convergence has been faster in the Member 
States which joined the Community after 1980. 
The increased convergence of prices for many products and 
services across the EU corresponds, at the detailed 
microeconomic levei, to the process of convergence in inflation 
(disinflation) achieved in the EU over the last few years. The 
SMP effect on prices has thus facilitated the conduct of a 
stability oriented macroeconomic policy. 
5. Income, employment and convergence 
5.1. Income and employment 
The previous sections supplied an analysis of the main channels 
through which the SMP impacted on different segments of the 
European economy. This mostly microeconomic analysis 
1 In fact, the measure used is the coefficient of price variation (including taxes), 
but the point is still the same. 
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produced many interesting pieces which provide evidence 
about the changes to the EU economy set in motion by the 
SMP. In the present section, we attempt to put together these 
different pieces so as to furnish a coherent ex-post quantitative 
macroeconomic assessment of the SMP. 
Providing an ex-post quantitative macroeconomic assessment 
of the SMP is a perilous task due to methodological difficulties. 
Quantification of the SMP effect raises the anti-monde 
problem, i.e. estimating what the world would have looked like 
in the absence of the SMP. Two types of models can be used 
for simulating the anti-monde, each with its own advantages 
and disadvantages: macro models and computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) models. Another methodological problem 
relates to the fact that the use of simulated models (regardless 
of whether they belong to the macro or CGE variety) for 
assessing a regime change like the SMP suffers from the 
inherent difficulty of incorporating such change in the model. 
Therefore, the assessment provided in this section should be 
viewed more as a check on the coherence of the messages 
contained in the previous chapters, than as an attempt to 
quantitatively estimate the macroeconomic impact of the SMP. 
Two models were used for the ex-post quantitative 
macroeconomic assessment of the SMP: GEM-E3-IM, a 
multicountry, multisectoral dynamic CGE model; and QUEST 
II, a multicountry dynamic macro model. The anti-monde 
produced by the CGE model is based on three sets of parameter 
change. It is assumed that in the absence of the SMP: (I) all 
SMP barriers would be reintroduced, thus raising trade costs; 
(2) the degree of competition (reflected in the degree of market 
integration) would be reduced, implying a reduction in the 
elasticity of substitution between EU and domestic products 
from a range of 3 to 6 to a range of 1.5 to 2; and (3) total factor 
productivity (TFP) growth would be permanently reduced by 
one tenth of a percentage point. On the other hand, the macro 
model's anti-monde simulation is based on two sets of 
parameter change. In the absence of the SMP: ( 1) the degree of 
competition would be reduced, as reflected by a permanent 
increase in mark-ups (the increase reaching half of a percentage 
point after five years; and (2) TFP growth would be 
permanently reduced by one tenth of a percentage point. 
Based on these assumptions, the CGE model estimates that the 
level of EU GDP in 1994 was 1.1 % above the level that would 
have prevailed in the absence of the SMP. The similar estimate 
based on the macro model is 1.5%. Given that, in 1994, the 
level of GDP for the EU 12 was around ECU 5 500 billion, 
these estimates imply that the SMP produced, by 1994, a gain 
of GDP in the range ECU 60 billion to ECU 80 billion. 
Where do the gains come from? The two main components are 
the increase in competition/efficiency and the rise in total factor 
productivity, each accounting for about half of the total effect. 
The elimination of trade barriers reduces the degree of 
segmentation of national markets, thereby increasing the degree 
of competition, which leads firms to increase their level of 
output. The result is also a decrease in costs and in prices, with 
a decrease in price-cost margins. This is the allocation or 
efficiency gain which puts the economy on a higher trajectory, 
albeit at the same growth rate as in the absence of the SMP. On 
the other hand, the rise in TFP, associated with a decline of 
X-inefficiency prompted by greater competition, induces a 
higher growth rate of GDP (the increment being of 0.1 % ). 
The CGE model and the macro model also compute the impact 
of the SMP on employment. The former estimates that the EU 
employment level in 1994 was about 300 OOO units above the 
level that would have prevailed in the absence of the SMP. The 
latter estimates the impact at around 900 OOO additional jobs. 
Further analysis of the impact of the SMP on employment was 
undertaken with the help of a multiregion, multisectoral 
econometric input-output model of the EU 12. The model 
includes intra- and extra-EU trade equations which have been 
re-estimated to account for the SMP. The anti-monde 
simulation produced by this model is based on trade equations 
reflecting the absence of the SMP. The model estimates that the 
level of employment in 1993 was 600 OOO units above the level 
that would have prevailed in the absence of the SMP. 
In conclusion, the impact of the SMP on income and 
employment obtained up to now is far from being negligible. 
There is little doubt that the effects will continue to grow as the 
SMP is further implemented and economic agents adjust to the 
new competitive environment of the European economy. 
5.2. Convergence 
The expected effect of the SMP on convergence within the EU 
is complex. On one hand, the SMP should favour convergence 
of per capita income levels across Member States via greater 
mobility of goods, services, capital and labour. On the other, 
increased geographical specialization could lead to increased 
polarization between richer and poorer countries or regions. 
Within the EU 12, analysis of the performance of Member 
States grouped by their date of entry into the EU provides 
useful insights. In terms of gross value added (GV A), the EU 6 
and the EU 9 performed much the same as the EU 12 as a 
whole, but the new entrants, Spain, Portugal and Greece, saw a 
larger relative improvement, their overall GVA in 1993 being 
nearly 7% higher than it would have been had pre-1987 growth 
trends continued. These three countries plus Ireland form the 
group of the so-called 'cohesion countries'. The performance of 
this group is even more striking, with an improvement of nearly 
Executive summary 
9.5% in 1993 relative to an extrapolation ofpre-1987 trends. 
This reflects the rapid growth of the Irish economy since 1987. 
With an average growth rate of about 8.5% per annum post-
1987, compared with 2.7% per annum in the period up to 1987, 
Ireland's GV A in 1993 was about 40% higher than it would 
have been if its economy had continued to grow at the pre-1987 
rate. Examining GV A per capita, the comparison of actual and 
extrapolated levels ceases to be positive for the original EU 6 
and EU 9, but the improved performance of the new entrants 
and the cohesion countries is even higher. 
Statistical analysis confirms that Ireland, Portugal and Spain 
have had above average growth, and have therefore converged 
after 1987. Among the poorer parts of the Community, only 
southern Italy and Greece have performed relatively worse 
after the SMP than before. The analysis gives some support for 
the fact that the SMP, in general, has contributed to these 
trends. However, in the case of Spain and Portugal, accession 
to the EU may have played an even larger role. 
On a regional level, there are some indications that the 
convergence process has been Community-wide rather than 
concentrated in a few Member States. Country-specific 
influences remain important but, taking into account 
differences between Member States, the speed of convergence 
of the regions is broadly similar. The question here is to what 
extent convergence is due to the SMP or to structural funds 
support (including the capacity of each Member State to 
manage these efficiently). Given that the launch of the SMP 
was accompanied by a significant Community regional policy 
package which ensured large flows of structural funds to the 
less developed regions, it is useful to try to distinguish the 
effects of structural funds spending on the favourable growth 
performance post 1987 from the SMP effects. Econometric 
analysis shows that variances in structural fund spending per 
capita did not have a significant effect on regional growth 
variations. Anti-monde macroeconomic model simulations on 
the other hand, indicate some positive short-term demand 
effects for the four cohesion countries; positive supply side 
effects of a more permanent nature do not seem to have 
materialized yet. 
The favourable impact of the SMP on the group of cohesion 
countries seems to be largely influenced by the exemplary 
performance of Ireland and, to a lesser degree, Portugal. 
Foreign direct investment and, in the case of Ireland, new 
greenfield investment by multinational corporations established 
since the early 1980s, have been among the major factors 
behind the above-average growth performance in these 
countries. 
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Introduction 
1. 1. Why review the single market programme 
(SMP)? 
This rev iew of the single market programme is being carried 
out by the Commi ss ion on the instructions of the European 
Council (Resolu tion 12 18/92), delive red just as the single 
market was formally supposed to become reality on January 1, 
1993. The reason fo r hav ing such a rev iew is due to the 
singular importance , partly historic and institutional, partly 
economic and soc ial, of the SMP to the whole process of 
European integration. 
1.1.1. The historic importance of creating a single 
European market and progress up to the start of 
theSMP 
Creating a unifi ed European market has been a fund amental 
obj ec ti ve of the Community since its very beg inning in the 
1950s. In Article 7 A, the Treaty of Rome itself envisages the 
abolition of all intern al obstacles to the free movement of 
people, goods, serv ices and capital (the so-ca ll ed four 
freedoms). By the end of the 1960s, much had already been 
ac hi eved - tar iffs and qu otas on int ra-EU trade had been 
aboli shed, a common ex ternal tariff on imports from third 
countries introduced and (in 1969) a programme introduced to 
remove intra-EU technical barriers. 
Nonetheless, despite these advances, capital fl ows, intra-EU 
trade in both goods and se rvices , and the free movement of 
persons around the Community fo r work or leisure purposes 
continued to be stifled by numerous non-tariff barriers (NTBs) 
in to the 1970s and 1980s. These NTB s could , broadl y 
speaking, be di vided into three : fi rstl y, phys ical barriers, in 
partic ualr customs contro ls, which we re used to enforce 
national norms on cross-border trade and resulted in signi ficant 
delays (in the early 1980s, a goods-laden lorry travelling l 200 
kms within a Member State enti rely lawfull y could complete 
the journey in 36 hours, but if it had to cross just two frontiers, 
the time needed rose to 58 hours!); secondly, technical barriers 
(different standards prevailed in di fferent Member States for 
simi lar products and Member States pu rs ued deliberately 
d iscriminatory ' buy domesti c ' public procurement po licies 
without rega rd for the economi c consequences) and fisca l 
barriers (widely divergent VAT rates in neighbouring Member 
States fuelled market fragmentation as Member States acted to 
prevent arbitrage in order to preserve tax revenues). The effect 
of these was to shelter European industries from the fu ll force 
of in ternational compet iti on, compromising effic iency, the 
optimal use of resources, and sensitivity to market signals. 
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This, combined with the recessions that fo llowed the oil price 
shocks in 1973 and 1978, and persistentl y high ra tes of 
unemployment and inflation made Member States turn inward 
during the 1970s, preferring to focus on domes tic problems 
rather than further trade liberalization. Thus continuing market 
fragmentation partially explains the Community's persistently 
poor performance into the first half of the 1980s. However, 
periods of economic weakness and high unemployment are 
never good times to advocate trade liber~lization. 
Nevertheless , the Communi ty's lack of internation al 
competiti veness became more and more apparent and a 
growing source of concern in the first half of the 1980s. In the 
light of increasingly globalized markets and competition, plus 
fas ter technologica l developments and diffu sion , trade 
integration began to be viewed as essential for the 
Community's future economic prosperity and potential to 
create jobs. There was a general recognition that unfe ttered , 
open markets work best, or at least better than markets that are 
even partially closed off from each other. Discussion within the 
Community on thi s issue culminated in the 1985 White Paper 
on completing the internal market, which identified the myriad 
of non-tariff barriers preventing intra-EU trade and provided a 
strategy for their removal aiming at the complete integration of 
the European economy by end-1992. The Single European Act 
of 1986 provided the political and legislative instruments that 
facilitated the integration process as well as complementary 
action in other policy domains such as R&D policy. 
1.1.2. The economic importance of the SMP 
Successful completion of the single market has very important 
economic implications for the Community. It should improve 
the competiti veness of the EU economy in world markets, 
increase employment, ra ise li ving standards and accelerate the 
ra te at which those li ving standard s grow around the 
Community thereafter. These potential economic consequences 
of the SMP were analysed in the Cecchini study (published in 
1988), which identified the channels throu gh which such 
consequences would arise, and es timated the ir magnitudes. 
Four princ ipal channe ls were he ld to hold the key to any 
potential economic gains: 
(i) signi ficantl y lower costs thanks to better exploitation of 
various kinds of economies of scale at both the production 
unit level and the enterprise level; 
(ii) improved enterprise efficiency, together with rationalized 
industrial structure and price-setting that better refl ected 
ac tu al production costs, thanks to the pressure of 
increased competition fo llowing the decline of barriers; 
(iii) industrial readjustments around the Communjty to refl ect 
better Member States' comparative advantages; 
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(iv) a stream of innovations, new processes and new products 
due to the competitive pressures stimulated by the single 
market. 
The overall conclusion was that the benefits of completing the 
Community market flowing from these four channels could be 
quite substantial. Furthermore, resources would be liberated for 
alternative productive uses, and the long-run sustainable level 
of EU-wide consumption and investment raised to higher 
levels. 
The single market and its macroeconomic environment 
From the above, it should be clear that the SMP was really a 
microeconomic supply-side initiative. However, the Cecchini 
study showed that the undoubted benefits of the SMP could be 
lesser or greater depending upon the macroeconomic 
environment in which it was introduced. Two simulations were 
carried out, representing two different macroeconomic policy 
regimes inside the Community. One simulation considered the 
impact of a passive macroeconomic policy. The second 
considered a more active, expansionary macroeconomic policy. 
The positive impact of the SMP was expected to be 
significantly greater in the second case. However, in reality, 
economic events (e.g., German unification) forced an EU-wide 
macroeconomic policy environment during implementation of 
the SMP more like that envisaged in the first simulation. 
Clearly, this may have restrained the potential positive effects 
of the SMP. 
1.2. The definition of the SMP 
1.2.1. The 1985 White Paper on completing the internal 
market 
Strictly speaking, the SMP is based on the hard core of 
legislative proposals set down in the 1985 White Paper on 
completing the internal market and the legislative measures 
actually implemented in the period 1988-93 as a direct result of 
the White Paper. A major legislative undertaking, the White 
Paper aimed to eliminate non-tariff barriers - particularly 
technical, administrative, and fiscal barriers - to trade, 
investment and the freedom of individual movement inside the 
Community. In the White Paper, the Commission proposed 282 
specific measures to remove non-tariff barriers. Table 1 below 
details the particular targets of the White Paper measures 
according to the broad classification described in the previous 
section - physical barriers, technical barriers and fiscal 
barriers. Note that subsequent experience and the changing 
circumstances under which the single market has developed 
have necessitated some revisions of the White Paper measures 
(though not their broad categorization) and as a result only 275 
are now in force. 
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Table 1 
Non-tariff barriers identified in the White Paper on the 
completion of the single market 
Physical barriers 
Veterinary controls 
Plant health controls 
Controls on individuals 
Specific controls (fuel tanks, waste) 
Technical barriers 
Special arrangements (arms, cultural works) 
New approach (standards) 
Motor vehicles 
Tractors and agricultural machinery 
Foodstuffs 
Pharmaceuticals 
Chemical products 
Construction and construction items 
Technical harmonization ( other items) 
Banks 
Insurance 
Transactions in securities 
New technologies and services 
Transport 
Company law 
Intellectual and industrial property 
Company taxation 
Public procurement 
Free movement of persons 
Tax barriers 
VAT 
Excise duties 
Source: European Commission. 
1.2.2. Beyond the White Paper - complementary 
policies 
However, in assessing the impact of the SMP, it is justifiable to 
use a definition which is wider than the White Paper measures 
alone because they were not, first of all, comprehensive. A 
number of sectors characterized by NTBs were not covered by 
the White Paper (notably energy), yet are now also becoming 
the target of NTB removal and so can legitimately be 
considered de facto as part of the SMP. Indeed, in many sectors 
new deregulatory initiatives have been promoted after the 
White Paper and can be viewed as part of the process of 
creating a single market. 
Furthermore, given the opportunities provided by the SMP for 
the exploitation of economies of scale and the rationalization of 
production across Europe, there is a risk that competition could 
suffer in certain sectors as monopoly or oligopoly structures 
develop. European competition authorities must be vigilant to 
such dangers, and should monitor any industrial concentrations 
and also have powers to act in case such concentrations appear 
likely to be excessive. In the process of completion of the SM, 
competition policy has been particularly strengthened in the 
domain of merger concentration, with the adoption of the 
merger regulation in 1989. Any analysis of the SMP should 
therefore take into account the role of competition policy, its 
evolution in the recent period, and its effects in the 
marketplace. 
Another Community initiative which complements and affects 
implementation of the SMP is regional policy. Use of the 
structural funds is justified explicitly by the need to ensure that 
the SMP does not adversely affect regional convergence. The 
transfers involved are significant enough to have potentially 
important macroeconomic effects. They are also designed to 
influence the location of productive activity around the 
Community which clearly relates to the expected SMP-spurred 
reallocation of production in order to capture potential scale 
economies. Clearly then, regional policy is a flanking measure 
for the SMP and therefore it should be taken into consideration 
in any assessment of the SMP impact. 
Subsequent chapters of this edition of European Economy will 
indeed use a definition of the SMP that goes further and wider 
than the list of White Paper measures alone to include 
complementary Community policies with the same 
fundamental aim of achieving the 'four freedoms'. 
1.3. The scope of the single market programme 
Given knock-on effects, the creation of a single market is 
bound to affect virtually all parts of the European economy. 
This is all the more true when the definition of the single 
market is enlarged to include competition policy and regional 
policy. However, sticking to the narrower White Paper 
definition of the SMP as being just about non-tariff barrier 
removal, work done by Buigues et al. ( 1990) ascertained that 
40 out of the 120 manufacturing sectors categorized at the 
NACE 3-digit level of disaggregation were likely to be 
especially affected because intra-EU trade in those sectors was 
particularly handicapped by non-tariff barriers. At that time, 
these 40 sectors represented somewhere around 12 to 18% of 
Community GDP (about 40 to 60% of Member States' value 
added in manufacturing). 
The SMP was also expected to have an impact on market 
services inside the Community. In common with the situation 
in other parts of the world, these had long been sheltered from 
competition as high levels of regulation suppressed service 
mobility across markets and service firms within markets, more 
in some Member States than others. Although from its very 
beginning, the Community had made decent progress in 
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establishing rights for service firms to establish around the 
Community, advances in liberalizing services trade made no 
real progress before the mid- l 980s. Even the SMP measures to 
liberalize trade in services can only be regarded as 'the 
beginning of the last step to freedom' (European Commission 
(1993)), whereas the SMP can be viewed as the final step 
needed to create the completely free movement of goods within 
the Community. Of the 282 White Paper measures, only about 
50 concerned services - especially financial services, 
transportation, telecommunications and professional services. 
Nevertheless, in combination with technological progress and 
globalization (discussed further in Chapter 2), the SMP could 
still lead to significant restructuring and growth of market 
services around the Community. Given the importance of 
market services to the Community economy - in 1990, they 
accounted for 48.2% of GDP and 42% of employment, whilst 
manufacturing accounted for 30% of GDP - the cumulative 
effect of such restructuring and growth could be very 
significant indeed (for an assessment of the impact on services, 
see section 1.6. below). 
1.4. The legislative effectiveness of the single 
market programme 
Although the single market programme has proved to be 
globally effective, there are areas where more work is still 
necessary. Nevertheless, overall it is effective enough to be 
having an impact on markets inside the Community. By 
comparison with the situation in 1985, much has already been 
achieved. It is like a rocket not yet in orbit, but well above the 
launch pad. The evidence for this comes from three sources, all 
of which give the same overall message: 
(a) the current state of completion of SMP legislation; 
(b) economic analysis; 
( c) survey results. 
The current state of SMP legislation is presented in this section. 
The evidence from economic analysis forms the backbone of 
this edition of European Economy. The survey evidence is used 
throughout this edition to supplement the economic evidence. 
1.4.1. The current state of transposition of single market 
legislation 
The first essential step in creating a single European market is 
to make sure that Member States actually introduce single 
market measures into their domestic legislation. Although 
transposition of single market measures is still improving, 
inadequate transposition still emerges as a major concern in 
some sectors and areas. Focusing on implementation of the 
body of White Paper measures (even if the SMP is in this 
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edition generally considered to be more than just the sum of 
those measures, the White Paper measures remain the heart of 
the SMP), it is clear that the task is nearing completion. At the 
Community-level, by mid-September 1996, the Council had 
adopted 259 single market proposals from the Commission, 
leaving just 12 outstanding - four concerning company law, 
another two company taxation. The rest cover VAT, 
intellectual property, the free movement of persons, foodstuffs, 
veterinary controls and phytosanitary controls. 
The 259 adopted proposals have in turn meant that by mid-
September 1996, 275 measures had entered into force, 1 with 
219 (translating into 1 378 Directives) requiring national 
implementation laws. 2 On average, Member States had 
transposed 92.9% of those 219 into their domestic legal 
systems. By contrast, to highlight progress made, at the end of 
1992 Member States had on average transposed about 75%. On 
the other hand, to give an idea of the work that is still 
necessary, only 55.6% of the 219 measures needing national 
implementation have actually been transposed by all 15 
Member States (see Table 2). Clearly, such a shortcoming 
diminishes the benefits of the single market. It is easy, 
however, to exaggerate the problem because 14 out of 15 
1 For legal reasons, some proposals have had to be translated into several 
measures in order to achieve the aim of the proposal; hence, the number of 
proposals is unequal to the number of consequent measures to be taken. 
2 Unless a Member State's domestic legislation already provides the necessary 
legal support, in which case some Directives may not be applicable. 
Table 3 
Table 2 
Classification of White Paper measures by number of 
Member States having transposed them correctly -
16 September 1996 
No of Member States 
having transposed 
15/15 
14/15 
13/15 
12/15 
11/15 
10/15 
Total number of 
measures = 219 
121 
179 
190 
197 
205 
208 
Percentage 
55.6% 
81.7% 
86.8% 
90.0% 
93.6% 
95.0'lc 
Member States have transposed almost 82% of the 219 
measures. 
As we can see from Table 3, the leading Member States in 
terms of SMP measures actually put into domestic legislation 
are the Netherlands and Denmark, with over 99% transposed. 
Next is the UK with almost 96% and then Sweden with 95.5%. 
The other two new Member States, Austria (83%) and Finland 
(87.7%) still have progress to make. Similarly, Italy, Germany 
and Belgium have each put just over 90% into domestic law. 
State of implementation of White Paper measures by Member State - 16 September 1996 
275 provisions in force/ 219 requiring national implementing measures 
Transposed Not applicable Derogations Measures not Partially Infringement 
measures yet transposed transposed proceedings for 
non-conformity 
A 181 1 0 31 6 0 
B 198 0 0 10 2 3 
DK 215 2 0 0 0 2 
D 196 2 0 14 2 5 
EL 194 3 3 16 1 2 
E 204 0 0 5 5 5 
F 202 0 0 8 4 5 
FIN 191 1 0 21 6 0 
IRL 204 2 0 6 2 5 
I 196 2 0 14 0 7 
L 207 4 0 5 0 3 
NL 217 0 0 0 1 1 
p 200 3 3 6 0 7 
s 208 2 0 8 I 0 
UK 210 0 0 3 2 4 
Source: European Commission. 
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GRAPH 1: State of implementation of the White Paper measures 
Situation by sector (in%), 16 September 1996 
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The chief areas for Member States where work still remains, as 
Graph 1 shows, whether in terms of transposing or 
implementing Community legislation, concern for example 
public procurement, intellectual property and insurance. These 
areas, together with the areas covered by proposals still 
awaiting Council agreement, are those where the single market 
has had the smallest economic impact. 
1.4.2. Problems with the operation of the single market 
The fact that SMP legislation has to a great extent been 
transposed into Member States ' domestic legislation is not in 
itself a sufficient condition for the single market to actually 
work. Now that the legislative framework is nearing 
completion , new problems are becoming clearer. These 
problems can broadly be divided into four: 
1. non-adoption of single market measures ; 
2. legislative inadequacies; 
3. ineffective enforcement of the legislation; 
4. the emergence of new obstacles. 
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Non-adoption of single market measures 
Eleven years after the launch of the White Paper programme, a 
'hard core' of proposals from the 1985 White Paper still 
remains to be adopted (as noted above), and some sectors 
remain to be liberalized. The main stumbling blocks are in key 
areas affecting business management, such as company law and 
corporate taxation , the free movement of people, cross-border 
payments and full liberalization of the transport and energy 
markets. 
Inadequacies of single market legislation 
Even when SMP measures have been adopted and transposed 
into domestic law, obstacles to free movement remain and in 
some cases the needs of economic operators wanting to engage 
in cross-border transactions are not well accommodated. Such 
problems have occurred for different reasons: 
sometimes the legislation is unclear; 
sometimes its scope is too limited; 
sometimes legislation entails over-complicated 
procedures, leading to excessive compliance costs. 
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Unclear legislation 
Although the SMP aimed to create a level playing field by 
providing a set of rules for even application across Member 
States, some provisions have lacked clarity and precision. The 
result is divergent, occasionally even conflicting interpretations 
by different Member States, so that business has had to face 
different requirements in different Member States. Reasons 
behind this defect can be found in one or more of the following 
factors: 
• complexity of EU decision-making processes (for 
example, unanimity voting in Council, and last-minute 
compromise amendments made to reach consensus) may 
have resulted in a dilution of the original proposal; 
• Member States' insistence on preserving particular 
national rules and practices may have forced them to seek 
derogations from the common provisions, thereby creating 
distortions within the single market; and 
• the decision to use directives, which leaves Member 
States to decide how to achieve the enshrined objectives, 
rather than regulations, may have Jed to some loss of 
harmonization in the implementation phase. 
Limited scope 
In a few cases, single market legislation has not adequately 
encompassed new market and product developments or the 
emergence of newly identified needs or barriers, and has 
therefore failed to meet current business requirements. An 
example of this can be found in the field of industrial products, 
wh'ere some technical regulations still do not cover installation 
rules (e.g., gas appliances, electro-medical equipment and 
telecommunications equipment). This can allow discriminatory 
national technical specifications to be maintained. 
Over-complicated procedures and high compliance costs 
Companies sometimes complain about two different types of 
costs associated with implementation of the SMP: 
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the first is the short-term, transitional costs of change to 
harmonized systems and conformity with new technical 
requirements; these are inherent to any changeover and 
are offset by additional gains from improved market 
access and export opportunities, although for firms 
operating on local markets (particularly SMEs), 
compliance with new technical standards may be 
disproportionately costly; 
the second is excessively complex and detailed regulation, 
which forces companies to invest substantially in order to 
comply; some of these difficulties may arise from the 
transposition of EU legislation into national Jaw. 
Ineffective enforcement and implementation 
Uneven enforcement of EU legislation is often regarded as the 
most persistent barrier to trade or fair competition because 
overcoming it entails close scrutiny of national, regional, or 
even local practices which cannot be supervised easily. 
Enforcement methods are far from harmonized across Member 
States, leading to two contradictory concerns: (a) the possible 
abuse of safeguard clauses or loopholes in the legislation, 
resulting in new barriers to trade; and (b) doubts as to the 
adequacy of market control in some Member States, giving 
manufacturers in these countries an unfair competitive 
advantage. 
Regulatory barriers 
As the most obvious barriers to a single market have been 
eliminated, so new market-fragmenting measures are 
appearing. Often, these new obstacles are associated with 
public policy objectives. Environmental regulations differing 
between Member States is one of the key areas where new 
obstacles to trade are appearing. Other obstacles can arise from 
technical requirements, as Member States persist in prescribing 
highly detailed rules for products on sale in their domestic 
markets. On average, more than 300 new national technical 
requirements for products are notified to the Commission each 
year. 
1.5. The effectiveness of single market legislation in 
overcoming the most important non-tariff 
barriers 
In this section, attention turns specifically to the evolution since 
1985 of the most important barriers, in terms of the wide scope 
and significance of their economic impact, which have 
segmented the European market: customs and fiscal barriers, 
technical barriers, 'buy domestic' public procurement policies, 
and restrictions on capital markets. The evidence presented is a 
mixture of economic analysis from studies on the SMP impact 
carried out by independent consultants for the Commission and 
survey results (see Box 1 for details on the surveys). 
1.5.1. Customs and fiscal barriers 
Physical frontier checks have been eliminated by the SMP, a 
measure which seems to have been the most appreciated of all 
from the point of view of manufacturing industries according to 
the Eurostat business survey (see Graph 2). This is very 
understandable as complying with customs formalities at 
internal Community frontiers implied considerable cost to 
traders. The implementation and success of this SMP measure 
was made possible by: 
Box 1: Surveys of the SMP 
As part of the process of reviewing the effectiveness and impact of 
the SMP, Eurosta t (the St ati s ti ca l Office of the European 
Communities) was charged with carrying out a survey of awareness, 
attitudes and reactions to the SMP at the company level. The survey 
covered approx imately 20 OOO manu fac turing and service 
enterpri ses of all sizes in the l 2 Member States that composed the 
Co mmun ity up to l 993. All service firm s with more than fiv e 
employees and manu fac tu ring fi rms with over 20 employees were 
asked to rate the success of the SM P, and it s imp ac t on the ir 
strateg ies and operations. More than l 3 OOO replies were received 
(i.e., a 65 % response rate). 
the adoption of transitional VAT legislation for intra-EU 
trade which retains the principle of taxing transactions at 
the point of origin whilst allowing VAT to continue to be 
levied in the Member State of destination; 
changes in statistical reporting proceedures (Intrastat); 
the abolition of customs clearance procedures on intra-
Community transac tions thanks to which 60 million 
customs forms have been removed; 
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A separate survey of 200 European trade associations' (responsible 
fo r indi vidual industrial sectors or subsectors accounting for 78% of 
the value of total production in the 80 largest EU indust rial sectors, 
and 80% of employment) perceptions of the effects of the SMP was 
coordin ated by the consultancy DRI in the contex t of the 
Commission's 1995/96 Panorama of European industry. Thi s used 
'face to face ' interviews to seek views on the relevance o f the 
SMP ' s leg islati ve measures , the impac t on industry, and a global 
assessment of the overall operation of the single market so far. 
Meanwhil e, many of th e independent co nsultants carryin g out 
studies to analyse particul ar SMP effec ts (whether on part icul ar 
sectors or horizontally) also conducted their own surveys and used 
the results to inform their study conclusions. 
the reorgani zation of contro ls on ve terinary and 
phytosanitary products and ce rtain o ther sensiti ve 
products. 
The impact of abolishing f rontier controls 
Thanks to the removal of border control s, mo ving products 
across borders is no longer subject to delays and uncertainties. 
The effec t on hauliers of eliminating delays at fro ntiers has 
GRAPH 2: Manufacturing enterprises' responses to Eurostat about the impact of the SMP on various 
obstacles to the free circulation of goods ( % of respondents) 
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Box 2: Impact of customs abolition for the textiles and clothing 
sector 
Prior to the single market, customs checks on textiles and clothing 
shipments were more pronounced than for other sectors as frontier 
controls were employed to administer national quotas on third 
country imports, quotas which had persisted despite the 
establishment of the common commercial policy. To prevent 
national restrictions on specific products from certain sources being 
bypassed by indirect imports through Member States applying zero 
or limited restrictions to imports of the same product, special 
controls were enforced at intra-Community crossing points (on the 
basis of Article 115 of the Treaty). One half of all Article 115 
authorized restrictions on cross-border shipments in the period 
1984-92 related to textiles and clothing. In other words, cross-
border shipments of textiles and clothing products were particularly 
hard-hit by customs formalities and requirements in the pre-SMP 
period. (IDS, 1996) 
It is therefore unsurprising that operators in this sector have 
perceived particularly large benefits as a result of the abolition of 
been savings of about ECU 400 million. 1 This translates into 
savings of around 2% of total costs for a haulier making a 
typical I OOO km road journey. However, a further effect has 
been to make intra-EU shipments no more complicated to carry 
out than domestic shipments, encouraging the overhaul of 
distribution and logistics networks around the Community; in 
particular, there has been a marked development of pan-
European logistics services as well as implementation of 'just-
in-time' and quick replenishment strategies (notably in the 
textiles and clothing sector, see Box 2). For fast moving 
consumer goods in general, commercial horizons have widened 
as purchasers now feel much more secure that foreign orders 
can be delivered on time. While difficult to quantify these 
improvements, they are probably a multiple of the direct cost 
benefits from the abolition of customs and fiscal formalities in 
the sectors concerned. 
Switchover to the transitional VAT system 
A majority of firms now regard the transitional regime as an 
improvement on previous arrangements. 2 Detailed analysis of 
traders' in-house administration costs shows that the change to 
the current transitional procedures for VAT declarations on 
intra-EU transactions has reduced compliance costs by two 
thirds (although they still remain much higher than those for 
domestic transactions). Aggregate savings are about ECU 
5 billion per annum, or 0. 7% of the total value of intra-EU 
trade. 
On the other hand, there was a one-off cost from switching 
over to the new fiscal and statistical declarations procedures 
' Source: Price Waterhouse study. 
2 Source: SITPRO. UK 95 and Price Waterhouse 1996. 
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frontier formalities. Producers and distributors report reduced 
delivery times of 15-20% on average, with some citing reductions 
of two to four weeks in the time taken from receipt of order to 
delivery. When coupled with the reduction in the cost of road 
haulage services (ascribed in part to SMP-induced competition in 
this sector), the SMP is considered to have made possible much 
more rapid cross-border delivery. As a result, textile and clothing 
manufacturers are estimated to have enjoyed a reduction in 
production costs of0.2-0.5% of turnover. (CEGOS, 1996) 
Furthermore, it has become economical to ship small deliveries 
across frontiers, thereby expanding the range of clients and allowing 
overnight demands to be met. This is seen as increasingly important 
given the growing demands placed on producers by organized 
distributors who are keen to source products from around the 
Community, but require prompt deliveries and rapid turnover of 
product ranges. CEGOS estimate that whereas previously products 
could only afford to exceed the price of third country imports by 
15% (primarily as a result of tariff protection), it is now felt that this 
wedge has increased to 20% thanks to the enhanced service quality 
and rapid delivery times associated with SMP completion. 
significant enough to trigger much protest in the months 
following introduction of the system. According to a sample 
group of 230 companies, these costs amounted to less than 
ECU 15 OOO for half of the sample and less than 25 OOO for 
70%. Although not negligible, they have nevertheless been 
quickly amortized by companies regularly engaged in cross-
border transactions - companies accounting for one third of 
total consignments should have repaid their set-up costs within 
the first three months, and those responsible for 50% would 
have recovered them within one year. Only companies which 
undertake relatively few cross-border shipments have taken 
longer to reach the break-even point, and for 20% this point 
will still not have been reached four years after the introduction 
of the new system. 
1.5.2. Technical barriers 
Technical trade barriers have traditionally been the most 
prevalent impediment to the free circulation of products in the 
EU market, and over 100 OOO different national technical 
specifications coexisted in the EU in 1985. Currently, 76% of 
the value of intra-EU trade is subject to mandatory technical 
specifications ( either national or Community-wide). 
Furthermore, sectors subject to national regulatory 
specifications appear as a consequence to be more heavily 
dependent on national markets - such sectors only account for 
21 % of trade but 29% of industrial gross value added (GVA).3 
This suggests that national technical trade barriers are 
effectively discouraging cross-border trade and competition in 
some sectors. 
' W. S. Atkins 'Technical barriers to trade" study. 
A central tenet of the SMP in this domain has been the need for 
greater coordination and collaboration at the Community-level 
to eliminate unnecessary costs. A number of approaches are 
used to achieve these ends. 
Mutual recognition 
The Commission has pressed for the widest possible 
application of the so-called 'principle of mutual recognition' 
i.e., that Member States must allow market access to products 
manufactured in a partner Member State if those products 
conform to the partner's specifications, and those specifications 
embody 'equivalent' levels of protection for prescribed 
objectives. 1 Full use of the 'mutual recognition' principle is 
relied upon to overcome technical trade barriers affecting 25% 
of intra-EU trade (or more if 'mutual recognition' comes to 
play an increasing role in ensuring the free circulation of newly 
emerging products). 
Technical harmonization 
Where 'equivalence' between levels of regulatory protection 
embodied in national regulations cannot be assumed, however, 
the only viable way to remove the technical barrier in question 
is for Member States to reach qualified majority agreement on a 
common set of legally binding requirements. EU legislation 
harmonizing technical specifications has involved two distinct 
approaches, the 'old approach' (detailed harmonization) and 
the 'new approach'. 
'Old' approach 
This is used for certain products where the nature of the risk is 
held to require extensive product-by-product or even 
component-by-component legislation. So far, the adoption of 
programmes of detailed harmonizing legislation seems to have 
overcome deeply entrenched technical trade barriers affecting 
sectors accounting for over 30% of the value of intra-EU trade 
(covering motor vehicles, chemicals, pharmaceuticals and 
foodstuffs sectors). Although only recently entered into force, 
there is general satisfaction with their operation. 
'New' approach 
The 'new' approach to technical harmonization was introduced 
in 1985. 'New' approach legislation confines itself to 
prescription of 'essential' requirements - detailed 
specifications for compliance are not prescribed. Such 
1 According to Article 36. these arc public morality. public policy, public 
security, protection of health and life of humans. animals and plants. 
protection of national treasures. protection of industrial or commercial 
property. Account must also be taken of other 'mandatory requirements' 
which justify derogations for Article 30 (protection of the environment. 
working environment). 
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legislation has been applied in a wide range of sectors, 
including both consumer products (e.g. toys) and equipment 
goods (e.g. machines), covering products which account for 
17% of the value of intra-Community trade in manufactured 
products. The limited experience so far suggests that this 
approach is effective and that the task of preparing European 
standards to ensure the effective functioning of the single 
market is well in hand. Products governed by this legislation 
can be marketed anywhere in the EU and circulate freely 
without further checks, or adaptation. 
Conclusions 
Despite the fact that Community legislation to eliminate 
technical barriers is only now coming into force, it is generally 
seen as effective. Surveys of business operators and their 
representative bodies reveal a strong vote of confidence in 
efforts to eliminate technical trade barriers. In many product 
sectors ( chemicals, mechanical engineering, office equipment, 
foodstuffs, motor vehicles), between 35-50% of respondents 
regard EU efforts as having generated benefits, as opposed to 
less than I 0% who experienced negative consequences 
(probably due to transitional costs). The proportion of large 
firms having a positive opinion consistently exceeds 50%, but 
smaller companies (<50 employees) are not as positive (30% 
positive and 15% negative). The higher proportion of smaller 
companies experiencing adverse consequences is probably due 
to the costs of switching over to new compliance procedures 
and/or specifications, but also increased competition from 
companies established in other Member States. 
On the other hand, 'mutual recognition' is still proving difficult 
to enforce in a way which guarantees unimpeded access to all 
Member State markets, particularly for products where the 
underlying risk to the consumer or user is potentially high. 
Recent accomplishments have defined ground rules for the 
definition and implementation of technical specifications, and 
created an institutional infrastructure capable of delivering a 
technical barrier-free single market. Surveys of industry 
federations consistently find that the SMP is held to be a crucial 
safeguard against the technical refragmentation of the single 
market. 
1.5.3. Public procurement 
Protecting large areas of economic activity from competition 
involves large costs, and public procurement practices have 
traditionally been all about protection - discriminatory 
procurement practices, deliberately restricted access to markets 
supplying the public sector or utilities to a limited number of 
national suppliers. As a result, in 1987, less than 2% of public 
purchasing was awarded to non-national suppliers, compared to 
levels of between 25 and 45% for private sector purchasing. 
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Single market public procurement legislation aims to break 
such discrimination down by improving the transparency and 
objectivity of public procurement contract awards. Success 
could lead to potentially huge benefits. Public procurement of 
works, supplies and services accounted for 11.5 % of EU 15 
GDP in 1994 or ECU 72 l billion (i.e. the combined size of the 
Belgian, Danish and Spanish economies or ECU 2 OOO per EU 
citizen). 
Unfortunately, any judgment regarding the effectiveness of 
Community procurement legislation is constrained by the short 
time since much of the legislation came into force and their 
slow pace of transposition into national law. 1 Still, there are 
signs that the legislation is starting to bite. Substantial increases 
in the level of publication of Official Journal tender notices 
have been recorded, from 12 OOO in 1987 to 90 OOO in 1995, 
whilst a wide-ranging survey of suppliers reveals that a 
significant number have benefited from the new mechanisms to 
identify new opportunities in both partner country and domestic 
procurement markets. Those companies actually identifying 
new opportunities also display high levels of responsiveness 
(90% rate of response to domestic and 70% to cross-border 
opportunities). Of companies submitting tenders in response to 
newly identified cross-border opportunities, 44% reported that 
they had won new business. Looking at the situation from the 
other side of the coin, 36% of respondents also reported 
increased competition on their domestic markets. 
In other words, EU legislation on public procurement 
liberalization is already acting as an effective catalyst for 
increased competition in public procurement markets. The 
impact on cross-border competition has been small, but non-
negligible - the proportion of procurement purchases sourced 
directly from partner country markets has doubled from 1.4 to 
3% between 1987 and 1994, whilst procurement purchasing 
indirectly sourced from partner countries via intermediary sales 
offices or subsidiaries, has expanded from 4 to 7% in the same 
period. Relatively high levels of import penetration are now 
recorded in some product markets typified by high levels of 
public procurement. 
On the other hand, despite these positive developments, there is 
as yet little evidence of substantial savings to public purchasing 
authorities. Still, contracting entities and suppliers are only just 
beginning to probe the new SMP opportunities. Only 15% of 
purchasing entities thought to be subject to the legislation are 
estimated to have actually published tenders, suggesting that 
entities have yet to come to grips with the new disciplines. 
1 The Codified Excluded Sectors Directive entered into force on I July 1994. Its 
entry into force is postponed for Spain until I January 1997, and for Greece 
and Portugal until I January 1998. 
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1.5.4. Capital market liberalization 
The free movement of capital is one of the SMP' s 'four 
freedoms', now written into the Treaty of Rome and one of the 
cornerstones of the single market as well as a building block for 
EMU. It is also an essential condition for a single market in 
financial services. Due to the single market, all capital controls 
have now been removed and all forms of capital movement 
between Community residents completely liberalized. 
To study the impact of this and capture the degree of capital 
market liberalization in the EU, a study by the NIESR 
approached the problem from different angles: three hypotheses 
on the macroeconomic effects of capital mobility were 
empirically tested and a survey of EU financial institutes on 
remaining barriers to the free movement of capital carried out. 
Information on the latter was also obtained from the OECD 
codes of liberalization. 
The NIESR conclude that capital mobility certainly has 
increased since the late 1980s ( although the empirical tests of 
the macroeconomic effects have to be interpreted cautiously 
because of the underlying assumptions and potential theoretical 
problems of the methods used). There really do now appear to 
be few barriers to capital mobility between Member States. 
Moreover, the increase in intra-EU capital mobility has been 
larger than vis-a-vis non-EU countries. However, the removal 
of barriers to capital mobility has proceeded at a slow and 
variable pace throughout Europe. Progress has been more 
pronounced in Member States with more initial restrictions. 
The study looks at onshore and offshore rates on equivalent 
financial instruments in the same currency. When countries 
limit the inflow or outflow of capital then the rates of return on 
the two markets will differ as international arbitrage cannot 
take place to equalize rates. The onshore-offshore differential 
gauges both ongoing transaction costs and the effects of 
barriers to mobility. If there are no such barriers, the 
differential should be small. It is found that this is actually the 
case. Onshore and offshore rates are now similar for most 
Member States of the Union. 
The result of the NIESR' s survey also suggest that a 
considerable degree of capital market liberalization has already 
been achieved. Respondents judged the freedom of capital 
movement in the EU as a whole to score now almost 8.5 out of 
10, compared with less than 6.5 in 1990. Indeed, it appears that 
domestic requirements encourage residents to buy, sell and 
hold equities abroad rather than at home, while, to a lesser 
extent, placing non-residents at an advantage over residents 
with respect to similar transactions on the home market. There 
may thus be an artificial stimulus to capital movement in both 
directions which distorts the efficient allocation of capital. This 
possibly counter-intuitive finding may derive from the 
interaction between relative freedom from domestic restrictions 
of foreign activities by residents and the incidence of domestic 
taxation. In general, non-residents encounter least constraint in 
their transactions on bond and money markets, while they are 
least free in respect of collective investment securities and in 
the field of investment services, especially management of 
privatization issues, lead management of bond issues, market 
making and access to payment systems. 
Of the various kind of factors which were still seen as 
inhibiting or distorting capital movements by .the survey 
respondents, the most frequently cited could be broadly 
categorized as insufficient liquidity in local markets, national 
differences in market structures, company law and accounting 
frameworks, non-residents' tax treatment and exchange rate 
risk. 
NIESR obtained similar results from analysing the OECD's 
codes of liberalization. All OECD Member States subscribe to 
codes of capital market liberalization thereby undertaking to 
remove restrictions on specified lists of cross-border capital 
transactions. However, countries may lodge reservations 
against specific items on those lists which they are unable to 
liberalize. It appears that EU Member States generally have 
only very few, mostly quite specific, reservations registered 
under the codes. An average of 3.5 reservations per Member 
State suggests that the EU allows greater overall freedom of 
capital movement than the US or Japan, which both entered 
4.5 reservations. Moreover, the activities of EU residents are 
explicitly exempted from a number of the reservations entered 
by EU Member States. This provides some indication that 
liberalization within the EU has in part been motivated by the 
SMP. However, the situation is not completely even across the 
Union: two Member States have no reservations, while seven 
Member States account for more than 80% of the EU total. 
There are also pronounced differences between different 
categories of market activities, operations in collective 
investment securities and money-market securities being 
relatively free of reservations, while operations in securities on 
capital markets and the provision of banking and investment 
services together account for over half the total number of 
reservations entered. In addition, I O Member States have 
entered reservations against the freedom of establishment and 
operation of branches of foreign insurers, banks and other 
financial institutions which qualify their freedom to conduct 
capital market or money-market operations. 1 
More evidence that there has been a substantial increase in the 
freedom of capital movement throughout the EU since 1990, 
with most change having been achieved in the most restricted 
markets, is found in the Eurostat business survey (see Box 1 for 
more details). Significant minorities of businesses attributed 
1 Out of those. about one third only applies to third countries but not EU 
members. The rest apply to both groups. 
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increased freedom to move capital to the SMP (some 23% of 
firms in manufacturing and 25% of firms in the financial 
intermediation business). However, the share of those 
perceiving no change at all remained relatively high, at 61 and 
72% respectively. 
Freedom of capital movements is judged to be 85% achieved 
by respondents2 to a further survey, compared with only 65% in 
1990. The importance of barriers to capital requirements, in 
terms of the restrictions they place on enterprises' ability to 
operate in other EU countries, was seen only of low to medium 
importance by respondents around the EU. However, the 
elimination of exchange rate uncertainty would result in greater 
borrowing and investment and inward and outward capital 
flows between the Member States. On the other hand, the 
effectiveness of the single market is constrained by the 
'sluggishness' of banks and credit institutions themselves in 
responding to the SMP. 
1.5.5. Concluding remarks 
Overall, a mixed picture emerges concerning the effectiveness 
of abolishing NTBs inside the single market. Clearly, the 
elimination of customs frontiers and of restrictions to capital 
flows has been achieved and felt in the market, but in other 
areas the situation seems to have changed only partially since 
the adoption of SMP legislation (i.e. fiscal and technical 
barriers, public procurement). This may be due to the non-
implementation of part of the legislation or the fact that types 
of barriers other than those targeted continue to exist. These 
include differences in national legislation, be it on taxes, 
prudential requirements, company law and other regulations. 
However, psychological barriers, such as preferences for 
national products, lack of information, cultural or language 
barriers, habits and traditions may also limit some cross-border 
movements of goods and services, but such barriers need not be 
changed by the SMP. On the other hand, however, the reaction 
chain - from legislative changes at the EU level, to national 
adoption of appropriate legislation, to the behaviour of 
consumers and firms - has not always been achieved. In some 
cases, firms and consumers simply appear not to be aware of or 
interested in the new freedoms offered by SMP legislation. 
1.6. The impact of the single market programme on 
market services 
As is discussed in section 1.3. above, prior to the single market, 
market services inside the Community were subject to 
numerous regulatory barriers to trade. Although the initial 
' Source: Credit institutions and banking study survey. 
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scope of the SMP in the field of services was rather moderate 
and its details missing, nevertheless it had a clear orientation 
and a fixed timetable. By 1993/94, most White Paper measures 
aimed at opening up the services sector were transposed. More 
importantly, the original set of objectives in the services sector 
has been significantly enlarged in subsequent years. Given the 
importance of market services to the EU economy, it is 
interesting to see what impacts these liberalization measures 
have had. 
1.6.1. Some evidence on progress so far 
Capacity restrictions in both road freight and air transport have 
been removed, allowing transport companies to extend their 
networks and improve the use of their assets. In road freight 
transport, the resulting savings for a typical 1 OOO km journey 
from the abolition of quotas and gradual introduction of 
cabotage are between 3-4% of total costs. 1 In air passenger 
transport, this has resulted in increased flexibility for airlines to 
adjust capacity (number of seats and frequencies) to meet 
passengers' demand and offer discounts to customers to 
improve traffic revenue. 2 
Although the effectiveness of new rules on freedom of 
establishment is difficult to measure, nevertheless the new 
system seems to work well. Thus, in air transport, new 
companies have entered the market on both intra-Community 
and domestic routes, a prospect unimaginable some years ago. 
' Source: NEA study. 
' Source: Cranfield University study. 
Table 4 
Service firms' global perceptions of specific features of the 
single market programme (weighted by number of 
employees in each firm) 
Opinions 
Measures Positi\'c Neutral Negative 
Harmonization of licences 20 66 5 
Recognition of licences 17 71 3 
Facilitation of cross-border 
operations 30 60 4 
Facilitation of physical 
establishment 17 74 1 
Public procurement liberalization 16 68 6 
Capital movements liberalization 25 66 l 
Double taxation 18 67 I 
Source: Eurostat survey, EU Member States excluding Germany. 
26 
Incumbent airlines too, such as British Airways, Lufthansa, 
Swissair and KLM, have taken advantage of the right to 
establish an airline based in another country and expanded their 
networks in other EU countries. In banking, cross-border 
branching by credit institutions has steadily increased over the 
last three years, albeit from a very low base, increasing by 58% 
the number of cross-border branches operating in the single 
market between 1993 and 1995.' 
1.6.2. Business perceptions 
Of all the SMP measures aiming to deregulate market services 
inside the EU, liberalization of cross-border operations and 
capital movements score the highest positive opinions (see 
Table 4). Moreover, positive opinions on capital movements 
rise to 55% when the financial services sector is considered 
separately, whilst positive opinions for cross-border operations 
rise to 69% in air-transport and 39% for land transport. 
The breakdown by sector provides more insight on how 
economic operators view the success of the single market in 
eliminating obstacles to EU trade. In sectors such as land 
transport, air transport and financial services, positive opinions 
are high, ranging from 32 to 60%. But negative opinions are 
still relatively high, ranging from 11 to 19%, indicating that 
important barriers still persist. This is particularly the case with 
business services, where negative opinions outnumber positive 
ones ( 19% against 17% ), and to a lesser extent with 
' Source: Economic Research Europe Ltd study. 
Table 5 
Service industries' perceptions of the single market impact 
by firm size 
Opinions 
Firm size Positive Neutral Negative 
5-49 16 63 21 
50-199 19 60 21 
200-499 17 61 22 
500-999 24 52 24 
>= 1000 39 41 19 
Total (EU 11) 25 54 22 
Source: Eurostat survey. EU Member States excluding Germany. 
information services and related activities, where the single 
market scores a meagre 28% of positive opinions compared to 
19% of negative opinions. 
The survey confirms the view that while significant progress 
has been made in liberalization of some service sectors, 
especially the traditional services (transport and financial 
services), barriers remain high in other service sectors. 
From Table 5, we can see that larger firms are generally more 
positive about the SMP impact than smaller ones. One possible 
explanation of this is that while SMEs recognize the 
opportunities created by the SMP they are unable to take 
advantage of the situation, while having to bear the negative 
consequences of increased competition in their domestic 
markets. Meanwhile bigger businesses are more widely 
affected by the SMP (see the middle column) but seem to cope 
better with the opening up of the markets and benefit from the 
opportunities created. 
The removal of legal barriers to entry and the easing of access 
conditions has had a psychological impact on service 
companies' perceptions of competition levels. Some 36% of 
Introduction 
land transport operators, for example, consider that competition 
from other EU operators has increased, with only 1 % 
disagreeing. 1 Figures for banking and credit institutions are 
similar; 31 % think competition has increased and only 3% 
disagree; in insurance, the scores are even higher - 42% and 
4% respectively. 
1.6.3. Conclusions 
Although the Community has established a basic legal 
framework in many services, the SMP in services is still 
incomplete. Nevertheless, the most obvious restrictions have 
been removed and competition has increased, especially in 
traditional service sectors. However, full implementation of the 
new legislative framework has taken longer than expected, 
especially in the utilities. Furthermore, delays in transposing 
the new rules into national law have impeded progress (e.g. 
insurance). Non-discriminatory rules based on the protection of 
the general good also still obstruct the free cross-border supply 
of services - notably business services, information services, 
and commercial communications. 
' Source: Eurostat Business Survey. 
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Chapter 2 
The European economy since the 
launching of the single market 
programme, 1985-95 
2.1. Introduction 
During the implementation of the single market programme 
(SMP), the Community economy has been shaped, on the one 
hand, by various events and ' shocks ' and , on the other, by a 
number of long-run structural developments. Any assessment 
of the economic effects of the single market programme must 
take account of both of these. The purpose of this chapter is to 
set the economic scene within which to identify the impact of 
the SMP in the remaining chapters of the present report. 
Section 2 highlights the main structural trends and shocks 
which have affected the single market since it began to be 
constructed. These include the adhesion of Spain and Portugal 
in 1986, German reunification , structural factors such as 
technological change and globalization, and cyclical factors 
including exchange rate developments. Section 3, following a 
structural approach, presents a macroeconomic overview of the 
EU in the context of the triad between 1985 and 1995. 
2.2. Structural trends and major affecting the 
Community economy during the development 
of the single market, 1985-95 
During the creation period of the single market, a number of 
structural trends and a number of events impacted on the 
Community economy. In assessing as far as possible the impact 
of the single market, it is an essential first step to identify these 
structural trends and major events. Failure to do so clearly risks 
ascribing economic changes (whether positive or negative) to 
the single market programme alone, which would be spurious. 
In the period 1985 to the present day , several structural trends 
and major events have hit the Community economy: 
• globalization 
technological change 
the accession of Spain and Portugal 
• oil price changes 
the October 1987 stock market crash 
German unification 
various exchange rate crises 
To put these trends and events in the right context it is 
convenient to start by providing some information on the 
evolution of main macroeconomic indicators and of the 
influence of macro policies implemented in the EU over the 
period. The structure of this part is as follows. Section 2.1 will 
present a series of stylized facts , including the analysis of the 
business cycle, and will discuss policy issues . Section 2.2 
analyses the two main structural trends : globalization and 
technological change, whilst section 2.3 is devoted to a number 
of events and economic shocks in chronological order. 
2.2.1 Stylized facts, cycles and economic policy 
Stylized facts 
Although the relative weights of the EU, 1 USA and Japan in the 
triad's GDP recorded quite marginal changes between 1985 
and 1995, the EU's share in terms of employment recorded a 
significant fall of more than two percentage points. In 1985, the 
EU represented 42% of real GDP (constant 1990 prices) in the 
triad as compared with 38.9% for the USA and 19.2% for 
Japan . Ten years later, in 1995, the share of the EU's GDP in 
the triad total amounted to 41.4%, against 38.8% for the USA 
and 19.9% for Japan. In terms of employment, the EU 
represented 43 % of total employment in the triad in 1985 
(37.2% and 19.8% for the USA and Japan respectively). This 
share had fallen to 40.9% in 1995, whilst it rose to 39% for the 
USA and to 2.2% for Japan. 
Obviously, such changes are not only the result of growth and 
employment creation differentials . The annual average growth 
rates have beert quite similar in the EU and the USA (2.4 and 
2.5%, respectively) between 1985 and 1995, whilst GDP grew 
in Japan by almost 3% per year. In Japan, employment 
increased by almost 1.1 % per year over the reference period. 
This is lower than in the USA , where employment grew by 
1.5 % per year. The figures for the EU, however, show the 
difficulties of a number of Member States in turning growth 
into jobs , as recognized in the White Paper on growth , 
competitiveness and employment. The EU created new jobs at 
a rate of only 0.4% per year. 
Such a relatively poor performance of the EU in creating jobs 
has its counterpart in unemployment figures. Whilst 
unemployment fell in Japan from 2.6% in 1985 up to 2.1 % in 
1 For the sake of comparability. the EU in th is section refers to EU 12 without 
including former East Germany. All the fi gures reported here can be found in 
Tables 2. 3. 5, 6 and 8. which are analysed in detail in Section 3. 
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1991 and then increased by I percentage point to represent 
3.2% of the active population in 1995, in the EU the lowest rate 
registered (1990) still amounted to 7.75 % and increased by 
almost 3 points in five years. Thi s structural trend of 
unemployment in the EU contrasts with a rather cyclical 
evolution in the USA, where the unemployment rate accounted 
for 5.5% of the active population in 1995 , half the rate 
registered in the EU. 
As in unemployment, the EU has recorded the highest inflation 
rate in the triad over the past decade . Inflation, measured by 
means of the annual average growth rate of the GDP deflator in 
national currency, amounted to 4.4% in the EU, compared with 
3. 1 % in the USA and 1 % in Japan. Such averages are quite 
representative of the evolution between 1985 and 1995. 
Although inflation rates have a strong cyclical component, the 
EU has always recorded the highest rates, whilst annual 
inflation in Japan has remained below 2.2% . Since 1993 , 
inflation rates in the EU and USA have been converging. 
Economic cycle 
Between 1985 and 1995 the EU , USA and Japan all almost 
completed a full economic cycle, from the expansion that had 
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started well before 1985 to the recovery of 1994-95 after the 
recession of 1992-93 ( 1990-91 for the USA, see Graph I). The 
EU' s GDP growth first accelerated between 1986 and 1989, 
peaking at 4.2 % in 1988, and then slowed down between 1989 
and 1991 to give way to the 1992/93 crisis , when GDP at 1990 
prices decreased 0.6% in 1993. Recovery started in 1994,1 but 
growth rates in 1994 and 1995 remained under 3%, below the 
ones reached in the preceding expansion . Within the triad , 
Japan's cycle has moved in phase with the EU, although the 
expansion peak exceeded 6% in 1988, whilst the 1994 recovery 
was much weaker than in the EU; Japanese GDP only grew by 
below 1 % over the period 1994-95. The USA, however, only 
shared the first part of the cycle with the EU. An almost 
equivalent expansion took place between 1986 and 1989, with 
US GDP growth reaching almost 4% in 1988, but after 1989 
the slowdown was quicker so that the USA went into recession 
in 1991 before recovering the next year. Furthermore, the 
USA's recorded growth rates were higher than 3% in 1993 and 
1994. 
1 Quarterly data show that recovery already had started in the second quarter of 
1993. 
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Most Member States' cycles reflect the EU average. However, 
a number of exceptions are worth mentioning. Firstly, although 
their cycles moved in line with the EU average, Spain and 
Portugal recorded higher growth rates than the EU average over 
the period 1986-89 (6% in Portugal and 5.6% in Spain in 
1987). Secondly, due to the reunification effect, German GDP 
growth reached its peak in 1990-91 (at over 5% ). Third, the UK 
does not seem to follow the same economic cycle as the EU as 
a whole, but rather the US one. British GDP growth, after 
reaching 5% in 1988, fell within two years to -2% in 1991 
before quickly recovering during 1993 and 1994 and equalling 
EU average growth in 1995 (2.4% ). Finally, Ireland seems to 
be a rather special case, where catch-up effects account for a 
rather significant part of GDP growth over the economic cycle. 
Since 1987, Irish GDP has been growing at rates higher than 
the EU average and most Member States. GDP growth in 
Ireland reached almost 8% in 1990 and, although the UK's 
1991 recession and the EU' s recession of 1992-93 slowed 
down Irish growth, nevertheless it still remained above 2% in 
those years. Ireland returned to a high growth path in 1993 
attaining 8% again in 1995. 
All in all, leaving these special cases aside, it is worth noting 
that the GDP growth slowdown and consequent recession in the 
EU has been coincidental with the main phases of 
implementation of the SMP. As we shall see in other chapters 
of this report, many studies have identified significant impacts 
attributable to the SMP in the late 1980s. Therefore, any 
analysis of the SMP's effects must disentangle the negative 
impact of the post-1989 GDP growth slowdown and the 
1992-93 recession in the EU. 
Economic policy 
Looking at the evolution of European economies between 1985 
and 1995 and, especially, since the beginning of the 1990' s, 
one could be tempted to say that the times when Western 
Europe seemed to have all the answers necessary to achieve the 
ultimate goals' of economic activity have gone. Until the 1970s 
the EU was an economic entity with rising living standards able 
to offer jobs for all and an opportunity to progress. Now, the 
EU seems to be immersed in a context of high unemployment, 
and relatively low inflation and slow growth. 
This radical change has often been associated with long-run 
trends such as globalization and technological change and the 
need to adapt to them. It has also been argued that the relatively 
poor performances of the EU have their origin in the past 
1 As Krugman (1994) states. what is important for the economy, are factors 
which affect living standards. namely productivity, income distribution and 
unemployment. 
activism of European governments, which has resulted in 
increasing public debt, large budget deficits and high taxes. 
Structural trends are studied in section 2.2 below; in the current 
section we deal with the rationale of economic poiicy in the 
EU. It should be noted, however, that 1985-95 is not the best 
period to look at the development of macroeconomic policy in 
the EU. In order to understand its rationale it is more useful to 
start after the second oil shock and to consider three 
subperiods, 1979-87, 1987-90 and 1990 to date. 
The fight against inflation was the priority in the first subperiod. 
By 1979 European economies had not yet absorbed the first oil 
shock. Inflation was high and unemployment had been rising 
since 1973. Furthermore, both monetary and fiscal policies 
were expansionary, with negative short term real interest rates 
and increasing public deficits. In this context, monetary policy, 
characterized by high interest rates, became very restrictive. As 
pointed out by Fitoussi (1996), Germany was a case apart. The 
inflation rate in Germany amounted to 2.7% in 1978 and the 
unemployment rate had decreased to 2.7% of the active 
population that year, although its budget deficit had increased 
after 1978. It is not surprising then that Germany took the lead 
in monetary policy, since it had already achieved what other 
countries were looking for. As a consequence, the other 
European countries benefited from German credibility, their 
currencies having the DM as an anchor. Restrictive monetary 
policy was accompanied by restrictive fiscal policy.2 The 
structural budget deficit declined between 1979 and 1987, 
which contrasted with the more activist economic policy and 
budget deficit run in the USA.3 
As shown in Graph 1, the recovery started before 1987 and 
output growth in the EU reached its peak level in 1988, then 
decelerated and became negative in 1993. We will argue in 
section 3 that inflation started to decline in 1991. 4 In other 
words, although at the end of the 1980s inflation rates were 
much lower than at the beginning, the battle against inflation 
was not yet won. In fact, inflation rates increased from 4.1 in 
1987 to 5 .5 in 1991 and monetary policy continued to be 
somewhat restrictive. 
After four years ( 1989-92) with real interest rates reaching 
historic highs, the policy mix shifted towards tighter fiscal 
policy and less restrictive monetary policy. The easing of 
monetary policy was prompted by the 1993 recession. 
However, one cannot characterize the post-recession period as 
one of expansionary macroeconomic policy in the EU. Fiscal 
consolidation also started in that year. The underlying rationale 
of today's macroeconomic policy in the EU is that, on the one 
As pointed out by Fitoussi ( 1996) the degree of austerity varies greatly among 
Member States. 
1 See Krugman (1994) and (1995). 
' Measured by the GDP deflator. see Graph 6. 
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hand, current public deficits in many countries are clearly 
unsustainable and, on the other, that lower public borrowing 
will reduce long-term interest rates and thus create a crowding-
in effect of productive investment and private spending. 
In completing the SMP the dilemma is that the single market 
needs dynamic demand to produce its full benefits. Therefore, 
so long as inflation is subdued, further easing of monetary 
policy combined with budgetary consolidation could be a 
desirable policy mix, compatible with achieving EMU and 
allowing the SMP to produce its full benefits. Furthermore, as 
concluded by the Florence European Council, budgetary 
consolidation should be based on rigorous control of current 
public expenditures, leaving room for additional efforts on 
public investment. 
2.2.2. Structural trends 
The definition of technological progress is fairly intuitive. It 
refers to any change in the relationship between inputs and 
outputs. Thus technological change means not only changes in 
the technology embodied in physical capital goods, but also 
changes in the organization of firms, as well as changes in 
production processes, which alters the composition and nature 
of human capital of the economy. On the other hand, we can 
say that globalization is the process whereby markets and 
production in different countries are becoming increasingly 
interdependent due to increasing trade in goods and services 
and flows of capital and technology .1 Globalization and 
technological change are interrelated. Technological change is 
one of the driving forces behind globalization, and, 
simultaneously, globalization speeds up the technological 
development and diffusion. Technological diffusion and 
reductions in transport costs allow significantly greater 
interdependence world-wide. Nevertheless, globalization 
cannot be understood without considering the strong 
liberalization processes taking place around the world, 
including industrialized countries and, of course, the EU. 
The World Bank report on Global economic prospects and the 
developing economies 2 shows that between 1985 and 1995 
world trade has grown more than twice global output. 
Furthermore, developing countries have recorded large 
increases in international openness. Over the 1985-95 period, 
trade flows of developing countries grew on average 6 
percentage points faster than real output growth. 2 This 
performance is the result of important programmes of de-
regulation and liberalization of their economies, and, as stated 
in Hoekman and Kostecki (1995), it partly reflects unilateral 
efforts by those countries to open their economies to foreign 
1 See OECD (1993). 
See World Bank (1995). 
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competition. Furthermore, these policy reforms are leading to 
greater competitive pressures and adjustments in industrialized 
countries. In this context, the SMP can be viewed as the EU's 
coordinated response to these pressures by providing a more 
competitive and flexible economic environment, which allows 
European firms to adapt better to changes in the world 
economy. 
By raising productivity, efficiency and more rational use of 
resources, globalization and technological progress have raised, 
and will continue to raise, global incomes. Nevertheless, the 
growing importance of technological progress and 
globalization are also often given as two causes of today's 
persistently high unemployment levels amongst low-skilled 
workers in the EU. On the one hand, current technological 
progress is leading to the replacement of unskilled workers by 
labour with a higher content of human capital. 3 On the other, 
globalization has helped the emergence of a growing band of 
developing economies able to compete with the EU as 
producers and exporters of manufactured products. 
Currently, as indicated by Sapir (1996), economic literature 
most often identifies technological progress as the more 
important of the two, especially as 'emerging· economies, 
although increasingly important, are still rather marginal in 
trade terms. In the future, continuing globalization will pose an 
increasingly important challenge for the Community. However, 
this challenge will be less the more workers can shift from 
import-competing manufacturing activities to the non-traded 
service sector. Clearly, economic growth and market flexibility 
will be a requirement to meet the challenge. The SMP may help 
to ensure that the Community can absorb unskilled labour in 
new activities because it enhances market flexibility by raising 
the EU' s growth prospects and stimulating European 
businesses' ability to react and compete in an increasingly 
dynamic global economy. 
Globalization 
The world economy is becoming increasingly 'globalized'. 
Trade integration amongst industrialized countries has been 
rising over the last two decades and emerging economies in 
Asia and in central and eastern Europe are becoming 
increasingly important trading partners. Such 'globalization· is 
reflected in increased sales on extended (international) markets4 
and an unprecedented surge of foreign direct investment (FDI 
- see discussion in Chapter 5). Driving forces behind this 
market globalization have been the progress in transportation 
and communication technology, liberalization of trade and 
investment, plus changes in enterprise organization and 
strategy. 
·' See Krugman (1996). chapter 12. 
' See the Competitiveness report. European Commission ( 1996b). 
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Several trade indicators provide direct and easily available 
measures of the degree of world-wide globalization. A recent 
DRI 1 report shows that the ratio of world exports to world GDP 
was around 19% in 1985, reached 20% in 1988 and then 23.5% 
in 1995 (see Graph 2) . However, this indicator conceals 
important regional and country differences. Graph 3 compares 
the same ratio in 1985 and 1995 in a number of regions across 
the world. Developing Asia2 has experienced the highest 
increase. Its exports to GDP ratio was over 40 % in 1995 , 
compared with just more than 25 % in 1985 . The degree of 
globalization of Europe, meanwhile, has remained relatively 
stable (around 30%, including intra-EU trade) over the last 
decade. In other words , ' globalization ' is far from a new 
phenomenon in European countries. Finally, against seemingly 
conventional wisdom, developed Asia was the least open 
region in 1995 (less than 15 %) and it seems to be becoming 
less and less 'globalized' . 
Figures on imports can also give useful insights about the 
degree to which the world economy is internationalized. 
1 See DR! (1996). 
Includes China and the N!Cs. 
European imports in 1995 were clearly double US and 
developing Asia ' s imports, and triple imports by developed 
Asian countries, whilst the relative weight of Latin America, 
the Middle East and Africa was rather marginal. The long-run 
trends shown in Graph 4 demonstrate again that 
internationalization or globalization is a secular characteristic 
of the European economies by comparison with other parts of 
the world, even if it is acknowledged that such a globalization 
trend exists at the world level. In fact , Graphs 3 and 4 seem to 
suggest that growing openness affects certain regions such as 
North America, developing Asia, Middle East and Africa, more 
than the EU, where trade openness was already higher than 
30% in 1985, or Japan that shows a quite low and seemingly 
declining openness ratio. 
Focusing on the Community , we have seen above how 
globalized it is . Currently, extra-EU exports of goods and 
services account for about 10% of Community output (EU 15). 
Whilst the share of these exports in GDP has, as remarked just 
above, increased only modestly over the last two decades, since 
prices on internationally traded products have risen slower than 
the overall price level , thi s masks the fact that the EU ' s 
international trade (like at the world level) has expanded at a 
considerably higher pace in volume terms than overall ouput 
growth. 
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Furthermore, the Community is a major participant in world 
trade. Its share in world merchandise exports (excluding intra-
EU trade) remains high at 23%, although this has tended to 
decline since the early 1970s. This fall is to some extent 
explained by a comparatively low share of Community exports 
in strong-demand, high-technology sectors relative to the US 
and Japan (26% of total exports from the EU against 30% in 
the US and 35% in Japan') (European Commission (1996)). In 
addition, the Community has a comparatively low share of 
exports directed towards markets which have been growing 
fast, partly due to geographical factors. For example, exports to 
the NICs and China, where import growth rates would appear 
to be particularly promising over the medium term, represent 
only 14% of extra-EU exports, against 23% in the US and 27% 
in Japan. However, the Community is well placed to benefit 
from the expected strong growth of trade with central and 
eastern European countries (CEECs) in coming years. In 1994, 
around 9% of extra-EU exports (EU 12) were directed towards 
the CEECs and the former Soviet Union, and such exports 
subsequently expanded by around 15 to 20% per year in 1994-
95 (measured in value terms). 
Meanwhile, recent flows of foreign direct investment around 
the world have grown significantly, up from an annual average 
of USO 50 billion between 1981 and 1985 to an average of 
USO 155 billion between 1986 and 1990. In 1990 they reached 
USO 200 billion; in 1994, USO 220 billion; and, in 1995, a 
record USO 325 billion (Unctad (1996)). The EU has been 
taking an increasing share of this growing wave, up from a 
quarter of all such FOi flows in the early 1980s to well over 
40% in 1993 (see the discussion on FOi in Chapter 5). 
Overall, then, it is generally believed that the Community 
economy is strongly affected by globalization. Moreover, it and 
its partners stand to gain in overall terms from this increased 
international integration. Nevertheless, concerns remain that 
certain groups within the Community may lose out. In 
particular, rising unemployment among low-skilled labour in 
most European countries has been attributed to increased 
competition from low-wage countries. However, it is very 
difficult to separate the effects of increased international trade 
from the effects of technological changes, which also appear to 
reduce demand for 'unskilled labour. One recent review of 
available evidence concluded that competition from low-wage 
economies has only had a small negative impact on EU 
employment in some sectors, and this may well have been off-
set by rising employment in other sectors. Trade with 
1 
'European competitiveness in the triad', Note for the attention of the EPC. 
Commission Services 1995. 
developed economies has in general had larger positive and/or 
negative effects. 
Technological change and inf01mation technologies2 
Information and communication technologies (ICT) are 
producing dramatic changes in the EU economy, by moving it 
from a situation in which manufacturing activities have 
dominated to a situation where most growth and value added 
was fostered by the development of services, particularly in 
activities concerned with the creation, processing and 
transmission of information. 
ICT3 is also introducing fundamental changes to the 
organization of enterprises, the way of working and the upward 
and downward relationships between sectors. 
Many of the issues and data discussed is this section are based on the already 
referenced ORI report. 
.1 Core sectors include: 
• computer and electronic data communication equipment; 
• telecommunications equipment and services; 
• software products and computing services: systems software and utilities, 
applications software, professional services, processing services, and 
network services. 
Table 1 
JCT expenditure as % of GDP (current prices) 
1992 1995 
Austria 3.52 3.94 
Belgium/Luxembourg 3.99 4.37 
Denmark 4.24 4.71 
Finland 3.65 4.50 
France 3.82 4.32 
Germany 4.21 4.61 
Greece 2.75 3.59 
Ireland 4.26 4.56 
Italy 2.48 3.18 
Netherlands 4.64 5.32 
Norway 4.63 5.47 
Portugal 3.19 4.50 
Spain 2.40 3.15 
Sweden 4.03 6.00 
Switzerland 5.69 6.13 
United Kingdom 4.52 5.32 
Western Europe 3.80 4.46 
us 5.65 5.71 
Japan 4.15 3.66 
Source: EITO. 1996. p. 332. 
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The rapid diffusion of ICT is explained by substantial 
productivity increases that accrue to user industries as well as 
by the declining cost of such technologies and their continuous 
improvement. Over the period 1988-96 western European 
information technologies market grew at the average annual 
rate of 6.5%. 1 Table 1 provides indications of ICT penetration 
in recent years, in terms of ICT expenditure to GDP (current 
prices). Western Europe's share has increased substantially, up 
from 3.8% in 1992 to 4.5% in 1995. 
In manufacturing, ICT does not mean anymore simply the 
'automation' of production. Most sectors are at present much 
more influenced by innovations which do not relate directly to 
new production techniques, but to the organization of the 
design, production, marketing and administration functions via 
the use of information network systems. For example, in 
sectors subject to rapidly changing demand patterns ( e.g. 
clothing, footwear, automobiles), the adoption of computer-
integrated flexible manufacturing systems and computer-based 
quick response strategies have considerably shortened the 
production and innovation cycles, rendered possible rapid 
design changes in accordance with changing consumer 
preferences, and reduced delivery time. 
Since the late 1980s, all service sectors are also increasingly 
using ICT. Financial services, which were at the forefront of 
ICT applications in the I 970s, represent one of the largest end-
user markets for ICT. The expenditure of financial services on 
ICT equipment accounts at present for more than 15% of 
expenditure on ICT equipment in the whole economy of the 
EU. 2 ICT is important to the distribution sector for handling 
logistic and stock management systems, as well as all segments 
of the transport industry, yielding quality improvements in 
transport services. In the passenger transport and tourism 
sectors, computerized reservation systems are becoming 
widespread, substantially increasing the efficiency of travel and 
tourism transactions. Business services are increasingly 
integrating ICT advances (accelerating external sourcing of 
business services and the development of tele-working). 
ICT is changing the organization of companies and work 
conditions. ICT applications: 
(a) reduce the minimum optimum scale of enterprises (the 
downsizing phenomenon); 
' See European Information Technology Observatory: EITO, 1996, p. 282. 
ICT have been a vital ingredient for the most important developments in 
financial services. Examples include automatic teller machines, electronic 
fund transfer, systems for credit and debit cards. automated cash transfers for 
corporate customers, and home banking or direct banking. 
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(b) flatten the internal hierarchies of enterprises and redefine 
the functions of middle and even top management; 
( c) require new skills at all levels of the workforce. 
As the efficiency of ICT systems increases (largely through 
networks), a lot of control and administrative functions 
concerned with the transmission of information are becoming 
obsolete. Manual, mechanical and chemical processes are (and 
will increasingly be) substituted by computerized machines. 
Face to face and direct services will more and more be replaced 
by self-service machines (e.g., automated telling machines or 
voice response systems, automated answering and call 
forwarding, electronic credit checking, etc.). This implies that 
ICT is reducing the impact of lower-skilled labour and that the 
trend is towards an increasing intensity in skill requirements 
related to the usage of ICT. This will take several forms: a 
strong persistent demand for specialized high-level computer-
related skills, a rapidly growing demand for multiskilling 
(computer, communications and business skills), and a need for 
increased communication skills. 
2.2.3. Events 
The accession of Spain and Portugal 
In January 1986 Spain and Portugal became members of the 
European Union. As discussed in Section 3 below, the two new 
adherents represented at that time around 8. 7% of EU 12 GDP 
and 12.1 % of employment. Although, from a quite narrow 
trade policy viewpoint, entry arrangements mainly concerned 
the bilateral removal of tariffs, quotas and other similar trade-
suppressing measures, as well as the adoption of the EU' s 
common external tariff, the enlargement coincided with the 
introduction of the SMP. This means that, although the SMP 
effects did not start to be felt until 1988/89, Spanish and 
Portuguese economies simultaneously experienced (during the 
reference period of this report) both the classical effects of 
joining a customs union and the early impacts of implementing 
the SMP. Such simultaneity amplified the expected effects of a 
classical customs union. 3 
Since the transitory periods following accession and 
implementation of the SMP partly coincided, analysis of the 
SMP impacts alone necessitate isolation of the accession 
·' Sec. for example, the empirical evidence on the likely additional impact of the 
SMP on Spain by Hine ( 1989) and Martinez and de Boer ( 1996 ), which show 
that the tariff changes seem to understate the considerably increased import 
competition actually faced by Spanish industry. 
The European economy since the launching of the single market programme, 1985-95 
impacts. Given Spain and Portugal's small relative weights in 
total EU trade, one can accept the small country hypothesis in 
order to analyse the 1986 enlargement impacts. In other words, 
accession alone could have had significant impacts on the two 
countries, but negligible impacts for the EU economy as a 
whole. In the Spanish case, the trade deficit jumped from 3.5% 
of GDP in 1984 to 6.1 % in 1992. 1 Furthermore, the trade deficit 
in manufactured goods changed from an average surplus of 
0.9% over the period 1979-85 to an average deficit of 3.8% 
over 1986-92, mainly explained by the sharp increase in 
imports of manufactures. Manufacturing exports remained 
almost constant (averaging 9.8% of GDP in the period 1979-85, 
and the same average over 1986-92), whereas imports rose 
sharply from 8.9% of GDP in the period 1979-85 to 13.6% over 
1986-92. Martinez and de Boer (1996) estimate that Spanish 
accession to the EU resulted in net trade creation, amounting to 
ESP 3 OOO billion2 in 1992, or around 4.5% of Spanish GDP in 
that year. These figures are not negligible for the Spanish 
economy but, on the one hand, such estimates include early 
SMP-associated pro-competitive accumulated effects and, on 
the other hand, such trade creation only represents around 0.3% 
of EU GDP, and was distributed widely amongst all Member 
States, as well as other industrialized countries (EFT A, the 
USA and Japan). Summarizing, in considering the anti-monde, 
the enlargement impact net of SMP effects is marginal for the 
EU as a whole. 
The fall in oil prices during 1985 and 1986 
Between 1985 and 1986, the Community was enjoying 
accelerating real GDP growth, slight growth in its nominal 
current account surplus and falling inflation (European 
Commission ( 1986)). Part of the explanation for this lay with 
tumbling oil prices, which fell from a range of USD 25-30 per 
barrel to USD 10-15 per barrel, a decline of over 45%. As the 
US dollar was simultaneously depreciating against the ecu, the 
proportionate fall measured in European currencies was even 
greater (55% ). Given the important role of oil as a source of EU 
energy this was clearly bound to have large effects. 
In the short term, there were two clear direct effects: firstly, 
positive income transfers from oil-producing countries to net 
oil importing countries and, secondly, widespread cuts in the 
production costs of oil users. Such income transfers were 
clearly strongest for Member States most dependent on oil 
imports, such as Portugal or Germany. On the other hand, as 
major oil producers, the UK and the Netherlands were 
adversely affected. The more significantly positive (negative) 
1 Sec Maninez and de Boer ( 1996). 
ECU 22.6 billion in 1992. 
such transfers were, the more positively (negatively) national 
economic growth was affected.3 
The stock market crash of October 1987 
During 1987, fuelled by the oil price falls discussed 
immediately above plus relatively loose monetary policy, real 
EU GDP growth continued to accelerate, reaching 2.8%. 
Deregulation of financial markets around the Community at 
this time helped to fuel a world-wide speculative bubble in 
equity and property markets that had begun in the mid-l 980s. 
This burst in October 1987, 4 threatening consumption and 
investment, as well as a potential liquidity crisis, with risks for 
overall growth (European Commission (1994 )). Acting in 
response to such risks, Member State authorities adopted 
policies of substantially looser monetary and budgetary 
policies. 
These policies were probably very effective in preventing 
excessively adverse effects on overall confidence, but they also 
excessively stimulated the Community economy. As a result, as 
well as thanks to factors such as the SMP, better investment 
profitability, financial liberalization and delayed effects of the 
reduction in oil prices (see above), the pace of economic 
activity increased sharply. Unemployment rates fell whilst the 
recorded rate of growth in the Community in 1988, over 4%, 
was the strongest since 1976. However, the economy was 
overheating with real growth estimated to have overshot 
potential output growth by up to 1.5 percentage points 
(European Commission (1996)). 
In response to the Community-wide economy's unexpected 
dynamism, and to avoid sparking renewed inflationary 
pressures, Member States began tightening monetary policy 
again from mid-1988 onwards. Budgetary policy, on the other 
hand, was only moderately tightened as many countries 
1 For the Communily as a whole, ex ante analysis (European Commission 
( 1986)) of the price cuts implied an income transfer up to the equivalent of 
1.8'7.o of EU GDP. However. the magnitude of the income transfers ranged 
widely amongst individual Member States ( according to their degree of 
dependence on oil imports) from +4.1 % for Portugal to -0.8% for the UK. 
This was expected to lead to more rapid real EU GDP growth achieving, at an 
upper bound, an increase in the real level of EU GDP after two years of about 
I .5o/c over and above what would have occurred without the oil price change. 
Most Member States fiscal situations were also expected to be cased by the 
price changes, thanks to lower energy expenditure (by between 0.1 and 0.5% 
of GDP) and a faster growing tax base. There were other expected benefits 
too. Diminished inflationary pressures (except in the UK. where the falling oil 
price was expected to lead to depreciations of the pound sterling) promised an 
overall estimated up to 2 point decline of the inllation rate over two years. 
Such an impact on inllation was in turn expected to prompt major falls in 
nominal long-term interest rates (down 2.0 points between July 1985 and July 
1986). Borrowers would benefit from such developments so strengthening 
demand. hut the falling oil price and associated disinllation reduced the need 
for tightening of macroeconomic policy. 
' Equity prices fell by a third in just a few days. 
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continued to implement previously announced tax cuts. 
Nevertheless, notwithstanding the monetary tightening and its 
dampening effect on economic activity, the Community 
economy grew by 3.5% in 1989, still faster than potential 
growth. Capacity utilization consequently reached record levels 
and inflationary pressures grew - thanks in part to strong 
import price increases, inflation recorded a significant 
acceleration to nearly 5% in 1989 and over 5% in 1990, against 
3.9% in 1988. 
October 1990 and after - German unification and its 
economic consequences 
From a peak of over 4% in 1988, Community GDP growth 
slowed to about 3.5% in 1989 and 3% in 1990. Inflation, 
meanwhile, had been growing in the same period because of 
the pressures discussed immediately above in Section 2.3. It 
was at this time that, along with the rest of the formerly 
Comecon countries, East Germany's socialist government fell 
from power during the momentous events of 1989. The two 
parts of Germany then formally unified as one country in 
October 1990. 
Unification, and the policies adopted to handle it, were to have 
powerful economic and monetary consequences, not just for 
Germany, but also the rest of the Community through intra-
Community trade impulses as well as interest-rate and 
exchange rate adjustments. In a first stage, demand-driven 
increases of German and other Member States' GDP growth 
rates. In a second stage, overheating in the German economy 
which led to monetary tightening by the German monetary 
authorities, measures then followed by the rest of the 
Community. 
The driving force for these powerful effects was the fact that 
unification, combined with the decision to convert Ostmark into 
DM at a rate of 1: 1, created a huge gap between aggregate 
German supply and demand (and as Germany is the largest 
economy in the Community, this had major consequences for 
other Member States). East Germany's supply-side could not 
compete at all, and so contracted dramatically 1 and demand 
there had to be supported by huge transfers (equivalent to about 
5% of GDP per year) from the west part of Germany. These 
transfers were financed mainly by a higher public-sector deficit, 
which deteriorated to more than 3% of GDP within the year 
following unification. Much of these considerable current and 
capital transfers were converted as far as possible into 
additional demands mostly addressed to West German firms, 
given their comparative advantages (geographic proximity, 
common language, common currency), but also firms 
elsewhere, particularly in other Member States. 
1 Industrial production fell 60 lo 70% in the first 12 months after unification. 
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In the first 12 months after unification, purchases by the five 
new Lander from the rest of the world including West 
Germany went up from DM 18 billion to about DM 130 billion, 
an amount close to the equivalent of public transfers received 
by those Lander. At the same time all other EU countries 
except Greece registered considerable upswings in their 
bilateral trade with Germany. 
As unified Germany's domestic demand grew vigorously, the 
effects were predictable. The current-account swung from 
surpluses equal to 4 to 5% of GDP between 1986 and 1989 to a 
deficit of almost 1 % of GDP in 1992. Meanwhile, GDP growth 
in western Germany reached 5.1 % in 1990 (indeed, almost 6% 
in the last two quarters of 1990 and the first quarter of 1991 ). 
Such rates were significantly above potential, so capacity 
constraints soon began to be felt in the form of labour market 
tensions and price increases. Wage increases accelerated from a 
roughly 3% a year trend in the period 1987-89 to 4.7% in 1990 
and 5.8% in 1991 whilst inflation reached rates of about 4% in 
1991 and 1992. 
Meanwhile, the induced boost to west Germany's final demand 
from east Germany in turn resulted in increased imports 
addressed to the rest of the world, especially other EU Member 
States, putting upward pressure on their growth rates too. 2 
Various exchange rate crises 
Since the crisis in the EMS exchange-rate mechanism in 
September 1992, a number of European currencies depreciated 
sharply against the German mark. Such was the case between 
August 1992 and August 1995 with the Italian lira (31 % 
depreciation), the Swedish krona (27% ), the Spanish peseta 
(24%) and the pound sterling (18% ). This period of turbulence 
on the foreign-exchange market has been marked by three 
important events: the departure of the pound sterling and the 
Italian lira from the EMS exchange-rate mechanism in 
September 1992, the decision in August 1993 to widen the 
mechanism's margins of fluctuation to 15%, and the sharp 
depreciation in the US dollar in February and March 1995, 
which contributed to the depreciation of a number of European 
currencies. 
At the moment when the September 1992 ERM crisis broke, 
the EU's GDP growth had been decelerating, and was under 
1 % per year. Inflation was also slowing, down from about 6% 
il is estimated that their growth rates could have been raised by about half a 
percentage point a year on a,·erage in both 1991 and 1992 (European 
Commission ( 1991 )). The amplitude of these positive effects on the different 
Member States. of course. depended not only on the relati,·e importance of 
exports to Germany in total exports but also on the share of exports to GDP. 
Thus, the smaller. open economics having close lies with Gennany such as the 
Benelux countries and Denmark. were more positively affected, in relation to 
GDP. than the larger countries. 
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per year in 1991 to around 5% in 1992. The crisis broke when 
the German monetary authorities reacted to domestic 
developments due to the unification process by tightening 
monetary policy, thus raising interest rates. Meanwhile, other 
Member States' growth rates were falling and their fiscal 
positions deteriorating. The general response of those Member 
States to this was moderately restrictive fiscal policy with 
looser monetary policy via lower short-term interest rates. 
However, the contradiction in this policy with that of Germany 
was ultimately unsustainable, and following the political 
difficulties which surrounded ratification of the Maastricht 
Treaty, the existing ERM exchange rate parity grid amongst 
Member States came under severe strain - leading finally to 
the ERM crisis of September 1992 (European Commission 
(1993)). 
During 1994, real Community GDP recovered from 1993' s 
recession to grow by about 3%. Meanwhile, the inflation rate 
continued the decline it had begun in 1991. Then, between 
December 1994 and April 1995, the US dollar fell 12% relative 
to the Deutsche mark, having already fallen 10% during 1994. 
The fall of the dollar, combined with uncertainties surrounding 
budgetary/inflation prospects in some Member States, triggered 
significant intra-European currency movements. The Italian lira 
fell by around 13% in nominal effective terms, and the pound 
sterling and the Swedish krona weakened considerably. Within 
the ERM, the central rates of the Spanish peseta and Portuguese 
escudo were devalued in March 1995. Conversely, the German 
mark and currencies closely tied to it strengthened significantly 
· in trade-weighted terms, by up to 6% between December and 
April. 
In 1995, the Commission's services carried out an examination 
of the impacts of recent exchange-rate movements on the 
operation of the internal market and on the economic growth of 
the Union and its Member States. 1 A number of phenomena 
were identified. First, growth decelerated. The currency turmoil 
( dollar related effects included) and the sudden changes in 
current or anticipated profitability stemming from it engendered 
uncertainty and a wait-and-see attitude among economic 
agents, leading to a slowdown in growth in 1995. Second, the 
effects of the currency fluctuations between 1992 and 1995 on 
long-term cost competitiveness vary. Of those Member States 
whose currencies have depreciated, some recorded appreciable 
gains in cost competitiveness (Italy, Sweden), while others 
experienced falls (Spain) and yet others recorded no change 
(United Kingdom). Of those Member States whose currencies 
appreciated, some saw their cost competitiveness decline 
(Germany), while others remained stable (France). Third, an 
appreciable effect on profit-margins was observed. Exporters in 
countries whose currencies depreciated improved their margins 
since 1992 whereas exporters in the other countries have 
1 See European Commission (1995a and b). 
reduced their margins. Finally, the impact at some sectoral and 
regional levels was more visible. In the car and clothing 
industries, for example, an erosion of margins and a fall in 
exports in volume terms were noted in countries with stable 
currencies. Some frontier regions close to countries whose 
currencies have depreciated were also experiencing specific 
difficulties. 
2.3. Macroeconomic overview 
We start this section by providing some indicators of the 
relative weight of the European economy in the triad. Then we 
analyse the structure of aggregate demand in the former 
12 Member States as compared with the USA and Japan. 
Subsection 3.3 looks at GDP growth rates and their 
components, and includes an analysis of the evolution of 
unemployment in the triad. Subsection 3.4 is devoted to an 
analysis of inflation and labour costs during the reference 
period, whereas section 3.5 presents the main features of the 
open sector in the triad. Finally, Section 3.6 deals with the 
European economies' sectoral structure. 
Table 2 
Real GDP at 1990 prices within the triad 
1985 1990 1995 1 1995' 
B 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.1 
DK 2.3 2.1 2.2 2.1 
D 24.6 24.7 25.2 27.0 
EL 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.3 
E 7.7 8.1 8.1 7.9 
F 19.8 19.7 19.4 18.9 
IRL 0.7 0.7 0.9 0.9 
I 18.2 18.0 17.8 17.3 
L 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
NL 4.7 4.7 4.8 4.7 
p 1.0 I. I I. I I.I 
UK 16.1 16.1 15.9 15.5 
EU 100 100 100 100 
EU 42.0 41.9 41.4 42.0 
USA 38.9 37.8 38.8 38.4 
J 19.2 20.3 19.9 19.7 
Triad 100 100 100 100 
1 Without including former East Germany. 
' Including former East Germany. 
Source: AMECO (DG II). 
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Table 3 
Employment within the triad 
1985 1990 
B 2.9 2.8 
DK 2.0 2.0 
D 21.2 21.0 
EL 2.9 2.7 
E 8.8 9.5 
F 17.1 16.7 
IRL 0.9 0.8 
I 16.8 16.1 
L 0.1 0.1 
NL 4.5 4.7 
p 3.3 3.3 
UK 19.7 20.1 
EU JOO 100 
EU 43.0 42.6 
USA 37.2 37.7 
J 19.8 19.7 
Triad JOO JOO 
1 Without including former East Gennany. 
' Including former East Gennany. 
Source: AMECO (DG II). 
1995 1 
2.8 
2.0 
21.7 
2.9 
9.2 
17. I 
0.9 
15.3 
0.2 
5.1 
3.4 
19.5 
100 
40.9 
39.0 
20.2 
JOO 
19952 
2.7 
1.9 
25.3 
2.8 
8.9 
16.4 
0.9 
14.4 
0.2 
4.9 
3.2 
18.5 
100 
41.9 
38.4 
19.7 
JOO 
2.3.1. The European economy in the triad. GDP and 
employment, 1985-95 
In t995, the EU, 1 including former East Germany, represented 
42% of real GDP (constant 1990 prices) in the triad, as 
compared with 38.4% for the USA and 19.7% for Japan. The 
so-called big four (Germany, France, Italy and the UK) 
accounted for almost 79% of EU GDP that same year, whilst 
Spain and Portugal, which acceded in 1986, represented around 
9%. The last two columns of Table 2 indicate that former East 
Germany only accounted for around 2% of European GDP in 
1995. In terms of employment (see Table 3 ), the EU 
represented 41. 9% of total employment in the triad in 1995 
(38.4% and 19.7% for the USA and Japan respectively), whilst 
the big four accounted for 74.6% of the EU' s total 
employment, as compared with 12. l % for Spain and Portugal 
and 3.5% for the new l.iinder. 
Since comparable data for former East Germany are not 
available before 1991, we restrict analysis of the evolution of 
real GDP and employment in the EU to the first three columns 
of Tables 2 and 3. In terms of both GDP and employment, the 
EU's share in the triad, excluding former East Germany, 
1 Since the period of reference is 1985-95 and, thus, prior to the accession of 
Austria, Finland and Sweden, by EU we will understand EU 12. 
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steadily decreased between 1985 and 1995. Since the USA' s 
share of the triad's GDP remained quite stable in that period, 
much of the fall in the EU's share was gained by Japan. 
However, in employment terms, the USA recorded the highest 
growth. 
Concerning Member States, although the GDP of Spain, 
Portugal, The Netherlands, Germany and, above all, Ireland 
(from 0.7% to 0.9%) grew faster than the EU average, the 
relative weights do not seem to show any drastic changes. This 
also applies to the distribution of employment within the EU. 
Nevertheless, the best relative performance is found in 
Luxembourg (which doubled its share), Spain, The 
Netherlands, Germany and Ireland (in the second half of the 
period). 
2.3.2. The composition of the aggregate demand 
Real GDP has been broken down into the main four 
components of aggregate demand: private consumption (PRC), 
public consumption (PC), gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) 
and the external balance. Table 4 depicts the relative weight of 
the first three components (real GDP is equal to 100 for each 
country) in 1985 and 1995, which accurately represent 
differences in the composition of aggregate demand across 
countries over the period. The main feature to note from this 
table is that the EU and USA have rather similar rates of public 
consumption (around 16/17%) despite the fact that the public 
sector is larger in the EU than in the USA and investment 
(18/19%) This contrasts with Japan, where public consumption 
is small (around 10% ), whilst investment rates are relatively 
high (always above 26% ). Differences concerning private 
consumption between the EU and USA are mainly due to 
differences in the external balances, which have been positive 
in the EU (and Japan) but negative in the USA over the 1985-
95 period. 
Direct comparisons between the EU and the other two members 
of the triad conceal significant heterogeneity amongst Member 
States. Diversity within the EU is so large that is practically 
impossible to find a 'representative' Member State for the EU 
average. Surprisingly, apart from a higher GFCF rate. which is 
compensated by a lower external balance, Spain was the 
country with the highest degree of similarity with the EU 
average in 1995. The most drastic changes in structure of 
aggregate demand are found in Germany, Spain and Portugal. 
These changes relate to reunification and accession. Between 
1985 and l 990~ private consumption accounted for 60.5% of 
GDP in Germany (PC 13%, GFCF 20%). However, in 1995, 
although public consumption fell by less than 1 percentage 
point, private consumption and investment rates respectively 
' Without including former East Germany. 
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Table 4 
Real private consumption (PRC), public consumption (PC) and investment (GFCF) in the triad as a % of GDP 
PRC 
B 62.68 
DK 54.22 
D' 60.48 
EL 69.92 
E 61.91 
F 59.70 
IRL 61.48 
I 58.57 
L 64.62 
NL 59.62 
p 62.47 
UK 59.00 
EU 1 59.91 
USA 66.26 
J 58.15 
Triad 62.04 
1 l 995: including former East Germany. 
Source: AMECO (DG II). 
1985 
PC GFCF 
16.55 14.94 
26.48 17.93 
13.64 19.50 
14.96 23.19 
14.08 17.61 
18.99 18.79 
19.43 18.37 
18.33 18.98 
13.85 15.38 
15.23 20.24 
15.01 21.79 
22.54 17.49 
17.56 18.71 
18.17 18.29 
10.22 26.25 
16.39 19.99 
had jumped by 4 and 2 points, thus reducing the external 
balance by more than 5 percentage points. Structural changes in 
Spain and Portugal were also significant. Both countries saw 
increases in the relative weight of public consumption and 
investment at the expense of drastic falls in their external 
balances. The structural change was particularly sharp in 
Portugal, where the share of private consumption increased 5 
points. Finally, the Irish situation is totally different. Its 
external balance has steadily increased from 1985 to 1995, 
compensated by significant falls in other components of 
aggregate demand, especially public and private consumption. 
Indeed, Irish private consumption in 1995 was lower than in 
Japan, whilst investment rates were comparable to Belgium and 
its share of public consumption close to Luxembourg or The 
Netherlands. 
2.3.3. GDP growth, factor accumulation and 
unemployment 
The components of GDP growth 
Table 5 presents the annual average GDP growth rates in the 
triad over the period 1985-95, and decomposes them into three 
components: growth explained by labour accumulation (second 
column), by capital accumulation (third column) and by total 
factor productivity (TFP, fourth column). Total factor 
productivity is the part of growth not explained by factor 
1995 
PRC PC GFCF 
63.26 14.25 18.09 
54.14 24.13 15.58 
64.56 12.26 22.24 
74.71 14.60 23.27 
61.57 16.48 21.86 
59.99 19.12 19.20 
53.01 13.36 15.37 
59.56 17.06 17.59 
62.64 13.19 26.37 
59.34 13.80 20.07 
67.44 16.10 28.62 
62.71 20.51 17.06 
61.86 16.47 19.68 
66.91 15.94 19.42 
58.67 9.54 29.82 
63.17 14.90 21.58 
Table 5 
Components of real GDP growth in the triad, 1985-95 
GDP GDP 
GDP growth growth 
growth explained explained TFP 
by labour by capital 
B 2.19 0.24 0.88 1.08 
DK 1.74 -0.02 0.26 1.49 
D 2.58 0.45 0.82 1.30 
EL 1.54 0.56 0.99 -0.01 
E 2.93 0.89 1.36 0.68 
F 2.16 0.20 0.90 1.07 
IRL 4.75 0.87 0.77 3.11 
I 2.05 -0.12 0.76 1.41 
L 3.44 1.78 1.46 0.20 
NL 2.52 0.80 0.98 0.75 
p 3.11 0.21 1.66 1.25 
UK 2.27 0.17 0.78 1.31 
EUR12 2.35 0.30 0.85 1.19 
USA 2.53 1.11 0.65 0.77 
J 2.96 0.60 1.51 0.85 
Triad 2.53 0.66 0.93 0.94 
Source: AMECO (DG II) and own calculations. 
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accumulation, and is calculated as GDP growth minus the part 
of GDP growth which can be explained by labour and capital 
accumulation combined. Overall, we can say that TFP 
represents efficiency gains. 1 High TFP means that one can 
obtain more output with the same factors. Given the way we 
measure labour (in persons employed) and capital ( capital 
stock), TFP growth represents here the effect on overall growth 
of such changes as hours effectively worked, changes in the 
composition of labour skills, the introduction of new 
investment goods embodying new, more efficient techniques, 
human and knowledge capital accumulation, as well as 
efficiency improvements induced by, for instance, pro-
competitive effects of trade. 
Apart from cyclical factors, which explain some differences 
depending on the subperiod considered, the EU and the USA 
have respectively been growing at an annual average rate of 
2.4% and 2.5% between 1985 and 1995. This is 0.5% per year 
on average lower than the rate recorded by Japan. The USA 
and Japan show lower TFP growth rates than the EU (0.77% in 
the USA and 0.85% in Japan, compared with 1.2% in the EU). 
More than 70% of the Japanese growth registered since 1985 is 
explained by factor accumulation, whilst TFP explains 50% of 
the GDP growth rates in the EU and 30% in the USA. Table 5 
also shows that the contribution of labour to the European 
growth is marginal (0.3% per year), whilst physical capital 
accumulation and TFP account for more than 86% of the 
growth registered during the period of reference. 
Only three European countries, Ireland, Luxembourg and 
Portugal grew by above 3%. These three countries plus Germany 
(2.6% ), Spain (2.9%) and The Netherlands (2.5%) recorded 
growth rates higher than in the EU as a whole. The contribution 
of employment to growth in Spain, Ireland. Luxembourg and 
The Netherlands is comparable to the USA and/or Japan, whilst 
all the Member States, except Denmark, record a contribution of 
physical capital to growth higher than in the USA, (indeed in 
Portugal, even higher than in Japan). Concerning TFP growth, 
four Member States - Greece, where it is negative, Spain, The 
Netherlands and Luxembourg -exhibit lower rates than Japan 
and/or the USA. Finally, it is worth noting that the growth 
recorded in Germany (2.6%) during the decade is mainly due to 
the rates registered during 1988-91 and, especially during the last 
two years of this subperiod, when direct effects of reunification 
boosted growth by more than 5%. Such high GDP growth rates 
in Germany were accompanied by a relatively high TFP growth 
(by 1.3% per year). 
Employment and capital accumulation 
In Japan employment increased by almost I. I% per year 
between 1985 and 1995, and capital stock grew at a rate of 
1 See Kmgman (1996). 
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Table 6 
Employment and capital accumulation in the triad, 1985-95 
Employment Capital 
growth accumulation 
B 0.26 2.64 
DK 0.24 1.37 
D 0.38 2.38 
EL 0.65 2.77 
E 1.12 3.65 
F 0.51 2.27 
IRL 1.36 2.23 
I -0.57 2.25 
L 2.87 3.94 
NL 1.73 2.44 
p 0.71 4.41 
UK 0.36 2.16 
EU 0.39 2.42 
USA 1.51 1.92 
J 1.09 4.81 
Triad 0.94 2.76 
Base year: 1991. 
Source: AMECO (DG ll). 
4.8% per year (see Table 6). The USA, on the contrary, 
registers the highest labour growth rate ( 1.5% ), but the lowest 
capital accumulation rate (1.92% ). The figures for the EU, 
however, show the difficulties of a number of Member States in 
turning growth into jobs, as recognized in the White Paper on 
growth, competitiveness and employment. Employment grew 
in the EU by only 0.4% per year. 
Table 6 also shows major differentials in job creation and in 
physical capital accumulation within the EU. For instance, 
Spain, Ireland, Luxembourg and The Netherlands created 
employment at rates similar or even higher than the USA or 
Japan, and Portugal almost doubled the EU average. However, 
although higher than in the USA, 2 accumulation of physical 
capital was lower in all the Member States than in Japan, 
although it exceeded 3% in Spain, Luxembourg and Portugal. 
Apart from TFP growth, it is capital accumulation (2.4% per 
year) which mainly explains the observed growth in Germany 
during the period, since employment creation was slightly 
below the EU average. 
Productivity and living standards 
The joint evolution of growth and employment determines 
labour productivity growth, which, in turn, is the main 
' Except for Denmark. 
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Table 7 
Productivity and living standards in the triad, 1985-95 
explanatory factor of the standard of living of a country. Living 
standards are usually measured by the GDP per capita, and the 
GDP is measured in purchasing power parities to allow for 
international comparisons. The GDP per capita in the EU grew 
at a rate of 2% per year in constant prices, representing around 
70% of the US GDP per capita in the 1990s. However, living 
standards in Japan grew by 2.5% per year and caught up with 
the European GDP per capita in the early 1980s and still 
continued to rise reaching the level of around 80% of the 
American living standard. 1 
Productivity 
growth 
B l.89 
DK 1.47 
D 2.39 
EL 0.90 
E l.81 
F l.65 
IRL 3.41 
I 2.66 
L 0.60 
NL 0.79 
p 2.40 
UK 1.91 
EU 2.01 
USA 0.97 
1 1.81 
Triad 1.58 
Base year: 199 1. 
Source: AMECO (DG ll ). 
Participation 
rate 
1995 
36.4 
49.9 
42.7 
36.5 
31.3 
38 .8 
34.5 
34.7 
52.5 
43.6 
44.9 
43 .7 
39.4 
48 .1 
51.7 
44.6 
GDP 
per 
capita 
growth 
l.87 
1.49 
2.07 
1.01 
2.71 
1.64 
4.65 
1.94 
2.40 
1.86 
3.17 
l.95 
2.01 
1.51 
2.52 
1.91 
The first column in Table 7 shows apparent labour productivity 
growth rates in the triad. The EU has recorded the highest rate, 
immediately followed by Japan . However, in terms of 
improvement of living standards, the EU is in a middle position 
between the USA and Japan (see last column of Table 7). The 
reason is that GDP per capita can be expressed as the product 
of the level in productivity and the employment to total 
population ratio. Therefore , the rate of growth in living 
standards is equal to the productivity growth rate plus the 
change in this ratio. The share of employment on total 
population has remained on average quite stable in the EU 
between 1985 and 1995 at around 40%, whilst it has been 
growing in the USA (from 45% in 1985 to 48% in 1995) and in 
1 See the Competitiveness Report. 
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Japan (from 48% in 1985 to 52% in 1995). In other words, 
concerning the EU as a whole, although it has performed 
relatively well in terms of growth and productivity, living 
standards have not increased in the same proportion because 
the share of employment in total population in the EU is 
relatively low. 
As far as growth rates in per capita GDP are concerned, 
countries like Spain (2.7% ), Portugal (3.2%) and, especially, 
Ireland (4.65 %), are the Member States which are recording 
the highest rates. It is also worth noting that, as a general rule, 
countries experiencing high growth rates in living standards, 
have also recorded high growth rates in employment. Apart 
from these countries, only Germany and Luxembourg recorded 
higher improvement in living standards than the EU average, 
although in Belgium, France, Italy, The Netherlands and the 
UK per capita GDP grew more than in the USA. 
Unemployment 
Such a relatively poor performance of the EU in creating jobs 
has its counterpart in unemployment figures. Graph 5 shows the 
evolution of unemployment rates in the triad between 1985 and 
1995. Whilst unemployment fell in Japan from 2.6 in 1985 up 
to 2.1 in 1991 and then increased by 1 percentage point to 
represent 3.2% of the active population in 1995, in the EU the 
lowest rate registered (1990) still amounted to 8% and 
increased by almost three points in five years. This structural 
Table 8 
Unemployment rate 
1985 1995 
B 10.1 10.1 
DK 7.1 6.6 
01 7.1 8.5 
EL 7.0 9.0 
E 21.0 22.5 
F 10.1 11.2 
IRL 16.7 14.1 
I 8.3 11.8 
L 2.7 2.2 
NL 7.6 7.3 
p 8.7 7.2 
UK 11.3 8.9 
EU 1 10.3 10.9 
USA 7.1 5.5 
J 2.6 3.2 
Triad 7.7 7.4 
1 1995: including fonncr East Germany. 
Source: AMECO (DG JI). 
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trend of unemployment in the EU contrasts with a rather 
cyclical evolution in the USA, where the unemployment rate 
accounted for 5.5% of the active population in 1995. 
The evolution of unemployment observed in the EU can be 
applied directly to the 12 Member States (see Table 8). Only 
Luxembourg, which registers the lowest unemployment rate in 
the triad, and Denmark, where unemployment is close to the 
USA's, are the exceptions to this rule. Even certain European 
countries, such as Spain or Ireland, which have performed quite 
well in terms of growth and employment growth, present a 
sombre panorama as far as unemployment is concerned. These 
two countries record the highest unemployment rates within the 
EU 22.5% and 14.1 % of the active population are respectively 
unemployed in Spain and Ireland. Looking at the evolution of 
the participation rate 1 it seems quite clear that in those countries 
there is a problem in absorbing an exogenous growing labour 
supply, which is mainly explained by sociological, structuraF 
factors. In other Member States, such as Belgium ( 10.1 % ), 
France ( 11.2%) or Italy ( 11.8%) unemployment rates are above 
10%, and in Germany or the UK the rate is 3 percentage point 
higher than in the USA. 
2.3.4. Inflation, wages and real unit labour costs 
The EU has recorded the highest inflation rate in the triad over 
the decade. Inflation, measured by means of the annual average 
growth rate of the GDP deflator in national currency, amounted 
to 4.4% in the EU, compared with 3.1 % in the USA and 1 % in 
Japan. Such averages are quite representative of the evolution 
between 1985 and 1995. Although, as shown in Graph 6, 
inflation rates have a strong cyclical component, the EU has 
always recorded the highest rates, whilst annual inflation in 
Japan has remained below 2.2%. The same can be said 
concerning nominal wages. However, although it is the EU 
again that shows the highest annual average rates (5.5%, 
against 4.1 % in the USA and 2.9% in Japan), the differences 
are a little bit lower than inflation. In fact, once average wages 
have been deflated by inflation and corrected by productivity to 
obtain real unit labour costs (RULC), the EU does not show the 
poorest performance any longer. RULC decreased in the EU by 
an annual average rate of 0.9%, which contrasts with the annual 
increase of 0.1 % experienced in the USA and Japan. 
Most Member States present the same basic characteristics as 
the EU average (see Table 9). Although Denmark (2.9% ), 
Germany (3% ), France (2.8% ), Ireland (2.6%) and The 
Netherlands (1.6%) have performed better than the USA, their 
1 The difference between the per capita GDP growth rate and the productivity 
growth rate gives the change in the panicipation rate. 
' It is worth remarking that Spain and Ireland show employment growth rates 
comparable to the USA and Japan. 
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1 Table 9 
Inflation, wages and unit Jabour costs rates (in national cur-
rencies) within the triad, 1985-95 
Nominal 
GDP wages RULC 
B 3.1 4.3 -0.5 
DK 2.9 4.2 -0.5 
0 1 3.0 4.5 - 0.7 
EL 15 .1 14.7 -1.0 
E 6.4 6.9 -1.0 
F 2.8 3.6 - 1.0 
IRL 2.6 4.9 -I. I 
I 6.0 7.0 -1.2 
L 4.7 5.1 -0.2 
NL 1.6 2.6 -0.1 
p 11.2 12.5 - 1.5 
UK 4.6 6.6 0.0 
EU 1 4.4 5.5 - 0.9 
USA 3.1 4.1 0.1 
J 1.0 2.9 0.1 
Triad 3.3 4.5 -0.3 
Base year: 199 1. 
I From 199 1: including fom1cr East Germany. 
S011ra: AMECO (DG II ). 
inflation rates are still higher than in Japan. On the other hand, 
certain Member States like Greece (15.1 % ), Spain (6.4% ), Italy 
(6.0%) and Portugal (11.2%) have recorded rather high 
inflation rates . The same applies to the evolution of average 
nominal wages , although now the number of countries 
performing better than the USA is more reduced, just including 
France and The Netherlands. However, once wages have been 
corrected by inflation and productivity, all the European 
countries shows negative rates for RULC. 
2.3.5. Price-competitiveness and trade 
Exchange rates and competitiveness 
One ecu was worth of 0.76 US dollars in 1985. Ten years later, 
Americans had to pay 1.31 dollars to obtain one ecu. This sharp 
appreciation of the ecu against the US dollar by around (72%) 
contrasts with the depreciation with respect to the Japanese 
yen , especially during the last five years of the period of 
reference . The result is that, when measured in ecu as a 
common currency, inflation rates and nominal wages in the 
triad lead to different conclusions (see Table 10) with the EU 
occupying an intermediate position between Japan (5.5% and 
7.5 % per year respectively for the GDP deflator and nominal 
wages measured in ecu) and the USA, where the GDP deflator 
and nominal wages in ecu respectively fell by 1.8% and 0.9% 
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Table 10 
Inflation and wage rates (in ecu) within the triad, 1985-95 
Nominal 
GDP wages 
B 4.7 5.9 
DK 3.8 5.2 
DI 4.8 6.3 
EL 3.7 3.4 
E 4.1 4.5 
F 3.2 4.1 
IRL 1.3 3.6 
I 2.1 3.2 
L 6.3 6.7 
NL 3.4 4.5 
p 6.8 8.0 
UK 1.3 3.2 
EU 1 3.3 4.6 
USA -1.8 -0.9 
J 5.5 7.5 
Triad 1.4 2.6 
Base year: 199 l. 
' From 1991: including former East Germany. 
Source: AMECO (DG II). 
Table 11 
Real effective exchange rate base on ULCE 
1985 1986 1987 1988 
BLEU 91.4 97.9 100 95.8 
DK 84.9 91.2 100 98.1 
D 84.8 94.2 100 96.6 
EL 118.3 101.9 100 104.9 
E 92.9 97.2 100 105.9 
F 95.8 100.4 100 95.6 
IRL 96.0 103.8 100 97.7 
I 89.4 96.3 100 99.7 
NL 90.5 96.4 100 97.2 
p 97.0 99.9 100 100.9 
UK 105.8 99.3 100 109.8 
EU 79.7 91.9 100 98.0 
USA 129.5 110.7 100 95 
J 74 95 100 105.7 
Source: Price and cost competitiveness (DG II). 
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and nominal wages in ecu respectively fell by 1.8% and 0.9% 
per year. 
The evolution of exchange rates within the triad has affected 
the EU competitiveness in external markets. Commission 
services publish on a quarterly basis an analysis on price and 
cost competitiveness. 1 Amongst a wide sample of 
competitiveness indicators, we focus here on the real effective 
exchange rate based on unit labour costs in the total economy 
(REER). Table 11 shows the evolution of the REER of each 
EU country, the EU, USA and Japan relative to 23 industrial 
countries between 1985 and 1995. A country is experiencing 
competitiveness gains when the index decreases and, 
analogously, increases in the REER mean a loss of 
competitiveness. 2 The table shows that the USA has been 
steadily improving its competitiveness since 1985, whilst the 
losses recorded in Japan have mainly taken place since 1991. 
Concerning the EU, although for the whole period a fal! in 
competitiveness can be appreciated, its competitive position 
has improved since 1992. 
1 See European Commission (1996a). Obviously. diagnoses on the evolution of 
price-competitiveness indicators vary depending on the base year used in the 
analysis. Although most analyses start in 1987 (Louvre agreement). here 1985 
has been chosen a the base year for a sake of uniformity in the presentation of 
chapter. 
' See European Commission (1996a) for the technical details. 
Annual figures (index 1987 = JOO) relati\·e lo 23 induscrial countries (/C23} 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
93.6 98.5 99.2 101.6 104.0 108.0 112.0 
94.3 97.7 92.8 94.7 95.5 94.2 98.9 
92.0 93.0 90.1 94.6 98.7 98.2 104.l 
110.7 115.3 104.5 103.5 103.5 109.6 114.3 
111.6 119.7 121.8 123.6 110.2 103.6 105.7 
91.6 94.9 91.4 93.0 95.7 96.0 99.4 
93. l 94.0 89.4 92. l 87.7 87.2 85.7 
102. l 109.7 111.2 108.3 90.3 86.2 78.3 
91.0 91.1 89.3 91.4 94.9 96.2 99.0 
104.1 112.0 124.0 131.6 130.4 129.5 133.2 
112.3 116.5 120.6 116.6 106.1 106.1 100.4 
93.0 104.4 100.4 104.5 92.3 90.7 94.4 
97.3 92 90 87.4 90.1 91 89.3 
98.9 86.9 92.5 95.6 114.6 124.2 129.7 
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Most European countries have experienced more or less 
significant cost-competitiveness losses. Only Ireland and Italy 
are clear exceptions to this rule, whilst Greece and the UK have 
recorded marginal competitiveness gains in 1995 with relation 
to 1985. However, the direct comparison of the two years 
conceals important differences concerning the evolution of the 
REER. There is a group of Member States, which mainly 
includes Belgium, Denmark, Germany, France and The 
Netherlands, whose competitiveness improved until 1991 and 
then fell until 1995. On the contrary, other countries, such as 
Spain, Italy or the UK recorded competitiveness losses during 
the first subperiod and then recovered totally or partially their 
competitive positions between 1991 and 1995. Portugal has 
been steadily losing competitiveness over the whole period, 
whilst Ireland has followed the opposite path. Finally, 
competitiveness has experienced minor changes in Greece. 
Total trade in goods and services 
Table 12 provides the geographical distribution of total exports 
of goods and services within the EU and the triad in 1985, 1990 
and 1995. Figures for the EU countries. as well as for the EU as 
a whole (second block of the table), include both intra and 
extra-EU exports. 1 
There are no clear trends concerning the distribution of total 
exports within the triad. Nevertheless two periods can be 
considered. In the first half of the period the EU gained market 
share at the expense of both the USA and Japan, whilst the 
opposite path is observed between 1990 and 1995. 2 It is worth 
noting that as long as shares have been calculated inclusive of 
intra-EU exports, such an evolution may reflect two effects: the 
well-known increase in intra-EU trade that took place during 
the 1980s, and the purely statistical effect of the changes in the 
reporting system in 1993 (lntrastat), which underestimates 
intra-EU trade flows. 1 In fact, trade within the triad net of intra-
EU trade shows a different picture.4 The USA's share steadily 
grew, whilst the EU' s share fell and Japan's remained more or 
less stable over the whole period. 
Total imports of goods and services (see Table 13) show a 
rather similar evolution, although the changes observed 
between 1985 and 1990 are sharper than for exports. Since 
intra-EU exports should equal to intra-EU imports, such 
changes are also partially due to the strong increase in intra-EU 
1 As we shall see later. statistics on intra and extra-EU trade of goods and 
services are only available up to 1993. 
Such developments are reflecting. of course. the impact of the evolution of 
exchange rates. 
' Sec Box I. 
' Extra-EU trade of goods and services can be found in the statistics on balance 
of payments between 1986 and 1993. 
Table 12 
Total exports of goods and services within the triad 
1985 1990 1995 1 
B 7.95 8.31 8.92 
DK 2.75 2.69 2.60 
D 26.08 28.24 24.85 
EL 0.85 0.82 0.84 
E 4.86 4.92 5.95 
F 16.20 15.79 16.15 
IRL 1.47 1.56 2.09 
I 12.05 12.94 13.41 
L 0.53 0.60 0.70 
NL 10.09 9.00 9.30 
p 0.11 1.29 1.38 
UK 17.06 13.95 13.81 
EU 100 100 100 
EU 61.28 66.37 63.53 
USA 23.32 21.28 22.44 
J 15.40 12.34 14.03 
Triad 100 100 100 
1 Including former East Germany. 
Source: AMECO (DG II). 
Table 13 
Total imports of goods and services within the triad 
1985 1990 1995 1 
B 7.97 8.27 8.75 
DK 2.83 2.36 2.43 
D 24.13 23.91 25.24 
EL 1.50 1.41 1.46 
E 4.61 6.10 6.27 
F 16.33 16.37 15.44 
IRL 1.47 1.46 1.80 
I 12.77 13.27 12.09 
L 0.52 0.61 0.66 
NL 9.64 8.52 8.80 
p 1.13 1.66 1.87 
UK 17.10 16.07 15.19 
EU 100 100 100 
EU 56.96 64.11 61.37 
USA 31.66 24.37 26.43 
J 11.38 11.52 12.20 
Triad 100 100 100 
' Including former East Germany. 
Source: AMECO (DG II). 
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trade during the 1980s and to the introduction of Intrastat. 
However, if only extra-EU imports are considered, one 
simultaneously observes a sharp increase in EU and Japanese 
shares up to 1990, then a significant fall in the share of EU 
exports followed by a more or less equivalent increase in the 
share of the USA. 
The main feature of the evolving relative weight of most 
Member States in total EU trade is that shares within the EU 
are much more stable than shares within the triad. This is a 
clear consequence of lower cyclical differences within the EU. 
The main exceptions are Germany, Ireland, Spain and Portugal 
where the effects of structural factors, such as economic 
integration and reunification, seem very apparent. Portugal 
increased its share of both exports and imports, whilst the 
weights of Ireland and Spain in EU imports have remained 
relatively stable. It is worth noting that such movements 
coincide with the impact of German reunification on trade 
shares. German shares show, as expected, that reunification 
decreased German exports, and increased imports, relative to 
the EU average. For Spain, Portugal and Ireland, once the 
effect of the reunification is taken out, it is clear that accession 
and the SMP have resulted in a higher increase of imports 
relative to exports. 1 
Intra-EU trade 
As far as the effect of the SMP on trade is concerned, one of 
the most interesting questions is the extent to which the SMP 
has increased trade within the EU. This will be analysed in 
detail in Chapter 4, but what can be shown in this overview is 
the evolution of intra-EU trade of goods and services. 
Furthermore, the extent of regionalization due to the SMP can 
be measured by the share of intra-EU trade in total EU trade. 
To focus on intra-EU trade one has to rely on alternative 
statistical sources such as the balance of payments, which are 
not directly comparable with the AMECO databank and only 
provide homogeneous data between 1986 and 1993 for all 
Member States. Tables 14 and 15 show that the evolution of 
intra-EU trade within the EU followed quite similar paths. 
Again, intra-EU shares are quite stable, except for Germany, 
Ireland, Spain and Portugal. In the last three countries, 
economic integration boosted both imports and exports, whilst 
in Germany reunification decreased intra-EU exports and 
increased intra-EU imports. 
Table 16 provides some indicators of the degree of 
regionalization in the EU during the SMP. It shows the 
evolution of imports from (exports to) EU countries relative to 
1 The evolution of trade shares within the EU in the second half of the period 
may also be reflecting differences across Member States in biases indiced by 
Intrastat. 
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Table 14 
Intra-EU exports of goods and services within the EU 
1986 
BLEU 10.7 
DK 2.4 
D 24.8 
EL 1.0 
E 5.2 
F 16.4 
IRL 1.9 
I 12.3 
NL 12.6 
p 1.2 
UK 11.6 
EU JOO 
' Including former East Germany. 
Source: Balance of payments. 
Table 15 
1990 1993 1 
10.7 10.7 
2.3 2.5 
23.5 21.4 
0.9 0.9 
5.8 6.3 
17.1 17.4 
1.9 2.3 
12.9 12.5 
11.8 12.4 
1.6 1.8 
11.5 11.7 
100 100 
Intra-EU imports of goods and services within the EU 
1986 1990 1993 1 
BLEU 10.4 JO. I 10.0 
DK 3.0 2.2 2.3 
D 22.3 21.5 22.5 
EL 1.3 1.3 1.4 
E 4.0 6.2 6.2 
F 17.7 17.6 17.1 
IRL 1.8 1.8 2.0 
I 12.6 13.5 11.7 
NL 10,7 9.5 10.3 
p 1.2 1.9 2.5 
UK 14.7 13.9 13.4 
EU JOO 100 100 
1 Including former East Gem,any. 
Source: Balance of payments. 
total imports (exports). In order to avoid the statistical 
complications imposed by changes in the reporting system of 
intra-EU trade, the analysis focused on 1986-92." The US share 
of exports to EU countries in total exports remained relatively 
stable, whilst Japan's significantly increased. However, the 
share of imports by EU countries in total imports has not 
As shown in Table 14 1993 is already available. However. data for this year 
are not comparable with the previous ones. The fact that the shares of both 
exports and imports fall in all the Member States reveals that the changes 
observed in 1993 are a purely statistical artefact. 
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Table 16 
Intra-EU trade in goods and services as a % of total trade in 
goods and services 
Export 1986 1990 1992 1993 
B 70.1 72.7 73.0 71.2 
DK 43.1 44.8 48.3 47.4 
DI 48.9 51.4 52.6 48.7 
EL 49.5 54.2 53.2 53.3 
E 61.0 68.2 68.8 66.5 
F 53.0 58.3 58.9 57.0 
IRL 69.9 69.7 69.6 69.8 
I 53.3 57.2 57.l 53.5 
NL 72.0 74.4 73.9 71.4 
p 64.8 70.0 71.8 73.8 
UK 42.7 47.7 50.9 47.8 
EU 1 54.0 57.9 59.1 56.5 
USA 24.4 26.0 25.4 23.7 
J 14.9 18.8 18.4 15.8 
Triad 42.1 46.3 46.3 42.9 
Import 1986 1990 1992 1993 
B 69.4 69.5 69.0 67.3 
DK 51.6 48.7 48.3 49.8 
D' 50.5 50.5 50.8 47.8 
EL 56.4 57.7 60.2 59.8 
E 51.4 58.8 60.0 58.8 
F 58.6 59.0 58.1 57.4 
IRL 70.1 69.4 69.0 69.1 
I 56.9 58.2 56.6 55.1 
NL 64.0 64.3 65.0 62.0 
p 58.9 68.2 72.9 74.4 
UK 51.3 50.8 51.2 48.7 
EU 1 56.3 57.0 56.9 55.1 
USA 21.9 21.0 20.2 20.2 
J 12.8 17.3 13.7 14.6 
Triad 41.8 43.9 43.8 41.0 
' From 1991: including former East Germany. 
Source: Balance of payments. 
changed within the triad. In other words, European countries 
have become more and more open as destination markets for 
triad exports, whilst the share of imports by the EU has evolved 
on average in the same way that total imports between 1985 
and 1992. 
Since, for the EU as a whole, intra-EU exports equal intra-EU 
imports, Table 16 indicates that European producers found it 
relatively more easy to increase their penetration of EU markets 
than external markets. Simultaneously, access to European 
markets is rather similar for European producers and third-
country producers. In consequence, 1986-93 data could indicate 
that the SMP 1 has lead to net trade creation. Something rather 
similar can be observed in most Member States, except Spain 
and Portugal where trade with other EU countries grew much 
more than total trade. 
2.3.6. The sectoral structure of European economies 
This section attempts to give some indicators of the evolution 
of the sectoral structure of the triad economies between the 
1980s and the 1990s. We consider the whole economy as made 
up of six broad sectors: agriculture, energy, manufacturing, 
construction, market services and non-market services. We 
analyse and compare the relative weights of these six sectors in 
the triad with a view to identifying the main structural changes 
taking place. Furthermore, since the SMP mainly affected 
manufacturing and market services we will be in a position to 
provide rough measures of the size of the single market and its 
evolution. Since the SMP does not affect all manufacturing and 
market services sectors, such measures can only provide an 
upper-bound of the size of the single market. 
The sectoral structure of the economies in the triad 
Tables 17 and 18 show the distribution of total employment, 
gross value added (GVA) and investment among the six sectors 
at the beginning and the end of period of reference. 2 
Concerning GV A, compared with the USA, the only triad 
member for which homogeneous data exist, the EU showed a 
relatively low specialization in market services and energy at 
the beginning of the period, whilst the relative share of other 
sectors was higher in the EU than in the USA. On the other 
hand, Japan presented a relatively high specialization in 
manufacturing, and the share of market services was higher 
than in the EU. This relative distribution of GVA has not much 
changed during the period. However, we can appreciate a 
significant increase of the relative weight of market services in 
the EU, which reached the same level as in Japan, whilst the 
share of manufacturing fell by two percentage points (but 
remained quite stable in Japan). 
1 This is consistent with the main empirical findings concerning trade creation 
and trade diversion analysed in Chapter 4. 
' The lack of complete data from 1992 prevents us from providing the actual 
changes taking place between 1985 and 1995. Tables 16 and 17 compare the 
average weight of each sector for the period 1983-85 with the average weigh! 
for the period 1990-92. Since we are carrying out structural comparisons, 
changes observed between these two periods may be good approximations to 
the actual changes which occurred between 1985 and 1995. 
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Table 17 
Weight of sectors in total economy, 1983-85 
Employment 
Agriculture Energy Manufacturing Building Market services Non-MS 
B 0.4 1.9 24.8 6.0 39.1 27.9 
DK 2.2 0.8 22.1 6.1 32.6 36.2 
D 1.0 2.1 33.6 7.7 33.7 21.9 
EL 2.2 2.1 25.3 9.5 35.5 25.3 
E 6.6 1.9 28.2 7.9 35.6 19.8 
F 1.7 1.5 25.4 7.1 35.6 28.6 
IRL 2.7 2.0 25.0 9.0 32.1 29.3 
I 5.2 1.2 28.8 7.7 31.1 25.9 
L 0.7 0.7 27.1 9.5 45.5 16.0 
NL 1.8 1.6 20.9 7.3 49.1 19.3 
p 5.1 1.3 31.5 12.2 27.3 22.5 
UK 1.6 2.6 22.6 5.1 46.8 21.3 
EU 2.5 1.9 27.3 7.1 37.2 23.9 
USA 1.8 1.6 20.I 4.6 53.1 18.7 
J NA NA 27.8 NA 47.6 NA 
Triad NA NA 24.7 NA 45.3 NA 
Value added 
Agriculture Energy Manufacturing Building Market services Non-MS 
B 2.5 3.1 22.7 5.6 48.8 15.4 
DK 5.8 1.5 19.4 5.7 43.9 22.9 
D 1.9 3.0 29.3 6.0 43.8 14.l 
EL 17.3 3.3 18.6 6.5 37.7 15.6 
E 6.3 2.8 25.4 7.0 43.5 11.9 
F 4.2 3.1 21.9 5.8 45.5 17.9 
IRL 10.9 3.5 31.3 6.9 36.0 18.3 
I 4.8 2.7 24.7 6.6 46.2 12.9 
L 2.2 1.3 25.4 4.9 54.1 I 1.3 
NL 4.2 7.9 17.3 5.1 49.3 12.7 
p 7.8 1.4 27.4 6.1 43.3 12.1 
UK• 1.7 7.7 23.7 5.8 42.1 15.7 
EU 3.6 3.9 24.6 6.0 44.5 15.0 
USA 2.3 5.9 22.4 4.3 54.1 I 1.3 
J NA NA 28.6 NA 48.0 NA 
Triad NA NA 24.2 NA 49.9 NA 
Investment 
Agriculture Energy Manufacturing Building Market services Non-MS 
B 2.5 7.0 19.8 1.5 52.9 16.2 
DK 6.5 9.3 14.2 3.3 54.2 12.5 
D 2.8 7.0 17.7 1.3 58.6 12.6 
EL 5.9 12.6 13.8 NA 46.1 21.5 
E 4.0 14.4 JO.I 0.9 51.8 12.4 
F 3.6 7.2 14.0 2.7 58.5 14.0 
IRL 8.8 8.8 18.9 2.7 53.4 7.5 
I 6.7 5.1 17.4 2.9 57.8 JO.I 
L 4.4 3.2 22.1 1.9 44.5 23.9 
NL 5.0 6.1 16.2 1.7 58.6 13.9 
p 3.9 8.7 22.3 3.2 49.3 12.6 
UK 2.1 11.9 13.0 I.I 62.3 9.9 
EUR 101 3.9 7.5 16.0 2.0 58.6 12.1 
USA 2.0 5.4 17.8 0.8 58.6 15.4 
J 6.1 8.2 20.1 2.5 44.4 18.5 
Triad 3.5 6.7 17.8 1.5 55.3 15.2 
1 Excluding: EL, E. 
Source: BOS. 
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Table 18 
Weight of sectors in total economy, 1990-92 
Employment 
Agriculture Energy Manufacturing Building Market services Non-MS 
B 0.4 I. I 22.6 6.5 42.8 26.6 
DK 2.0 0.8 21.6 6.0 34.0 35.6 
D 0.9 I. 7 32.4 6.8 36.6 21.7 
EL 1.6 2.3 23.5 7.6 36.1 29.1 
E 4.3 1.4 24.8 9.9 33.8 25.7 
F 1.4 1.2 21.9 6.8 39.5 29.3 
IRL 2.7 1.7 24.7 7.3 32.6 30.4 
I 4.5 1.2 26.2 7.0 34.3 26.8 
L 1.1 0.6 20.4 10.5 52.4 15.0 
NL 1.7 1.3 19.6 7.4 53.8 16.3 
p 5.4 1.3 32.2 7.8 27.9 25.4 
UK 1.3 1.6 18.6 4.8 50.7 23.1 
EU 2.1 1.4 24.9 6.8 40.0 24.9 
USA 1.7 1.2 16.9 4.5 57.3 18.4 
J 0.2 0.1 26.5 1.0 51.8 20.5 
Triad 1.6 I. I 22.1 4.7 49.1 21.5 
Value added 
Agriculture Energy Manufacturing Building Market services Non-MS 
B 1.9 4.2 20.9 5.7 53.9 13.4 
DK 4.1 2.9 18.5 5.5 46.5 22.6 
D 1.3 3.9 28.6 5.5 47.4 13.2 
EL 15.3 4.2 15.8 7.0 40.7 17.1 
E 4.3 6.0 20.8 9.6 44.9 14.5 
F 3.2 4.1 20.4 5.4 50.3 16.6 
IRL 7.9 2.7 30.3 5.3 41.3 15.8 
'I 3.3 5.5 21.6 5.9 49.7 14.0 
L 1.6 1.5 23.8 7.3 51.5 14.3 
NL 4.1 6.5 18.0 5.4 55.0 11.0 
p 5.4 3.9 25.2 5.2 44.9 15.5 
UK 1.5 5.9 21.1 6.2 49.8 15.6 
EU 2.8 4.8 22.8 6.0 49.0 14.7 
USA 2.2 3.9 18.9 4.1 57.8 13.1 
J 2.2 3.3 27.6 9.5 49.5 7.8 
Triad 2.4 4.1 22.4 6.1 52.4 12.5 
Investment 
Agriculture Energy Manufacturing Building Market services Non-MS 
B 1.6 4.6 26.4 2.1 58.0 7.2 
DK 5.4 7.7 15.5 2.7 57.5 11.5 
D 2.2 4.7 19.5 1.6 60.7 I 1.4 
EL 3.4 6.4 17.9 NA NA 15.6 
E NA NA NA NA NA NA 
F 2.7 4.1 15.8 2.3 59.9 15.3 
IRL 10.7 4.2 18.5 2.2 58.4 6.1 
I 5.4 5.3 18.1 2.5 59.2 9.4 
L 2.4 2.6 14.7 2.0 59.8 18.5 
NL 4.8 4.9 14.1 1.7 62.8 11.8 
p 4.5 0.8 21.1 5.5 49.9 11.0 
UK 1.2 10.7 12.6 0.7 63.3 11.6 
EUR 101 3.1 5.6 17.2 1.9 60.4 11.7 
USA 2.0 5.4 15.9 0.7 55.1 20.8 
J NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Triad NA NA NA NA NA NA 
' Excluding: EL. E. 
Source: BDS. 
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Similar features are found in the sectoral distribution of labour. 
However, by comparing sectoral shares in GV A and in labour, 
it becomes apparent that market services are less labour-
intensive' in the EU than in the USA and Japan. 2 As expected, 
such low labour intensity in EU market services in the EU is 
accompanied by the highest capital intensity in the triad. 
During the reference period EU market services showed a 
relative investment to GV A ratio higher than in the USA or 
Japan. 
When looking at the Member States we can observe similar 
trends towards a higher weight of market services. 
Nevertheless, Tables 17 and 18 show a great degree of 
heterogeneity within the EU. Whilst in certain countries, like 
the UK, The Netherlands, Belgium, France or Luxembourg, the 
sectoral distribution is comparable to the one observed in the 
USA or Japan, other Member States, like Ireland, Spain, 
Portugal or Greece, present a share of market services, far from 
the EU average. Differences between European countries and 
the USA and Japan are even more evident regarding the 
distribution of employment. In all Member States the share of 
market services in employment is lower than in the USA, 
although in the UK, The Netherlands and Luxembourg it is 
higher than in Japan. Furthermore in almost all European 
countries the share of non-market3 services is higher than in the 
USA or Japan. Another common feature concerning market 
services in EU countries is that their share of investment is 
higher than their share in GV A and that, as long as investment 
is an indicator of capital intensity, market services in Member 
States are on average more capital intensive4 than in the other 
1 A rough measure of relative labour intensity is obtained by means of the ratio 
between the employment and the GV A shares. 
Sec Buigues cl al. ( 1993 ). 
·' Which includes a numhcr of services provided by the public sector. 
' And lower labour-intensity. 
Box 1: Statistical problems with trade series since 1 January 
1993 
An accurate assessment of changes in international trade from 1993 
on is difficult because of a new reporting system (lntrastat) which 
was introduced at the beginning of 1993 in connection with the start 
of the single market. According to the new system, cross-border 
transactions within the EU are no longer recorded by customs 
offices but instead reported directly by companies to statistical 
offices. (Trade with countries outside the EU continues to be 
recorded by customs). Only transactions exceeding a certain 
minimum value, which can vary from country to country. need to be 
reported. There have been many teething problems with the new 
system which have led to unusually long delays in the publication of 
the trade statistics and to perceived biases in the measured trade 
flows. In general, the volume of trade appears to have been 
underestimated. 
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two triad members, which is clearly linked to relatively higher 
labour costs and apparent labour productivity in EU market 
services within the triad.5 
On the size of the single market 
Although the SMP spreads its effects directly or indirectly over 
the whole economy, manufacturing and market services are the 
two sectors most directly concerned. To simplify the analysis 
we focus in this chapter on the share of these two sectors in 
terms of GV A. The joint share of manufacturing and market 
services in the EU GDP recorded the highest growth in the triad 
during implementation of the SMP. At the beginning of the 
period, manufacturing and market services represented around 
69% of EU GDP (76.5% in the USA and 76.69'c in Japan). In 
the last years available, the share jumped to almost 729'c in EU, 
but remained relatively stable in the USA (77%) and Japan 
(77% ). However, although the relative growth of these two 
sectors in EU GDP is evident, it is difficult at this stage to link 
it with the SMP, since the EU showed the lowest share at the 
beginning of the period. Therefore, apart from the SMP, other 
structural factors may explain this relative evolution. 
As expected, structural changes taking place in the Member 
States are rather heterogeneous and do not show clear links 
with the SMP. Although many countries, such as Belgium, 
Germany, France, The Netherlands and the UK, followed the 
same path as the EU average, in Greece, Italy and Portugal the 
joint shares of manufacturing and market services remained 
quite stable. However, shares in Luxembourg (which were 
especially high in 1985) and Spain decreased. In both cases, 
such a fall is coincidental with an almost equivalent increase in 
non-market services. 
' See also Buigues et al. (1993 ). 
The nature of the bias appears to differ between intra- and extra-EU 
trade flows. The former seem to be systematically biased 
downwards, but the extent of the bias probably varies across 
Member States. Extra-EU flows are affected differently. Here the 
main problem seems to be with Belgium and the Netherlands. on 
the one hand, and with France and Germany on the other. Due to the 
transit activity of the ports of Antwerp and Rotterdam. trade 
statistics overestimate the actual exports (imports) originating in 
(destined for) the former and underestimate those of the latter since 
1993. 
Thus the international trade data of EU Member States are probably 
surrounded with a relatively large margin of uncertainty. In any 
case, the introduction of Intrastat has affected the comparability of 
the data for EU countries in 1993 with those of previous years. 
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Chapter 3 
Methodology for an evaluation of 
the internal market programme 
3.1. Introduction 
Assessing the economic impact of a wide-ranging economic 
policy such as the single market programme poses a 
challenging methodological problem for economic analysis. 
The difficulty of the task was recognized at the time of the 
Cecchini report, which already carried out an ex ante 
evaluation of the potential effects of the SMP. As argued 
below , the ex post analysis faces even more difficult 
methodological questions. 
Assessing the SMP encountered two principal problems. The 
first related to the microeconomic nature of the SMP and to the 
fact that it affects the decisions of a large number of individual 
firms and consumers throughout the entire European economy. 
The second problem referred to the type and number of 
regulatory measures covered by the SMP, which runs the whole 
range from the elimination of border controls to the 
harmonization of standards in certain industries. 
;rhe ex ante Cecchini exercise tackled these problems by using 
a variety of methods based on state-of-the-art economic 
analysis of the time . 'The Economics of 1992' (European 
Economy, No 35, March 1988) constituted essentially an 
ex ante 'comparative statics ' assessment of the policy change, 
based on a number of model-based techniques, complemented 
with conventional survey and case study analyses. The general 
approach and the methods that were used are briefly reviewed 
in section 2. 
The qualitative and quantitative economic evaluation presented 
in this volume raises methodological challenges that very often 
go beyond those experienced in the preparation of the 1988 
report. Section 3 briefly discusses how the present evaluation 
expands the general approach used in the earlier report by 
incorporating recent contributions to economic analysis. It al so 
outlines the new methods that have been used in the 
background reports for this volume. 
3.2. The economics of 1992 
The general objective of the ex ante study on 'The economics 
of 1992 ' was to get a deeper understanding of the channels 
through which the removal of market barriers may result in 
economic gains and to quantify these potential gains. 
The analysis in the 1988 report focused almost entirely on 
static allocation effects , adding to classical analysis on 
comparative advantage an innovative approach that highlighted 
economies of scale and imperfect competition. The removal of 
barriers implied by the SMP was expected to produce an 
improved allocation of resources through the fuller exploitation 
of comparative advantage and specialization. In addition, in 
many sectors of the European economy the SMP was expected 
to improve efficiency via rationalization of production 
associated with a fuller exploitation of scale economies. Great 
emphasis was laid on efficiency gains from economies of scale 
at the plant or firm level associated with the size of the EU 
market. However, as economies of scale inevitably lead to 
concentration in production, the report also emphasized the 
potential impact of the SMP on competition. It indicated that 
the removal of barriers was likely to produce strong 'pro-
competitive' effects, while also emphasizing the need for a 
strong Community competition policy . Provided greater 
competition was obtained, the lower production costs 
associated with the efficiency gains from the SMP were to 
translate into lower consumption prices. 
Clearly , the potential efficiency gains from the SMP required 
the reallocation of resources within the EU: reallocation within 
and across firms, reallocation within and across sectors, and 
reallocation within and across regions or even Member States. 
Such reallocation would imply more or less adjustment costs 
depending on its nature and on the functioning of labour and 
capital markets . Thus, in the short term the SMP was likely to 
create unemployment. As the report indicated: 'Let there be no 
mistake, the [SMP] is a medium-term therapy; it will take time 
for its benefits to become apparent, and patience and political 
determination will be required if we are not to change course' . 
The ex ante study distinguished between three categories of 
impact. First , the direct and short-run effects of removing 
barriers, which were expected to affect principally the price of 
traded goods and to be relatively small. Second, the indirect 
effects on efficiency and costs, which were to result from 
enhanced competition and were to effect cost and efficiency. 
They were supposed to be higher than the direct and short-term 
effect. Finally , the medium to long-term effects and the 
dynamic impact, which were to result from the positive impact 
of increased competition and market size on innovation and 
technological progress. These were dubbed as ' dynamic 
effects ' because they effect the long-term potential growth rate 
of the economy. They were potentially the most important 
e ffects, since, although they were to emerge only gradually , 
they provided cumulative economic gains. 
The importance of the short-term effects were judged to depend 
in part on the speed of adjustment. As the authors of the 
Cechinni report indicated, 'it takes several years , however, to 
move to this new situation (the new equilibrium involving a 
once-and-for-all increase in the level of economic welfare) and 
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the time path may in reality be influenced by cyclical macro-
economic conditions'. 
Moreover, in the short term, the static effects dominate, 
whereas in the medium to long term, the importance of the 
dynamic effects will increase, although there is inevitably 
greater uncertainty about the size of these longer-term impacts. 
The ex ante study therefore concluded that 'the benefits of the 
internal market programme are likely to be progressively 
bigger as the time horizon for the analysis is extended .... 
However, the technical difficulty of the analysis and the margin 
of error surrounding quantitative estimates also increase .... If 
the analyses were stopped at the most easily observable (direct, 
short term) effects, it would give a serious understatement of 
the programme's likely effects'. 
The ex ante report was based on five evaluation methods. The 
first was a business survey in which enterprises were requested 
to give their opinion about the costs of the various barriers 
impeding their activity. 
The second approach involved microeconomic case studies of 
the cost of barriers in different industries. 
The third method was based on partial-equilibrium models that 
tried to estimate the impact of the SMP on economic welfare, 
distinguishing between consumers, producers and government. 
These models used inputs from the microeconomic studies to 
provide a more complete overview of the impact. The results of 
the partial equilibrium exercises were aggregated to provide an 
approximation of the total aggregate or macroeconomic impact. 
A fourth method involved macroeconomic models. The 
microeconomic methods gave a description of the potential 
final equilibrium for many markets in the economy, but this had 
to be complemented with macroeconomic models which could 
capture the interaction between the changes introduced by the 
SMP and the evolution of macroeconomic variables and 
macroeconomic policies. Using this approach, the economic 
consequences of the SMP (GDP, consumer prices. 
employment, public deficit, external balance) were presented 
according to different scenarios depending on the 
accompanying economic policy measures. 
A final methodology referred to the dynamic effects of the 
SMP. The partial equilibrium microeconomic studies and the 
macroeconomic models focused on 'comparative statics' 
analysis, ignoring the dynamic effects of the SMP in terms of 
enhanced technological progress and innovation. The report 
attempted to provide some crude estimates of these effects. 
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3.3. The ex post economic evaluation 
The ex post evaluation of the SMP undertaken in this report 
poses new methodological problems which were not present at 
the time of the ex ante evaluation. 
The basic methodological challenge of an ex post evaluation 
involves isolating the effects of the SMP from many other 
economic disturbances and policy shocks - such as the 
economic cycle or German unification - that effected the 
European economy in recent years. The systemic and 
multifaceted nature of the SMP mentioned above make it 
extremely difficult to control properly for factors other than 
those under evaluation. 
A second problem of the present ex post evaluation is that it 
cannot be fully an ex post analysis of the SMP because of the 
very short time that has elapsed since the completion of the 
programme. The very nature of the 1992 programme, and its 
gradual implementation, imply that its effects will only be fully 
observed throughout the economy a few years after the 
programme is completed. Events up to 1996 cannot incorporate 
the full impact of the programme, and, as a consequence, any 
assessment at this point in time has to be considered as partial 
and preliminary. This is all the more the case in view of the fact 
available statistics only permit analysis up to 1994. 
Finally, almost 10 years have elapsed since the launching of the 
SMP. Over this period, the understanding of the implications of 
economic integration has been significantly improved due to 
new theoretical insights and empirical evidence obtained by 
researchers world-wide. This report is based upon the general 
framework put forward in 'The Economics of 1992 ·. but 
incorporates new perspectives from economic theory and relies, 
where appropriate, on recent empirical evidence produced 
elsewhere. The new theoretical contributions are briefly 
reviewed next. 
According to the most recent economic thinking, the SMP can 
be expected to produce three types of economic effects: 
allocation effects, accumulation effects and location effects. 
The first consists of the impact of integration on the static, short 
run allocation of resources, i.e. on economic efficiency. As 
argued above, this was the main focus of the Cechinni report. 
The second effect encompasses the impact on the accumulation 
of productive factors and covers both medium and long-run 
growth effects. The third effect refers to the geographical 
allocation of resources across Member States and/or regions of 
the EU. Both accumulation and location effects have been 
analysed in this report. 
The accumulation and location effects are likely to require a 
longer time span to materialize than the allocation effects. The 
SMP should boost accumulation, and thereby contribute to 
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higher growth rates in the EU, in two manners. On one hand, 
the static, efficiency gains of the SMP translate into higher 
incomes, which may generate higher investment and raise 
growth in the medium term. On the other, the SMP could 
improve the benefits and reduce the costs of producing new 
innovations in the EU, which would boost growth in the long 
run. The SMP is also likely to affect the geographical 
distribution of production within the EU. The economic 
literature has noted that the degree of specialization in Europe 
is far below what is observed in the United States. Some 
ascribe this situation to the existence of trade barriers in Europe 
and predict, therefore, that the SMP could increase 
geographical specialization in the EU. 
Related to the issues of growth and location is the question of 
the impact of the SMP on real convergence between the 
Member States and the regions of the EU. The expected effect 
of the SMP on convergence is ambiguous. On one hand, the 
SMP should favour convergence of per capita income levels 
across Member States via greater mobility of goods, services, 
capital and labour. On the other, increased geographical 
specialization could lead to increased polarization between 
richer and poorer countries or regions. Obviously, the purpose 
of the enhanced Community regional policy is to tilt the 
balance in favour of the former outcome. 
With regard to the conventional allocation effects, this report 
incorporates some new perspectives on the impact of 
i~tegration on trade flows. Recent developments in the 
economic literature suggest that the traditional division 
between intra- and inter-industry trade is insufficient. It is 
useful, for classifying trade flows, to distinguish products on 
the basis of price and quality, i.e. to recognize the existence of 
vertical differentiation. This approach has several advantages: 
it offers a useful empirical approximation of observed intra-
industry trade flows at the product level, it can explain the 
specialization of countries along different price-quality ranges 
and it has important implications in terms of the adjustment 
costs resulting from changing patterns of trade. 
The analysis of the impact of economic integration on the 
efficiency of firms and the extent of competition has also made 
substantive progress over recent years. Economists understand 
better today that supply-side economic policies such as the 
SMP prompt strategic reactions by market participants, in 
particular large firms and governments. The SMP changes the 
rules of the game in many markets, promoting new entry and 
competition in some, triggering exit and restructuring in others. 
Faced with such a structural change, firms and governments do 
not remain passive. Instead, they react to the new environment. 
Therefore, changes in the structure of markets in the final 
equilibrium, and the extent to which efficiency gains are 
achieved and passed on to consumers, is the result of a complex 
strategic game. Recent advances in economic analysis also 
show that the final outcome depends to a large extent on the 
extent to which firms invest in intangible assets and on the 
evolution of EU policies which complement the SMP, such as 
competition and trade policy. 
As for methods, the current report relies on a broad set of 
studies which for the most follow the methodologies used for 
the ex ante analysis. The main innovation has been the use of 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) models. The main 
advantage of CGE models is that they are based on clear 
microeconomic foundations. This means that these models 
trace the effects of policy changes on the whole economy in a 
consistent fashion. That is, taking into account the constraint 
imposed by the availability of factors of production on the 
sectoral allocation of resources. 
Finally, the ex post assessment benefits from the availability of 
observed data for the period under investigation, and this 
means that the box of tools of the analyst has included on this 
occasion a wider use of econometric and statistical techniques. 
Nevertheless, for the reasons presented above, the tentative 
nature of the exercise remains. In the ex ante exercise, the 
question asked was a hypothetical one: What are the potential 
gains associated with implementing the SMP? In the present 
ex post analysis, the question is: What have been the gains 
afforded by the implementation of the SMP? 
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Chapter 4 
Trade and FDI specialization 
effects of the single market 
programme 
4.1. Introduction 
This chapter analyses the extent to which the single market 
programme (SMP) has changed the specialization of the 
Member States , in terms of both trade and FDI. Trade 
expansion is held to be welfare-increasing because less 
efficient domestic production is replaced by imports produced 
more efficiently. The SMP, by removing trade barriers between 
countries , was expected to expand trade among EU Member 
States and thereby improve welfare. There was clearly a 
possibility that increased trade amongst the Member States 
could be at the expense of trade with third countries or, on the 
other hand, that the SMP could have the effect of improving 
market access for third country imports into the EU market, 
thus to some extent reducing the welfare gains for the EU. The 
expected impact of the SMP on foreign direct investment is 
complex. On one hand, because the single market lowers cross-
border trade costs , it could increase trade relative to FDI. 
Conversely , for Member States whose locational advantages 
are s ignificantly improved by the SMP (because of market 
integration and the dynamic impact on economic growth), FDI 
will increase relative to trade. 
The chapter is divided in two sections: the first one looking at 
the trade issue and the second one at FDI. In each section, we 
fir st di scu ss the expected theoretical impact of removing 
barriers in the development of trade within the EU , then we 
analyse the main trade (FDI) indicators of evolving market 
integration. The question we want to answer is to what extent 
there is any evidence of changing patterns in terms of trade 
(FDI) throughout the EU between 1985 and 1995. Finally , on 
the basis of the theoretical framework, which determines the 
conditions under which the SMP was expected to change the 
EU' s trade (FDI), we assess the extent to which the removal of 
trade barriers due to the SMP explains the observed changes in 
the patterns of trade (FDI). 
4.2. Trade 
4.2.1. Expected impact of the single market programme 
The removal of non-tariff barriers and the completion of the 
SMP has important implication s for trade patterns. The 
theoretical effects of economic integration have been well 
known for a long time, 1 and the basic tools to analyse these 
effects can be found as far back as Viner ( 1950), who coined 
the concepts of trade creation and trade diversion . The SMP 
will expand trade amongst Member States as they remove trade 
barriers with each other (trade creation) . Furthermore, 
depending on the relative importance of remaining external 
trade barriers, one could also expect increasing trade amongst 
partners at the expense of trade with third countries (trade 
diversion). 
With regard to integration, changes in the composition of trade 
also matter. The gains from economic integration differ 
depending on the type of trade . Trade in different products 
(inter-industry) between countries brings efficiency gains, but it 
could also entail redistributive implications and adjustment 
costs since production could remain only in the most efficient 
producer country and disappear in the others. On the other 
hand, trade in similar products (intra-industry) benefits the 
consumer by providing a much wider variety of products, 
whilst adjustment costs are lower as the geographical 
distribution of production does not change drastically. Finally, 
however, for certain sectors with increasing returns to scale, 
integration may change the spatial organization of the 
production process, also affecting the location of demand, 
which could lead to changes in the spatial distribution of 
welfare within the integrated area. 
4.2.1 .1. Trade creation and trade diversion 
The SMP will lead to internal trade creation if the removal of 
trade barriers within the EU replaces local production by intra-
EU imports. Analogously, the SMP will result in internal trade 
diversion if remaining extra-EU trade barriers lead to switching 
from third countries to intra-EU imports. On the other hand, we 
can find evidence of external trade creation and diversion when 
the removal of trade barriers within the EU leads to lower 
external trade barriers in a Member State that formerly had 
higher external barriers and when domestic production and 
intra-EU imports, respectively, are replaced by extra-EU 
imports. Finally, there exists the possibility of trade 
suppression when the SMP allows certain EU firms to exploit 
economies of scale and expand domestic production at the 
expense of both intra and extra-EU imports. 
Although the effects described above implicitly refer to the 
direct impact of import prices on trade flows, in theory it is not 
difficult to extend the analysi s to changes in trade patterns 
ari sing from competition, scale and dynamic effects of the 
1 Vin e r ( 195 0 ) . Lipsey ( 1957). Bal assa ( 196 1 ). Mayes ( 1978) and . mos t 
rece ntl y. Bald win and Venables ( 1995) arc some relevant references of more 
than fo ur decades of subsequent research in thi s area. 
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SMP. 1 The only difference is that the a prion impacts 
concerning trade creation become more ambiguous. Theoretical 
findings of international trade models under imperfect 
competition,2 suggest that further changes in trade patterns can 
result if the increase in market size induces higher competition 
amongst firms, permits the exploitation of large economies of 
scale and/or changes the number of varieties sold in any 
industrial sector. 1 The removal of non-tariff barriers could 
increase intra-EU trade as long as liberalization cuts price-cost 
margins within the EU and leads to larger-scale production by 
fewer firms. On the other hand, if higher market integration 
reduces the room for market power so that firms become price 
takers, the reduction in price-cost margins could make partner-
country markets less attractive, thus reducing intra-EU trade 
(negative trade creation). However, there is less ambiguity 
about trade diversion. The cutting of price-cost margins and 
larger-scale production will improve EU-based firms' 
competitiveness and generate trade diversion. As regards 
dynamic effects, they stem from recent developments of 
endogenous growth theories, which foresee effects of 
integration on saving, investment and growth and, thus, on 
trade flows. 4 If integration leads to increased income, saving 
and investment in the EU, then both intra- and extra-EU trade 
will increase.' 
4.2.1.2. Intra- versus inter-industry trade 
Since the 1960s, economists have been aware that the bulk of 
contemporary international trade takes place between similar 
countries, which trade similar products (intra-industry trade -
IIT). Such empirical evidence questioned the conventional 
view of international trade, based on differences between 
countries producing goods under constant returns, and led to 
the development of the new theory of trade, which 
complements comparative advantage with trade under 
imperfect competition. From the perspective of the theory of 
economic integration under imperfect competition, the SMP 
would lead to an increase of intra-industry trade between the 
more developed Member States. 
The effects of the SMP and economic integration on trade are 
therefore complex. In the traditional analysis of international 
trade, the SMP should lead to greater specialization by 
countries on the basis of their respective comparative 
1 See Cox and Harris ( 1985), Smith and Venables ( 1988) and Jacquemin and 
Sapir ( 1991 ). 
Sec Ethier and Horn ( 1984) and Smith and Venables ( 1988). 
-' The traditional approach recognized that there could be such secondary effects 
(sometimes referred to as dynamic effects). hut satisfactory treatment of such 
effects became possible only after the development in the late 1970s of trade 
models under imperfect competition. 
' Sec, for instance, Baldwin ( 1989) and Rivera and Romer ( 1991 ). 
' See Baldwin ( 1989 ). 
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advantages. The SMP would, in that case, favour an increase of 
inter-industrial trade, each Member State specializing primarily 
in the sectors where it is relatively efficient. However, if we 
take into account imperfect competition and product 
differentiation, the SMP could increase intra-industry trade, the 
simultaneous import and export of similar product lines 
between Member States (e.g. cars for cars) (Balassa, 1965, 
Greenaway D., Milner C., 1986). Finally, agglomeration 
economies could lead to the concentration of economic 
activities in countries initially advantaged, resulting in an 
increase of inter-industry trade. 
The gains from economic integration differ between these two 
types of trade (inter-industry trade and intra-industry trade). 
Inter-industry trade between different countries brings 
efficiency gains, with each country specializing in those 
activities in which it is relatively more efficient, whilst 
consumers gain lower prices as a consequence. However, this 
implies a deeper specialization between the less developed 
Member States and the more advanced, each country 
experiencing a contraction of some of its sectors and expansion 
of others (e.g., clothing vanishing in high labour cost countries, 
and high-tech in low skill ones). The redistributive implications 
of this are considerable and the adjustment process costly. 
By contrast, intra-industry trade benefits the consumer by 
leading to a much wider variety of products, whilst producers 
face lower adjustment costs. Here, adjustments take place 
amongst firms inside industries rather than among industries. 
As Member States' industrial structures remain roughly similar. 
the EU becomes more diversified and is therefore less 
vulnerable to sector specific shocks (e.g., increases in the price 
of oil, etc.). A shock has no very different effects depending on 
the Member State (no asymmetric shocks). This is particularly 
important within a monetary union. 
4.2.1.3. Location and geographical specialization 
Agglomeration effects may lead to a concentration of firms in 
the 'country' with an initial advantage. due to the relatively 
easy availability of relevant sector-specific resources. leading 
to a comparative advantage. On the other hand. the size of the 
country may provide more opportunity for the exploitation of 
external economies of scale so that certain industries in large 
countries may operate at lower costs, counter-balancing initial 
comparative disadvantages.6 
0 The 'home market effect', the tendency of countries to export goods for which 
they have a large domestic market. was analysed in Krugman ( 1980). A more 
detailed analysis of external economies and agglomeration effects can be 
found in Krugman ( 1991 ). 
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The spatial organization of the whole production process will 
be shaped by the available technology providing the possibility 
of economies of scale, the location of demand, the availability 
and prices of factors of production in different locations , and 
the structure of markets (Helpman and Krugman, 1985 , 
Krugman, 1991 ).1 
The impact of the integration of products , services and factors 
of production on the location of economic activity is a central 
issue . In the neo-classical and Hecscher-Ohlin-Samuelson 
models, the cost of factors of production and their profitability 
tend to converge when barriers are removed. However, the 
result of such models depends particularly on the assumption 
that markets are functioning efficiently and there are no barriers 
to movements . From that point of view, the comparison of the 
cost of capital and the cost of labour and their evolution 
between the EU countries is particularly relevant. 
Economic theory presents arguments for increasing or 
decreasing convergence in the costs of factors of production 
among countries. On one hand, the increasing international 
1 The di stribution o f we lfa re among the di ffe re nt Member States o f the EU in 
an integrated Europea n market is a n iss ue of ve ry high political se ns iti v ity . 
Thi s will be deve loped in the next chapter. 
integration of goods and services markets will lead to 
equalization of factor incomes: wages and costs of capital. On 
the other hand, the movement of labour is restricted by cultural, 
institutional and spatial factors whereas the movement of 
capital is free following the implementation of the directives on 
the free movement of capital. 
4.2.2. General overview of trade within the EU 
4.2.2.1. Evolution of EU trade 
Following Jacquemin and Sapir (1988) , the extent of 
regionalization is often measured by the share of intra-area 
trade in total trade and relative increases in the importance of 
intra-area trade are proof of increasing integration. 
Graph I compares the evolution of intra-EU imports in goods 
with total EU imports. Several periods can clearly be 
distinguished. During 1960-72, the EU' s share of imports rose 
steeply from 38 to 54 %. The second period ( 1972-81) is 
characterized by a steep decline in 1973 followed by a period 
of relatively stability around 50%. In contrast, the period from 
1981 to 1992 is characterized by a relative recovery of intra-EU 
trade with the index increasing from 1984 to 1987 and then 
again stagnating around 58 to 59 %. Unfortunately for 
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Table 1 
Share of intra-EU trade in total trade, manufacturing 
Intra-EU exports Intra-EU imports 
(share in % vis-a-vis world) 
EUR 1985 53.7 61.2 
1995 67.8 67.9 
BLEU 1985 71.7 70.4 
1995 79.5 74.8 
DK 1985 42.2 53.2 
1995 67.3 74.7 
01 1985 49.6 56.7 
1995 62.8 62.9 
EL 1985 52.4 67.7 
1995 59.0 74.7 
s 1985 51.3 61.6 
1995 69.8 77.l 
F 1985 51.9 68.9 
1995 68.0 74.2 
IRL 1985 68.8 72.4 
1995 82.1 73.8 
I 1985 48.3 58.8 
1995 58.2 66.l 
NL 1985 73.7 64.6 
1995 81.6 66.3 
p 1985 63.6 70.7 
1995 81.8 84.0 
UK 1985 44.7 54.4 
1995 64.4 59.3 
' 1985: West Germany. 
1995: Whole Germany. 
Source: Eurostat. 
comparitive purposes, there is a break in the time series from 
1993 on. The elimination of all customs documentation means 
that intra-EU trade data are now recorded in a new way and it is 
clear that a significant discontinuity in the data series has 
arisen.' Meanwhile, records of extra-EU trade continue 
unchanged. 
Tables 1 and 2 give the share of each Member State's intra-EU 
and extra-EU trade in total trade in 1985 and 1995 for 
manufacturing and services. For exports the period between 
1 See Box I in Chapter 2. 
70 
Table 2 
Share of intra-EU trade in total trade, services 
Intra-EU exports Intra-EU imports 
(share in % vis-a-vis world) 
EUR 1985 42.6 46.9 
1993 50.2 50.0 
BLEU 1985 62.9 63.0 
1993 69.3 62.l 
DK 1985 28.6 44.3 
1993 31.3 39.2 
01 1985 37.4 42.9 
1993 43.6 45.7 
EL 1985 43.2 44.l 
1993 50.l 49.6 
s 1985 57.8 48.3 
1993 69.2 60.5 
F 1985 39.4 43.4 
1993 46.0 47.5 
IRL 1985 61.l 62.4 
1993 59.7 59.9 
1985 53.2 49.7 
1993 54.0 50.6 
NL 1985 53.6 51.6 
1993 59.5 54.3 
p 1985 49.4 51.0 
1993 70.3 71.7 
UK 1985 24.4 39.2 
1993 30.8 40.8 
1 1985: West Germany. 
1995: Whole Germany. 
Sources: Eurostar: Coopers and Lybrand (1993). Bureau of Labour Statistics. 
1985 and 1995 registered a significant increase in the share of 
intra EU trade: on average + 14 points for manufacturing 
exports and + 7 .6 points for exports of services. For imports, 
this increase is less significant: +6.7 points for manufacturing 
imports and +3.1 points for imports of services. For Spain and 
Portugal, which both joined the Community in 1986, the 
combined effects of accession and the developing internal 
market led to spectacular increases in the import and export 
shares. 
A country's domestic demand is met by a combination of 
domestic production (share of output not exported), imports 
Trade and FDI specialization effects of the single market programme 
from other Member States (intra-EU imports) and imports from 
outside the EU (extra-EU imports) . For EU manufacturing 
products, domestic production supplied 66 % of domestic 
demand in the EU on average in 1985, and 57 .5% in 1995 (a 
fall of 8.5 points), whilst the part supplied by intra-EU imports 
increased from 19. 7 to 25.6% in 1995 ( +5.1 points) , and the 
share supplied by extra-EU imports increased by 2.8 points 
over the same period 1 (see Graph 2). However, the comparison 
of 1995 with 1985 does not give a fair picture of the relative 
increase of intra- and extra-EU imports. As shown in Box I of 
Chapter 2, the introduction of the lntrastat system in 1993 
significantly affects these figures and underestimates the 
increase of intra-EU import shares. Between 1985 and 1992 the 
share of extra-EU imports remained almost stable at around of 
14%, whilst intra-EU shares jumped from 19.7 to 24.1 % (+4.4 
points) . However, the comparison between 1992 and 1995 
would lead to the opposite conclusion. Extra-EU shares jumped 
by 2. 7 points during the period 1992/95 , but the part of 
domestic demand supplied by intra-EU imports only grew by 
1.7 points . This relatively low growth of intra-EU imports is 
1 From 14 .1% in 1985 to 16.9% in 1995. 
just a statistical illusion due to the change in the intra-EU trade 
reporting system. The evolution of import shares over the 
period 1993/95 , which only includes data gathered under 
Intrastat, shows that intra-EU import shares increased 85 % 
more than extra-EU import shares (2.4 against 1.3 percentage 
points for respectively intra- and extra-EU import shares) . We 
can therefore conclude that, when comparing homogeneous 
figures, and regardless of the period considered, the part of the 
EU demand supplied by intra-EU imports has grown much 
faster than that supplied by extra-EU producers. 
In services, the penetration of domestic demand by imports is 
much less marked : on average 4% of domestic demand of 
services is covered by intra-EU imports and 4% by extra-EU 
imports (Graph 3). 
4.2.2.2. The development of intra- versus inter-industry trade 
In this part we turn to the patterns of intra-EU trade over the 
past 15 years at the most aggregated level, all countries and 
products taken together. The CEPII (1996) has proposed a 
method which allows each year' s total trade to be broken down 
into three trade types according to the similarity in unit values 
for exports and imports (proxy for prices and therefore quality) 
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and the degree of overlap between imports and exports in trade 
(Box I) between Member States. 
• Inter-industry trade (or one-way trade): when exports and 
imports for the same product line are such that one is less 
than I 0% of the other. 
• Intra-industry (or two-way trade) : when exports and imports 
for the same product line are such that one represents at least 
10% of the other. Intra-industry trade is divided into: 
- intra-industry trade in similar products: export and import 
unit values for the same product line differ by less than 
15%; 
- intra-industry trade in differentiated products: export and 
import unit values for the same product line differ by more 
than 15%. 
The most important trade type at the beginning of the 1980s 
was one-way trade (with a share of some 45 %). The 
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preparation phase of the SMP has been accompanied by a 
decrease in the share of inter-industry trade in Europe (see 
Graph 4) . This, however, does not mean that SMP per se has 
caused this event ; it could be associated with other 
determinants which may have operated simultaneously. 
At this level of presentation (all countries and products taken 
together), in contrast to what is often implicitly assumed, the 
rise in intra-industry trade in intra-EU trade concerns products 
which are differentiated by price and quality. In fact , two-way 
trade in similar products remains rather stable and represents 
less than 20% of all intra-EU trade, whereas two-way trade in 
price and quality differentiated products , which could be 
associated with different factor endowments, increased from 
less than 35 % in 1980 to 1985 to more than 42% in 1994. Of 
course , this general observation might change once we 
introduce the dimension industry and/or country. 
Table 3 displays the shares of the three trade types for each 
country in 1994, as well as their changes between 1987 and 
1994. Two groups of countries can roughly be distinguished: 
Trade and FDI spec iali zation effects of the s ing le marke t programme 
Box 1: Methodology on intra- versus inter-industry trade 
The meth odo logy used by the C EPII has the fo ll ow ing 
charac teristics: 
( l ) Minimi zes the bi as ari sing fro m sec toral aggregation by using 
far more desegregated classifi cations. The classification of the 8-
dig it ' combined nomencl ature (CN)' (and , until 1987, the 6-
di g it Nimexe) provides some l O OOO item s, whi ch are 
suffic ientl y de tailed fo r products to be distingui shed by the ir 
principle, technical characteri stics. 
(2) Minimi zes the bi as of geographi c agg regati on by onl y 
considering bilateral fl ows. 
(3) Considers, depending on the degree in overlap, both exports and 
import s as be ing as part o f e ither two-way trade or one-way 
trade; trade in an item is considered to be ' two-way ' when the 
value of the minority fl ow (for example imports) represents at 
How to defin e the three trade types 
least 10% of the majority flow (exports in this case). Below thi s 
level, the minority fl ow cannot be considered significant as it 
does not represent a structural feature of trade. 
(4) Distinguishes between vertical and hori zontal differentiation by 
incorporating price differences . It is assumed that di fferences in 
pri ces (unit va lues) re fl ect qualit y di ffe rences. There fore , 
products whose unit values are c lose (in a g iven year) a re 
con side red as s imil ar . Traded products are cons ide red to be 
similar (or hori zontally differentiated) if the export and import 
unit va lu es diffe r by less than 15% . (Abd El Rahm an, 199 1, 
Greenaway, Hine and Milner, 1994, also used a 15% threshold). 
Wh en thi s is no t the case , produc ts are cons ide red to be 
vertically differentiated. 
The table below provides the typology of trade used in the CEPII 
report. 
Degree of overlap between 
exports and import values : 
Definition of which flow? Similarity of export and import unit values : 
Does the minority flow represent at leas t 
l 0% of the majori ty flow? 
Do export and import unit va lues diffe r less than 15%? 
Yes No 
(verti ca l differentiation) (hori zontal diffe renti ati on) 
Yes 
(Two-way _trade) 
Both ex port s and im port s Two-way trade in 
similar products 
Two-way trade in vertically 
differentiated products 
No Majorit y flow One-way trade 
(One-way trade) Minority fl ow Res idual 
Note : By construction. the residual lrade represents a very small part of all trade. While being calculated separately. it is presented together with one-way trade. 
(a) The first group is composed of countries for which one-
way trade accounts for more than half of all trade. These 
countri es are charac teri zed by an inter-indu stry 
spec iali zation. As fa r as they engage in intra- indu stry 
trade, two-way trade is predominantl y done in goods 
differing in quality. With the exception of Denmark, the 
countries in thi s group (Greece, Portugal, Ireland) have 
lower levels o f economic deve lopment. For Denmark , 
strong spec iali zation in a limited number of sec tors 
explains this figure. 
(b) The second group is characteri zed by a high share of two-
way trade. It corresponds mainly to the large 'European 
traders ' . While two-way trade in similar products is more 
important in this group than in the firs t one, intra- industry 
trade is mostly done in di ffe renti ated products, suggesting 
a speciali zati on within products by quality ranges. Two-
way trade in similar products is particularly important for 
France, Belgium/Luxembourg and Germany, and two-way 
trade in quality-di ffe renti ated products fo r the United 
Kingdom, Germ any and France . Due to it s rapid 
convergence toward s the trade structure of the more 
developed European countries, Spain is now part of thi s 
group and in a situation similar to Italy's. 
For eac h country, two-way trade in qu ality di ffe rentiated 
products is more important th an two-way trade in simil ar 
products. Thi s underlines the parti cul ar interest of where the 
di ffere nt Member States are positioned in relation to di fferent 
market segments, as thi s might have important consequences in 
terms of income di stribution. From a policy point of view, it 
must be borne in mind , when interpreting such a pattern of 
trade, th at hi gh 'quality' (as revea led by prices) can be 
att ributed to more R&D, more hi ghl y qu alifi ed labour, the 
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Table 3 
Share of trade types in intra-EU trade by country, 1994 
Share in 1994 (%) 
Two-way trade Two-way trade 
in similar in differentiated 
products products 
France 24.1 44.3 
Germany 20.5 46.9 
Belgium-Lux 23.2 42.0 
United Kingdom 16.5 47.9 
Netherlands 18.9 41.9 
Spain 18.9 35.2 
Italy 16.2 36.9 
Ireland 7.9 34.4 
Denmark 8.1 31.9 
Portugal 7.5 23.9 
Greece 3.7 10.3 
ECl2 19.2 42.3 
EC without Spain 
and Portugal 19.5 43. 1 
Source: Eurostat-Comex t. calculations by the CEPII 
One-way trade 
3 1.6 
32.6 
34.8 
35.6 
39.3 
45.9 
46.9 
57.7 
60.0 
68.6 
86.0 
38.5 
37.4 
Variation 1987 to 1994 (% points) 
Two-way trade Two-way trade One-way trade 
in similar in differentiated 
products products 
2.8 3.6 -6.4 
1.9 3.4 -5.4 
1.6 2.2 -3.8 
- 1.9 8.9 -7.0 
-0.3 5.1 -4.8 
8.7 3.3 -12.0 
5.8 -3. 1 - 2.8 
- 0.9 - 1.3 2.2 
- I. I -0.0 I.I 
3.9 4.8 -8.6 
0.8 -0.6 -0.2 
2.0 3.1 - 5. 1 
1.7 3.3 -5 .0 
The countries are· ranked according to the importance o f two-way trade in all trade . Figures in bold indicate hi gher-than-average shares or variations. 
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specific organization of firms ' internal procedures , or large 
investments in advertising . 
In order to understand this qualitative division of labour in 
Europe better, we compare - year by year, and product by 
product - un it values for each trade flow with a European 
average. Here again , we assume that differences in prices (unit 
values) reflect quality differences . As exports and imports are 
analysed separately , flows for the same product with a given 
trade partner can exist in different European price-qual ity 
ranges : 
• high price-quality products: unit values exceeding the EU 
average by at least 15 %; 
• low price-quality products : more than 15 % below the EU 
average; 
• medium price-quality products: between+/- 15% around the 
EU average. 
Graph 5 shows that the most importan t market segment, 
medium price-quality products saw their share actually decline 
(by some 15 points) . This means that the dispersion of unit 
values has grown throughout the last 15 years. The correlated 
increase of trade in high and low price-quality products means 
a specialization of countries over the quality spectrum. 
Table 4 plots the evolution of intra-EU exports and imports by 
price-quality range . In 1994, we can clearly distinguish two 
groups of countries when we look at exports. For a certain 
number of countries , high price-quality products represent 
more than 40% of total exports in 1993/94: Ireland (53.8% ), 
Germany (47 .7%), Denmark (41.7%), UK (40.5 %) and France 
(39.9%). In contrast, low price-quality products represent more 
than 25 % of total exports for Portugal (34% ), Greece (31 % ), 
Spain (28.9%) and Italy (28.5% ). 
If the results of Germany are compatible with the image of 
'high-quality products', the role of foreign affiliates using 
Ireland as a location for assembly lines is certainly particularly 
important in explaining its share of high-quality products in 
exports. 
The specialization of the different appreciating or depreciating 
countries has been unaffected by monetary fluctuations. 
Analysis at the industry level shows that currency depreciation 
has not led Italy to low quality specialization in its key 
industries: its primary comparative advantage remains in high-
quality textiles . The same remark can be made for the United 
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Table 4 
Price-quality structure of exports and imports in intra-EU trade, 1985/86 and 1993/94 
Country 1985/86 1993/94 Variation 85/86 to 93/94 
Low Medium High Low Medium High Low Medium High 
Export 
BLEU 17.4 57.8 24.9 18.1 50.0 31.9 0.7 -7.7 7.0 
DK 16.4 45.6 38.1 19.8 38.4 41.7 3.5 -7.1 3.7 
D 11.9 46.4 41.7 14.0 38.6 47.4 2.1 -7.8 5.7 
EL 32.8 50.8 16.4 31.0 42.3 26.7 - 1.8 -8.6 10.3 
E 29.3 50.8 19.9 28.9 48.0 23.1 -0.4 -2.8 3.1 
F 12.2 54.6 33.2 14.9 45.2 39.9 2.7 -9.4 6.8 
IRL 19.6 31.1 49.3 21.3 24.9 53.8 1.7 -6.2 4.5 
I 26.9 47.1 26.0 28.5 39.4 32.2 1.6 - 7.8 6.2 
NL 13.2 64.9 21.9 15.4 50.9 33.7 2.3 - 14.1 11.8 
p 37.0 42.2 20.8 34.1 39.6 26.3 -2.9 -2.6 5.5 
UK 15.5 51.5 33.0 20.5 39.1 40.5 5.0 - 12.5 7.5 
Import 
BLEU 17.8 54.8 27.3 19.9 45.2 34.9 2.1 -9.7 7.6 
DK 16.2 43.9 40.0 20.8 32.9 46.3 4.6 - 11.0 6.3 
D 14.0 58.7 27.4 14.2 46.4 39.4 0.3 - 12.3 12.0 
EL 21.2 40.9 38.0 21.5 37.0 41.6 0.3 -3.9 3.6 
E 24.0 43.4 32.6 23.8 40.4 35.8 -0.2 -3.0 3.2 
F 15.7 54.4 30.0 19.2 44.1 36.7 3.5 - 10.2 6.7 
IRL 27.9 42.2 29.9 28.3 30.3 41.4 0.4 - 11.9 11.5 
I 10.1 52.2 37.7 15.1 43.7 41.2 5.0 - 8.5 3.5 
NL 20.5 52.8 26.7 19.6 45.2 35.2 -0.9 -7.6 8.5 
p 21.7 36.4 41.9 22.8 41.0 36.2 1.1 4.7 -5.8 
UK 16.1 44.5 39.4 21.8 36.7 41.6 5.7 - 7.9 2.1 
EC -12 16.1 52.3 31.6 18.7 42.9 38.4 2.5 -9.3 6.8 
Source: Eurostat-Comext, calculations by the CEPII. 
For each year, relative shares of price-quality ranges add up to 100%. The variation is in percentage points. 
Kingdom, showing a specialization in high-quality chemicals in 
1994. These results may thus serve as an ex-post justification of 
the indicator of price-quality ranges, since these two countries 
are still able to sell at high prices in their key industries. The 
fact that the degree of specialization does not change despite 
the existence of significantly large fluctuations shows that the 
indicator is unaffected by exchange rate movements. 
Finally, an analysis of 'the contribution to the trade balance' 
(G. Lafay, 1990), which focuses not only on exports but also on 
imports, is particularly interesting.' Scrutiny of the contribution 
1 The contribution to the trade balance used by the CEPII is an indicator which 
compares an industry's performance to the overall one. If there is no 
comparative advantage (or disadvantage) for any industry j (in a given 
country) then total trade surplus (or deficit) should be distributed across 
industries according to their share in total trade: 
<x -M>[,_x:M,,x-M] 
, , x,-M, x•M 
by definition, the sum over all industries is zero. 
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to the trade balance of low, medium and high price-quality 
product ranges spotlights different country groupings (Table 5). 
Germany has a comparative advantage in high price-quality 
product ranges, France in medium to high price-quality ranges, 
the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg 
and Denmark only in medium price-quality ranges, Spain in 
medium to low price-quality ranges, and Italy, Greece and 
Portugal only in low price-quality ranges. 
These overall results need nevertheless to be examined at an 
industry level, taking into account the contribution to the trade 
balance of 14 sectors for the three price-quality ranges defined 
here (high, medium, low). Analysis based on the first five 
strengths and weaknesses by industry and price-quality range in 
1994 shows quite contrasting patterns across countries: 
• Some countries are specialized in certain industries over the 
whole price-quality spectrum: Denmark for agriculture and 
Greece for textiles. 
Trade and FDI specialization effects of the single market programme 
Table 5 
The national strengths in intra-EU trade by price-quality 
range,1994 
Country Price-quality range 
Low Medium High 
Ireland + 
Germany + 
France + + 
United Kingdom + 
Netherlands + 
Belgium-Luxembourg + 
Denmark + 
Spain + + 
Greece + 
Italy + 
Portugal + 
Source: Eurostat-Comext and CEPII-CHELEM, calculations by the CEPII. 
A+ represents a positive contribution to the trade balance of the price-quality 
ranges. 
• Most countries also show a rather strong industrial 
specialization with two of the first five strengths in the same 
industry. Here we find the Netherlands (medium - followed 
by a high in agriculture), Italy (high and medium in textiles 
and low and medium in non-electrical machinery), the 
United Kingdom (high and medium in electrical machinery), 
Ireland (high and medium in non-electrical machinery1 ), 
Portugal (medium and low in textiles and wood and paper 
products) as well as Spain (medium and low in motor 
vehicles and agriculture). 
• In this typology, Germany is a clear outlier. Its specialization 
is not oriented towards specific industries, but clearly 
towards a price-quality specialization. Germany's five major 
strengths are all in up-market goods (motor vehicles, non-
electrical machinery, electrical machinery, chemicals and 
other transport). 
Concerning welfare, intra-industry trade with price 
differentiation implies that Member States are more and more 
specialized inside industries in products with differing price-
level ranges, importing low price/quality ranges and exporting 
high ones, or vice versa. Of course, the situation could differ 
for different sectors: one country could import high quality 
clothing and export high quality cars. For most advanced 
1 In our industrial breakdown. non-electrical machinery includes some 
automatic data processing equipment. 
countries such an evolution implies growing intangible 
investment in R&D, training and innovation to compete in 
traditional mature industries, and for less advanced countries, 
the possibility of entering high tech and high value-added 
sectors and competing on price. 
However, manufacturing sectors are not all comparable in 
terms of the nature of trade (intra- versus inter-industry trade) 
and therefore in terms of adjustment costs and efficiency gains 
resulting from the SMP. 
In terms of inter- versus intra-industry trade, manufacturing 
sectors can be broadly divided into two groups: firstly, in food 
and beverages, mining, textiles and non-metallic minerals, 
trade is mainly inter-industrial. These sectors represent about 
one third of total manufacturing value added. Secondly, in non-
electrical machinery, professional goods, electrical machinery, 
motor vehicles, chemicals, wood and paper, trade is mainly 
intra-industry differentiated by price and quality. These sectors 
represent about two thirds of total manufacturing value added 
(see Table 6). 
In general, for all sectors between 1985 and 1994 intra-industry 
trade in price-quality differentiated products increased whilst 
inter-industry trade decreased. In particular, for sectors 
traditionally characterized by high inter-industry trade, the 
implementation of the single market is characterized by a 
steady increase of intra-industry trade, notably due to an 
increase of trade in price-quality differentiated products (wood, 
paper, textile, clothing, food and beverages). 
However, in industries traditionally characterized by high 
levels of intra-industry trade, the latest years of the SMP may 
be characterized by a decrease of intra-industry trade (electrical 
machinery, scientific instruments and consumer electronics). 
This could be the result of specialization along the lines of 
comparative advantages in a few Member States for the 
production of these goods. 
Finally, the evolution of the car sector is atypical, with a sharp 
increase of intra-industry trade in similar products and a sharp 
decrease of inter-industry trade. This could be the result of new 
EU countries producing more and more cars (Spain) and/or an 
increasing difficulty in maintaining practices of discrimination 
in prices for cars between the Member States. 
4.2.2.3. Production specialization patterns in Europe 
The question of the effects of regional integration on the 
location of industry is clearly linked to the pattern of trade 
observed above. Recent work (Brillhart and Tosstensson, 1996) 
argues that employment in scale intensive industries tends to be 
concentrated at the centre of the EU, which explains why intra-
industry trade tends to be relatively low in such sectors. 
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Table 6 
Share of trade types in intra-EC trade by industry 
Share in 1994 (%) Variation 1987 to 1994 (% points) 
Two-way trade 
in similar 
products 
Two-way trade 
in vertically 
differentiated 
products 
One-way trade Two-way trade Two-way trade One-way trade 
Prof. goods 1 
Other transport2 
Non-electr. machinery 
Electr. machinery 
Other industries1 
Chemicals 
Motor vehicles 
Wood and paper 
Basic metals 
Non-met. minerals 
Textiles 
Food and beverages 
Mining and quarrying• 
Agriculture 
Average 
13.9 
47.6 
14.4 
14.2 
5.9 
20.3 
40.4 
20.2 
25.5 
11.6 
10.7 
12.5 
19.6 
9.3 
19.2 
57.9 
33.8 
58.1 
53.4 
57.0 
45.5 
41.8 
46.9 
35.2 
38.7 
40.4 
26.6 
12.6 
16.8 
42.3 
28.3 
18.5 
27.5 
32.4 
37.2 
34.3 
17.8 
32.9 
39.3 
49.7 
48.9 
60.9 
67.8 
73.9 
38.5 
in similar 
products 
-3.9 
1.2 
-3.9 
-0.1 
-6.0 
-2.6 
19.1 
-3.3 
-2.0 
1.3 
-3.2 
0.8 
4.4 
2.6 
2.0 
in vertically 
differentiated 
products 
0.4 
6.8 
3.1 
- 3.1 
2.0 
5.8 
1.9 
10.1 
6.1 
0.0 
9.2 
8.7 
- 1.0 
5.2 
3.1 
3.5 
-8.0 
0.5 
3.6 
3.9 
-3.3 
-21.0 
-6.8 
-4.2 
- 1.4 
-6.0 
-9.5 
- 3.4 
-7.8 
-5.1 
1 Professional goods mainly include scientific instruments, musical instruments, televisions, video recorders. 
Other transport mainly includes railway and aerospace equipment. 
3 Other manufacturing mainly includes weapons, furniture and toys. 
' Mining and quarrying mainly includes minerals, cement and petroleum products. 
Source: Eurostat-Comext, calculations by the CEPII 
The industries are ranked according to the importance of two-way trade in all trade. Figures in bold indicate higher-than-EC-average shares (or variations). 
However, as the authors conclude, these findings should be 
considered as suggestive rather than conclusive due to data 
limitations and the relatively simplistic definition of increasing 
returns. The analyses of the effect of the SMP on the structure 
of production within the EU are mainly in line with Krugman' s 
observations in 'Geography and Trade' (1991). The author 
concludes on the basis of a comparison between the structure of 
production of regions of the US and big countries in Europe, 
comparable in terms of economic size and population, that 
European countries are less specialized than US regions. For 
Krugman, this situation arose due to the existence of barriers to 
trade between European countries and he therefore concludes 
that the SMP could create the conditions for more 
specialization between EU countries particularly in sectors 
operating under increasing returns to scale. 
Tables 7 and 8 present the correlation matrix calculated for 
NACE 3 digits manufacturing sectors (around 100 sectors) in 
terms of value added. 
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When the structure of value added in two different countries is 
the same, the index will be equal to I. In contrast, the index 
will be equal to nil or even negative when the structures of 
production are very different. The matrix has been elaborated 
for two years, 1985 and 1994. 
Countries with higher labour costs and lower costs of capital 
have very similar sectoral structures of value added in 
manufacturing. Germany, France, Italy and UK (coefficient of 
correlation more than 0.8). On the other hand, countries with 
lower labour costs and higher costs of capital have similar 
structures of value added: Greece, Portugal and Spain 
(coefficient of correlation more than 0.8). However, the case of 
Spain is different from the other two, since its production 
structure is also highly correlated with Denmark. France, the 
Netherlands and the UK. Moreover, for small countries such as 
Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark or Finland, the results are 
sometimes contradictory and the interpretation is complex. 
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Table 7 
Correlation matrix: sectoral breakdown of manufacturing value added, 1985 
B DK D EL E F IRL NL p UK 
BE 1 0.411 0.747 0.455 0.589 0.734 0.275 0.762 0.757 0.397 0.722 
DK 0.411 1 0.528 0.586 0.832 0.621 0.744 0.705 0.802 0.592 0.841 
D 0.747 0.528 1 0.214 0.479 0.872 0.136 0.868 0.648 0.165 0.831 
EL 0.455 0.586 0.214 1 0.817 0.508 0.658 0.567 0.569 0.885 0.545 
E 0.589 0.832 0.479 0.817 I 0.731 0.759 0.693 0.817 0.732 0.816 
F 0.734 0.621 0.872 0.508 0.731 1 0.416 0.859 0.776 0.456 0.922 
IRL 0.275 0.744 0.136 0.658 0.759 0.416 1 0.373 0.699 0.571 0.563 
I 0.762 0.705 0.868 0.567 0.693 0.859 0.373 1 0.759 0.567 0.890 
NL 0.757 0.802 0.648 0.569 0.817 0.776 0.699 0.759 1 0.573 0.881 
p 0.397 0.592 0.165 0.885 0.732 0.456 0.571 0.567 0.573 1 0.539 
UK 0.722 0.841 0.831 0.545 0.816 0.922 0.563 0.890 0.881 0.539 1 
Correlation matrix: sectoral breakdown of manufacturing value added, 1994 
B DK D EL E 
B I 0.455 0.751 0.400 0.659 
DK 0.455 1 0.583 0.756 0.844 
D 0.751 0.583 1 0.218 0.578 
EL 0.400 0.756 0.218 1 0.840 
E 0.659 0.844 0.578 0.840 1 
F 0.847 0.693 0.880 0.536 0.834 
IRL 0.391 0.766 0.298 0.828 0.745 
I 0.676 0.729 0.879 0.498 0.661 
,NL 0.653 0.900 0.646 0.784 0.879 p 0.287 0.735 0.256 0.890 0.812 
UK 0.789 0.836 0.784 0.675 0.886 
If we do the same calculations for the correlation matrix on the 
trade structures for manufacturing (Table 8), the groupings are 
similar but these similarities measured by the correlation 
coefficients are smaller than for the production structure. This 
could be because internal consumption patterns which are the 
main explanatory factor for production structures are relatively 
similar between EU countries. 1 
A comparison of the correlation matrix for value added and 
exports for both 1985 and 1994 presents an interesting result. In 
the nine years following the launch of the SMP in 1985, there 
has been a tendency towards more convergence in terms of 
structures of manufacturing production. 
1 The correlation of the pallern of demand is much higher than the one for 
production and export, even between the southern and the northern European 
countries. 
F IRL NL p UK 
0.847 0.391 0.676 0.653 0.287 0.789 
0.693 0.766 0.729 0.900 0.735 0.836 
0.880 0.298 0.879 0.646 0.256 0.784 
0.536 0.828 0.498 0.784 0.890 0.675 
0.834 0.745 0.661 0.879 0.812 0.886 
1 0.571 0.842 0.844 0.522 0.932 
0.571 1 0.468 0.823 0.662 0.669 
0.842 0.468 1 0.780 0.556 0.828 
0.844 0.823 0.780 1 0.706 0.918 
0.522 0.662 0.556 0.706 1 0.619 
0.932 0.669 0.828 0.918 0.619 1 
4.2.3. Assessment of the effect of the SMP on trade 
4.2.3.1. Trade creation and trade diversion 
Allen, Gasiorek and Smith (1996) assess the effects of the SMP 
on trade flows in the EU through the estimation of an 
econometric model of demand for imports in the EU. The effect 
of the SMP is computed as a residual or difference between the 
observed trade flows and those predicted by the model. The 
approach followed by Allen et al. (1996) improves upon 
previous studies2 by proceeding to a full specification of the 
supply side of the model within an explicit oligopoly setting. 
Their econometric analysis is able to examine the effects of the 
SMP on both supply and demand within particular markets. 
' See Winters ( 1987) and Appendix I. 
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Table 8 
Correlation matrix: sectoral breakdown of manufacturing exports, 1985 
B DK D EL E F IRL NL p UK 
B I 0.310 0.658 0.320 0.790 0.788 0.323 0.393 0.640 0.057 0.617 
DK 0.310 1 0.304 0.431 0.171 0.532 0.657 0.353 0.779 0.168 0.489 
D 0.658 0.304 1 - 0.380 0.746 0.903 0.179 0.641 0.494 -0.005 0.789 
EL 0.320 0.431 - 0.380 1 0.343 0.252 0.300 0.337 0.435 0.694 -0.034 
E 0.790 0.171 0.746 0.343 1 0.802 0.118 0.408 0.436 0.159 0.433 
F 0.788 0.532 0.903 0.252 0.802 1 0.426 0.558 0.761 0.091 0.809 
IRL 0.323 0.657 0.179 0.300 0.118 0.426 1 0.086 0.784 0.048 0.463 
I 0.393 0.353 0.641 0.337 0.408 0.558 0.086 1 0.310 0.463 0.638 
NL 0.640 0.779 0.494 0.435 0.436 0.761 0.784 0.310 1 0.157 0.636 
p 0.057 0.168 -0.005 0.694 0.159 0.091 0.048 0.463 0.157 1 -0.700 
UK 0.617 0.489 0.789 -0.034 0.433 0.809 0.463 0.638 0.636 -0.700 1 
Correlation matrix: sectoral breakdown of manufacturing exports, 1994 
B DK D EL E 
B 1 0.367 0.722 0.208 0.715 
DK 0.367 1 0.375 0.441 0.162 
D 0.722 0.375 1 - 0.056 0.720 
EL 0.208 0.441 - 0.056 1 0.023 
E 0.715 0.162 0.720 0.023 1 
F 0.618 0.502 0.778 0.084 0.673 
IRL 0.373 0.640 0.336 0.243 0.117 
I 0.305 0.341 0.726 0.217 0.345 
NL 0.590 0.832 0.492 0.384 0.274 
p 
-0.010 0.053 0.036 0.527 0.134 
UK 0.703 0.477 0.851 -0.005 0.463 
Box 2 presents a more detailed description of this 
methodology. 
In order to maximize the efficiency of estimation, they have 
chosen to concentrate the analysis on examining total 
manufactures plus 15 three-digit level manufacturing sectors, 
which account for 35.7% of total EU manufacturing value 
added. These sectors make up the group of larger industries 
identified ex ante by Buigues and Ilzkovitz ( 1990) as likely to 
be particularly sensitive to the SMP. 1 Additionally, since they 
1 The 40 sectors identified by Buigues et al. as particularly sensitive to the SMP 
represent around 50'7c· of EU manufacturing value added. Therefore, the 15 
sectors included in the study represent more than 70% of the value added 
accounted for by all sectors considered ex ante as most sensitive to the SMP. 
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F IRL NL p UK 
0.618 0.373 0.305 0.590 - 0.010 0.703 
0.502 0.640 0.341 0.832 0.053 0.477 
0.778 0.336 0.726 0.492 0.036 0.851 
0.084 0.243 0.217 0.384 0.527 -0.005 
0.673 0.117 0.345 0.274 0.134 0.463 
1 0.442 0.412 0.597 -0.008 0.740 
0.442 1 0.070 0.893 - 0.014 0.676 
0.412 0.070 1 0.205 0.387 0.517 
0.597 0.893 0.205 1 -0.019 0.714 
-0.008 -0.014 0.387 -0.019 1 -•0.041 
0.740 0.676 0.517 0.714 -0.041 1 
performed a similar analysis for manufacturing as whole, they 
are also able to examine the effect of the SMP on the other 
manufacturing sectors. It is worth noting, however, that the 
requirements of the model in terms of the span of statistical 
series, as well as the disaggregation level, prevented them from 
carrying out the analysis for all the Member States. There are 
homogeneous and long enough available series only for France. 
Germany, Italy and the UK. Although this is an obvious 
limitation of the analysis, in aggregate terms, for the 
Community as a whole, the conclusions are representative 
enough, since these four countries make up the bulk of 
production and trade in the sectors listed on page 81.2 
Since the sample of countries does not include certain countries such as Spain 
and Portugal. where trade has significantly increased since 1986. the SMP 
effects estimated by Allen et al. should be considered a lower bound rather 
than a representative average. 
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Therefore, the study focuses on the following 18 sectors: 
Code 
247 
248 
251 
257 
3 15 
322 
324 
325 
330 
344 
345 
351 
364 
427 
453 
Sec tor 
Glassware 
Ceramics 
Bas ic industrial chemica ls 
Pharmaceutical products 
Boilermaking, e tc . 
Machine tools fo r metals 
Machines fo r foodstuffs indu stries 
Pl ant for mines 
Office machines 
T elecommunicati ons equipme nt 
Electronic equipme nt 
Motor vehicles 
Aerospace equipment 
Brewing and ma lting 
C lothing 
Total of 15 sectors 
Rest o f manu fac turing 
Total manu fac turing 
Box 2: Models to assess trade creation and trade diversion 
The econometri c model proposed by All en, Gas iorek and Smith 
( 1996) improves the traditi onal Winters' approac h by 
compl ementin g the alm ost ideal demand sys tem (A IDS ) with a 
structural model th at takes account of the effects of the SMP on 
improved supply. Their approach to modelling supply is closest to 
that of Jacquemin and Sapir (1 99 1) and examines the determination 
of domestic prices within an explic it oli gopoly setting. The supply 
effects of the SMP can be thought of as taking two forms. First, the 
in crease of competiti on will narro w th e mark-up of price over 
marginal cos t by domesti c firm s. Seco nd , both increased 
competiti on and increased marke t s ize will allow fo r the grea ter 
ex pl oita ti on of economi es o f scale, reduc in g cos ts marg in s. 
Empirical evidence of SMP competiti ve effec ts on domestic price 
setting can be obtained by including dummy variables in the price 
equations. 
The combination of the AIDS model to investigate the SMP effects 
on demand and of an oligopoly model of price competition to assess 
the impac t on price-cost margins, permits the identification of the 
overall effec t of the SMP on trade fl ows and to di stingui sh the 
effec ts due to changes in import prices fro m the impac ts due to 
changes in domestic prices. As suggested by Winters, direct impacts 
of the re moval o f non-tariff barriers on import pri ces are 
represented by a number of dummies entering the equations of the 
AIDS sys tem. On th e o ther hand , o th er dummi es in the price 
equation representing the competiti ve impact of the SMP on price-
cos t margin s, all ow fo r the simul ation of domestic prices, whi ch 
incorporate the SM P effect. The substituti on of these simul ated 
series into the AIDS systems give the additional supply side effects 
on trade fl ows. 
The CGE approach 
Such a resi du al-based assess ment is compl e mented with an 
analyti cal model of the economy, whi ch includes the same SMP 
effects as the econometric model. The theoretical model underlying 
the CGE approach is based on imperfect competition and economies 
As mentioned in Section 2.2.1 , each of these sector markets has 
three supply sources: domestic production, imports from other 
Member States (intra-EU imports) and imports from outside the 
EU (extra-EU imports). The stud y es timates the full SMP 
impact on the market shares supplied by each of these three 
sources . It also estimates how much of the SMP changes are 
due to fa ll s in intra-EU import prices as a result of barrier 
removal (direct effect), and how much are due to increases in 
competition resulting from the SMP (pro-competitive effect). 
The direct effect captures the contractionary impact of the SMP 
on transportation and admini strative costs and the 
harmonization of standards to increase market access . In other 
words, the SMP reduces the prices of imported goods relative 
to the ir domestic price, thus increasing the market share of 
imports. The pro-competitive effect examines the impact of the 
SMP on price-cost margins. Lower mark-ups reduce domestic 
prices, increasing domestic market shares. 
of scale . Each country is endowed with three prim ary fa ctors of 
production (capital , which is perfectly mobile, and manual and non-
manual labou r, whi ch are intern ationall y immobil e) . The 
commodity structure is defined by NACE 3-digit industries with the 
rest of each economy aggregated into a single perfectly competitive 
composite, which is tradeable and which is taken as numeraire. The 
model is calibrated to 199 1 data and then it is used to project the 
effect of the SMP. 
Th e econometri c model takes account of the th eory but is 
essentially driven by the empirical data, while the CGE model takes 
account of empirical data but is driven by the theory. Such different 
approaches are, however, integrated in a common research strategy, 
since some results of the econometric modelling are incorporated in 
th e CGE model. Neve rthe less, because th ey are based on such 
di ffe rent methodologies, one can not expect them to give the same 
answer, but the ex te nt to whi ch their answers di verge will give 
some sense of the extent of our true understanding of the nature of 
the SMP. 
Although the econometric analys is covers onl y a limited range of 
sectors, and some of those are sectors where the CGE has had to 
operate at a more aggregated level because of data constraints, the 
comparison between both experiments permits the drawing of some 
robust conclusions: 
I. Where intra-EU trade seems to have declined, the fa ll is likely to 
be large ly the res ult o f oth er eco nomi c fo rces, rather th an 
perverse effects of the SMP. 
2. Long run adjustment to the SMP in labour markets and through 
entry and exit of firms is already taking place. 
3. The libera li zati on of external trade has been at least as strong as 
the intra-EU liberalizing effects of the SMP. It is therefore clear 
that concern s about 'fortress Europe' effec ts of the SMP were 
unnecessary: the SMP has clearl y not closed the EU market to 
third countri es , nor has it been accompani ed by pro tec ti oni s t 
measures. 
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These estimates of the SMP impact on the three supply sources 
allow the study to quantify the overall impact of the SMP on 
trade creation and diversion by means of simulation techniques, 
taking account of both direct and pro-competitive effects. The 
overall impact is obtained by adding up these two effects. In 
order to obtain the market shares that would have prevailed in 
the anti monde (absence of SMP) Allen et al. (1996) rerun the 
model maintaining the estimated parameters but changing the 
dummies, which represent the policy change, and using the 
simulated values of domestic prices, which would have been 
observed had the pro-competitive effects of the SMP not taken 
place. 
Actual changes of market shares between 1985 and 1995 for 
the four countries here considered suggest that the SMP has 
been trade-creating. For total manufacturing, the increase in 
intra-EU import market shares was almost 60% higher than the 
change in the part of domestic demand supplied by extra-EU 
imports. The share of intra-EU imports jumped from 16.9% in 
1985 to 21.5% in 1995 (+4.6 points), whilst extra-EU import 
market shares increased by 2.9 percentage points (from 12.7% 
in 1985 to 15.6% in 1995). As for the EU as a whole, 1 this 
general conclusion holds regardless of the subperiod 
considered. The increase of intra-EU shares was 3.6 points over 
the period 1985/92 and 1. 7 points over the period 1995/93, 
which compares with 0. 7 and 1.0 points respectively for extra-
EU import market shares. 
The impact of the SMP on markets in the four countries is 
clearer when distinguishing amongst sectors on the basis of 
their sensitiveness to the SMP. Intra-EU import market shares 
grew by 7.9 percentage points in the 15 SMP-sensitive sectors 
between 1985 and 1995, against 3.1 for the rest of 
manufacturing sectors. Furthermore, between 1985 and 1992 
intra-EU import shares in these 15 sectors grew by 5.9 
percentage points, which compares with only 3.1 points for the 
rest of manufacturing. The corresponding figures for the period 
1995/93 are respectively 2.8 and I.I. Finally, sectoral data do 
not show any evidence of trade diversion. Extra-EU import 
shares grew by l .5 points in the 15 sectors, but decreased by 
0.2 points in the rest of manufacturing between 1985 and 1992. 
However, over the period 1993/95, extra-EU import shares 
only increased by 0.4 points in the 15 sectors, against 1.1 in the 
rest of manufacturing. 
Allen, Gasiorek and Smith's parallel econometric assessment 
confirms that the SMP has indeed been trade-creating, and that 
there is little evidence of any substantial trade diversion of 
1 See section 2.2.1 of this chapter. 
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extra-EU trade. It is worth noting that quantitative figures 
displayed in their study should be treated with care, since the 
sample used to estimate the econometric models covers the 
period 1976-1994, and the impacts refer to the period 1992-94. 
Therefore, both parameter estimates and simulated impacts 
include the post-1993 Intrastat effect. As a consequence, actual 
changes under-value intra-EU import shares and over-value 
extra-EU market shares, whilst simulations show a clear bias 
towards over-estimation of impacts on intra-EU imports and 
under-estimation of impacts on extra-EU imports. However, 
once such biases are taken into account it seems clear that the 
SMP has been trade-creating, and that it almost fully explains 
the evolution observed in the part of the domestic demand 
supplied by intra-EU imports. Consequently, the SMP accounts 
for 80% of the increase recorded in total import market shares. 
On the other hand, when comparing the 15 large sectors 
particularly sensitive to the SMP with the rest of 
manufacturing, the study by Allen et. al. (1996) seems to reveal 
that the explanatory power of the SMP increases the higher is 
the sensitivity of sectors to the internal market measures. For 
instance, whilst in the 15 sectors the impact of the SMP would 
fully explain the observed changes in domestic shares, for the 
rest of manufacturing the overall impact of the SMP would 
account for around half the actual change. 
Regarding competition effects, interesting differences can be 
distinguished between the sensitive sectors and other 
manufacturing sectors. The SMP has opened European markets 
as a whole to more intense competition, but this is especially 
true the higher the sensitivity of sectors to the SMP. Domestic 
producers in the 15 sectors particularly sensitive to the single 
market have reacted by lowering price-cost margins. leading to 
lower domestic prices and avoiding larger falls in domestic 
market shares. Allen, Gasiorek and Smith estimate that the 
average price-cost margin in this group has fallen by 3.9Ck. The 
SMP would have therefore induced domestic firms to reduce 
their prices and expand domestic production at the expense of 
both intra- and extra-EU imports. In other words, domestic 
market shares in the absence of pro-competitive effects would 
have fallen more than actually observed. Moreover. these 
competitive effects have been relatively larger with respect to 
EU competitors than against non-EU producers. Without such 
reductions in price-cost margins, domestic market shares would 
have been 0.8 percentage points less in favour of other EU 
producers and 0.4 points less against non-EU competitors over 
the period 1992/94. Finally, domestic producers in the rest of 
manufacturing would have maintained price-cost margins. 
which would have led to a 0.8 percentage points fall in 
domestic shares during that period, benefiting equally EU and 
non-EU competitors. 
Last but not least, aggregate results provide some interesting 
and important conclusions about the access of non-EU 
producers to EU markets. Although the main thrust of the SMP 
was always to liberalize markets, there were bound to be 
Trade and FDI specialization effects of the single market programme 
Box 3: The impact of the SMP on conditions of access of third 
countries to the EU market. The cases of clothing and footwear 
The study by Begg, Grimwade and Seccombe-Hett (1996) has 
explored the quantitative impact of the SMP on two sectors in 
which it has had a direct effect on the trade regime. The first, 
clothing, has seen a switch from, largely, Member State based 
quantitative restrictions (QRs) to a Community-wide restriction on 
certain major exporters to the EU. In footwear, the second sector 
examined, the change has been to abolish QRs, except for the 
imposition of a Community-wide restriction on China, the exporter 
with the third largest market share in 1990, but which is now the 
leading supplier. Other exporters now enjoy unfettered access. Both 
sectors are characterized by competitive, rather than oligopolistic 
market structures. 
The main conclusion of the study is that, in both sectors, access for 
third countries has improved as the SMP has been implemented. 
This suggests that in other sectors in which similar changes in the 
trade regime occurred as a direct result of the SMP, the effect on 
access for extra-EU suppliers will also have been favourable. 
The different empirical exercises undertaken in the course of this 
study all provide complementary evidence that the changes 
engendered by the SMP have led to an easing ofrestrictions: 
(a) First, the analysis of trends in market shares produced clear 
evidence that the share of imports from partner countries and 
third countries alike had risen substantially in both sectors. 
(b) Second, a detailed examination of quota utilization in the two 
sectors revealed that, as the '1992' deadline approached, non-
EU producers seem to have taken advantage of the growing 
liberalization of the market to increase sales relative to quotas. 
Indeed, several quotas have regularly been exceeded. 
(c) Simulations based on partial equilibrium models for the two 
sectors, showed that where the change is to complete 
liberalization, market access is greatly improved, but also that 
EU consumers benefit substantially. The simulations of a move 
to Community-wide QRs in place of national QRs produced 
concerns in third countries that access to the EU market would 
become more difficult as the single market was consolidated. 
There are three main routes by which the SMP might have 
made access more difficult: by diverting demand from third 
countries to partner countries; by creating a more dynamic EU 
economy such that European producers gain in 
competitiveness; and by translating national quantitative 
restrictions on imports (QRs) into Community barriers that 
restrain imports more effectively. The study by Allen et al. 
(1996) has dealt with the first two issues. Box 3 summarizes the 
main results of the study by Begg et al. (1996) on two 
study cases, clothing and footwear, assessing whether or not the 
move away from QRs imposed by Member States has altered 
market access. 
The argument that the SMP has led to external liberalization 
towards non-EU producers, because market access is easier 
with a single system, is supported by the findings of Allen et al. 
( 1996). The increase actually recorded in intra-EU trade has not 
at all been at the expense of trade with non-EU countries. Their 
little change in market access, but a significant redistribution 
between Member States. Member States which previously 
imposed the most restrictive QRs see the greatest increase in 
extra-EU imports but gain from lower prices. 
More precisely the impact obtained in both sectors can be 
summarized as follows: 
Clothing 
The essence of the changes brought in for clothing by the SMP is 
that separate national quotas are replaced by a single Community-
wide quota. Under the hypothesis that total EU imports are constant, 
imports from constrained countries are redistributed within the 
Community from the less restrictive Member States to the more 
restrictive ones. At the same time producers in previously more 
protected markets, lose while those in previously more open 
markets gain. Redistribution of imports between Member States 
occurs because non-EU suppliers aim to equalize their returns 
across markets. It therefore turns out that prices fall in the markets 
which were previously most restrictive and rise in the least 
restrictive ones. The EU as a whole benefits from this process, 
although the gains and losses are unevenly distributed both between 
Member States, and between consumers and producers. 
Footwear 
For footwear, although quotas have not been entirely removed, 
since certain imports of footwear from China are still subject to 
quota restraint, compared to the position prevailing in 1988, there 
has been a significant movement towards complete quota 
liberalization. In this case, the combination of import liberalization 
and completion of the SMP has a much greater impact. Prices fall in 
all Member States (by an unweighted average of 2.4% ), while the 
volume of imports to the Community rises by 25%. Again, EU 
consumers benefit as a result, although European producers of 
footwear lose out. Exports from unconstrained countries fall by 
almost 10%, while European production falls by 3%. Again, there is 
a redistribution of supply between Member States. 
estimates suggest that for total manufacturing the SMP explains 
around 70% of the actual increase in the part of domestic 
demand supplied by non-EU producers. Again, the impact of 
the SMP is larger the higher the sectoral sensitivity to the SMP. 
The SMP would explain almost 75% of the actual change in 
extra-EU import market shares, which contrasts with the 
performance of extra-EU imports in sectors less sensitive to the 
SMP, where the simulations yield an impact of around 60%. 
As often emphasised in most ex ante studies on the effects of 
the SMP, the programme is expected to affect industries in 
different ways depending on the exact nature of the single 
market measures implemented and their interaction with the 
nature of competition within a particular industry. The study by 
Allen et al. (1996) provides sectoral evidence of the SMP' s 
effects on the 15 sectors particularly sensitive to the SMP. 
Leaving aside sectors where falls in market shares and mark-
ups are relatively small (around 5% or lower), there are certain 
sectors (basic chemicals, pharmaceuticals, machine tools for 
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foodstuffs, office machines and aerospace) that have reacted to 
higher competitive pressures (reduced import prices) by 
reducing mark-ups, and others (machine tools for metals, 
electronic equipment and brewing and malting) where falls in 
price-cost margins are less significant. Clearly market structure 
and conduct differ between these two sets of sectors, though 
there is no evidence in the data available of systematic 
differences in concentration or in returns to scale between the 
two groups. Allen et al. (1996) conjecture that the existence of 
switching costs could explain why certain firms prefer to 
reduce prices to keep their market share. This is not implausible 
in any of the four sectors that have recorded the largest falls in 
price-cost margins. Switching costs, however may be less 
significant in the second group of industries where fixed price-
cost margins may maximize profits, despite a consequent loss 
of market share. 
A common characteristic of both sets of industries is that they 
are highly oligopolistic. In fact, these results differ 
considerably from the behaviour we would expect in a 
competitive industry, where an increase of competitive 
pressures would be reflected both in reductions in mark-ups and 
market shares. The behaviour of boilermaking and clothing 
provides interesting evidence of this. Both sectors could be 
included in the group of most competitive industries in the 
sample, as measured by concentration ratios. 1 In both cases, 
direct, negative, effects of the SMP on domestic market shares 
are accompanied by almost equivalent competitive effects on 
1 See Chapter 5 in Allen. Gasiorck and Smith ( 1996). 
Box 4: Econometric methodology to explain the nature of 
bilateral intra-EC trade 
The share (or value) of two-way trade in horizontally and/or 
vertically differentiated products in the bilateral intra-EC trade of 
each Member State, by industry, for each year ( 1980-94) is used as 
the dependent variable. 
Explanatory variables combine country variables, market structures, 
and finally integration variables. 
Country variables are those generally chosen in the literature, 
controlling for growth, size of countries (potential for economies of 
scale), purchasing power (demand for variety), comparative 
advantage, and transaction costs. 
Turning to market structures, increasing returns are taken into 
account. Here, economies of scale have been proxied by the relative 
productivity of larger enterprises, in each industry. The 
differentiation of products is proxied by an original aggregated 
index of unit values dispersion based on calculations for each 
product. 
Lastly, economic integration - which is the core of this research -
is addressed first by variables taking values according to the levels 
of the non-tariff-barriers. The evolution of the parameter estimate 
before and after 1986 will allow for a quantification of the impact of 
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price-cost margins. As mentioned above, Box 3 presents 
additional evidence on clothing. 
4.2.3.2. Inter- versus intra-industry trade 
The large increase in intra-industry trade, and the importance of 
intra-European trade in price-quality differentiated products are 
two phenomena which might be associated with SMP 
completion, but also with other features of the European 
economy, such as growth, convergence of countries, etc. 
Moreover, the single market might actually have had some 
effects which counteract the prevailing trends in European 
trade patterns. To examine these issues, the CEPII (1996) 
carried out econometric work with two purposes: 
(a) to identify the factors determining European trade 
patterns, independently from the SMP completion; 
(b) to isolate the SMP effect ceteris paribus. 
In their models, the dependent variable is the share (as well as 
the value) of each country's bilateral two-way trade (in similar 
as well as in quality-price differentiated products) in intra-EU 
trade, by industry and for each year (1980-94) (see Box 4 on 
methodology). 
Most determinants act in the same way on intra-industry trade 
in both types of product differentiation. They either increase or 
reduce their respective share of total bilateral trade. Among 
factors which increase the share of both types of intra-industry 
trade are market size, average per capita income of declaring 
the SEM on the composition of trade. Second, evolution over time 
of the parameter estimates associated with transaction costs enable 
us to capture the effect on trade of the cancellation of border 
formalities. Lastly, since private expectations of the SMP have led 
to large flows of foreign direct investment between European 
partners, this phenomenon has had a powerful influence on intra-
European trade, which can be measured' keeping in mind the 
convergence hypothesis (leading to trade displacements) referred to 
above. 
The large explanatory power of the model - higher than is 
traditionally found in the literature - is essentially due to the 
inclusion of multiple indexes, which is theoretically more 
appropriate, and which empirically greatly increases the number of 
observations. In contrast, using the same specification industry-by-
industry, or country-by-country, leads to less satisfactory results, as 
expected. 
1 A dummy has also been used, quite unsuccessfully, as a measure of the 
impact of the SMP. Another dummy for Southern countries integration has 
been tested: the results were statistically significant but unable to 
disentangle SMP effects and the ones associated with integration to the 
EC. 
T rade and FDI speciali zation effec ts of the single market programme 
and partner countries, returns to scale, foreign direct investment 
and the intensity of non-tariff barriers in intra-EU trade before 
the SMP. In contras t, fac tors which reduce the share of both 
types of intra- industry trade are transportation costs and 
currency depreciation. 
Box 5: The cost of multicurrency management - A remaining 
barrier to trade and investment 
The existence of multiple currencies in the European Union creates 
transaction costs fo r exchanging currencies. These costs and risks 
influence trade and in ves tment decisions and lower the Un ion's 
welfare. A study by the IFO institute prov ides new estimates of the 
transaction costs within the existing system of exchange rates in the 
European Union between 1986 and 1995 . The study also assesses 
how the single marke t programme has affec ted these transac ti on 
costs. 
Overall transacti on cos ts are calcul ated by multiplying the to tal 
volume of foreign exchange transacti ons in the EU with the cos ts 
associated with the di ffe rent types of transactions. The study shows 
that fore ign exchange management costs within the EU amounted to 
almost I% of EU 12 GDP in 1995 . Thi s fi gure has remained quite 
stable over th e per iod 1986/95 , and exceeds the pre vi ous EC 
estimate of 0.4% (see One market, one money). The di ffe rence can 
be explained by the use of more up-to-date stati stical material and 
the methodology applied. In the present study, the anti monde is the 
EU without the SMP, whereas that of the study 'One market, one 
money' was the EU without a currency union. 
Transaction costs are substanti ally lower fo r inter-bank business. 
1Between 1986 and 1995 bid-ask spreads fo r interbank trade of EU 
currencies and important thi rd party currencies (US dollar and the 
Japanese yen) have declined strongly fo r all noted currency pairs, 
especially fo r the DM. Transactions using the US dollar as a vehicle 
currency have become cheaper, but not to the same degree as when 
using one of the three most important EU currencies (German mark, 
Briti sh pound, Fre nc h fr anc) as vehicle currencies. Th ere are 
substantial di ffe rences in the unit costs of exchanging small or large 
sums. This is true for inter-bank transactions as fo r transactions of 
non-bank business fo r current account and capital account. There 
has also been a s ignifi cant change in th e size s tructure of cos ts 
between 1986 and 1995. The re lati ve cos ts of exchanging large 
sums have decreased substantially. The cos t diffe rences are largely 
dictated by the different size structure of transactions. Overall , unit 
costs have been declining signi ficantly since 1986. 
The study identifies two main determin ants of the evo luti on of 
transac tion cos ts: On the one hand , intra-EU transacti on volumes 
have increased subs tanti all y because of in creas ing marke t 
integra tion in the European Union. Gi ve n constant uni t cos ts of 
transactions, this positive integration effect would result in a rise of 
to tal transac tion co sts . All o the r thin gs be in g equal, th e more 
effec ti ve the SM P turns out, the larger the ri se in transact ion costs. 
On the other hand, it is found that unit costs have declined over this 
time period. It is argued that capital marke t deregul ati on and the 
free movement of capital ushered in by the SMP has decreased bank 
charges substantially. The decline in unit costs will , ceteris paribus, 
decrease tota l transac ti on cos ts. The effects of the SM P on total 
transac tion costs, therefore, seem to have cancelled each other out 
to a certain degree. This is a reason fo r the relati ve constancy of the 
ratio of transaction costs to GDP in the EU between 1986 and 1995. 
Exchange rate movements within the EU not only reduce intra-
indu stry trade, thus increas ing inter-indu stry trade and 
adjustment costs, but the current multi -currency system in the 
EU introduces additional transaction costs, which represents a 
remaining barrier to trade and inves tment and prevents full 
The study tries to single out the effec t of the SMP on unit costs. The 
hypotheses tested in this analysis are, fi rs tl y, that the single market 
programme of deregulating capital markets is not instantaneous and 
that a hi gh level of capital market imperfecti on and high costs of 
bankin g servi ces in th e late 198 0s continue to have a be lated , 
persistent effect on bank charges in 1994; secondly, it is expected 
that where ex ante imperfection levels were high, the impact of the 
single market on bank charges was strongest. Thus, inter-country 
patterns o f cost declines should be largely determin ed by 
differences in the degree of previ ous capital market imperfec tions 
and by the speed in which they were eliminated. It is assumed that 
in a world without the single market programme's first and second 
Direc ti ves fo r coordinating banking law and the Directi ve fo r the 
complete liberali zation of capital movements no such cost declines 
would have occurred. The important second banking Directi ve of 
1989 se t out the principle of the ri ght of banks to trade fin ancial 
services and to es tablish branches th roughout the EU, on the bas is 
of a s ing le authori za ti on or ' licence ' from their home country 
supervi sor. The Direc tive liberalizing capital movements of 1988 
was of outstanding importance because it required the dismantling 
of all barriers to capital movements in the EU. 
In the study regressions are run of the different types of unit costs 
against the volume of enterprises ' fo reign trade and the direc tion of 
trade (i.e. the share of EU trade), as well as other variables. The 
most noteworthy result concerns the size of the es timated elastic ity 
of bank charges to the volume of a firm 's total foreign trade. In the 
two countries where capital market liberalization and deregul ation 
are s tro nges t, in Germany and the UK, thi s elas ticity has a 
substantially higher absolute value than that found in the three other 
countries analysed. The es timated elasticity of - .2 indi cates that 
with a 10% increase in the volume of fo reign transactions a firm 's 
unit bank charges fo r exc hang ing currencies fa ll s by 2 %. T hi s 
implies that in the more competiti ve markets in Germany and the 
UK, large firms have greater cost advantages than in Italy or France. 
The larger elasticity in the first two countries is corroborated by the 
fin d ing th at a s igni fica nt number of German and UK firm s (and 
among them espec iall y th e small er firm s) s tated their cos ts had 
increased. Thi s could well be the case in a banking environment 
where large firms can demand low charges and banks raise charges 
on small and middle-s ized fi rms in order to cover cos ts or maintain 
profi t margins. The pictu re is less clear fo r intra-EU trade : On the 
one hand , the coe ff\ cients to the EU trade or EU ex port share 
vari ables are all negati ve, indicating th at int ra-EU trade involves 
fo reign exchange transactions with lower costs than trade with other 
countries. On the other, the coeffi cients are either not significantl y 
di ffe rent from zero or only marginall y significant. The size of the 
coefficient is highes t in Germany, which means that among German 
firm s there are cos t benefit s to be fo und in EU trade. For a small 
number of UK fi rms the coe ffi cients are even hi gher. A ve ry 
preliminary interpretation of these results could be that in these two 
countri es th e degree o f co mpe ti t ion among banks fo r intra-EU 
business is more intense than the competition fo r business with the 
rest of the world. 
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Table 9 
Synthesis of econometric results for intra-EU trade patterns 
General determinants 
Market size 
Income per capita 
Returns to scale 
Foreign direct investment 
Non-tariff barriers before the SMP 
Transportation costs 
Exchange rate variations 
Differences in market size 
Differences in factor endowments 
Vertical differentiation of products 
Single market related effects 
Measures General effects 
Effect on the share of intra-industry trade 
in total, bilateral trade 
Similar products 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
Products 
differentiated 
price-quality 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
Cancellation of border formalities 
(EMU) 
Completion of the SMP 
Structural funds 
Reduced transaction costs 
Currency depreciation 
Microeconomic adjustment growth 
Convergence of GDP 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
Variation over 1980-94 
exploitation of the advantages of the internal market. As shown 
in Box 5, the study conducted by the IFO institute (1996) 
reveals that such transaction costs are far from negligible and 
amount to around I% of the EU 12 GDP. 
Having identified these determinants of intra-EU trade patterns, 
they can be controlled in order to address the question of an 
anti monde: How might trade patterns have evolved without 
completion of the SMP? There is clear econometric evidence 
that the cancellation of border formalities has directly led to an 
increased share of intra-industry trade. However, the empirical 
evidence on the nature of intra-EU trade is the result of 
complex relationships, influencing trade types with different 
intensities. A key feature of the evolution of intra-industry 
trade in Europe during the completion period has been the 
expansion of two-way trade in differentiated products, even if 
this evolution might not only be the result of the SMP per se, 
exogenous factors having played an important role. Table 9 
tries to distinguish specifically SMP-related factors having an 
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effect on intra-industry trade from more general factors which 
would also have had an effect as the SMP was progressing (and 
which would have had an effect in the absence of the SMP). 
4.3. Foreign direct investment (FDI) 
4.3.1. Expected theoretical impact of FDI 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) can take the form of 
'greenfield' investment (establishing a new company from 
scratch) and cross-border mergers and acquisitions of existing 
firms. Trade and FDI are different ways of supplying 
international markets. Multinational companies are the main 
source of FDI flows, and the sales of multinational foreign 
affiliates are now by some estimates worth double the value of 
world exports. 
Trade and FDI specialization effects of the single market programme 
Until recently, most research on FDI 1 has been conducted 
within the theoretical framework developed by Dunning (1977, 
1981 ). This theory seeks to explain under what conditions a 
firm will engage in FOi abroad rather than serve foreign 
markets via exports or some other means, such as licensing. It 
argues that multinational enterprises must possess some 
advantage over local firms which overcomes the inherent 
disadvantages and additional costs" of producing in another 
country. 
Broadly, this advantage will hold when three conditions are 
fulfilled (Dunning 1993): the multinational possesses 
ownership specific advantages (0), it has certain internalization 
opportunities (I) and the foreign market has locational 
advantages (L). Ownership advantages which give an MNE 
cost advantages over local rivals in the foreign market can be 
due to the product it makes or its characteristic production 
process, or to intangible reasons such as reputation for quality, 
brand name, and superior management. Locational advantages 
can include trade barriers, both natural (transport costs) and 
artificial (tariffs and quotas), cheap factors of production, and 
ease of access to consumers. Internalization advantages are 
factors which make it more profitable for an MNE to set up a 
foreign subsidiary itself rather than exploit ownership and 
locational advantages in other ways such as licensing a foreign 
firm to produce the product. 
Clearly, the SMP will only directly affect locational 
advantages. The net effect is however ambiguous. To the extent 
that the SMP is expected to raise income levels and growth in 
the EU, FDI will be increased. To the extent that trade becomes 
easier and plant-level economies of scale are available, FDI 
may no longer be necessary to access markets and will 
consequently contract. 
Over time, these OU concepts have been refined. Concerning 
ownership advantages in particular, it is now held that 
knowledge-based assets are more important than physical 
capital assets in determining whether or not FDI takes place 
(Markusen, 1995). This is because knowledge-based assets are 
easily transferred back and forth between different locations (in 
different countries) at little cost (which gives them the 
properties of public goods), unlike physical capital. 
1 We take FOi to be a proxy for international production (as there is no 
adequate information on production or sales). Following the !MF definition, 
FOi refers to investments made to acquire a lasting interest in an enterprise 
operating in an economy other than that of the investor. the investor's purpose 
being to to have an effective voice in the management of the enterprise. 
Which include communication costs, expatriate conditions for relocating 
company personnel abroad. resources used up in overcoming language 
barriers and differing local customs. as well as the costs of being outside local 
business and government networks (Markusen, 1995 J 
Knowledge-based assets therefore provide firms with cost 
advantages over independent single plant firms. 3 Conversely, 
potential economies of scale arising from concentrating 
production at a single plant tend to discourage FDI and 
geographically dispersed production. The implication is that in 
sectors subject to economies of scale, the SMP will lead to 
relatively more trade than FDI.4 For sectors characterized by 
knowledge-based assets, however, FDI will increase relative to 
trade to Member States whose locational advantages are 
significantly improved by the SMP (because of the removal of 
market fragmentation and the dynamic impacts on economic 
growth and prosperity).5 
Locational advantages certainly seemed to have been affected 
by earlier Community regional integration developments. Early 
research on EC integration and FOi emphasized that the 
formation of the European customs union led to 'tariff 
jumping' by means of FDI into the Community, implying that 
the process of integration enhanced the locational advantages 
of the countries hitherto served by exports from the United 
States or other non-EU countries, thus leading to a surge of 
FDI. This is particularly true for non-European firms 
(Balasubramanyam and Greenaway, 1991 ), with direct 
investment providing a means of gaining tariff-free access to 
the European-wide market. 
Recently, a (currently) small body of literature (called the New 
theory of FDI) has evolved which takes the key concepts of 
ownership and locational advantages from the OU literature 
and introduces them into general equilibrium trade models. 
Initially, this theory explained the decision to expand via 
investment overseas in terms of differences in the costs of 
factors of production due to relative factor endowments which 
vary across countries (Helpman (1984 ), Markusen ( 1984 ), 
Helpman and Krugman (1985)). In this case, MNEs arise to 
exploit these differences in factor costs by expanding vertically 
abroad - i.e., headquarters are located in capital-abundant 
countries, whilst production is located in labour-abundant 
countries. 
Thus, if factor endowments across countries are similar, their 
respective factor prices will not diverge much either, and there 
will be no motivation for multinational activity. This approach 
1 Consider R&O, clearly a knowledge-based asset; a single two-plant firm has a 
cost efficiency advantage over two independent single-plant finns because the 
multi plant firm (the MNE) need only make a single investment in R&O 
spread over two plants, whilst the two independent firms must each make the 
R&O investment. 
' Except, perhaps. in the short-run when FOi is used to concentrate production 
inside the Community to exploit economies of scale. 
' In principle, all Member States' locational advantages will be enhanced by the 
SMP, but for some, other factors may conspire to reduce the positive impact 
of the SMP. 
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therefore suggests that we should expect to see FDI flowing 
between countries with substantially different relative factor 
proportions and in a single direction; typically from rich capital 
intensive countries to poor Jabour-abundant countries. 
Most recently, models have been produced allowing for 
horizontal multinationals and two-way investment between 
countries (Brainard (1993), Markusen and Venables (1995)). 
The key elements of these models are plant and firm level scale 
economies, tariffs and transport costs. Firms will undertake 
FDI the higher are firm level fixed costs and trade costs relative 
to the benefits of locating all production at a single plant, due to 
plant level scale economies. 
• A principal contribution of these latest models is that they 
can show which country characteristics are associated with 
high levels of FDI. Their key propositions are (Markusen and 
Venables (1995)): 
• MNE activity will tend to become more intensive as 
countries converge in size and relative endowments; 
• MNEs displace trade. Trade costs tend to favour FDI over 
exporting; 1 
• sectors in which firm level economies of scale are important 
will tend to be dominated by MNEs relative to sectors in 
which plant level scale economies are crucial. 
4.3.2. Overall picture of the pattern of FDI in the EU 
As Chapter 2 already highlights, stocks of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) around the world have grown in value from 
USD 68 billion in 1960 to USD1 650 billion in 1993, four 
times faster than global GDP and three times faster than global 
trade in the same period. This enormous increase has been 
particularly intense in the most recent period - worldwide FDI 
flows grew almost five-fold between 1984 and 1990 (before 
contracting some 36% in 1991 ). Multinational enterprises 
(MNEs) are the main source of FDI flows, and the number of 
MNEs around the world has risen from around 7 OOO in the late 
1960s to about 37 OOO in the early 1990s. As a result, the sales 
of MNE foreign affiliates are now, by some estimates, worth 
double the value of world exports. Clearly, foreign affiliates 
have taken over from exports as the main way in which MNEs 
supply markets around the world with goods and services. FDI 
can take a variety of forms, including both 'greenfield' 
investment (establishing a new company or factory from 
scratch) and mergers and acquisitions of existing firms 
1 However, to the extent that the SMP removes barriers and consequently 
lowers trade costs, the SMP may tend to increase trade relative to FOi within 
the EU. This is particularly true in sectors where there arc large. unexploited 
economics of scale. 
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Table 10 
Share of FDI inflows ( % ) from all countries 
1982-87 
Developed countries 78.1 
Developing countries 21.9 
European Union 28.2 
as % of developed 36.1 
United States 39.9 
Japan 0.7 
S011rce: Based on Unclad 1994 and !MF data. 
1988-90 
84.6 
15.3 
42.3 
50.0 
31.3 
1991-93 
67.0 
33.0 
44.4 
66.3 
10.2 
0.9 
(M&As). Furthermore, as trade and FDI are different ways of 
supplying international markets, FDI has to be studied with at 
least as much interest as international trade, especially to 
investigate the extent to which the two substitute for or 
complement each other. 
Even more importantly as far the EU is concerned, as a target 
for FDI it has disproportionately enjoyed the FDI surge, with a 
seven-fold increase in flows in the 1984-90 period, implying a 
growing share of the worldwide total. Table 10 shows how its 
share climbed throughout the 1980s and up to 1993 from just 
over a quarter to over 44% of world-wide flows ( or two thirds 
of FDI inflows to developed countries, up from only 36% in the 
period 1982-87). The EU' s success contrasts with the United 
States' experience, where the share of world-wide FDI flows 
hit a low of 10.2% in the period 1991-93. Japan provides 
another contrast, as its share of worldwide FDI flows have 
consistently been virtually negligible. 
In 1993, the EU Member States attracted almost ECU 
52 billion of FDI (from outside the EU and from each other), 
down from ECU 61 billion in 1992, and the peak of ECU 
72 billion in 1990. Nevertheless, the 1993 total remains 
considerably higher than the ECU 17 .5 billion attracted in 
1986. Concerning the source of these flows, Table 11 shows 
that investments by Member States in other Member States 
(intra-EU FDI) increased as a proportion from 41 % of total FDI 
flows to the EU in 1984, to 55% in 1986-90 and over 60% in 
1991-93. In other words, the EU has accounted for an 
increasing share of a rising total of FDI. Outside the EU, the 
major sources of foreign investment have been the US and 
EFT A, which together provided 44% of FDI flows in 1984, 
falling to 29% in 1990 and then 24% in 1993. One result of this 
was that the EU' s share of US foreign affiliates' total assets 
rose to nearly 50% in the early 1990s. Following a dip during 
the recession of the early 1980s, this surpassed previous levels 
Trade and FDI specialization effects of the single market programme 
Table 11 
EU FDI inflows from all countries 
1984 1985 1986 1987 
Intra-EU 4 213 5 949 10449 12 344 
Extra-EU 6 152 5 711 7 119 12 991 
Intra+ extra 10 365 11 660 17 568 25 335 
Share of extra-EU FDI inflows from all countries 
1984 1985 1986 1987 
Extra-EU(% total) 59% 49% 41% 51% 
us 28% 15% 15% 9% 
Japan 4% 6% 3% 6% 
EFTA 16% 16% 19% 15% 
Source: Eurostat and Commission Services. 
and reflected an increased concentration of US MNE activity in 
Europe. Japanese FDI to the EU has, meanwhile, oscillated 
since 1984 between 3 and 8% of the EU total. There was a 
notable decline in the Japanese share during the period 1991-93 
to 3% from 8% in 1990. 
I 
The importance of FDI stocks to the EU as a share of GDP has 
risen significantly. Table 12 demonstrates that while the ratio of 
FDI inward stock to GDP since 1980 has generally grown 
world-wide, the European Union's has grown even faster, most 
markedly in the period 1985 to 1990, and remains higher than 
for most developed countries. That underlines the important 
role which FDI plays in the EU economy, in contrast to both 
the United States and in particular Japan, and means that FDI is 
Table 12 
Significance of FDI inward stock to GDP 
Developed countries 
Developing countries 
European Union 
Rest of W. Europe 
United States 
Japan 
1980 1985 
4.7 
5.2 
5.8 
4.7 
3.2 
3.0 
6.4 
9.2 
8.7 
6.4 
4.7 
2.5 
Source: Based on Unctad 199-l and IMF data. 
1990 
8.4 
5.5 
11.3 
7.7 
7.3 
2.6 
1992 
8.2 
9.2 
11.5 
8.3 
7.1 
1.1 
Value (mil/io,i ec11s) 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
22 317 34 485 39 295 34 904 38 373 30 844 
18 141 27 943 32 753 20 993 22 551 21 029 
40 458 62 428 72 048 55 897 60 924 51 873 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
45% 45% 45% 38% 37% 41% 
6% 16% 13% 10% 19% 17% 
6% 7% 8% 3% 3% 3% 
21% 13% 16% 12% 7% 7% 
probably having more pronounced effects on the EU economy 
than on other economies around the world, especially 
developed countries. 
4.3.2.1. Country dimensions 
At the Member State level, Table 13 shows that the most 
noticeable changes in shares of total FDI inflows to the EU are 
the strengthened positions of Belgium/Luxembourg especially 
and, to a lesser extent, France. Conversely the UK position 
declined in the period 1990-93. Generalizing, the main Member 
State recipients of FDI flows between 1990 and 1993 were the 
UK first with around 23% of the total, then France (15%), 
Belgium/Luxembourg (14%) and Spain (12%). At the other 
extreme, Greece barely received I% of such flows, whilst 
Denmark and Portugal received only about 2% each. 
The UK's overall dominance as a location ofFDI is partly 
because it is a large Member State with a consequently larger 
domestic market Uust as the apparently low share of Greece, 
Portugal and Denmark can be partially attributed to their being 
relatively small Member States). However, it may be, as is 
sometimes argued, that the UK's dominance is also partly due 
to other factors - cultural, geographic, linguistic and structural 
- which make it relatively more attractive than other Member 
States as a location for FDI, especially from outside the EU -
primarily from US and Japanese MNEs. In the period 1986 to 
1992, the UK consistently received over 40% of extra-EU FDI 
flows targeting the EU (apart from just one year, 1991, when its 
share fell to 27% ). This dominant position in terms of attracting 
FDI from outside the EU means that the UK remains one of the 
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Table 13 
Member States' share of FDI inflows, 1986-93 
Share of average intra-EU FDI flows to Share of average extra-EU Share of total FDI flows to 
1986 1993 1990-93 1986 
BLEU 7% 19% 17% 2% 
Denmark 0% 1% 1% 2% 
Germany 9% 7% 11% 3% 
Greece 1% 1% 1% 3% 
Spain 17% 13% 14% 15% 
France 14% 18% 15% 19% 
Ireland 1% 6% 7% 0% 
Italy 7% 7% 5% -6% 
Netherlands 18% 16% 12% 13% 
Portugal 1% 2% 3% 1% 
UK 25% 9% 14% 47% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Share of extra-EU flows to total 41% 
Source: Eurostat. 
main Member State locations for overall FOi within the EU. 
France also receives significant extra-EU FOi inflows, but trails 
the UK, generally receiving a I 0-20% share of the extra-EU 
total. 
As hosts for FOi from other European Union countries, 
Belgium/Luxembourg and France feature prominently, each 
Table 14 
Significance of the EU's inflows to GDP by Member State, 
1986-93 
Ratio of total FDI to GDP 
BLEU 
Denmark 
Germany 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
UK 
EU-12 
1986 
0.75% 
0.23% 
0.13% 
0.86% 
1.20% 
0.38% 
0.25% 
0.05% 
1.54% 
0.65% 
1.04% 
0.49% 
Source: Eurostat and Commission services. 
90 
1993 
4.79% 
1.04% 
0.22% 
0.56% 
1.32% 
0.78% 
7.68% 
0.40% 
2.18% 
1.47% 
1.29% 
0.94% 
1990-93 
4.70% 
0.89% 
0.37% 
0.64% 
1.75% 
0.89% 
9.41% 
0.40% 
2.74% 
2.64% 
1.83% 
1.17% 
EU inflows of FDI to: the EU going to: 
1993 1990-93 1986 1993 1990-93 
16% 9% 5% 17% 14% 
4% 2% 1% 2% 2% 
7% 5% 7% 7% 8% 
0% 0% 2% 1% 1% 
9% 9% 16% 11% 12% 
14% 16% 16% 16% 15% 
6% 4% 0% 6% 6% 
7% 7% 2% 7% 6% 
4% 10% 16% 11% 11% 
1% 2% 1% 2% 2% 
34% 37% 34% 19% 23% 
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
41% 40% 
absorbing some 18% of intra-EU FOi in the period 1992-93. 1 
Meanwhile, the UK absorbed less than 10% of intra-EU FOi 
flows in the same period, having become significantly less 
important as a location for FOi from other Member States over 
the period 1986-91. 
As Table 14 shows, the impact on the domestic economy in 
terms of the ratio of FOi inflows to GDP differs widely 
amongst Member States and gives a markedly different picture 
from the simple analysis of the magnitude of inflows and their 
destination. In the period 1990-93, annual Irish FOi inflows 
were worth over 9% of GDP. For Belgium/Luxembourg, the 
ratio was nearly 5% a year. The Netherlands, with a ratio 
nearing 3%, came third, then Portugal (2.6% p.a.), the UK 
(over 1.8% p.a.), and Spain (with almost 1.8%). Least affected 
as judged using this measure are Germany (less than 0.4% ), 
Italy (0.4% p.a.) and Greece (0.6%). 
4.3.2.2. Sectoral dimension 
The bulk of FOi to the EU as a whole is targeted at the services 
sector (see Figure 6 below). From 1984 to 1993, 63% of 
cumulative FOi inflows went to service sectors whilst only 
31 % went to manufacturing sectors. This partially reflects the 
dominance of service sectors in all advanced economies. 
However, as services are generally less tradeable than 
1 However. the former may be slightly exaggerated as a result of the presence 
of holding companies or financial affiliates of firms from other European 
Union countries. 
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Table 15 
Comparison between share of intra-EU FDI and trade by broad industrial sector, 1984-92 
( % ) 
1984-86 1 1987-89 1990-92 
FDI Trade FDI Trade FDI Trade 
More technology intensive 73.0 59.9 47.0 61 .3 50.6 62 .1 
Chemicals 30.8 18 .4 28.4 16.6 9.9 15 .9 
Non-electrical machinery 15.7 10.6 3.2 11.4 10. l 11. l 
Electrical and electronic 18 .4 14.8 13 .3 15.4 15 .3 15 .6 
Transport equipment 8.1 16.1 2.1 18 .0 15 .3 19.5 
Less technology intensive 26.9 40.1 43.0 38.7 49.5 37.9 
Food products 9.6 12.5 22.7 11.3 27 .2 10.8 
Metal and metal products 0.7 3.6 6.4 3.8 3.5 4.1 
Other industries 16.5 23 .9 23 .9 23.7 18.8 23 . l 
All industries 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
ECUs (billion) 1.33 319.9 6.67 424.2 9.02 547.2 
1 Annual average. Intra-EC FOi is defined as inward investment flows into all Member States of the EC from other Member States of the EC; and intra-EC trade as 
value of ex pons between members of the Community. 
Source: Eurostat (1994). 
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Table 16 
Numbers of M&A operations by sector and Member State oyer the period 1986-9.5 
NACE Belgium Denmark France Germany Greece Ireland Italy NL Portugal Spain UK 
2. Extraction and processing of non-energy-producing minerals and derived products 
Chemical industry 
21 0 0 0 0 3 4 0 0 3 I I 
22 5 2 2 4 3 1 3 3 4 3 2 
23 1 1 2 2 0 3 1 1 1 1 0 
24 9 8 5 6 17 7 5 10 11 7 4 
25 12 8 11 11 3 9 21 11 14 14 12 
26 O· 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3. Metal manufacture; mechanical, electrical and instrument engineering 
30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
31 4 8 4 6 0 4 4 2 3 4 4 
32 13 18 13 18 0 4 13 14 3 7 13 
33 0 3 1 1 0 1 0 2 0 0 3 
34 7 11 10 13 0 12 12 10 14 10 13 
35 2 2 4 3 0 I 5 2 1 4 4 
36 3 1 2 2 10 I 2 2 0 1 3 
37 2 2 4 4 0 0 2 2 0 1 4 
38 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
39 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4. Other manufacturing industries 
40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
41 7 9 5 4 3 16 6 12 11 11 5 
42 8 7 7 4 38 7 8 8 11 11 5 
43 3 1 3 3 7 3 I 3 6 2 I 
44 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
45 2 1 4 2 0 3 3 I I 2 1 
46 3 4 3 3 0 I 1 5 6 2 2 
47 13 9 10 7 10 10 7 8 8 12 15 
48 6 3 7 6 3 7 6 5 1 4 6 
49 1 1 2 1 0 I 1 I 1 1 1 
Source: AMdata. 
manufacturing goods, FDI is often the only way to supply FDI. Table 16 shows the breakdown of M&A activity (by 
foreign markets. This reinforces the dominance of services' numbers of operations) in NACE 2-digit manufacturing sectors 
FDI relative to manufacturing FDI. As for the manufacturing for the period 1986-95 by Member State. Of course, the data 
sectors receiving FDI in the EU, a broad general characteristic suffers the serious shortcoming of treating all operations as 
has been the growing importance of less technology intensive equally important, even though they may differ greatly in 
sectors in the recent period, a development which is the reverse value. Nevertheless, from the table we can see interesting 
of recent trends in trade (see Table 15). Member State differences in the sectors attracting most M&A 
activities. For example, NACE sector 32, mechanical 
Data constraints (see Box 6) make it difficult to obtain more engineering, has apparently been either the first or second most 
detailed evidence on the sectoral breakdown of manufacturing popular sector as a target for M&A (if} terms of numbers) in the 
FDI, especially to individual Member States. However, there is generally more developed Member States. Conversely, NACE-
detailed data on mergers and acquisitions (M&As) available, 42 and 43, textiles and clothing, has only been an especially 
and although this ignores greenfield investments, it can, popular target for M&A activity in the less developed Member 
nevertheless, provide interesting information about the bulk of States. 
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Box 6: FDI data availability 
There is a significant lack of comprehensive statistical data on FDI. 
Eurostat has collated data on FDI flows within the EU, but these 
data are not available prior to 1984 and there are numerous country 
and sectoral gaps. Moreover, use of flow data rather than stock data 
on FDI can lead to inaccurate conclusions since flows often vary 
widely between years, reinvested profits are not included I and there 
remain differences in the ways that different countries record FDI 
flows that the Eurostat harmonization process has yet to resolve. 
However, mergers and acquisitions (M&As) are an increasingly 
important phenomenon of the globalizing economy, and their rapid 
growth in the late 1980s coincides with the implementation of the 
internal market. Over the period 1987-93, worldwide cross-border 
M&As were around two thirds (66.2%) of FDI inflows into 
developed countries. 2 It is legitimate, therefore, to take data on 
M&As as a reasonable proxy for FDI. 
Furthermore, data on M&As (from the AMdata database) is 
relatively rich, and quite sectorally disaggregated. Another 
advantage is that it includes acquisitions financed by locally-raised 
capital that would not normally appear in the balance of payments, 
even though the consequent change of ownership would qualify as 
' Until very recently. These can form a significant part of FDI. particularly for the 
more mature investments of, for example. US firms. 
Unctad 1995. This phenomenon is discussed in more detail in Chapter 11. 
4.3.2.3. FDI and the exploitation of relative comparative 
advantage 
f 
From a view of the sectoral breakdown of FDI (as proxied by 
M&A) within the Community, it is but a short step to 
consideration of whether or not FDI flows reflect Member 
States' relative comparative advantages. Theory, as we have 
seen, suggests that at least some FDI should indeed do so, even 
if the bulk of FDI will be between rich countries with similar 
factor endowments. 
The information on M&A activity provided in Table 16 above 
is used to make such an analysis. Two approaches are used. 
Firstly, the ad hoe assumption is made that NACE 2-digit 
sectors 32 to 37 (mechanical engineering, office machinery, 
electrical engineering, motor vehicles, other means of transport 
and instrument engineering) could be described as more 
processed products, whilst NACE sectors 41 to 46 (food, drink 
and tobacco, textiles, leather goods, clothing and footwear, and 
timber and wooden furniture) could be described as relatively 
basic products. On this basis, the share of M&A activity in each 
Member State's total M&A activity over the period 1986-95 
was calculated. The result is presented below in Figure 7, and 
provides interesting evidence suggesting that FDI activity is 
indeed related to Member States' comparative advantages. 
The second, slightly less ad hoe approach is to calculate the 
similarity of the M&A activity between the Member States for 
manufacturing sectors with a correlation coefficient, as we have 
FDI under the conventional definition. 3 On the other hand, M&A 
data is only complete for numbers of M&A, not for value. In fact, a 
significant number of the transactions on the AMdata database are 
not recorded with values attached, particularly where the target is a 
continental European firm. Another problem with using M&A data 
as a proxy for FDI is that it ignores greenfield investment. 
The problem with using data on number of operations alone is that 
it implies assigning equal values to M&A operations which may 
have been significantly different in terms of their monetary value. 
On the other hand, AMdata only records large-scale M&A activity, 
which may reduce the scale of the problem somewhat. Furthermore, 
value data could also introduce a bias - capital-intensive industries 
would dominate M&A activity, whilst interesting activity occuring 
in non capital-intensive sectors may be overlooked. 
Finally, as regards the issue of neglected greenfield investment, it is 
not obvious why such activity should have a different sectoral 
composition to M&A activity - in other words, although not 
comprehensive, AMdata is adequate for sectoral analysis. In any 
case, Eurostat data does allow some generalizations to be made 
about the value of FDI and the sectors to which it has been directed 
in the Member States. 
' IMF sec Chapter 3. 
done for production and trade. This matrix of correlation on 
inflows FDI is presented below in Table 17. The closer to 1 is 
an index, the more similar the FDI activity in the two Member 
States under comparison as represented by numbers of M&A, 
and vice versa. This index has been calculated at the NACE 2-
digit level which is highly aggregated and therefore loses 
significant details. What is clear from the table is that the 
'northern' Member States are very similar to each other - i.e., 
the intensity of M&A activity in particular sectors has been 
much the same amongst the northern Member States. A 
distinction can be drawn between the northern Member States 
and most of the southern Member States apart from Spain 
(which according to this analysis is very similar to the northern 
Member States). These results may well reflect factor 
endowment differences and so be based on investors' 
perceptions of comparative advantage. 
4.3.2.4. FDJ/trade relationships 
FDI and trade are alternative ways of supplying foreign 
markets. This, plus the fact that theory (as we have seen) does 
not generate very definite conclusions about the likely SMP 
impact to be drawn, makes it interesting to see how their 
relationship to each other has developed during the SMP 
period, and so obtain empirical evidence as to whether they 
have complemented or substituted for each other. Table 18 
compares intra-EU FDl/trade ratios by broad industrial sector. 
Clearly, the trade/FDI ratios have fallen substantially during the 
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Table 17 
Correlation matrix on inflows FDI, 1986-95 
B DK D EL E F IRL NL p UK 
B I 0.875 0.927 0.837 0.452 0.749 0.849 0.920 0.764 0.916 0.889 
DK 0.875 1 0.892 0.925 0.241 0.707 0.779 0.923 0.664 0.793 0.870 
D 0.927 0.892 1 0.926 0.283 0.730 0.910 0.888 0.711 0.871 0.955 
EL 0.837 0.925 0.926 1 0.092 0.589 0.862 0.856 0.592 0.720 0.886 
E 0.452 0.241 0.283 0.092 1 0.363 0.231 0.369 0.502 0.493 0.214 
F 0.749 0.707 0.730 0.589 0.363 1 0.667 0.822 0.846 0.887 0.700 
IRL 0.849 0.779 0.910 0.862 0.231 0.667 1 0.821 0.737 0.867 0.864 
I 0.920 0.923 0.888 0.856 0.369 0.822 0.821 1 0.825 0.889 0.829 
NL 0.764 0.664 0.711 0.592 0.502 0.846 0.737 0.825 1 0.899 0.662 
p 0.916 0.793 0.871 0.720 0.493 0.887 0.867 0.889 0.899 1 0.846 
UK 0.889 0.870 0.955 0.886 0.214 0.700 0.864 0.829 0.662 0.846 1 
Average 0.818 0.767 0.809 0.729 0.324 0.706 0.759 0.814 0.720 0.818 0.772 
Source: AMDATA. 
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Table 18 
Intra-EU trade/FDI ratios 1984-92 
More technology intensive 
Chemicals 
Non-electrical machinery 
Electrical and electronics 
Transport equipment 
Less technology intensive 
Food products 
Metal and metal products 
Other industries 
All industries 
Source: Eurostal ( 1994 ). 
1984-86 
196.4 
142.7 
160.8 
192.9 
478.1 
355.6 
312.2 
1047.2 
346.5 
239.5 
1987-89 
82.9 
37.1 
325.5 
73.8 
540.3 
46.4 
31.5 
37.7 
62.9 
63.5 
1990-92 
74.4 
97.2 
66.5 
61.9 
77.5 
46.6 
24.1 
69.0 
74.6 
60.7 
period of the single market to a quarter of their previous levels. 
The decline in this ratio was generally most marked in the less 
technology intensive sectors, and in the early SMP 
implementation period ( 1987-89) when flows of FDI peaked. 
CEPS (1996) carry out a series of tests with the explicit aim of 
empirically testing the relationship between trade and FDI. In 
particular, they investigate whether changes in FDI outflows 
from one country to another lead to subsequent changes in 
exports between the two. In theory, increases in FDI should 
precede declines in exports. However, they find little support 
for the hypothesis that there are strong causal links between 
FDI and exports. It does not seem from the evidence that 
increases in FDI outflows by EU Member States have led to 
export declines, nor that increases in exports have led to 
declines in FDI. At most, there is some very weak evidence that 
exports and FDI may actually be positively related - in other 
words, that they complement each other. In particular, increases 
in FDI lead after a lag to increases in exports. 
4.3.3. Assessment of the single market effect 
The single market and levels of intra-EU FDI 
The first indication of the extent and direction of the SMP 
impact on FDI in the EU is provided in section 3.2 where the 
increasing share of FDI flows worldwide absorbed by the EU 
during the SMP period is noted. It is not implausible to argue 
that other developed countries offer an approximate anti-monde 
to developments in the EU - i.e., other developed countries 
were impacted by significant global economic trends such as 
globalization and technological progress in presumably similar 
ways to the EU, but did not share in the single market 
programme (SMP). Therefore, the EU's outstanding 
performance in attracting FDI flows during the single market's 
establishment period could well be linked to the single market 
process. MNEs around the world may have come to believe 
that the SMP is and will continue to have significantly 
beneficial growth impacts on the EU economy, and that 
therefore the EU is a potentially good location for improving 
future profitability. 
Another, more systematic way of estimating the SMP effect on 
intra-EU FDI flows is to assess whether such flows have risen 
more rapidly than might have been predicted from a 
conventionally specified model of FDI determinants without an 
explicit indicator for the single market. The result would 
portray the anti-monde effect of the completion of the SMP. In 
the rest of this section, the results of work carried out by EAG 
(1996) and CEPS (1996) in this spirit are presented. 
CEPS makes use of a so-called gravity model to try to explain 
the geographical distribution of outward FDI flows and exports 
for France, Germany, Japan, Sweden, the UK and the US, using 
data for a panel of destination countries for the years 1982 to 
1993 (see Box 7 below for more details). It is estimated that a 
1 % increase in a country's income leads to a more than 
proportionate increase in FDI into that country. The single 
market, to the extent that it has achieved its expected result of 
raising incomes inside the Community, must therefore have led 
to an increase in FDI targeting the EU. More directly, it is 
estimated that FDI flows from France to the EU were 100% 
higher due to the SMP in 1989 than they would have been in 
the absence of the SMP, whilst German FDI flows to the EU 
were 80% higher in their peak year 1990, and British FDI flows 
to the EU were 200% higher in 1989. Sweden, despite only 
recently becoming a Member State, also stepped up FDI to the 
EU following implementation of the SMP. On the other hand, 
the SMP does not seem to have had any impact on the intensity 
of Japanese and US investment in the EU. 
EAG use an econometric model to yield explicit estimates of 
the impact of declining non-tariff barriers on cross-border 
investment and the extent to which there has been a significant 
structural change in the pattern of investment since the middle 
of the 1980s. Arguing that the quality of the available aggregate 
EU sectoral data is limited, they only look at the determinants 
of outward FDI from the UK and Germany. However, these 
two EU countries account for the largest level of outward 
overseas investment, some 55% of the total stock of FDI by EU 
Member States as of 1989. The geographical pattern of the 
recorded stocks of UK and German foreign direct investment is 
reported in Table 19 .1 Detailed discussion of the econometric 
methodology used can be found in Appendix 3. 
EAG estimates that the single market programme may have 
raised the constant price stock of UK investment in the EU 
1 The EU figures arc for the 12 Memhcr States as of 1994; they therefore 
include data for Greece. Spain and Portugal prior to their accession into the 
EC. 
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Box 7: Gravity models applied to FDI 
CEPS make use of a 'gravity model' to study FDI flows in the EU 
during the 1980s and 1990s. Such models have been well used to 
study bilateral trade flow volumes and provided for one of the initial 
estimates of the impact of the EEC on European trade flows (Aitken 
(1973)). It has also recently been applied by Eaton and Tamura 
(1996) to explain US and Japanese FDI data. The gravity model 
relates bilateral FDI and trade flows to factors reflecting country 
size (proxied by population), supply and demand (reflected by 
income), transport costs (measured by distance), and the fixed costs 
of establishing an overseas plant (a possible proxy being the level of 
human capital - CEPS investigate to see whether this has any 
effects but the results are insignificant, although available indicators 
used not felt to be satisfactory). 
Typically, the standard gravity model describes the trade flow from 
a particular source country (i) to a particular destination country (j) 
in terms of the following relationship: 
where Xij is the value of the trade flow from country i (exporter) 
to country j (importer) 
GDPi is the gross domestic product of country i 
POPi is the population of country i 
DISTij is the distance between countries i and j 
Dkij are dummy variables representing the adjacency of i 
and j (ADJ) and preference relationships between i and j. 
These additional variables also take account of artificial 
trade barriers 
a, l3i and -yk are parameters to be estimated. 
The evolution of FDI flows shares some of the principal 
characteristics of the development of trade flows. FDI has tended to 
become more intense between similar countries, in terms of having 
high incomes, and has grown at a faster rate than income (and 
exports). This suggests that a gravity-type approach could be useful 
in explaining the geographical distribution of FDI flows, a view 
reinforced by the recent theoretical developments which show how 
economic size and relative resource endowments can be important 
determinants of FDI. As for distance, theory suggests that firms will 
tend to prefer FDI to exports as trade costs, as proxied by distance, 
rise. More distant markets will tend to be served by overseas 
affiliates rather than by exporting. 
A simple standard version of the gravity model is therefore used to 
explain the geographical distribution of outward FDI and exports 
for France, Germany, Japan, Sweden, the UK and the US using a 
panel of destination countries for data pooled over the period 1982 
to I 993. A dummy variable is added to assess whether FDI flows to 
EU countries are higher than can be explained on the basis of 
income, population and distance alone. 
by some USO 15 billion as of 1992. This represents around 
31 % of the aggregate stock level at that date. The level of 
outward German FOI in the EU seems to have been 
considerably less affected by the SMP than the UK. As of 
1992, the SMP is estimated to have raised the constant price 
stock of German FDI by some USO 5.0 billion, equivalent to 
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The results strongly suggest that GDP in the destination market is a 
highly significant determinant of the geographical distribution of a 
country's outward FDI flows. For exports, GDP is similarly a highly 
significant explanatory variable. However, the income effect is 
much larger on FDI than exports. Thus, FDI and exports will tend 
increasingly to be directed towards richer countries and, as incomes 
rise ceteris paribus, both FDI and exports will increase, but the rise 
in FDI will be the more pronounced. 
For all the countries, population is found to have a negative and 
significant effect. In other words, populous countries tend to receive 
less foreign investment and trade less. In all cases, population has a 
larger negative impact on FDI than exports. Distance, in general, is 
found to have a dampening effect upon both FDI and exports, but 
more on exports than FDI, as theory would predict. The results, 
however, are found to be less reliable in the case of FDI compared 
to exports, and caution is recommended. 
The parameter on the dummy variable for FDI outflows from 
France, the UK and Germany to EU countries is found to be large, 
positive and highly statistically significant. For France, it would 
appear that FDI outflows to other EU Member States are six times 
higher than might be expected on the basis of income, population 
and distance alone. The effect is even greater for the UK - eight 
times. The intensity of German FDI outflows to other EU Member 
States is much less - only twice as high. For Sweden, FDI flows to 
the EU are only 50% higher than one would expect from the 
standard gravity model variables. Japanese FDI flows to the EU are 
less than the gravity model would predict. For the US, the EU 
dummy is not significant. 
To capture the SMP effect on FDI flows in the EU, two sub-samples 
are used to reestimate the gravity model: 1982-87, and 1988-93. 
The first is treated as the pre-SMP period, and the latter is taken to 
be the period when the SMP impact should be apparent on FDI 
flows. The approach then is to assess whether the magnitude of the 
EU dummy changes between the two sub-periods. An SMP effect 
should be reflected in an increase in the intensity of intra-EU FDI 
relative to FDI to other countries once distance, population, income 
and the general trend in FDI flows have been taken into account. 
For France and the UK. the value of the EU dummy is considerably 
larger in the latter period than in the earlier one. In the first period, 
French FDI to the EU was about five times higher than one would 
expect on the basis of the standard gravity model. Between 1988 
and 1993, however, this EU effect had risen to a magnitude of 
almost seven times higher. For the UK, the rise was from a factor of 
four in the earlier period, to a factor of 18 in the latter one! For 
Germany, only a slight increase is registered. For Sweden. flows 
were well predicted by the gravity model in the earlier period. but 
double in the latter. No impact is found for Japan and the US. Little 
evidence is found that the driving force for extra FDI in the EU in 
the latter period could be put down to the accession of Spain and 
Portugal. Overall, it is estimated that in the year of its peak effect, 
the SMP increased FDI to the EU by 100% for France. 80'ic for 
Germany, and 200% for the UK. 
61/2% of the aggregate stock level. The primary beneficiary 
appears to have been the UK, where investment is some 
USO 4.3 billion higher than it would otherwise have been. 
roughly one third of the reported stock level in that country. 
These results are very much in line with the results found by 
CEPS. 
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Table 19 
The geographical pattern of UK and German outward foreign direct investment ( % of total stock) 
1978 1981 
UK manufacturing 
EU 25.7 21.6 
EFTA 2.2 1.6 
North America 30.7 39.3 
Other developed 1 24.0 20.9 
Rest of the world 17.5 16.5 
UK all industries2 
EU 25.4 20.7 
EFTA 5.1 2.1 
North America 26.1 34.6 
Other developed 23.1 20.4 
Rest of the world 20.2 22.2 
German manufacturing 
EU 32.2 29.9 
EFTA 10.0 8.4 
North America 28.3 32.8 
Other developed 4.3 5.3 
Rest of the world 25.2 23.6 
Germany all industries 
EU 38.5 34.0 
EFTA 12.2 10.1 
North America 20.3 27.9 
Other developed 3.6 4.4 
Rest of the world 25.4 23.6 
' South Africa, Australia, New Zealand and Japan. 
' E,lcludes energy investments prior to 1984. 
Source: Business Monitor MA4, various issues and Deutsche Bundesbank. 
The sectoral distribution of the UK's FDI stock in the EU 
Of the extra estimated USD 15 billion of outward UK FDI stock 
in the EU in 1992 due to the SMP, FDI in services represents 
about half. The stock of financial services FDI alone was higher 
by USD 5.0 billion as a result of the SMP (see Table 20). 
Within manufacturing, the effects for the electrical goods and 
chemical sectors are much greater than for either mechanical 
engineering or for food, drink and tobacco. The results provide 
little indication that the single market has led UK companies to 
reduce outward investment in order to exploit economies of 
scale from domestic production fully. 
The sectoral distribution of German outward FDI stock in the 
EU 
Germany's sector results (methodological details are given in 
Appendix 3) are similar to those for the UK in that they show 
the largest gains arising in financial services (see Table 21 ). 
1984 1987 1991 1992 1993 
17.8 27.3 32.0 33.2 38.7 
2.6 1.8 1.7 1.9 1.0 
44.6 43.5 46.0 42.8 38.9 
20.5 14.8 8.7 9.1 8.6 
14.4 12.6 11.5 13.1 12.8 
21.1 27.9 26.9 26.1 32.0 
3.4 3.2 3.0 3.0 2.7 
41.6 41.3 42.7 41.8 39.0 
15.4 11.1 10.3 10.0 9.9 
18.5 16.6 17.1 19.2 16.4 
28.8 34.5 41.6 39.7 35.5 
7.8 9.1 8.6 9.1 8.9 
36.4 33.4 29.3 28.5 30.6 
5.3 4.8 4.6 4.5 4.7 
21.7 18.2 15.9 18.2 20.3 
32.2 39.2 51.0 50.3 48.0 
8.8 10.4 9.5 9.0 9.0 
33.4 29.9 25.3 25.6 26.4 
4.1 4.3 3.9 3.8 4.3 
21.4 16.2 10.3 11.3 12.3 
However there is little overall gain in distribution. Within 
manufacturing, the largest gains are for electronics and 'other' 
manufacturing, with small drops for chemicals and mechanical 
engineering. In proportionate terms the SMP has had a 
particularly marked effect in the electrical sector, accounting 
for some 21 % of the outstanding stock of German direct 
investment in the EU. 
It is clear that using this econometric methodology the SMP 
has had a significantly differential impact on the sectoral 
distribution of FDI (results summarized in Table 22) for both 
German and UK outward stocks. Services have indeed been the 
most affected as would be expected given the high level of 
NTBs which the SMP has sought to remove, their frequent non-
tradeability, 1 and their having significant firm-specific assets. 
1 In terms of FDI theory, trade costs are very high. 
97 
Economic evaluation of the internal market 
Table 20 
Impact of the internal market on UK FDI in the EU 
Sector 
Chemicals 
Mechanical engineering 
Electrical 
Food, drink and tobacco 
Other manufacturing 
Distribution 
Financial and other services 
Table 21 
1992 stock 
8.01 
0.83 
2.69 
6.36 
6.15 
11.09 
13.20 
I USD hi/Ii 011, I 990) 
SMP effect 
2.12 
0.12 
0.99 
2.35 
1.63 
2.94 
4.88 
Impact of the internal market on the composition of 
German FDI in the EU 
Sector 
Chemicals 
Mechanical engineering 
Electrical 
Food, drink and tobacco 
Other manufacturing 
Distribution 
Financial and other services 
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1992 stock 
9.5 
2.4 
4.8 
4.0 
7.1 
17.3 
31.3 
(USD billio11, 1990) 
SMP effect 
-0.4 
-0.5 
1.0 
0.4 
0.9 
0.3 
3.3 
Table 22 
Significance of internal market on industrial sectors 
Sectors 
United Kingdom 
Chemicals 
Mechanical engineering 
Electrical 
Food, Drink and tobacco 
Other manufacturing 
Distribution 
Financial and other services 
Germany 
Chemicals 
Machinery 
Electrical 
Transport equipment 
Other manufacturing 
Distribution 
Financial and other services 
Source: EAG. 
Significance of IM 
effect to total FDI 
stock(%) 
26.5 
14.5 
36.8 
36.9 
26.5 
26.5 
36.9 
-4.2 
-20.8 
20.8 
10 
12.7 
1.7 
10.5 
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Appendix 1: Assessing the effects of economic 
integration on trade flows 
Quantitative studies of integration arrangements have been 
extensively concerned by assessing the impact of integration on 
trade patterns. Since the theory is unable to provide 
unambiguous generalizations on the welfare impacts of 
economic integration, the aim of many of these studies is to 
gauge the impact of integration in terms of income and welfare 
through the analysis of changes, both static and/or dynamic, in 
trade flows (Hine (1994 )). Assessments of the impact of 
integration on trade flows try to answer two questions. Firstly, 
to what extent the eventual increase in trade amongst partners 
is due to the integration process underway and, secondly, to 
what extent this is at the expense of trade with non-member 
countries. To answer these questions requires building a model 
which incorporates all the factors determining trade. Such a 
model should fulfil all the characteristics of what Mayes (1978) 
calls analytic models and would provide an economic 
explanation of the actual trade flows after economic integration. 
Building analytic models is a very difficult task, given their 
substantial data requirements, and consequently much 
empirical work has concentrated on the so-called residual 
imputation models. These models establish relationships 
between trade and a set of key variables, and such a 
relationship is used to assess what would have happened to 
trade in the absence of integration. This hypothetical scenario is 
known as the anti-monde, as opposed to the monde, which is 
what actually happened (see Hine (1994) and Mayes (1978)). 
Following Mayes, the major advantage of analytical models is 
that they can be tested after the event and can be used for 
forecasting as well as ex post estimation, whilst in residual 
models there is no means of testing its validity other than the 
plausibility of the results and the behaviour of the model in 
different observable situations. 
Residual models provide an ex post ( after the event), 
quantification of the impacts on trade by comparing 'what 
actually did happen with what might have· and 'make use of 
the experience with integration' (Hine (1994 )). Ex ante models 
(before the event), on the contrary, generate two hypothetical 
situations with and without integration. We are interested in the 
ex post quantification of the impact of the SMP. Since we only 
dispose of a few observations in the post-SMP period, most of 
the econometric models proposed in the literature on ex post 
quantification of trade creation and diversion, when applied to 
the assessment of the impact of the SMP, would fall in the 
category of residual models. 1 Under these circumstances, only a 
1 Gravity models (sec Aitken (1973) and Mayes (1978) arc sometimes 
considered an exception lo this rule. since they can rely on cross-section 
methods. However. they arc forcefully simple and the impact is represented 
by dummies and/or changes in the parameters. which do not provide the 
economic explanation of the changes induced hy economic integration. 
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CGE adequately calibrated in both the pre- and post-SMP 
period could be considered as a good approximation of an ideal 
analytical model. However, we should keep in mind that even 
these kinds of models are forcefully simple and that they do not 
fulfil all the conditions established by Mayes (1978) to provide 
a full determination of trade flows. 2 In other words, both 
residual and analytical models will lead to biased estimations of 
the effects on trade. The only thing we can do is to think of a 
series of partial but complementary approaches, which lead not 
only to reasonable unbiased quantification of the impact of the 
SMP on trade flows but also to a clear distinction between the 
standard, direct effects, the competition effects and the 
dynamic effects. 
Despite their limitations, residual models form the bulk of ex 
post models to quantify the impact of economic integration on 
trade. Focusing on residual approaches to assess the impact of 
integration on trade flows, the final research programme on 
measuring accession effects ex post, as described in Mayes 
(1978), is Winters (1984a),3 who adopts the almost ideal 
demand system (AIDS )4 to examine the effects on trade 
creation and diversion of the UK's accession to the common 
market. 5 His methodology follows Truman· s approach of 
modelling shares in apparent consumption. Basically, he 
presumes that total expenditure on a given good is determined 
by a higher stage budgeting process that considers national 
income and the price indices for the different aggregate goods 
available. Then, such total expenditure is allocated across 
import sources and domestic supplies consistently with the 
AIDS structure. This explains the shares of imports from trade 
partners and the share of domestic supplies on total expenditure 
on the aggregate good as a particular function of real 
expenditure and the prices of both import sources and domestic 
supplies. 
As pointed out by Winters (1987) this approach greatly 
improved the research programme on assessing the impact of 
economic integration on import flows. On the one hand, it 
explicitly assumes that the demand for imports not only 
depends on import prices and domestic income. as in the 
previous stage of the programme,6 but also on the price of 
home goods. In other words, Winter's proposal to model import 
flows allows the disentanglement of cyclical effects (income 
Mayes points out that in order to obtain an unbiased model. it should include 
economic variables detennining the behaviour in the importing. exporting and 
third countries. as well as variables explaining the specific characteristics of 
trade between partners. 
' See also Winters ( 198..\b ). 
' See Deaton and Muellbauer ( 1980). 
' The same methodology has recently been applied by de Boer et al. ( 1995) to 
the Spanish accession to the EU. The previous work on the SMP effects by 
Brenton and Winters ( 1992) fails in this tradition. 
' Sec Mayes ( 1978) and Winters ( 1987) for a critical review of the literature. 
Waller ( 196 7). Truman ( 1969). Balassa ( 197..\) and Morgan ( 1980) are some 
representative examples of early import models. 
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effects) as well as changes in price differentials from the 
impact of other factors, such as policy changes. On the other 
hand, the consideration of a complete demand system is that it 
treats the allocation of income over sources in a consistent and 
rigorous fashion, drawing on a number of results from 
consumer demand theory, which imposes a well known number 
of constraints on import allocation models. Furthermore, when 
applied to assessing the impact of changes in tariff barriers, as 
used to be the case of the accession of a new country to the 
Community, changes in tariffs can be incorporated quite simply 
by altering relative prices. Finally, in the tradition of residual 
models, a number of dummy variables can be added to 
represent non-price effects. 
One the most common features of the empirical literature, 
which has very often focused on European integration, is that 
the impacts on trade flows mainly consist of trade creation, 
both internal and external, whilst trade diversion, if any, is 
comparatively lower than trade creation (see Mayes (1978), 
Winters (1987) and Hine (1994)). 1 Therefore, most residual ex 
post models suggest the existence of positive impacts on 
welfare. However, as pointed by Hine (1994) the order of 
magnitude of such welfare gains may appear minimal when 
measured in terms of the actual GDP. 
The evaluation of inter- versus intra-industry trade has been 
developed in the literature in the following ways. 
1 The results by de Boer et al. on the Spanish case arc also consistent with this 
empirical regularity. 
Intra-industry trade must be quantified with tools implementing 
a distinction in terms of differentiation. As far as products are 
not sold at the same price, even if produced in the same 
country, they do not entail the same content of factor services. 
The difference might be based on fixed costs of development 
increasing with the level of quality and on variable costs 
associated with a content of capital or qualified labour 
increasing with quality (Greenway, Hines and Milner, 1994, 
Greenaway, Milner and Eliott, 1996, have also used an 
approach based on the use of unit value differences as an 
indicator of quality). Whatever this basis would be, it would 
imply a net factor content of trade which is not necessary nil, 
even if trade is balanced and perfectly intra-industry. This 
means that potential effects associated in vertically 
differentiated products are not those referred to in the literature 
on horizontal differentiation. Adjustments costs might 
replicate, inside industries, effects observed between industries 
in the inter-industry/specialization framework. 
Moreover, inter-industry trade must be disconnected from its 
traditional comparative advantage basis, in order to integrate 
new considerations like externalities, agglomeration effects, 
etc. The mono location of industries subject to externalities will 
lead to a sectoral specialization and interindustry trade is then 
possible without any initial comparative advantage. 
Agglomeration effects could lead to a concentration of firms in 
special regions. 
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Appendix 2: The impact of the SMP on intra-EU 
trade. Evidence provided by the 
Eurostat Business Survey. 
Geographical and sectoral 
breakdown 
A.2.1. Geographical breakdown 
Irish and south European firms are much more positive in 
assessing the SMP impact on EU sales than companies located 
in the UK, Germany, France, Belgium and Luxembourg. 
Spanish and Italian firms in the manufacturing sector, and 
Greek enterprises in the service sector, have a well-above-
average positive perception of the SMP impact on intra-EU 
sales (see Table 1 below). The weight of large firms in the 
positive responses given by interviewees varies greatly across 
Member States. This is particularly true when comparing the 
size-weighted results for countries such as Portugal and Greece 
with those for Ireland. Indeed, when the weighting is done by 
the number of employees, Portuguese and Greek enterprises 
Table A.2.1 
reach 41 % and 42% of positive opinions respectively, against 
only 29% and 34% when weighted by number of firms - thus 
suggesting that a sizeable proportion of large firms have 
responded favourably to the question of the impact of the 
internal market on cross-border EU sales. In Ireland, on the 
contrary, weighting by number of employees produces a lower 
figure (36%) in favour of the SMP than that of the weighting by 
number of firms (37% ), thus implying that SMEs in this 
country have a casting vote when assessing the positive 
contribution of the SMP to the companies' increase in EU 
sales. 
A.2.2. Sectoral breakdown 
Sectors like textiles, leather and furniture, machinery and 
equipment NEC, and the chemicals industry - that were 
previously heavily regulated and suffered from market 
fragmentation - benefited most from the removal of trade 
barriers. The weight of large firms supporting the assertion of a 
positive impact is particularly apparent in the food, beverage 
and tobacco processing machinery sector where 28% of the 
The positive effect of the SMP on sales to other EU countries. All sectors. Percentages. 
Industry sector Services sector 
Member State Positive impact Rank Positive impact Rank Member State Positive impact 
(weighted by (weighted by (weighted by 
number of firms) number of employees) number of firms r 
Spain 47 1 54 1 Greece 41 
Italy 42 2 46 2 Spain 18 
Ireland 37 3 36 6 Ireland 18 
Greece 34 4 42 3 Italy 16 
Denmark 33 5 39 5 France 16 
Portugal 29 6 41 4 Denmark 14 
EU 12 28 30 Luxembourg 13 
Netherlands 27 7 29 7 Portugal 12 
France 21 8 24 9 Belgium 12 
UK 20 9 28 8 EU 11 1 12 
Luxembourg 20 10 28 8 UK 9 
Belgium 18 11 21 10 Netherlands 6 
Germany 16 12 20 11 
1 The German services sector has not been surveyed. The European average for the services sector is therefore based on 11 EU countries. 
' In the services sector, no weighting by number of employees was made when dealing with national results. 
Source: Eurostal. 
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total number of firms represents 38% of the sector weighted by 
number of employees. 
The average positive impact of the SMP on intra-EU sales in 
the services sector is 12%, that is 19% of the sector when 
weighted by number of employees. These relatively low figures 
can be explained by the fact that most firms in the services 
sector are SMEs, with only local or national coverage. The 
Table A.2.2 
highest result when weighted in number of firms has logically 
been obtained in the transport, storage and communication 
sector. Furthermore, large enterprises in the financial 
intermediation sector seem to have had an enormous weight in 
assessing the positive effect of the internal market on cross-
border sales, thus converting the lowest figure (7%) of Table 3 
(weighting by number of firms) into the highest one (24%) 
when weighted in terms of employee population. 
The positive effect of the single market programme on sales to other EU countries. Manufacturing sector. Percentages. 
Industry sector Positive impact Rank Positive impact 
(weighted by number of firms) (weighted by number of employees) 
Textiles, leather and furniture 34 1 35 
Machinery and equipment NEC 31 2 27 
Chemicals, rubber and plastics 30 3 34 
Food, beverage, and tobacco machinery 28 4 38 
EU 12 28 30 
Electrical and optical machinery 27 5 30 
Metals and metal products 27 6 29 
Non-metallic mineral products 25 7 31 
Wood, paper and printing/publishing 20 8 22 
Transport equipment 19 9 25 
Source: Eurostat. 
Table A.2.3 
The positive effect of the single market programme on sales to other EU countries. Service sector. Percentages. 
Services sector Positive impact Rank Positive impact 
(weighted by number of firms) (weighted by number of employees) 
Transport, storage and communication 18 I 21 
Property and business activities 13 2 16 
EU 11 1 12 19 
Hotels and restaurants 10 3 15 
Financial intermediation 7 4 24 
1 The German services sector has not been surveyed. The European average for the services sector is therefore based on 11 EU countries. 
Source: Eurostat. 
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Appendix 3: Econometric methodology used to 
estimate the single market impact on 
FDI 
A.3.1. Introduction 
The primary objective of the econometric work is to quantify 
the impact of the single market programme on the sectoral and 
geographical pattern of intra-EU foreign direct investment. 
A.3.2. Data sources and approach to empirical study 
Two separate studies have been undertaken looking at the 
determinants of outward FOi from the UK and Germany. These 
are the two EU countries with the largest level of outward 
overseas investment, accounting for some 55% of the total 
stock of FOi by EU Member States (and 23% of OECD FOi) 
as of 1989. Both countries publish detailed statistics on the 
sectoral and geographical split of their overseas investments in 
regular publications, and data can be readily obtained from the 
late 1970s through to 1993. 
The analysis draws on two separate panel data sets for the UK 
and Germany. For the UK, the evolution of investment in the 
EU as a whole and in the United States is examined, reflecting 
the absence of consistent data by sector for a number of EU 
locations. For Germany, a panel was constructed with eight 
separate locations, six within the EU, plus the United States 
and Austria. The six EU locations were Belgium and 
Luxembourg, the UK, France, Italy, the Netherlands and 
Spain/Portugal. Investments in Denmark and Greece were 
excluded on grounds of size. 
Although the main interest is in intra-EU investments, it is 
important to include Austria and the US as comparator groups 
(subject to the availability of consistent data). Inclusion of 
Austria allows separation of factors that affect European 
investment inside and outside the EU, whilst inclusion of the 
US provides a means of picking up the underlying upward 
trend in FOi in the 1980s throughout the developed world. No 
data on investment in EFT A is included in the UK panel as 
investment is negligible. 
In both cases the available investment data was amalgamated 
into seven separate sectors, five for manufacturing and two for 
services. Investments in energy, mining, construction, transport 
services and real estate were excluded where possible. There 
are relatively minor differences in the sector composition for 
the two countries. In manufacturing, food, drink and tobacco 
can be separately identified for the UK, but not for Germany, 
where it is included in the 'other manufacturing' group. For 
Germany the latter measure is given by total manufacturing 
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investment less investments in the four separately identified 
industries. For the UK, 'other manufacturing' is given by total 
manufacturing investment excluding paper, metals and metal 
products, transport equipment (where investment is negligible) 
and the four separately identified industries. As of 1993, the 
seven sectors account for 83% of the UK stock of non-energy 
FOi in the EC and 85% of the UK stock of non-energy FOi in 
the US. The equivalent proportions for Germany are 93% and 
97% respectively. 
A.3.3. The econometric model and techniques used 
The German data set assembled has 13 annual observations 
( 1980-92) for seven sectors in eight separate locations giving a 
total panel size of 728 observations. The UK panel is smaller. 
with 12 annual observations (1981-92) for seven sectors in two 
localities, giving a total of 168 data points. All the main 
explanatory variables, with the exception of the gearing ratio 
for the UK, are entered in logarithmic form, permitting direct 
estimates of their elasticities. 
In practice the existence of adjustment costs due to delivery 
lags, delays in finding suitable investments overseas and delays 
in obtaining planning permission, means that the desired and 
actual stocks of investment are unlikely to be equal period by 
period. A partial adjustment model is therefore used in 
estimation, whereby the aggregate change in the investment 
stock (i.e. the flow of new direct investments) is a function of 
the discrepancy between the current desired capital stock 
(denoted S*j,) and the actual stock at the end of the previous 
period: 
[I] 
or, equivalently: 
[2] 
This provides an important distinction between the model used 
here and those used in earlier studies of intra-EU direct 
investment. Cul em ( 1988) and Molle and Morsink ( 1991) both 
relate the current change in the investment stock to the factors 
that determine the desired stock, even though the standard 
neoclassical model relates the investment stock to relative 
costs. Omission of the lagged stock ignores potentially valuable 
information and could potentially generate misspecification. Of 
course, it is possible to substitute out for the lagged stock in [2] 
using the identity: 
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I ll I S = (1-l1.) ./ J J .t () J J .I- [3] 
where a1 denotes the rate of depreciation and 11 the flow of new 
investment (=6.S1), although this implies that lagged terms in 
the flow of investment should be included in [2]. These terms 
are typically omitted from the previous studies that focus on 
direct investment flows. 
The existence of a lagged dependent variable induces small 
sample bias into panel estimates produced using OLS (Nickell, 
1981 ), so that an instrumental variable estimator has to be 
employed. There are a number of potential instruments that can 
be used for the lagged dependent variable; one possibility is to 
employ the second lag of the dependent variable. An alternative 
is to use the rank order of the lagged dependent variable. This 
latter instrument is clearly strongly correlated with the variable 
being instrumented, but has been 'cleaned' of the lagged 
disturbance term. 
However it may be a poor instrument if there is substantial 
measurement error present in the instrumented variable and, 
hence, in the associated rank order. A priori, measurement error 
is more likely to be present in the UK data given the need to 
construct some data by interpolation. The rank order is thus 
used as an instrument in the German panel study alone. For the 
UK the higher order lag of the dependent variable is used. 
Partial adjustment models are also used to avoid problems 
raised by non-stationary variables (there are three non-
stationary variables in the panel model: the stock of foreign 
direct investment, output and the stock of patents). The results 
are not significant. 
A.3.4. Significance of the variables employed 
The main empirical results for the UK are summarized in Table 
A.3.1. The first column (labelled (I.I)) reports the estimates of 
a simple model which does not include any explicit variable to 
capture single market effects. This illustrates that it is possible 
to obtain a parsimonious, economically coherent model for the 
pattern of FDI by UK firms over the period from 1981. 
There are significant effects from both host region output and 
patents, with respective elasticities of 1.54 and 2.03%. A 
sizeable, positive effect is also obtained from relative unit 
labour costs, although it is not statistically significant. One 
possible explanation for this finding is that foreign labour costs 
can have a dual effect (Cushman, 1988 ), as they affect both the 
location decision and the optimal factor mix at a particular 
location. However, inclusion of a relative factor price term 
made little difference to the reported results. Although the term 
was correctly signed, with a positive coefficient, it was not 
significant (with at-ratio of 0.96). The lack of significance of 
labour costs is in accordance with the findings of 
Papanastassiou and Pearce (1991 ). 
The corporate gearing measure appears to have a significant 
impact on investment, with a long-run semi-elasticity of 
-1.66%. This implies that a one percentage point rise in gearing 
will eventually reduce investment by 1.66%. This term should 
be seen primarily as an indicator of the extent to which changes 
in domestic financial conditions affect the timing and the size 
of the flow of direct investment. As the gearing ratio cannot be 
expected to permanently trend over time, it cannot be the 
primary factor behind the continuing upward trend in the stock 
of investment. 
One additional term in ( 1.1.), denoted USME, is a dummy 
variable set to unity in 1992 to allow for a large change in the 
recorded book value of UK investments in mechanical 
engineering in the US in 1992. This change appeared to be 
unrelated to either the flow of investment in 1992 or currency 
movements that year. The inclusion of the dummy does not 
have a marked effect on the reported coefficients, but is 
necessary to ensure the validity of the subsequent hypothesis 
tests. 
The single market indicator based on mergers and acquisitions 
data is introduced in equation ( 1.2). This is denoted IM and is 
set to zero for all the US sectors. For the EU sectors it has the 
value of 1, 2 or 3 from 1987 onwards. The significance of the 
variable provides support for the hypothesis that the single 
market has resulted in an increased level of investment within 
the European Union by UK firms. 
One point of interest is that the implied elasticities on output 
and patents are now smaller than in ( 1.1 ), at 1.17 and 1.66% 
respectively, suggesting that some of the impact of the single 
market was previously being assigned to these variables. The 
continued presence of the lagged dependent variable means that 
the model has the implication that the impact of the single 
market has built up over time. 
The main empirical results for Germany are summarized in 
Table A.3.2. The first column (2.1) reports the basic model for 
German FDI, which has a structure similar to that obtained for 
the UK. There is again evidence that host country output, 
relative unit labour costs and the level of patents registered by 
German corporations are important factors behind the growth 
of FDI. Relative labour costs appear to be better determined 
than in the UK equations, although the implied elasticity is a 
little smaller at 0.36%. The output and patents elasticities are 
also lower at 0.84 and 1.3% respectively, although this may 
simply be because the level of patents registered by German 
companies grew much more rapidly over the 1980s than the 
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Table A.3.1 
The determinants of UK outward FDI 
Dependent variable: In (FDI), Sample period: 1981-92 
(I.I) 
In (FDl),.1 0.5501 (7. 7) 
In (Y), 0.6934 (2.6) 
In (REL), 0.2965 (0.8) 
In (PAT), 0.9140 (5.1) 
CASH,.1 -0.7488 (1.9) 
USME, - 0.9665 (4.3) 
IM, 
IMCH, 
IMME, 
IMEE, 
IMFD, 
!MOM, 
IMDS, 
IMFS, 
IMUS, 
!MIND, 
IMSER, 
w 0.943 
Standard 
error 0.2054 
Test 
Variable definitions 
FDI - Stock of UK FDI (USD million. 1990 prices) 
Y - Sectoral output (USD million, 1990 prices) 
REL - Relative UK/foreign unit labour costs 
( 1.2) 
0.5594 (8.1) 
0.5148 (2.0) 
0.4711 (1.3) 
0.7386(4.1) 
- 0.7750 (2.0) 
- 0.9375 (4.3) 
0.0699 (3.2) 
0.946 
0.1989 
2.71 
PAT - Stock of UK sectoral patents (three-year cumulation) 
CASH - Ratio of debt interest payments lo UK corporate cash flow 
(1.3) ( 1.4) ( 1.5) 
0.5318 (7.3) 0.5481 (7.9) 0.5509 (7.9) 
0.5157 (1.9) 0.3061 ( 1.5) 0.4654 (1.8) 
0.5009 (1.3) 0.2516 (0.6) 0.5066 (1.3) 
0.8253 (4.2) 0.5994 (3.2) 0.8061 (4.3) 
- 0.8049 (2.0) - 0.8042 (2.1) - 0.7950 (2.0) 
- 0.9059 (4.1) - 0.9034 (4.2) - 0.9140 (4.2) 
0.0951 (3.7) 
0.1483 (1.2) 
0.0319 (0.3) 
0.1550 (1.2) 
0.0291 (0.2) 
0.2948 (2.4) 
0.2601 (2.1) 
0.2811 (2.2) 
0.0583 ( 1.9) 
0.0539 (2.1) 
0.1032 (2.9) 
0.946 0.954 0.953 
0.1999 0.1971 0.1988 
1.70 1.65 2.07 
USME -Dummy variable for outlier in investment in US mechanical engineering sector 
IM - Sectoral internal market indicator for EU (zero before 1987) 
IMUS - Sectoral internal market indicator for US (zero before 1987) 
IMCH - Dummy variable for EU chemicals ( I from 1987-92) 
!MME - Dummy variable for EU mechanical engineering ( I from 1987-92) 
!MEE - Dummy variable for EU electronics ( I from 1987-92) 
!MFD - Dummy variable for EU food, drink and tobacco ( I from 1987-92) 
!MOM - Dummy variable for EU other manufacturing ( I from 1987-92) 
IMDS - Dummy variable for EU distribution (1 from 1987-92) 
IMFS -Dummy variable for EU financial services (I from 1987-92) 
!MIND = !MCH + IMME+ !MEE + IMFD +!MOM 
IMSER = !MDS + !MFS 
number of patents registered by UK companies. It has been 
argued that because the major European economies have a 
similar market size and costs of production, location-specific 
advantages may be linked to host country technological 
conditions (Cantwell and Sanna Randaccio, 1992). However 
no significant effect from indicators based on patents 
registered by corporations in the respective host countries are 
obtained. 
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After some experimentation financial effects were best captured 
by a relative factor price term, given by the ratio of the user 
cost of capital for German corporations to foreign unit labour 
costs. (In effect this can be considered as one estimate of the 
real user cost of capital.) A 1 % rise in the cost of capital is 
estimated to eventually led to a 0.34% reduction in the level of 
investment, other things being equal. No significant effect from 
either an interest gearing term or from net corporate 
Trade and FDI specialization effects of the single market programme 
Table A.3.2 
The determinants of German FDI 
Dependent variable: In (FDI). Sample period: 1980-92 
(2.1) (2.2) 
In (FDI),.1 0.4513 (8.4) 0.4430 (8.2) 
In (Y), 0.4630 (3.8) 0.4 755 (3.9) 
In (REL), 0.1999 (1.9) 0.1973 (1.9) 
In (PAT), 0.7162 (5.9) 0.6271 (5.1) 
ln (REC), -0.1861 (3.2) -0.1051 (1.5) 
EXCH, 0.1140 (2.5) 0.1317 (2.8) 
IM, 0.0393 (2.9) 
IMCH, 
IMME, 
IMEE, 
IMTR, 
!MOM, 
IMDS, 
IMFS, 
IMUS, 
!MOE, 
!MIND, 
IMSER, 
R' 0.972 0.973 
Standard 
error 0.2274 0.2267 
Variable Definitions 
FDI- Stock of Gennan FDI (USO million. 1990 prices) 
Sectoral output ( USO million. 1990 prices) 
Relative Gennan/foreign unit labour costs 
Stock of Gennan sectoral patents (three year cumulation) 
Gennan user cost of capital relative to foreign labour costs 
(2.3) (2.4) (2.5) 
0.4511 (8.6) 0.4426 (8.2) 0.4436 (8.2) 
0.3700 (2.9) 0.5022 ( 4.1) 0.3854 (3.1) 
0.2464 (2.3) 0.2565 (2.2) 0.2059 ( 1.9) 
0.6358 (4.8) 0.6762 (5.4) 0.7419 (5.9) 
- 0.1680 (2.3) - 0.1332 (1.9) - 0.1400 (2.0) 
0.1205 (2.7) 0.1327 (2.9) 0.1192 (2.6) 
0.0248 (1.6) 
- 0.0625 ( 1.1) 
- 0.0642 ( 1.1) 
0.0181 (0.3) 
0.1451 (2.2) 
0.0748 (1.3) 
0.0069 (0.1) 
0.2391 (3.7) 
-0.0315 (1.2) 
- 0.0311 (1.3) 
0.0154 (0.4) 
0.1229 (2.5) 
0.973 0.973 0.973 
0.2236 0.2266 0.2272 
Y-
RELl 
PAT-
REC-
EXCH-
IM-
IMOE-
IMUS-
IMCH-
IMME-
IMEE-
IMTR-
IMOM-
IMDS-
IMFS-
IMIND= 
IMSER= 
Dummy variable for fixed bilateral exchange rate ( I for ERM members and Austria) 
Sectoral internal market indicator for EU (zero before 1987) 
Sectoral internal market indicator for Austria (zero before 1987) 
Sectoral internal market indicator for US (zero before 1987) 
Dummy variable for EU chemicals ( I from 1987-92) 
Dummy variable for EU mechanical engineering (I from 1987-92) 
Dummy variable for EU electronics ( I from 1987-92) 
Dummy variable for EU transpon ( I from 1987-92) 
Dummy variable for EU other manufacturing ( I from 1987-92) 
Dummy variable for EU distribution ( I from 1987-92) 
Dummy variable for EU financial services ( I from 1987-92) 
IMCH + IMME+ !MEE + !MTR +!MOM 
IMDS +IMFS 
indebtedness could be obtained. The results in Barrell, Pain and 
Hubert ( 1995) suggest that such terms primarily affect 
investment in developing locations outside Europe. 
Finally, a significant effect is obtained from the proxy variable 
to capture the impact of currency variability. The term EXCH 
takes the value of unity for those countries whose currencies 
are linked to Germany, either through a formal arrangement 
such the exchange rate mechanism of the EMS, or informally, 
such as the Austrian schilling. The variable is zero for the UK 
and Spain, prior to ERM entry in 1990, and zero for the US 
throughout the sample period. The reported positive coefficient 
suggests that German corporations value exchange rate 
stability, and is consistent with the notion that Germany may be 
the final market for some goods produced elsewhere within 
Europe. 
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The single market indicator is introduced in equation (2.2). As 
with the UK, a significant positive coefficient is obtained, 
although it is somewhat smaller than that for the UK. The 
inclusion of the IM variable generates a drop in the elasticities 
on patents and the user cost of capital. The significance of the 
term provides an indication that German investment in the EU 
has, on average across sectors and countries, been higher than 
might otherwise have been expected since 1987. 
A.3.5. Evaluating the impact of the single market on 
intra-EU FDI 
Using the estimated relationships with the IM variable it is 
possible to calculate the effect of the IM programme on the 
stock of UK and German FDI in the European Union. The use 
of the estimated parameters from a model with an explicit 
indicator for the single market is to be preferred to the 
alternative of inspecting the pattern of the residuals from a 
model without such an indicator. This is because such residuals 
will reflect the impact of all factors otherwise unaccounted for 
in estimation. Other structural changes, such as the impact of 
the opening of Eastern Europe, could easily affect the time 
pattern of the residuals. 
All the reported regressions for UK direct investment can be 
expressed as: 
ln(FDl)t = a ln(FDl)t-1 + p IMt + ....... . [4] 
Any quantitative evaluation of the estimated impact of the IM 
variable on particular sectors has to take account of the 
presence of the lagged dependent variable. At any given period 
the overall implied direct effect of the single market on the 
stock of direct investment in a particular sector can be 
calculated from the regression coefficients using: 
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0 (i-lJ 
IMIMPACT =A/fl. a [5] 
where X. varies between 1-3 and n denotes the number of 
periods from the start of the single market programme to the 
time at which the impact of the programme is estimated. Our 
illustrative calculations are for 1992, so that n=6. 
It is similarly possible to use the estimated relationships with 
the IM variable and the EU country dummies to calculate the 
effect of the single market programme on the stock of German 
FDI in any particular sector within a EU Member State. Again 
it is important to emphasise that such estimates need to be 
treated with particular caution, not only because the overall 
single market impact will also arise from the output effect but 
also because the country dummies may be picking up 
additional effects unrelated to the single market. 
All the reported regressions take the form of [6], where j 
denotes each EU Member State. 
ln(FDl)t = a ln(FDl)t-1 + p IMt + o IMh + ........ [6: 
In estimating the impact of the single market, account needs to 
be taken of the lagged dependent variable. At any given period 
the overall effect of the programme on the stock of direct 
investment in a particular sector and a particular country can be 
calculated as: 
n (i-1) 
IMIMPACT =(8+).,B)La [7] 
where X. varies between 1-3 and lJ denotes the number of 
periods from the start of the programme to the time at which 
the impact of the programme is estimated. Our illustrative 
calculations are for 1992, so that n=6. For simplicity, equation 
( 10.1) is used, although there are obviously a number of other 
possible specifications that could be used to produce such 
calculations. 
Chapter 5 - Efficiency and competition effects 
Contents 
5.1. Introduction 115 
5.2. Changes in the structure of European industries 115 
5.2.1. Mergers and acquisitions 115 
5.2.2. Concentration 119 
5.2.3. Firm size and efficiency 122 
5.3. The competitive conditions in European markets 127 
5.3.1. Market integration and competition 128 
5.3.2. Manufacturing 129 
5.3.3. Services 130 
5.4. The convergence of prices across the European Union 133 
5.4.1. Introduction 133 
5.4.2. Price differentials throughout the EU 133 
5.4.3. Price convergence and increased integration 138 
Box 1: The single market programme and European restructuring 117 
Box 2: Manufacturing sectors: The nature of competition and 
the impact of market enlargement 121 
Box 3: The indirect effects of the SMP: The case of the 
telecommunications industry 132 
Box 4: Price convergence: Data sources and methodology 133 
Box 5: The econometric analysis of the factors underlying price convergence 140 
Tables 
Table 1: Share of worldwide M&As 116 
Table 2: Mergers and acquisitions in the EU, by nationality of partners 117 
Table 3: Breakdown by Member State of cross-border M&A operations and GDP 118 
Table 4: The evolution of concentration at the European Union level 120 
Table 5: The evolution of concentration at Member State level 121 
Table 6: The evolution of firm size in manufacturing 123 
Table 7: Average firm size and sensitivity to the SMP 124 
111 
112 
Table 8a: Average firm size and industry growth by class of industry 
Table 8b: Firm and industry growth by class of industry 
Table 9: Changes in size and concentration by class of industry 
Table 10: Perceived effect of the single market programme on unit costs 
in manufacturing 
Table 11: Perceived importance of unit costs changes in manufacturing 
by cost category 
Table 12: Perceived impact of the single market programme on the extent 
of competition in manufacturing 
Table 13: Perceived impact of the single market programme on the extent 
of competition in distributive trade 
Table 14: Perceived impact of the single market programme on the extent 
125 
126 
126 
127 
127 
130 
130 
of competition in other services sectors 131 
Table 15: National State aid as a percentage of GDP 131 
Table 16a: Coefficients of price variation for selected groupings 134 
Table 16b: Level and evolution of price dispersion by product/service groups 135 
Table 17: Coefficients of price variation for selected groupings 136 
Table 18: Comparison of the coefficients of variation for alcoholic beverages and 
tobacco products, based on price indices with and without indirect taxes 137 
Table 19: Comparison of the coefficients for energy products and fuels and lubricants 
for motor vehicles, based on price indices with and without indirect taxes 137 
Graphs 
Graph 1: Evolution of the number of M&As by the origin of the firms involved 116 
Graph 2: M&A in the EU by industry 118 
Graph 3: Share of domestic M&A by industry 119 
Graph 4: The effect of the SMP on European manufacturing mark-ups 129 
Bibliography 141 
Annex 1: The econometric analysis of firm size 142 
Table Al.I Type I industries 143 
Table Al.2 Type 2a industries 
Table Al.3 Type 2r industries 
Table Al.4 Type 2ar industries 
Annex 2: National concentration and EU-wide concentration 
144 
145 
145 
147 
Annex 3: The econometric analysis of price-cost margins 148 
Graph A3.l Average margins 148 
Graph A3.2 Cross-country variance of average margins 149 
Graph A3.3 Evolution of margins (Ml) (Controlling for country- and 
sector-specific effects and cycle) 150 
Graph A3.4 Sensitive sectors relative to other sectors 150 
Graph A3.5 Evolution of margins (M2) (Controlling for country- and 
sector-specific effects and cycle) 151 
Graph A3.6 Sensitive sectors relative to other sectors 151 
Graph A3.7 Definition of policy variable 152 
Table A3.l Impact on price-cost margins 153 
Annex 4: Price convergence in the EU 155 
Table A4. l Coefficients of price variation for selected groupings: actual versus 
adjusted for exchange rate movements, 1993 155 
Table A4.2 Regression analysis of price disparity across the EU 9 158 
Table A4.3 Regression analysis of price disparity across the EU 9 159 
Table A4.4 Regression analysis of price disparity across the EU 9 160 
Table A4.5 Regression analysis of price disparity across the EU 9 161 
113 

Chapter 5 
Efficiency and competition effects 
5.1. Introduction 
Many of the beneficial effects of the single marketing 
programme (SMP) on the European economy were supposed to 
result from the competitive forces unleashed by the integration 
of the European economies. The ex-ante analysis of the impact 
of the SMP forecast substantial gains accruing to the European 
economy through increased efficiency, with lower costs and 
prices, and increased product variety. The main channels 
through which these benefits were to be reaped throughout the 
economy were the exploitation of scale economies in the 
operations of firms, and the increase in the degree of 
competition, which would eliminate inefficient firms and lead 
to a restructuring of European industry. 
As argued below, the European economy has indeed benefited 
from gains in efficiency and competition due to the SMP. 
These gains have been possible to a large extent thanks to a 
substantial restructuring of European industry, even if the 
specific forms in which the SMP has spread through the 
economy do not sometimes exactly coincide with what was 
forecast in advance. In particular, the cost reductions related to 
size achieved over the period 1985-93 have been mostly the 
result of the exploitation of scale advantages linked to fixed 
investments in marketing, brand development, R&D spending 
and development of new products and production processes. 
Few improvements in efficiency have been the consequence of 
the exploitation of purely technical efficiency gains related to 
the size of establishments. Moreover, the restructuring appears 
to have taken place mostly through the capital market via 
mergers and acquisitions, with a more limited role for entry, 
exit and the internal growth or decline of existing firms. 
This chapter describes and studies this restructuring process 
and assesses the extent to which it has led to increased 
efficiency and competition in European industry. Section 5.2. 
reviews the main features of the wave of mergers and 
acquisitions associated with the SMP, and discusses the 
implications of these changes for the structure of European 
industries in terms of market concentration and the size of 
European firms. Section 5.3. looks at the competitive changes 
triggered by the SMP. Finally, section 5.4. studies to what 
extent increased competition and cross-border activity across 
the EU has contributed to the appearance of pan-European 
markets. This assessment is undertaken with an analysis of 
price convergence across Europe. 
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5.2. Changes in the structure of European industries 
5.2.1. Mergers and acquisitions 
The announcement and the implementation of the SMP has 
promoted a broad restructuring of the European economy 
between 1985 and 1995. Chapter 4 has shown that this 
restructuring process has taken place in part through trade and 
foreign direct investment (FOi), which has quite often taken the 
form of cross-border mergers and acquisitions. In fact, the 
restructuring of European industry has had both a cross-border 
and a purely domestic dimension. In both cases, the adjustment 
to the new market circumstances has taken place mostly via 
mergers, acquisitions and other forms of external growth of 
firms. The dramatic change in competitive conditions triggered 
by the SMP in many markets, coupled with the on-going 
liberalization of the European capital markets (see Box I), have 
meant that in many industries, companies have adapted to the 
new competitive environment by way of takeovers, 
collaborative agreements, mergers and other kinds of financial 
and strategic deals. 
Smith and Walter (1992) point out that the economic 
restructuring of European industry is not dissimilar to the 
restructuring that occurred in the United States in the 1980s. 
These authors show that there is a high correlation between the 
sectoral impact of restructuring in both economic areas. In 
particular, industries most affected in the US were also the 
sectors subject to the strongest restructuring in Europe. Within 
a context of global industries under an intense process of 
increased cross-border competition, one may argue that the 
SMP facilitated the restructuring process in Europe by 
provoking a drastic change in the competitive environment and 
liberalizing capital markets (see Box 1 ). 
The increasing importance of European restructuring through 
the capital markets and the sheer magnitude of this 
reorganization process is shown, for example, by the growing 
and dominant proportion of world-wide mergers and 
acquisitions ( domestic or cross-border) involving European 
firms (Table 1). Between 1985 and 1987, the value of mergers 
and acquisitions (M&As) involving European firms represented 
around 20% of the world total, and this figure had risen to 
almost 43% for the period 1991-93. 1 
The rapid growth of European M&A activity after the 
launching of the SMP has been particularly strong where all 
firms involved are EU firms and in operations where only the 
target company is EU-based. The number of deals of this kind 
1 Sec also European Eca11omr No 7. July 1996. Note that the analysis ofM&A 
data is based upon number of operations because of the incomplete coverage 
of the data on value. 
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has grown by a factor of 3 to 5 between the period 1986-88 and 
1995 (see Graph I). 
Despite the growing importance of cross-border operations, the 
bulk of M&A operations still have a Member State dimension, 
indicating that the restructuring has taken place, at least 
initially, through changes in the domestic market structure. For 
Table 1 
Share of worldwide M&As 
Intra-European 
Extra-European 
European total 
US domestic 
US cross-border 
US total 
All other 
Global I Total 
1985-87 
9.9 
9.7 
19.6 
68.0 
12.0 
80.0 
0.3 
100.0 
Source: EAG. Based on Smith and Waller ( 1994). 
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(pac 1'11 lll g t• of total 1·0 / 11 , •) 
1988-90 
22 .8 
15 .0 
37.8 
44.3 
15.7 
60.0 
2.2 
100.0 
1991-93 
28.8 
14.0 
42 .8 
35.4 
11.7 
47.1 
I. I 
100.0 
the EU 15 over the period 1990-95 , more than 70% of all 
operations were domestic, a proportion roughly equivalent to 
that over the period 1986-90. 
The domestic nature of the restructuring process is especially 
significant in countries such as Germany, Spain and Italy and, 
in general, it is a feature of the largest economies in the Union 
(Table 2) . Small open EU economies tend to have a larger 
share of cross-border M&As. This is particularly true for 
Austria and Ireland. As mentioned before. cross-border M&As 
are increasingly Community M&As (18.7% between 1990 and 
1995). Operations involving firms from the rest of the world 
continue, however, to be important in countries such as the 
U.K., Ireland, Sweden and Austria. 
The extent of industry restructuring that has taken place over 
the period of implementation of the SMP varies across Member 
States. This may be due to a differential effect of the SMP but, 
to a large extent it is related to differences in financial and 
regulatory systems across the Community. Among the large 
economies in the Union, restructuring through M&As has been 
particularly important in the UK, while Italy and Spain have 
registered a low level of operations given the importance of 
their economies. 
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Table 2 
Mergers and acquisitions in the EU, by nationality of partners 
(bi percenrage poitlls) 
Operations 
National Community International Total 
1990-95 1986-89 1990-95 
Belgium 60.2 60.4 31.9 
Denmark 67.0 41.7 22.0 
Germany 79.5 72.9 12.3 
Greece 73.l 0.0 19.2 
Spain 80.9 74.6 11.5 
France 66.0 60.7 24.5 
Ireland 36.9 19.9 49.0 
Italy 77.8 74.9 14.9 
Luxembourg 2.0 5.3 86. l 
Netherlands 57.9 57.0 30.5 
Austria 22.4 30.4 65.7 
Portugal 64.9 0.0 35.l 
Finland 78.8 65.8 14.4 
Sweden 56.8 47.2 29.4 
United kingdom 73.8 75.l 12.9 
Total 70.8 70.l 18.7 
Source: DG II. AMdata. 
Box 1: The single market programme and European 
restructuring 
The single market programme was expected to lead to a substantial 
upheaval in European industry. As the ex-ante analysis put it: 'The 
increased dynamism of the competitive process will ... prompt the 
restructuring and multinationalism of companies, lead to relocation, 
disengagement and "creative destruction"' (European Economy, 
1988, p. 138). 
Faced with a drastic change in competitive conditions in product 
and service markets, firms can adjust their strategies by processes of 
internal and external change. Restructuring can thus take place 
through internal change when firms expand or contract their 
activities adjusting to new market circumstances, or when firms 
enter and exit industries. External growth will occur when 
companies react to the changing market conditions by acquiring on-
going concerns, or by disposing of parts of firms and other types of 
assets, through mergers and acquisitions, divestitures and other 
financial restructuring processes. 
Several reasons explain why a significant part of the restructuring 
process has taken place in the EU through mergers and 
1986-89 1990-95 1986-89 1990-95 1986-89 
34.8 7.9 4.9 100.0 100.0 
40.6 11.0 17.7 100.0 100.0 
18.7 8.2 8.4 100.0 100.0 
0.0 7.7 100.0 100.0 100.0 
23.9 7.6 1.5 100.0 100.0 
26.7 9.5 12.6 100.0 100.0 
58. l 14.l 22.0 100.0 100.0 
18.6 7.3 6.4 100.0 100.0 
89.5 11.9 5.3 100.0 100.0 
30. l 11.7 12.9 100.0 100.0 
56.5 11.9 13.0 100.0 100.0 
100.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 
23.0 6.8 11.2 100.0 100.0 
34.9 13.7 17.9 100.0 100.0 
9.0 13.3 15.9 100.0 100.0 
15.5 10.5 14.4 100.0 100.0 
acquisitions.' First, the need for a rapid adjustment to the changed 
market environment, which made it difficult to pursue strategies 
based on internal expansion; second, the increased breadth and 
liquidity of European capital markets, particularly on the Continent, 
and third, the increased efficiency of European capital markets as 
the effects of deregulation were being felt across Europe, with more 
transparent information, more companies being quoted in exchange 
markets and an increasing role of institutional investors; all of these 
factors promoting the development of a more effective market for 
corporate control. Finally, the empirical evidence shows2 that 
restructuring through the entry and exit of firms constitutes a limited 
instrument for restructuring, possibly important only in infant 
industries 
1 One should bear in mind. however. that not all M&As involve restructuring 
processes as remarked by Neven and Vickers ( 1992). 
See Gcroski ( 1992) and (1995 J. 
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Table 3 
Breakdown by Member State of cross-border M&A opera-
tions and GDP, 1990-95 
Domestic Target Bidder GDP 
Belgium 1.8 5.0 2.9 2.9 
Denmark 4.0 3.9 4.8 2.0 
Germany 23.0 25.5 14.4 24.7 
Greece 0.1 0.4 0.1 1.2 
Spain 2.6 8.1 1.5 7.3 
France 14.8 13.8 18.5 17.7 
Ireland 0.7 0.9 2.9 0.7 
Italy 6.2 6.9 4.3 16.2 
Luxembourg 0.0 0.6 1.0 0.2 
Netherlands 5.1 7.5 9.1 4.3 
Austria 0.2 1.3 1.7 2.4 
Portugal 0.1 1.2 0.1 1.0 
Finland 6.1 3.1 4.0 1.8 
Sweden 4.4 4.5 8.2 3.3 
United Kingdom 30.8 17.5 26.5 14.3 
EUR15 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: AMdata and DG II. 
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It is also interesting to note that companies from the Nordic 
countries, the Netherlands, France and the UK have taken 
predominantly a bidding role in the M&A process, while 
companies in countries such as Italy, Spain and Germany have 
usually been the targets of acquisitions (Table 3). 
At the sectoral level , restructuring has taken place both in 
manufacturing and in services. Manufacturing was the most 
active sector over the period 1988-92, possibly even in 
anticipation of the removal of NTB restrictions ; in the latter 
period, 1993-95, the lead has been taken by services , in 
accordance with the delayed introduction of SMP measures in 
these sectors. Between 1986 and 1995 the number of operations 
has grown from 720 to 2 296 in manufacturing, and from 783 
to 2 602 in services (see Graph 2). 
The importance of domestic operations in the M&As process is 
particularly significant in the case of services , where 
institutional restrictions may have prevented the extent of intra-
European cross-border operations which has been observed in 
manufacturing . In 1995, 70% of all deals were domestic in 
services, and the figure was 63.5 % in manufacturing. 
Incomplete adoption of SMP regulations in services could 
therefore prevent some beneficial cross-border restructuring in 
these sectors (for example , in the banking and transportation 
sectors) (see Graph 3). 
M&A activity has thus been a very important channel through 
which European firms have adapted their strategies and 
redeployed their resources as a reaction to and in preparation 
for the new competitive environment created by the gradual 
implementation of the SMP. M&As have allowed the external 
firm growth and the internal restructuring demanded by the new 
post-SMP scenario . We will review next how this has 
translated into changes in market structure and efficiency. 
5.2.2. Concentration 
In manufacturing sectors , the restructuring process has led to 
substantial changes in the concentration of European industry . 
Data analysis seems to indicate that concentration has increased 
significantly at EU level , but that this has been coupled with a 
reduction or stabilization of national concentration 1 ratios, with 
the exception of Germany and advertising-intensive sectors. 
For the average industry at EU level , the share of total sales by 
the leading four firms has increased from 20.5 to 22 .8% 
1 As indi ca ted be low. th e date fo r nati ona l conce ntrati on re fers 10 Ge rm any. 
France . the UK and Be lg ium. · 
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between 1987 and 1993, but many industries have experienced 
increases larger than five percentage points (Table 4 ). These 
levels of concentration are still well below those achieved in 
the US, an economically integrated area of a size comparable to 
the EU. As indicated by Lyons and Davis (op. cit.) it is hard to 
compare concentration ratios between the EU and the US due 
to the lack of concordance of statistical classifications. 
Nevertheless, these authors estimate that EU concentration in 
1987 was about 14 points below that of the US. That would 
mean that the 2.3 points increase registered between 1987 and 
1993 is still a small step towards comparable levels of 
concentration. 
The most significant increases have taken place in industries 
related to public procurement, (in telecommunications -wires 
and cables, transmission equipment or transportation -
aerospace , rail stock) , in food sectors sensitive to the SMP 
(pasta , starch , oils and fats) and in other sectors such as 
electrical machinery , domestic electrical appliances and 
measurement equipment. 
Overall, the trend towards the increase in concentration at EU 
level is especially significant in technologically-intensive 
industries (see Box 2 for a definition of industries comprised in 
this group). These are industries where the efficiency gains of 
an enlargement of market size and an increase in scale are 
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Table 4 
The evolution of concentration at the European Union level 
NACE 
code 
326 
418 
346 
374 
341 
346 
342 
411 
423 
428 
371 
417 
362 
221 
372 
Industry type/ Industry class** 
Unweighted average for total manufacturing* 
Conventional industries 
Advertising-intensive industries 
Technology-intensive industries 
Industries with both high 
advertising and R&D expenses 
Transmission equipment 
Starch 
Aerospace 
Clocks and watches 
Ins. wires and cables 
Domestic electrical appliances 
Electrical machinery 
Oils and fats 
Other foods 
Soft drinks 
Measuring instruments 
Pasta 
Rail stock 
Iron and steel 
Medical instruments 
CR4in CR4in Change 
1987 1993 in 
(%) (%) CR4 
20.5 22.8 2.3 
13.2 14.4 1.2 
22.3 23.6 1.3 
32.9 38.9 6.0 
30.1 32.4 2.3 
30.6 64.1 33.5 
19.4 50.1 30.7 
47.7 64.3 16.6 
17.2 31.7 14.5 
34.7 48.9 14.2 
36.9 50.5 13.6 
13.1 22.8 9.7 
21.7 30.2 8.5 
14.6 20.9 6.3 
25.8 31.8 6.0 
9.3 15.3 6.0 
22.3 28.2 5.9 
45.5 50.9 5.4 
34.5 39.8 5.3 
24.3 29.2 4.9 
Sectors excluded for lack of data: 223. 224, 246, 255, 256, 259, 313, 314, 322, 328. 353. 373. 441. 442. 456, 461. 462. 463. 464. 465. 466. 467. 473. 481. 483. 492. 
494,495. 
Total number of sectors included: 71 
*=NACE codes 2 to 4. ** For definition of industry type see Box 2. 
Source: EAG; data by Davies & Lyons, revising estimates published in Davies & Lyons ( 1996). 
particularly important, and seem to have been reaped by the 
leading firms. 
The increase of six points in EU-wide concentration in 
technology-intensive industries registered between 1987 and 
1993 is also remarkable because, according to the data 
presented by Lyons and Davis (op. cit.), the concentration gap 
between the EU and the US was smallest precisely in this type 
of industry. According to their estimates, the difference of 
concentration was 4.8 percent points. 1 
1 Davies and Lyons estimate that the difference in concentration ratios is 13.5 
in traditional sectors, 14. 7 in advertising-intensive sectors, 4.8 in technology-
intensive sectors, and 9.6 in sectors intensive both in advertising and R&D. A 
simple comparison with the changes reported in Table 4 shows that R&D-
intensive industries appear to have already concentration levels comparable to 
those in the US, while the difference is still very large in conventional and 
advertising-intensive industries. 
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In industries where advertising, brand name and marketing are 
important (which we call advertising-intensive - see Box 2) 
the increase in EU-wide concentration is more moderate, and 
concentration is increasing fundamentally at the national level, 
suggesting the predominance of domestic restructuring (Table 
5). This is consistent with the characteristics of this type of 
industry where the diversity of preferences and distribution 
channels across the EU might still partially be segmenting 
national markets. Leading firms do deploy their marketing 
skills Europe wide, but most of the augmented concentration is 
the result of increasingly concentrated domestic markets. In this 
type of industry, the average share of the four leading firms 
goes up between 1986 and 1992 by 2.9 percentage points in 
Germany, by 1.3 points in France and by 3.2 points in the UK. 
These national concentration trends in advertising-intensive 
industries (see Box 2) such as food products, consumer 
Table 5 
The evolution of concentration (CR4) at Member State level 
France 
Industry class * 1985 1992 
All sectors 34.4 34.3 
Conventional industries 28.0 28.4 
Advertising-intensive industries 37.9 39.2 
Technology-intensive industries 48.2 47.0 
Industries with both high 
advertising and R&D expenses 35.0 33.3 
Belgium 
Industry class * 1985 1992 
All sectors 54.5 52.8 
Conventional industries 48.4 47.0 
Advertising-intensive industries 55.9 55.5 
Technology-intensive industries 68.1 62.8 
Industries with both high 
advertising and R&D expenses 57.6 60.9 
* = Unweighted means. 
Source: EAG. 
Box 2: Manufacturing sectors: The nature of competition and 
the impact of market enlargement 
Following Sutton (199 l) and Davies, Lyons et al. (1996) we 
distinguish between manufacturing sectors with exogenous and 
endogenous fixed (and sunk) costs. 
In sectors with exogenous fixed costs, firms enjoy economies of 
scale based on production. High fixed costs imply that unit costs fall 
with the size of production runs. However, these are fundamentally 
engineering or technical scale economies, which cannot be altered 
by firms. As the market size grows, the minimum efficient scale 
becomes smaller relative to the size of the market and the degree of 
concentration diminishes. In industries of this kind (for example, 
shipbuilding, cement, carpets, leather, wood products, wool and 
cotton, iron and steel, metal products) products are homogeneous or 
horizontally differentiated and competition is based fundamentally 
on price. For the sake of simplicity we will name these industries as 
conventional. 
In sectors with endogenous fixed costs the economies of scale are 
related to fixed spending by firms in outlays such as research and 
development (development of new products and processes) and 
advertising (establishment of brand names and reputation). These 
fixed outlays also generate reductions in unit costs as production 
increases. However, these economies of scale are reaped at firm 
level, as the specific assets developed by the firm are deployed 
across several plants and subsidiaries. Moreover, these fixed costs 
(and the extent of scale economies) are endogenous, to the extent 
that R&D and advertising spending become strategic tools used by 
firms with the objective of improving their market position. This is 
possible because in these markets R&D and advertising leads to 
what is known as vertical differentiation: differentiation through 
Efficiency and competition effects 
United Kingdom 
Difference 1985 1992 Difference 
-0.1 42.8 41.9 -0.9 
0.4 38.1 35.7 -2.4 
1.3 54.7 57.9 3.2 
-1.2 43.3 42.5 -0.8 
-1.8 51.0 52.9 1.8 
Germany 
Difference 1985 1992 Difference 
-1.7 34.0 35.9 1.9 
-1.4 28.0 30.9 2.9 
-0.3 35.7 36.9 1.2 
-5.4 42.4 42.0 -0.4 
3.3 46.1 48.0 1.9 
perceived or actual changes in quality. In these markets increased 
spending in research and development or advertising alters 
consumers' willingness to pay and, consequently, improves the 
market share of the investing firm. Thus, fixed outlays in R&D and 
advertising become endogenous. 
In markets characterized by endogenous fixed costs, increase in 
market size will not be associated with increased fragmentation. On 
the contrary, some firms will anticipate the change in market size 
and incur fixed costs which will improve their market share and 
contribute to increased market concentration. 
Examples of markets with high levels of outlays in R&D are basic 
chemicals, industrial and agricultural chemicals, machine tools, 
telecommunication equipment, office machinery, electrical 
machinery and aerospace. Industries intensive in advertising are 
basically related to the food industry (confectionery, beer, soft 
drinks, tobacco). Finally, some industries are intensive in both R&D 
and advertising (i.e. pharmaceuticals, soaps and detergents, 
domestic electrical applicances, radio and television, motor 
vehicles). These three types of industries will be respectively, 
technology-intensive; advertising-intensive, and, finally, those 
which are both advertising- and R&D-intensive. 
The distinction between industries with exogenous and endogenous 
fixed costs has implications also in terms of the potential for price 
convergence (see Box 4 below). Markets with endogenous fixed 
costs are usually those where vertical differentiation is pervasive. In 
such markets, even in the absence of artificial or strategic barriers to 
trade, a substantial level of price dispersion may be observed. Thus, 
in those markets the absence of price convergence is not a reliable 
indicator of market segmentation. 
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chemicals, consumer electronics and motor vehicles are 
noteworthy given the overall tendency to a slightly declining 
concentration of the average industry in France, Belgium and 
the UK (together with Germany, the only EU countries for 
which this information was available on a systematic basis). 
Over this period, only Germany has experienced a tendency 
towards increasingly concentrated industries. Such a tendency 
is at the root of the increasing gap between the average size of 
manufacturing firms in Germany and the size of firms 
elsewhere in the EU, a remarkable evolution to which we will 
turn later on. 
As for market services, the impact of the SMP on concentration 
has been very much affected by the nature of each service. 
Sectors such as distribution and road freight transport -which 
were highly sensitive to the SMP but have relatively light 
regulation- have registered substantial restructuring, 
involving both domestic and EU increases in concentration. 
The improved efficiency of these sectors has had a significant 
effect, upstream, on manufacturing industries and, downstream, 
on final consumers, to the extent that significant cost reductions 
in distribution have been achieved (Table 1 above). 
In road freight transport the industry has segmented, with an 
increase in large and small specialized competitors, and a 
declining share of intermediate firms. In distribution, the 
increased EU-wide concentration of manufacturers and retailers 
has reduced the market share of wholesalers. New firms which 
provide logistic services throughout the distribution chain have 
gained substantial ground in the industry. 
Highly regulated services, with large potential gains from scope 
and network economies (economies tied to the simultaneous 
exploitation of several businesses or a distribution network) 
such as telecommunications, airlines or retail banking, have 
observed smaller increases in EU-wide concentration. Quite 
often, due to institutional constraints, the benefits that can be 
derived from a wider EU market have been exploited by 
alliances and not by M&As. Increased concentration has been 
observed only at the domestic level, selectively and very much 
depending on the extent to which some of these sectors had 
restrictions on entry before the implementation of the SMP. For 
example, the market share of the leading firms has increased 
slightly in banking, while it has declined in airlines and 
telecommunication services, where entry regulations have kept 
artificially high concentration ratios. 
5.2.3. Firm size and efficiency 
It is important to ascertain the extent to which the restructuring 
process triggered by the SMP has been used by firms as an 
intermediate step, with the final objective of exploiting the cost 
reductions generated by the increased scale and scope of their 
activities. Moreover, it is also very important to ensure that the 
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increased concentration generated by this industrial 
restructuring has not undermined the competitive forces 
unleashed by the SMP, and thus prevented a translation of the 
cost reductions into lower prices to consumers and downstream 
users. The competition effects will be discussed in section 5.3 
and this subsection will focus on the efficiency gains. 
The productive efficiency effects of an integration process such 
as the SMP cover a wide range of economic phenomena. They 
include, first, the elimination of technical inefficiencies. These 
inefficiencies involve the misuse of technical and human 
resources due to the existence of low competitive pressures and 
managerial slack (what is known as X-inefficiency). Second, 
the cost reductions arising from the increased exploitation of 
economies of scale and scope, as the market is expanded 
through integration. Scale and scope economies may arise at 
the plant level (production scale economies), or may be linked 
to other functions within the firm and to assets which are shared 
at the firm level (economies linked to R&D and advertising, for 
example). 
Other efficiency gains may be related to economies that are 
external to the firm, arising at the level of regions and nations 
when, for example, firms enjoy technological spillovers or 
share access to specialized inputs. Finally, the SMP may have a 
dynamic efficiency effect, changing the incentives to undertake 
R&D, the rate of adoption of new technologies or increasing 
the benefits of learning-by-doing processes by EU firms. Cost 
reductions through the elimination of technical inefficiencies 
and the achievement of larger scale will be the focus of this 
subsection. 
A key distinction has to be drawn between those sectors in the 
economy which are directly influenced by increased (potential) 
trade - the tradables sector which we approximate by 
manufacturing - and the rest of the economy -fundamentally 
service industries- where the enlargement of the market takes 
place through the possibility of expansion by establishment in 
foreign markets. In both cases increased competitive pressures 
may reduce X-inefficiencies. The potential for scale economies 
is likely to be more important in manufacturing. In the case of 
services, however, scale and scope economies at the firm level 
might also be reaped as firms deploy their intangible assets 
abroad through subsidiaries. 
This section will analyse both the manufacturing and the 
service sectors. In the case of manufacturing. the analysis will 
focus on the examination of the evolution of firm size. Thus. a 
direct estimation of changes in production functions or 
movements along the cost curves is not undertaken. The 
background studies have not attempted to provide empirical 
evidence on the existence of unexploited scale economies. Nor 
have they attempted to analyse the extent to which some firms 
may have adjusted to the SMP by reorganizing their production 
across plants. This is a very difficult exercise. which has been 
partially attempted elsewhere and has provided overall 
inconclusive results. 1 We will therefore focus on a simple 
descriptive analysis of the determinants of changes in film size. 
Such changes are not related to efficiency gains in a simple 
way, but provide an intuitive description of how the SMP has 
affected an easily observable measure of economic structure. 
Moreover, modern developments in the theoretical and 
empirical analysis of the relation between the nature of 
competition and the impact of market enlargement" show the 
increasing importance of scale and scope economies linked to 
endogenous fixed costs such as those incurred through R&D 
and advertising competition. These economies of scale and 
scope are obtained at the firm level and, for many industries, 
are more important than purely technical production returns to 
scale which arise at the plant level.3 For this kind of potential 
efficiency gains, the firm constitutes the correct level of 
analysis. Although the conventional approach to scale and 
scope economies already contemplated the role of economies 
arising at the firm level (and these were adequately treated in 
the Cecchini report), recent theoretical and empirical work has 
brought these issues into the main focus of analysis. 
In the case of services, the analysis will be based on the 
sectoral studies undertaken in the context of the SMP exercise 
and will cover a limited but representative array of sectors. 
The restructuring process that has taken place throughout the 
European economy via M&As should have implications not 
only for concentration, but also in terms of the size of the 
representative firms in the industry. However, average firm size 
is an indicator which has to be interpreted with great caution. It 
is the result of two opposing trends. Average firm size may be 
unchanged or increase only as a result of a positive effect on 
1 Caves and Barton ( 1990) and Caves et al. ( 1992) have analysed the extent of 
X-inefficiency in industrialized economies and whether this inefficiency is 
related to the degree of trade liberalization. Caves and Barton work with US 
manufacturing data and find that imports as a percent of total supply is a 
significant determinant of technical efficiency when domestic producers are 
concentrated. The effect is. however. small. An increase in import competition 
by one standard deviation ( I O percentage points in the imports/supply ratio) 
raises industry efficiency by only 0.02 standard deviations. The studies 
reported by Caves ( 1992) referred to Japan. Korea. Australia. Britain and 
Canada and only confirm this finding in the case of the United Kingdom. 
Some of the research yields a negative relationship between import 
competition and technical efficiency. These inconclusive results arc not very 
different from the ones found in the literature that analyses the impact of trade 
liberalization on productivity growth (see. for example. Harrison, 1994). 
Sutton ( 1991 J and Davies and Lyons ( 1996). 
' Early commentators of the Cechinni report (see for example Davis et al. 1989) 
rightly argued that for many European manufacturing industries. the scope for 
increased exploitation of technical scale economies was rather limited. In this 
view. the main gains from the SMP were to arise from increased product 
diversity. which need not necessarily be associated with restructuring and 
increased firm size. However. to the extent that competition through product 
differentiation and product innovation involves endogenous sunk costs 
increased firm size and augmented concentration for some type of industries 
may in fact be a consequence of the SMP. 
Efficiency and competition effects 
average size through mergers and acquisitions, and a tendency 
towards a reduced average size, as a more dynamic 
marketplace promotes the entry of new firms. Both opposing 
tendencies would be consistent with a satisfactory restructuring 
of the economy. Assessing these two tendencies would require 
information on entry, exit and size distribution. However, 
consistent data on these variables for the main countries in the 
EU is not avalaible. Additionally, data on the distribution of 
firms by size is not gathered on a consistent and timely basis, 
and even simple information on average firm size is only 
available with a long time delay. As a consequence, the results 
of the analysis on firm size, although informative, should be 
interpreted with caution. 
Manufacturing 
One of the remarkable facts of the European manufacturing 
sector is the significant difference between the average size_of 
firms in the leading industrial Member State, Germany, and 
other main industrial countries such as France or the UK. In 
1985, the gross value added per firm in Germany was ECU 7.4 
million (1990 prices), while in the other two countries was one 
third below that figure. The data show that manufacturing firm 
Table 6 
The evolution of firm size in manufacturing* 
1985 1992 Percentage 
change 
Gross value added (GV A)** 
Germany 235 711 299 980 27.3 
France 127 653 142 152 11.4 
Italy*** 102 131 124 895 22.3 
United Kingdom 123 681 130385 5.4 
EUR 4*** 589 136 697 412 18.4 
Number of companies 
Germany 31 718 34 987 10.3 
France 26 046 26 941 3.4 
Italy*** 30 717 32 521 5.9 
United Kingdom 25 886 27 342 5.6 
EUR 4*** 114 367 121 791 6.5 
GV A per company 
Germany 7.4 8.6 15.4 
France 4.9 5.3 7.7 
Italy*** 3.3 3.8 15.5 
United Kingdom 4.8 4.7 -0.2 
EUR 4*** 5.15 5.72 11.1 
* Defined as Chapters 2. 3 and 4 for NACE. excluding Chapters 21, 23 and 
adding sectors 1200, 1400 and 1520. 
** 1990 prices mio. ecu. 
*** Data for Italy corresponds to 1991. 
Note: Germany includes only West Germany for both 1985 and 1992. 
Source: VISNDEBA and DG II. 
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size in the largest EU countries increased between 1985 and 
1992 by between 8% in France and 15% in Germany and Italy. 
Of the main EU economies only the UK did not experience an 
increase in firm size. The overall increase over the period was 
11 % for the EU 4 economies. · 
This means that after the implementation of the SMP, this 
structural characteristic of the European manufacturing sector 
has remained unaltered. If anything it has been reinforced given 
the comparatively weak growth of firm size in France and, in 
particular, in the UK (Table 6). 
At the sectoral level, the large size of German firms is 
particularly significant in motor vehicles, chemicals and 
engineering industries, but also in more traditional industries 
such as textile and timber. Over the period of implementation 
of the SMP, the size gap has increased in sectors such as office 
machinery, measurement equipment and transportation 
equipment; but also in the food, textile and clothing industries. 
There seems to be no differential effect of the SMP in terms of 
the impact on firm size across sectors. The stronger growth in 
firm size is actually in the set of industries which were not 
SMP-sensitive. The sectors where the SMP was supposed to 
have a stronger impact had already a larger firm size, and 
growth has lagged behind (Table 7). 
Table 7 
Average firm size and sensitivity to the SMP 
Germany 
Industry class * 1985 1992 
Sensitive sectors** 11.5 13.3 
Non-sensitive sectors 5.1 6.1 
All manufacturing sectors 7.4 8.6 
France 
Industry class * 1985 1992 
Sensitive sectors** 7.3 7.5 
Non-sensitive sectors 3.5 4.0 
All manufacturing sectors 4.9 5.3 
* = As defined in Buigues et al. ( 1990). Data in 1990 mio ccu. 
**= Data for Italy corresponds to 1991. 
S011rCl': VISA/DEBA and DG II. 
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Changes in firm size have therefore not been fundamentally 
linked to the impact of the SMP, but rather to the nature of 
competition in each industry. Strong growth of average firm 
size has been detected in advertising-intensive industries in all 
the four main EU countries (Table 8). This trend is consistent 
with the data on national concentration and confirms that, in 
these industries, firms are increasing their size, so that they can 
reap the scale economies linked to the creation of strong brand 
names, new product development and heavy up-front 
advertising investments. 
The performance of sectors where R&D is important has not 
been as impressive in terms of the size of the average firm but, 
as argued above, the data on concentration indicates that R&D-
in tensi ve industries have also taken advantage of the EU 
market dimension and have spread their large up-front fixed 
R&D costs across the Community. In sectors where scale 
economies are linked to establishment size ( technical 
production economies) we also observe an increase in the 
average size of firms. However, there is no systematic evidence 
that firms have indeed profited from the SMP by reorganizing 
production across Europe and increasing the size of their 
establishments. 
The general results stemming from an analysis of the simple 
summary data presented in the previous tables are confirmed by 
Italy 
Percentage 1985 1992 Percentage 
change change 
15.5 3.9 4.4 12.3 
19.5 2.8 3.2 16.5 
15.4 3.3 3.8 15.5 
United Kingdom 
Percentage 1985 1992 Percentage 
change change 
2.8 5.7 5.9 3.0 
13.4 3.7 3.5 -4.0 
7.7 4.8 4.7 -0.2 
Table Sa 
Average firm size and industry growth by class of industry* 
Industry class * 
Conventional industries 
Advertising-intensive industries 
Technology-intensive industries 
Industries with both high 
advertising and R&D expenses 
Industry class * 
Conventional industries 
Advertising-intensive industries 
Technology-intensive industries 
Industries with both high 
advertising and R&D expenses 
Industry class * 
Conventional industries 
Advertising-intensive industries 
Technology-intensive industries 
Industries with both high 
advertising and R&D expenses 
* = As classified in Box 2. Data in 1990 mio ccu. 
+ = Data for Italy corresponds to 1991. 
Source: VISA/DEBA and DG ll. 
1985 
4.4 
5.5 
12.2 
38.6 
1985 
3.0 
5.4 
10.1 
11.9 
1985 
3.2 
5.6 
8.8 
16.0 
Germany 
1992 
5.2 
8.6 
13.1 
43.1 
France 
1992 
3.2 
7.4 
9.4 
13.8 
EUR4 
1992 
3.6 
7.8 
9.1 
18.0 
the econometric study undertaken by EAG (see Annex 1). The 
econometric tests reveal no significant impact of the SMP on 
firm size, and highlight the importance of industry-type specific 
effects. 
The evolution of firm size across the different Member States 
is, of course, not unrelated to the evolution of concentration 
data which has been analysed above. That relationship is made 
clear in Table 9. As expected, in conventional industries and 
technology-intensive industries where national concentration 
falls or is stable, industry size grows ahead of firm size. The 
evolution of EU-wide concentration is, however, markedly 
different, possibly reflecting the increased multinationalization 
of technology-intensive sectors. In industries where advertising 
Percentage 
change 
20.0 
55.9 
7.7 
11.9 
Percentage 
change 
7.9 
36.2 
-6.9 
16.1 
Percentage 
change 
13.0 
38.6 
3.3 
13.7 
Efficiency and competition effects 
Italy 
1985 1992+ Percentage 
change 
2.3 2.6 14.6 
3.8 5.4 40.1 
5.4 6.0 9.7 
9.9 I I.I 11.7 
United Kingdom 
1985 1992+ Percentage 
change 
3.2 3.2 3.0 
8.4 10.8 27.7 
6.4 5.5 -14.0 
8.9 11.9 33.2 
is important, firm size grows faster than industry size. National 
concentration increases slightly (Annex 2 provides some detail 
on the formal relation between EU-wide concentration, national 
concentration and other structural market characteristics). 
The efficiency gains associated with the implementation of the 
SMP in manufacturing have also been confirmed by the 
perception of firms, as reflected in the Eurostat business survey. 
Overall, large firms seem to have benefited the most from the 
reduction in unit costs associated with the SMP (Table 10). 
According to this survey, the gains in unit costs were mostly 
due to reduction in the costs of raw materials (new sourcing 
opportunities), production and distribution costs (Table 11 ). 
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Table Sb 
Firm and industry growth by class of industry 
Industry class 
Conventional industries 
Advertising-intensive industries 
Technology-intensive industries 
Industries with both high 
advertising and R&D expenses 
Conventional industries 
Advertising-intensive industries 
Technology-intensive industries 
Industries with both high 
advertising and R&D expenses 
Germany 
30.4 
44.8 
27.7 
14.9 
1985 
242 676 
34 868 
197015 
83 828 
(*) Industry size data in million ecu. 1990 prices. 
Source: VISA/DEBA and DG II. 
Table 9 
Changes in size and concentration by class of industry 
Industry class 
All sectors 
Conventional industries 
Advertising-intensive industries 
Technology-intensive industries 
Industries with both high 
advertising and R&D expenses 
Growth in size 
1985-92 
(in%)* 
Firm 
10.4 
40.0 
-0.9 
18.2 
Industry 
16.0 
24.6 
13.6 
20.4 
• Simple mean of national averages (Data for Italy corresponds to 1985-91 ). 
Source: EAG and DG II. 
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France Italy 
Growth in industry size ( 1985-92) 
(percentage change) 
10.9 
26.1 
6.1 
16.2 
Industry size(*) 
(EUR 4) 
1992 
28 705 
43 774 
232 481 
98 500 
20.7 
21.9 
24.3 
17.1 
United 
Kingdom 
2.1 
5.7 
-3.7 
33.5 
Percentage 
change 
18.5 
25.5 
18.0 
17.5 
Concentration 
Mean 
national EU level 
change (in%) 
(in%) (C4 EU) 
(C4 Nat) 
1986-92 1987 1993 Difference 
-0.1 20.5 22.8 2.3 
-0.3 13.2 14.4 1.2 
1.3 22.3 23.6 1.3 
-1.9 32.9 38.9 6.0 
1.3 30.1 32.4 2.3 
Table 10 
Perceived effect of the single market programme on unit 
costs in manufacturing 
( Perct•11Itl_f:t' of t·11terprisn cxpre.'isi11g opi11io11) 
Reduction No change Increase Don't know 
in unit costs in unit costs 
EUR 12 15 53 14 18 
By employment 
size class 
20-49 12 51 17 21 
50-199 16 56 13 15 
200-499 22 57 9 12 
500-999 21 53 8 18 
Larger than 999 26 55 7 12 
S011rce: Eurostat. 
Efficiency gains in service sectors linked to the SMP have been 
harder to detect due to the nature of service activities and the 
problems measuring outputs and inputs in these sectors 1 (refer 
to Gordon (NBER paper 1996) and Baily (BPEA, 1995); as 
well as OECD). 
' In sectors such as distribution and road freight transport, some 
relevant indicators show remarkable gains in productivity. For 
example, improvements in the distribution sector have meant 
that over the period 1987-93 logistic costs as a proportion of 
total revenue for a large sample of 1 OOO European large firms 
declined by 30%. Other gains have accrued in terms of a 
reduction in the number of days between order placement and 
shipment receipt (from 21 to 15 days) and in terms of an 
increased quality of service (a decline of 31 % in the service 
failure rate). In road freight transport, the SMP has reduced the 
cost of cross-border transport by an estimated 6%. 
Nevertheless, the harmonization requirements imposed by the 
SMP in this sector have also led to cost increases with an 
overall increase for international transport which ranges 
between 1 % and 2.5%. 
Productivity and efficiency gains in the more regulated sectors 
(telecommunications, banking, airlines) have been less 
pronounced, and in general, the extent to which the observed 
changes are linked to the SMP is very uncertain. Large gains 
have been observed only in liberalized telecommunication 
services. In this case, the SMP has indeed promoted rapid 
1 On the measurement problems see. for example, Gordon (1996 ). 
Efficiency and competition effects 
Table 11 
Perceived importance of unit costs changes in manufactur-
ing by cost category 
( Percentage ofc11raprist•s exprc.uing opi11io11) 
Category Important Not important Don't know 
Production process 22 33 44 
Testing and 
certification 19 37 44 
Distribution costs 21 35 44 
Marketing costs 15 41 44 
Cost of raw materials 30 26 44 
Banking costs 17 40 44 
Insurance costs 14 42 44 
Other cost sources 4 24 71 
S011rce: Eurostat. 
technological change (for example, in cellular telephony 
through the adoption of the GSM standard), the main source of 
efficiency gains in such a dynamic sector. In airlines and 
banking the evidence is less comforting. In airlines, labour 
productivity has increased ahead of labour costs, although this 
is basically due to the reduction of the labour force directly 
employed by airlines. In banking, no significant improvements 
in productivity or efficiency are reported. Staff costs in banking 
have declined but these reductions may have been compensated 
by increases in non-staff costs related to investments in 
information technology. These trends, however, do not appear 
to be the direct result of the SMP measures adopted in the field 
of banking. 
5.3. The competitive conditions in European markets 
The removal of barriers to trade leads to what Krugman and 
Venables (1993, p. 3) describe as 'a reduction in the cost of 
doing business across space'. Measures aimed at fostering 
competition and promoting market integration affect the cost of 
selling in foreign markets in two different ways: 
They reduce the firms' fixed costs of entering foreign 
markets. For example one such fixed cost would be 
registering car models to check they comply with national 
technical and safety standards. 
They reduce the variable cost of supplying goods and 
services to other markets. Examples are border costs 
which arise from the requirement that goods have to be 
checked at the border (for reasons of taxation, as well as 
to uphold national health regulations and trade policies 
against non-member countries). 
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Both types of cost reduction, fixed and variable, affect entry 
into a foreign market, although in different ways. The first type 
simply reduces (sunk) entry costs regardless of the scale of 
entry. The second type affects decisions to supply foreign 
customers in much the same way as a reduction in transport 
costs. More specifically, they reduce the costs that must be 
incurred in supplying a foreign customer relative to the cost of 
supplying a domestic customer at the same distance. 
While tariff barriers almost always relate to a per unit or per 
value charge on imports, most non-tariff barriers imply a 
mixture of fixed entry costs and variable per unit cost. For 
example, adapting to different technical regulations on product 
packaging and marketing means that costs are higher for every 
unit sold in foreign markets, both because of higher fixed costs 
and higher variable costs. 
Overall, a reduction in non-tariff barriers implies that 
competition is likely to increase because there is an increase in 
both the actual number of competitors and their price 
competitiveness. However, even if the number of competitors 
does not change significantly, the potential for entry may 
induce changes in behaviour and a more competitive 
--environment. 
Whether it is due to an increase in the number of competitors or 
to the threat of entry, the change in the competitive 
environment will translate into a combination of a reduction in 
mark-ups and a reduction in costs, where those were too high 
due to the presence of X-inefficiency or inefficiently small 
scales of operation. 
The promotion of actual competition as a result of the SMP is 
particularly important since, as described above, the European 
economy has undergone a process of increased industrial 
concentration as a result of the SMP. Such increase in 
concentration and firm size could, however, result in reduced 
economic welfare if it were to stifle competition. 
Additionally, competition could also be reduced by a strategic 
reaction of market players (firms or governments) that might 
try to adopt strategies and competitive behaviours that reduce 
or soften rivalry. 
This section will first review the available evidence on the 
effect of trade and European integration on competition and 
will subsequently analyse the extent to which increased 
competition has been observed in EU industrial and services 
markets. The evidence on price-cost margins and business 
perceptions seems to indicate that the efficiency gains 
associated with large size have been translated to consumers 
and users by way of vigorous competition associated with the 
SMP. 
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5.3.1. Market integration and competition 
The general principle that market integration leads to increased 
competition is broadly supported by the available empirical 
evidence. Before analysing the specific evidence on the SMP, 
this section reviews the main studies that have looked at this 
issue. First, on the more general question of the procompetitive 
· effect of imports and trade liberalization. Second, on the more 
direct question of the effects of European integration on the 
extent of competition. 
We must recognize at the outset that the assessment of the 
relationship between trade liberalization and competition is 
subject to daunting measurement problems. As shown by 
Bresnahan ( 1989) and others, assessing changes in the extent of 
competition requires the estimation of industry-specific 
structural models and, almost always, an impressive amount of 
firm-level data and sector-specific knowledge. 
In the absence of this type of model I much of the evidence on 
this subject has been established by means of cross-section 
econometric analysis. 2 Most of the studies look at the 
relationship between profitability (as measured by accounting 
rates of return or price-cost margins (PCM)) and openness to 
trade. The main conclusion of this literature is that the ratio of 
imports to domestic consumption tends to be negatively 
correlated with the profitability of domestic sellers, especially 
when domestic concentration is high.' 
Some recent research has looked at this issue within a structural 
framework. Levinsohn (1993) uses firm-level data and shows 
how mark-ups decrease when trade is liberalized. He estimates 
a transformation of a firm production function. 4 The OECD has 
recently followed a related approach. After estimating mark-
ups for several manufacturing and services industries in some 
OECD countries, the estimated mark-ups are regressed on a 
series of structural and policy variables, which include the 
presence of non-tariff barriers (NTBs). These barriers emerge 
as a significant explanatory variable of mark-ups. 
Within the context of European integration. the analysis using 
cross-section industry-level data was undertaken by 
Sleuwaegen and Yamawaki (1988) and Jacquemin and Sapir 
(1991). 
Sleuwaegen and Yamawaki (1988) do not directly assess the 
effect of declining protection within the EU on a proxy for 
competition such as the PCM. Instead, they relate the PCM to 
1 Sec. however. Levinsohn (1993) and Allen (1994) below. 
These studies follow the tradition of the cross-section structure-conduct-
performance paradigm analysis as summarized by Schmalensee ( l 989). 
' See Schmalensee. (op. cit. p. 976) and the references cited therein. 
' This follows the pioneering work of Hall ( l 989). 
national and EC-wide measures of concentration and argue that 
the formation of the common market in the 1960s and 1970s 
led to an increase in EU concentration and increased PCM in 
the industries where trade liberalization progressed more. 
Jacquemin and Sapir (1991) investigate directly the potential 
disciplinary role of imports in the EU by looking at the 
relationship between PCM and both intra-EU and extra-EU 
imports . They take into account the simultaneity problem (the 
fact that increased imports can cause a decline in PCM, but at 
the same time high PCM could lead to increased import 
penetration 1) and find (with data corresponding to 1983 and 
I 00 sectors) that only extra-EU imports exert a disciplinary 
effect on domestic competitors . They also find, however, that 
sectors with high NTB enjoy abnormally high profitability , 
which could be indicative of low competitive pressures. 
' All en ( 1994) esti mates a model with sectoral data. He does not look at the 
di sc iplinary effect o f imports but estimates a structural mode l which captures 
thi s s imultaneity probl em. Hi s re sult s confirm th at domesti c pri ces are 
influenced by import prices. Thi s complements the traditi o nal result - that 
do mestic prices affec t import prices- ob tai ned in th e pri c ing to market 
literature (see Goldberg and Knener. 1996). 
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Overall , these results suggest that market integration may be 
conducive to increased competition, but that such a relationship 
might crucially depend on maintaining low trade barriers with 
countries outside the area proceeding to further integration. 
5.3.2. Manufacturing 
The implementation of the SMP has had a significant effect on 
the degree of competition in manufacturing sectors. This effect 
has been detected statistically by means of an econometric 
analysis of the evolution of manufacturing mark-ups between 
1980 and 1992 (see Annex 3 and London Economics ( 1996) for 
details) . 
Over the period 1980-92, European manufacturing industry has 
registered a recovery of price-cost margins, at a yearly rate of 
0.25 percentage points , controlling for the evolution of the 
economic cycle and the diverging industrial structures of the 
EU Member States . Within this overall trend , the statistical 
analysis of price-cost margins confirms that the implementation 
of the SMP has imposed increasing pressure on price-cost 
margins, thus ensuring that cost reductions have been passed on 
to consumers and downstream users. The data indicate that the 
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SMP has led to a significant reduction in price-cost margins. 
Other things equal, the estimates indicate that the SMP yields a 
yearly reduction of 0.20 percentage points in margins as of 
1987. If we take into account the evolution of other variables 
which affected margins over the period and the rest of 
parameter estimates obtained by London Economics, we can 
evaluate the ex post impact of the policy change on mark-ups. 
This is presented in Graph 4, where we observe that over the 
period 1987-91 the SMP policy resulted in a drop of mark-ups 
of 0.50 percentage points compared to what would have 
happened in an anti-monde without the SMP. The relative 
?ecline in ~argins triggered by the SMP has been particularly 
important m some of the manufacturing sectors most sensitive 
to the SMP (specifically, sectors which had moderate non-tariff 
barriers before the SMP, such as consumer electronics, motor 
vehicles, textiles and clothing) but also in sectors which were 
not particularly affected by the SMP. On the opposite side, the 
effect on some of the SMP-sensitive sectors (traditional or 
regulated public procurement markets such as pharmaceutical 
products and electrical equipment, etc.) does not appear to have 
been significant. 
The increased competitive pressure revealed by margins data is 
confirmed by the perceptions of firms as reflected in the 
Eurostat business survey (Table 12). 
Table 12 
Perceived impact of the single market programme on the 
extent of competition in manufacturing 
( Percentage of e,11erprises 1.•xpn•ssi11g opinion) 
Increase No change Decrease 
Number of competitors 
Domestic 25 64 11 
EU 39 59 2 
Non-EU 25 74 2 
Price competition 
Domestic 44 51 4 
EU 41 55 4 
Non-EU 29 67 4 
Quality competition 
Domestic 33 64 3 
EU 29 69 2 
Non-EU 18 79 3 
Source: Eurostat. 
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5.3.3. Services 
Competitive conditions in services have also been significantly 
alte_red by t_he SMP. A significant increase in competition is 
noticeable m sectors such as telecommunication services or 
retail banking, but also in airlines, where the implementation of 
the SMP has only been partial so far. Overall, however, the 
increase in competition seems to be less strong than in 
manufacturing sectors, reflecting that in services many 
:egulations are _still maintained and the SMP has not been fully 
implemented m several domains. This diffference in the 
reaction of manufacturing and services is also consistent with 
the results obtained by the business survey, and therefore, with 
the perception of firms (see Tables 13 and 14). These 
perceptions also indicate that the increased competitive 
pressures in services are mostly due to the behaviour of 
domestic competitors. This is in tune with the domestic nature 
?f the restructuring provoked by the SMP, as highlighted above 
m the context of the analysis of M&As. 
The change in the degree of competition in services has been 
prompted by new entry in certain markets 
(telecommunications, airlines) but also by the elimination of 
conduct regulations which restricted firm's marketino strateoies 
(airlines, banking). "' "' 
Table 13 
Perceived impact of the single market programme on the 
extent of competition in distributive trade 
f Pt•rcemage of enterprises expressing opinion} 
Increase No change Decrease 
Number of competitors 
Domestic 29 65 6 
EU 32 67 1 
Non-EU 9 90 1 
Price competition 
Domestic 38 60 2 
EU 29 68 3 
Non-EU 11 85 4 
Quality competition 
Domestic 28 69 3 
EU 19 79 2 
Non-EU 8 90 2 
Source: Eurostat. 
Table 14 
Perceived impact of the single market programme on the 
extent of competition in other services sectors 
( Pact'lllage of t•ntt•rpri.H'S expressing opi11io11) 
Increase No change Decrease 
Number of competitors 
Domestic 30 63 7 
EU 21 77 2 
Non-EU 9 88 2 
Price competition 
Domestic 37 60 3 
EU 16 81 3 
Non-EU 9 87 3 
Quality competition 
Domestic 27 69 4 
EU 14 83 3 
Non-EU 8 89 3 
Sourc~: Eurostal. 
Increased competition has resulted in substantial and quite 
general price reductions in sectors such as telecommunications, 
and'in a more selective decline of prices in segments of the 
airline and banking industries. In airlines, yields in real terms 
have declined between 1986 and 1994 by almost 20%, 
reflecting the fact that the increased availability of discount 
fares has promoted increased consumption, increasing the 
relative weight of discount fares compared to business fares 
which have not declined significantly. In banking, 
intermediation margins have also declined, reflecting increased 
competition in some of the segments of conventional retail 
banking markets (i.e. high-yield cheque accounts, etc.). Prices 
have declined for selected products such as credit cards, 
corporate loans and some deposit products in most EU 
countries. 
In road freight transport, the margins for cross-border traffic 
have declined sharply over the period 1986-94, with an overall 
increase in costs of 22% and an increase in nominal prices in 
the range of 3-10%. The reduction in real transportation costs 
together with the efficiency gains in distribution have led to a 
substantial change in the sourcing patterns of manufacturing 
and retailing firms, which have increasingly considered EU-
wide sourcing. This wider range of sourcing possibilities 
indicates that the decline in the cost of inputs is one of the key 
components of costs reductions due to the SMP, as reported by 
the business survey results. 
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Table 15 
National State aid as a percentage of GDP 
(,-haagt'S rfyt·arly daraJ 
1981-86 1986-88 1988-90 1990-92 
Italy 5.0 3.1 2.9 2.8 
West Germany 2.1 2.5 2.4 2.4 
France 2.1 2 1.8 1.8 
UK 1.4 I. I 1.1 n.a. 
Belgium 3.4 3.2 2.8 2.3 
Netherlands 0.8 1.3 1.3 0.9 
Ireland 2.5 2.7 2 1.5 
Greece I. I 4.5 3.1 2.2 
Denmark 0.7 1 I. I 1 
Luxembourg 6.0 4 4 3.9 
Spain n.a. 2.7 1.8 1.3 
Portugal n.a. 1.5 2.2 1.4 
EC 12* 2.4 2.2 2 1.9 
* Data for 1981-86 correspond to EC I 0. 
Source: European Commission. reports on State aids (various years). 
Finally, competition in some of the service sectors has been 
distorted by the existence of restrictions which have prevented 
the adjustment of the market. 1 Even though the aggregate data 
on State aids (see for example Table 15) shows a steady decline 
of their importance in the economy for practically all Member 
States, some of the key service sectors -such as airlines or 
banking- are not included in those globally positive statistics. 
Thus, State aids and other government interventions or 
regulations may have prevented the complete restructuring of 
some service industries to the new competitive environment 
created by the SMP. 
The pro-competitive impact of the SMP has expanded beyond 
the sectors which were targeted by the SMP measures. Through 
market interactions and strategic reactions by firms, changes in 
competitive conditions in one sector have spilt over related 
sectors, such as clients or suppliers. For example, SMP-driven 
changes in the glass sector have led to upstream restructuring in 
the soda ash industry; similarly, the liberalization of telecom 
services has had a profound impact on the telecommunications 
equipment market (see Box 3). This spreading of the SMP 
effect implies that the linkage between SMP sectoral sensitivity 
and changes in performance (i.e. prices) is not simple, as many 
non-sensitive sectors end up being affected by the SMP. 
1 Neven and Vickers ( 1992) discuss the potential restructuring delay !hat mighl 
be caused by State aids. 
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Box 3: The indirect effects of th e SMP: The case of th e 
telecommunications industry 
The EU telecoms equipment industry employs over 700 OOO people, 
and has a turnover of over ECU 30 billi on. Telecoms equi pment 
production is an important ac ti vity fo r global economic and social 
development - the supply of affordable, state-of-the-art telecoms 
equipment is a prerequi site fo r the development of the European 
economy and the economi es of other reg ions o f the world . 
Telecoms equipment production is a technology-intensive activity 
in which the EU has maintained its global competitive position over 
rece nt years. Defending and in creas ing the competiti veness of 
equipm ent manu fac turin g is a key chall enge for th e EU. It is 
therefore import ant to unders tand th e imp ac t of a maj or 
environmental change, such as the single market programme, on the 
competitiveness of the telecoms equipment manufac turing sector. 
While single market measures have had a significant direct effect on 
many parts of the European telecoms equipment sector, their most 
profound impac t in telecoms equipment manu fac tu ring has been 
indi rec t. The changes occurring through the creation of an internal 
market for telecoms services are having a substantial impact on the 
In the oppos ite direc ti on, the pro-competiti ve impact of the 
SMP may have been dampened by the behav iour of firm s 
and/or governments. As argued before, thi s has been the case 
for certain sectors with regards to governments and State aid. In 
the case of fi rms, it could be the expl anation of the de fac to 
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s tru cture and perfo rmance of the European telecom s equipment 
sec tor. T he introducti on of competition in te lecoms services is 
causing telecoms operators to be more demandi ng in their 
relationships with suppliers. 
The study by Analys is Ltd. and Arcome (1996) concludes that the 
primary impac t of the internal market has been to accelerate the 
reducti on of EU equipment prices by changing the purchasing 
behaviour of Europe's telecoms operators, which account for over 
80% of telecoms equipment purchases in the EU. 
The attached fig ure illu strates the trends in real equipment prices 
from 1985 to 1995 , and the estimated impact of the single market 
programm e. In I 985 EU telecoms eq uipment pr ices were 
considerably higher than equivalent prices in other regions. Since 
I 985 , EU equipment prices have fa llen dramatically to around one 
quarter of their I 985 levels in real terms, and the price premium in 
EU markets has fa llen from 20 to 8%. In the absence of key internal 
market measures , the EU would have foregone average equipment 
price fa lls of approximately 7% (in total, I 985 to I 995), equivalent 
to between EC U 1.5 bill ion and ECU 2.0 billion per annum of 
additional cost to equipment purchasers in the EU. 
limited changes in the liberal ization of markets related to public 
proc urement. Note also that these markets have regis tered 
remarkable increases in concentration and firm size through a 
process of mergers and acqui sitions, and only limited pressure 
on price-cost margins. 
5.4. The convergence of prices across the European 
Union 
5.4.1. Introduction 
The previous sections have assessed whether the benefits from 
increased efficiency and competition have been achieved. This 
last section considers the extent to which the implementation of 
the SMP has led to the development of pan-European markets: 
that is , integrated markets where arbitrage is allowed to operate 
and Member State borders are not hindering economic 
transactions . Under certain conditions, 1 the emergence of pan-
European markets will translate into increased price 
convergence across the Union and will provide an indication 
that the gains from increased competition and efficiency are 
being fulfilled. 
It must be stressed, however, that price convergence is not an 
end in itself. The existence of price disparities across different 
1 Price convergence is ne ither a 11ecessarr nor a s11ffic ie111 conditi on fo r markets 
to beco me pan-Euro pean. It is no t a necessa ry co ndition as marke ts can 
beco me integ rat ed witho ut a s ignificant chan ge in th e ex tent o f price 
dispe rsion. Nevertheless. it is possible to describe the conditions under which 
such a non-convergence integrati on process is likely to take place (consumers 
might not be willing to arbitrage when dec is ion vari ables other than price -
fo r exa mpl e . qu a lity- are key de te rmin ant s o f product cho ice) . Pri ce 
conve rgence is not a s11fficie11t co nditi on for market integration since prices 
may co nverge to a hig h leve l across marke ts whi ch a re kept seg ment ed by 
firm s coordinating the ir ac tions. It is al so poss ibl e, however. to establi sh the 
c ircumstances in which such a coordin ated behav iour is like ly (i.e. marke ts 
where structural conditions make collusion easier). 
Box 4: Price convergence: Data sources and methodology 
The anal ys is of price convergence across Member States and over 
time is done at a detailed level , for 174 good s and services 
categories, using price di spersion indices provided by Eurostat. The 
database covers the 15 EU Member States, for the years 1980, 1985, 
1990 and 1993 (Sweden and Finland are not included in 1980). 
Among the 174 goods and services categories, are: 
(a) consumer goods, of which: 
- 51 food and drink products 
- 2 tobacco products 
- 8 clothing and footwear products 
- 24 durable goods 
- 18 other manufactured goods 
(b) services 
(c) energy products 
(d) equipment goods 
(e) construction categories. 
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geographic markets is a source of concern only if it reflects 
barriers to the arbitrage process2 that prevent the completion of 
a truly integrated European market. 
The extent to which price convergence is observed will depend, 
first, on the potential for price convergence. This potential is 
related to the significance of structural factors (i .e. arbitrage 
costs, demand elasticities , vertical differentiation and other 
structural characteristics of markets) which prevent price 
equalization. And, second, to the extent to which behavioural 
and policy factors by economic operators (firms or 
governments) have maintained barriers which were artificially 
segmenting the Member State markets , thus preventing the 
effective integration of markets. 
5.4.2. Price differentials throughout the EU 
The analysis of price convergence is based on the evidence 
provided by the ORI study (ORI, 1996). This study constructs 
measures of price dispersion across the Union for a large 
The di spe rs io n o f price s does not constitute a properly de fin ed welfare 
measure. Indeed. economic theory shows that forbidding price discrimination 
can be welfare-reducing when arbitrage is not possible. However, we focus on 
spatial markets where arbitrage is poss ible and di scrimination invol ves fre ight 
absorption (consumers which are close to the manufacturer have a lower 
elasticity and are charged a hi gher price) . In such a s ituation, a reducti on of 
arbitrage costs may reduce the discrimination against domestic consumers and 
is unlikely to lead to a price increase in foreign (hi g h e lasticity ) marke ts 
which res ult s in th e interruption o f suppl y and has harmful we lfare 
consequences. 
Eurostat has devised a method to ensure the greatest degree of 
comparability between these categories across countries. In the case 
of consumer goods, the headings represent the different categories 
of final consumption of households by function . As for equipment 
goods , the headings are based on a classification by type of product 
which refers to the technical characteristics of products . 
Two important features of the price indices supplied by Eurostat 
must be underlined: 
(a) The series consist of national price indices as compared to the 
EU 12 average, and not price levels. For each Member State, 
each product/service and each year considered, the price index 
is calculated in such a way as to be equal to I 00 if the observed 
price is equal to the EU 12 average. Thi s mean s that it is 
possible to compare changes in price di spersion between years 
but it is impossible to compare changes in price levels over Lime 
(in other word s, it is po ss ibl e to say whether prices have 
converged over Lime but impossibl e to say whether they have 
converged towards a higher or a lower average level). 
(b) The indices are based on prices inclusive of taxes (both VAT 
and excise duties) for consumption goods and services and net 
of deductible VAT in the case of equipment good s and 
construction . 
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variety of goods and services at different points in time 
between 1980 and 1993. The series consist of national price 
indices as compared to the EU 12 average, and not price levels. 
For each Member State, each product/service and each year 
considered, the price index is calculated in such a way as to be 
equal to 100 if the observed price is equal to the EU 12 
average. 1 This means that it is possible to compare changes in 
price dispersion between years but it is impossible to compare 
changes in price levels over time (in other words, it is possible 
to say whether prices have converged over time but impossible 
to say whether they have converged towards a higher or a lower 
average level; see Box 4 for further details). 
The analysis of the trend in price disparities per category of 
products/services after 1980 has been done over four 
geographical regions, reflecting the different stages of EU 
integration. The first region considered is the EU 6, consisting 
of the six founding EU Member States. Another region is then 
defined with the following three entrants (Denmark, Ireland and 
the UK), called EU 9. For both the EU 6 and the EU 9, price 
dispersion coefficients, defined as the standard deviation of 
prices divided by the region's average, were calculated using 
final prices (including all indirect taxes) and prices net of VAT 
(and excise duties for certain products) for each of the years: 
1980, 1985, 1990 and 1993. A third region is then considered, 
consisting of the EU 12 (i.e. the EU 9 plus Spain, Portugal and 
Greece), for which the price dispersion coefficients based on 
price data net of VAT was calculated on! y for 1990 and 1993, 
as none of these countries had fully adopted a VAT system by 
1985. The fourth region covers the EU 15, i.e. the EU 12 plus 
the three Member States which joined the EU on January 1, 
1995: Sweden, Finland and Austria. The coefficients of price 
variation for the EU 15 were calculated using prices including 
taxes for 1985, 1990 and 1993 and prices excluding VAT for 
1990 and 199 3. They were calculated to serve as a reference 
and to provide information on the degree to which increased 
European integration has also led to a greater convergence of 
these countries' prices towards the EU average. 
We start by describing the evolution of price dispersion 
between 1980 and 1993: has there been evidence of price 
convergence following the launch of the internal market 
programme, and, if so, has this price convergence taken place 
throughout the EU or have price disparities been reduced 
comparatively more in some regions or in some markets? 
1 The price indices are essentially purchasing power parities ( weighted averages 
of price ratios in national currencies) multiplied by current exchange rates. 
Temporary misalignments of the current exchange rate can therefore lead to 
temporary changes in convergence or divergence which have nothing to do 
with the underlying process of microeconomic price convergence which we 
want to examine. Appendix 4 checks the robustness of the indicator of price 
convergence to this type of problem. 
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The following subsection describes the link between the 
creation of pan-European markets and price convergence, and 
discusses the expected theoretical impact on prices of increased 
integration according to different characteristics of the markets 
considered. It thus presents a theoretical framework which 
determines the conditions under which the SMP was expected 
to lead to price convergence, and then assesses the extent to 
which structural, behavioural or policy factors explain the 
observed patterns in price convergence over the period 1985 to 
1993. 
Price convergence by product/service 
The analysis of the overall trends in price dispersion in the EU 
shows that: 
(1) There has been a general trend towards price convergence 
in the EU 12 over the period 1980-93; this tendency has 
been observed for consumer goods, equipment goods and 
services, but not for energy and construction (see Table 
16a below). 
Table 16a 
Coefficients of price variation for selected groupings 
( Prices inc/udi11g taxes) 
1980 1985 1990 1993 
EU6 
Consumer goods 15.9 14.2 13.5 12.4 
Services 22.7 23.9 20.0 21.3 
Energy 18.4 12.5 19.4 24.3 
Equipment goods 10.5 9.7 11.6 12.5 
Construction 15.7 11.0 14.0 19.1 
EU9 
Consumer goods 19.9 19.1 20.3 18.0 
Services 25.2 25.6 24.6 23.4 
Energy 22.1 16.1 24.7 30.6 
Equipment goods 13.1 12.5 12.2 12.9 
Construction 20.1 14.4 16.5 22.4 
EU 12 
Consumer goods 26.0 22.5 22.8 19.6 
Services 33.0 33.7 31.8 28.6 
Energy 30.8 21.1 28.0 31.7 
Equipment goods 18.0 14.0 13.1 14.5 
Construction 24.4 22.1 23.5 27.4 
EU 15 
Consumer goods 27.0 25.9 19.6 
Services 35.2 35.9 28.1 
Energy 23.7 27.5 31.9 
Equipment goods 15.0 14.2 15.3 
Construction 22.4 23.5 27.0 
Source: ORI. 
(2) For energy and construction, price dispersion decreased 
between 1980 and 1985 but increased substantially 
thereafter. 
(3) The convergence in consumer products and in services 
prices has actually tended to accelerate following the 
launch of the internal market programme. 
(4) Price dispersion is lowest the more traded 
products/services are within the EU. 
(5) The product categories which have seen the greatest 
convergence in prices following the launch of the single 
market programme correspond to highly traded sectors 
and, more specifically, to sectors that are more open to 
competition from non-EU producers; the reduction in 
price disparities for sectors classified as having been 
subject to high non-tariff barriers before the launch of the 
single market programme is low. 
The price convergence patterns by specific products/services 
provide complementary information: 
(1) Among the 10 products/services categories for which 
price disparities in the EU 12 were highest in 1993, there 
are four products/services related to health care. This 
reflects the fact that both pharmaceutical product prices 
and health care delivery prices are still highly regulated at 
Table 16b 
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national level. Two additional product categories with 
high price dispersion are energy products, again reflecting 
regulatory price controls and differences in indirect tax 
rates, and two are national monopolies in most EU 
countries (water distribution and railway transport 
services). 
(2) The number of manufactured products for which price 
dispersion was amongst the 50 highest in 1980 has come 
down significantly since. By 1993, the list of 50 
consumption categories for which price disparities were 
highest was dominated by services (as opposed to 
manufacturing) sectors. 
(3) As expected, differences in GDP per capita explain 
disparities in price levels across the EU in many services 
sectors. There are, however, 18 out of 37 service 
categories for which price disparities are not correlated 
with the differences in GDP per capita: these include 
almost all health-care services, along with a number of 
regulated activities, among which are water distribution, 
postal services, telecommunications services and railway 
transport. 
Table 16b summarizes the situation of price dispersion in 1993 
and the evolution between 1985 and 1993 for all 
product/service groups. 
Level and evolution of price dispersion by producUservice groups 
Food products 
Beverages 
Clothing, footwear 
• Baby clothing and accessories for 
clothing 
• Rest of textile clothing, footwear 
Durable consumer goods 
• Radio equipment, TV, washing machines, 
recorders, personal computers 
• Fridge, freezers, flooring, 
household appliances, film 
• Heating, air conditioners, motor vehicles 
Energy 
Services 
Equipment goods 
Construction 
Price dispersion in 1993 
Comparatively low 
Very high 
(less traded, taxation for alcohol) 
• high price dispersion 
• average price dispersion 
• comparatively low 
• comparatively low 
• high price dispersion 
• high dispersion 
• high dispersion 
• low dispersion 
• relatively high 
Evolution ( 1985-93) 
Average trend stability 
Notable trend towards price 
convergence 
• convergence 
• average to slow convergence 
• strong convergence 
• slow convergence on divergence 
• convergence close to the average 
• increase of disparities 
• some convergence but 
slow compared to manufacturing 
•average 
• convergence between 1985 and 1993 
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Price convergence by country 
The analysis of overall trends in price dispersion in the EU 
shows: 
(1) The tendency for prices to converge has been 
comparatively greater in the three Member States which 
joined the EU in 1989 (Greece, Portugal and Spain) than 
in the EU 9; this may reflect a 'catch-up' effect of 
integration. 
(2) Convergence of price dispersion indices for the EU 12 
towards those of the EU 6 has been fastest for durable 
consumer products and a number of market services, and 
slowest for tobacco products and alcoholic beverages in 
general. For energy, the trend was for increased price 
disparities in all three regions, but a much stronger 
increase in price disparities in the EU 6 and EU 9 than in 
the EU 12. The same holds for health care. 
(3) In the EU 15, price disparities in 1993 are not 
significantly greater than in the EU 12, except for food, 
beverages, clothing and footwear; this mainly reflects 
differences in the regulatory environments for these 
products in Austria, Finland and Sweden. 
(4) In the service sectors, price convergence has been 
observed for most of the market services, mainly in the 
Table 17 
Coefficients of price variation for selected groupings 
EU6 
Consumer goods 
Services 
Energy 
EU9 
Consumer goods 
Services 
Energy 
EU12 
Consumer goods 
Services 
Energy 
EU 15 
Consumer goods 
Services 
Energy 
Source: ORI. 
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Inc!. 
VAT 
15.9 
22.7 
18.4 
19.9 
25.2 
22.1 
1980 
Exel. 
VAT 
15.7 
23.1 
17.2 
18.8 
25.7 
20.5 
Inc!. 
VAT 
14.2 
23.9 
12.5 
19.1 
25.6 
16.1 
1985 
EU 12. In the EU 6 and EU 9 regions, convergence has 
taken place at a much slower rate. 
(5) The ranking of countries according to the lowest or 
highest price level is remarkably stable over time; out of 
145 goods/services categories, there are only 18 for which 
some countries shift from being a high-price to a low-
price country over subsequent periods, and vice versa. 
Indirect taxation and price convergence 
The general assessment of the role of indirect taxes reveals that, 
while they significantly increase price disparities for some 
product/service categories, they do not appear to have altered 
overall price convergence or divergence trends between 1980 
and 1993. There is no significant difference in price 
convergence/divergence patterns including or excluding 
indirect taxes. 
Table 17 shows that differences in VAT structures between 
Member States mainly influence the relative dispersion of the 
prices of consumer goods and energy products, as opposed to 
those of services. Overall, differences in VAT rates have 
increased price disparities of consumer goods and energy, as 
their coefficients of variation for prices including VAT is 
higher than for prices net of VAT (see Table 17). 
Exel. 
VAT 
14.2 
24.6 
10.4 
17.7 
25.2 
13.3 
1990 
Inc!. 
VAT 
13.5 
20.0 
19.4 
20.3 
24.6 
24.7 
22.8 
31.8 
28.0 
25.9 
35.9 
27.5 
( Based 011 prices including and excluding \'A.TJ 
1993 
Exel. Inc!. Exel. 
VAT VAT VAT 
13.4 12.4 12.6 
20.2 21.3 21.7 
18.8 24.3 23.4 
18.5 18.0 16.6 
23.7 23.4 23.3 
22.6 30.6 27.4 
21.8 19.6 18.4 
30.9 28.6 28.4 
26.8 31.7 24.7 
24.6 19.6 18.4 
37.4 28.1 28.4 
26.3 31.9 30.7 
It is clear, however, that price differences between EU 
countries stem mainly from factors other than indirect taxation, 
and that price convergence patterns are explained more by 
movements in underlying prices net of taxes than by changes in 
VAT rates. 
There are, however, a few detailed product items for which 
indirect taxes account for a significant part of price dispersion 
(see Tables 18 and 19). This is particularly the case for 
products subject to excise duties . Excise taxes indeed play an 
important role in the case of tobacco products and for some 
energy products and alcoholic beverages , increasing 
significantly price disparities as compared to the trend in prices 
net of taxes. 
Table 18 
Efficiency and competition effects 
When the coefficients of variation of prices excluding VAT and 
excise duties are compared with those for prices including VAT 
and excise duties in the EU 9 over the period 1985 to 1993, it 
appears that indirect taxes on alcoholic beverages, tobacco and 
energy products significantly raise the average coefficient of 
price variation for these products. In 1985, VAT and excise 
duties accounted for a quarter of the dispersion in beer prices 
and close to a fifth in wine prices. Changes in VAT and excise 
rates after 1985 have, however, reduced the distortionary effect 
of these indirect taxes from a price convergence point of view. 
However, for heating oil and other heating fuels, although price 
disparities based on prices net of taxes increased consistently 
after 1985, indirect taxes have been a significant additional 
source of divergence. 
Comparison of the coefficients of variation for alcoholic beverages and tobacco products, based on price indices with and 
without indirect taxes 
CV including taxes - EU 9 CV excluding VAT and excise duties - EU 9 
Product 1980 1985 1990 1993 1980 1985 1990 1993 
Alcohol 39.3 33.6 33 .0 34.4 36.5 30.7 29.6 31.3 
Wine 48.9 47.9 40.8 30.7 46.9 38 .8 33 .0 26.0 
Beer 22 .6 32.4 25 .3 18.9 21.5 24.1 19.3 16.2 
Other alcoholic beverages 24.2 36.7 31.3 17.9 21.9 34.2 28.4 15 .0 
Tobacco products 38 .0 37 .3 33 .3 24.6 35.7 29 .9 26.4 20.5 
So11rce: DR!. 
Table 19 
Comparison of the coefficients for energy products and fuels and lubricants for motor vehicles, based on price indices with 
and without indirect taxes 
CV including taxes - EU 9 CV excluding VAT and excise duties - EU 9 
Product 1980 1985 1990 1993 1980 1985 1990 1993 
Electricity 25 .2 12.5 5.6 20.1 24.9 11.2 15.1 20. l 
Natural gas 34.9 25 .6 36.4 40.9 30.8 22.7 33.4 36.1 
Liquefied gas 21.7 11.7 24.3 24.5 23.1 13 .9 21.1 21.8 
Heating oil and 8.7 13 .2 35 .6 47 .5 6.6 8.7 24.1 31.3 
other heating fuel s 
Coal , coke and 21.8 14.7 18.0 29.4 20.1 12.6 23.2 28.7 
other solid combustibles 
Fuels and lubricants 11.6 10.9 12 .8 9.3 9.5 8.6 11.4 JO.I 
for motor vehicles 
So11rce: DR!. 
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5.4.3. Price convergence and increased integration 
Two geographic areas form part of the same market for a 
specific tradable product or service if the 'law of one price' 
applies, i.e. if the prices of identical products are similar, net of 
any arbitrage costs. The price of the same product at the same 
horizontal stage in two places will, however, be equal only if 
the two following conditions apply: consumers are willing to 
transfer demand between suppliers on the basis of prices net of 
arbitrage costs (i.e. the cross-price elasticity of demand is 
high); consumers are able to transfer demand between 
suppliers. 
The first condition is not necessarily always fulfilled in the EU, 
as there can be: 
(a) language barriers; 
(b) national preference bias (which can lead to vertical 
differentiation and market segmentation into branded/own 
label products, implying differences in packaging, quality, 
etc.); 
(c) non-price based competition (reputation, after-sales 
service, etc.). 
On the other hand, for the second condition to be fulfilled, i.e. 
for customers to be able to transfer demand between suppliers, 
implies that there is no market-sharing cartel, and that the 
distribution systems are organized in such a way that customers 
indeed have access to suppliers from different or distant 
geographic markets. Exclusive distribution systems (as in the 
fine fragrances market) or stringent access-to-market 
regulations (as in the pharmaceutical products' market) indeed 
hinder the arbitraging process. 
In the case of non-tradable services, the 'law of one price' does 
not apply because prohibitive arbitrage costs (typically, the 
service is consumed at its production stage) make it imposible 
for consumers to transfer demand across countries. As a 
consequence price convergence in services will result only if 
determinants of price levels such as GDP per capita, regulatory 
regimes and market structures converge. 
As argued before, price homogeneity is not a sufficient 
condition for a market to be pan European, as uniformity of 
prices could result from cooperation between firms. To 
discriminate between cases where price convergence results 
from increased competition and cases where it results from 
behaviours that work counter to the single market philosophy, 
an analysis of the changes in market structure (number of 
companies, degree of concentration, trend in profitability) is 
needed. 
There are a number of factors which can explain price 
disparities for the same product at the same horizontal stage of 
138 
development. As indicated above, this can be the case when 
there are structural characteristics on the demand or on the 
supply side which prevent the arbitrage process from taking 
place (a discussion of the supply side characteristics for 
manufacturing sectors is provided in Box 2). These are referred 
to below as the 'structural factors', and include genuine 
arbitrage costs, differences in consumer preferences and the 
extent of vertical quality differentiation of products. For 
services, GDP per capita is an important factor. 
Price disparities can, however, also result from strategies of 
companies aimed at segmenting markets or raising barriers to 
entry to reduce competition. These factors are referred to as 
'behavioural factors' and can explain the failure of prices to 
converge in some markets: market sharing agreements, the 
control of distribution or of supply source, the creation or the 
increase of barriers to entry. 
Finally, government policies can limit or constrain the arbitrage 
process (protective regulatory environment, existence of 
barriers to entry, etc.). These policies are referred to as the 
'policy factors' restraining price convergence in the remainder 
of the analysis. 
For all the products/services markets in which price disparities 
are being observed, the assessment of the degree of pan-
Europeanization of the market will thus require identifying 
whether it is structural, behavioural or policy factors which 
explain the observed price differences. 
This identification is undertaken on the basis of a multivariate 
linear regression model where price dispersion at the sectoral 
level for the years 1980, 1985, 1990 and 1993 is the dependent 
variable, and severa! regressors are included with the objective 
of capturing the abovementioned structural and policy factors 
(see Box 4 and Annex 4 for details). 
The general results of this analysis are the following: 
(I) Structural factors, reflecting differences in consumer 
preferences or leading to a competitive process based 
more on quality than on price explain a significant part of 
the variation in price disparity in the EU 9 across product 
categories, particularly for products/services intensive in 
R&D and advertising. However, policy factors (taxes and 
NTBs) also emerge as significant explanatory factors. 
albeit with a reduced magnitude. 
(2) Indeed, disparities in tax policies across countries were 
also found to have a significant positive impact on price 
disparity across the EU. 
(3) Similarly, the existence of high or moderate non-tariff 
barriers (NTBs) hindering the arbitraging process also 
explains part of the observed price disparities. 
(4) A high degree of concentration in national markets tends 
to favour price disparity, whereas a high degree of 
internationalization of the market, either through import 
penetration or through the presence of multinational 
companies within national markets, tends to decrease 
price disparity. 
(5) In the absence of non-tariff barriers, or where these are 
ineffective, national structures (measured by high degree 
of concentration in national markets) and national 
regulations (in particular differences in taxation) lose their 
effectiveness. Thus, in markets with no NTBs, 
behavioural and policy factors are less effective in 
keeping markets fragmented, and it is mainly structural 
factors which explain price disparities, where these are 
still observed. 
(6) Overall, about 30% of the observed variance of the 
dependent variable (the coefficients of price variation 
include taxes in the EU 9) is explained by structural and 
quantifiable policy factors. The remainder is due to other 
factors, among which policy barriers and, possibly, 
behavioural responses of firms to the rise in competition 
in the market. 
By type of sector (see Box 5 below) the following results 
should be highlighted: 
( 1) In homogeneous products markets, where competition is 
solely based on prices, and in horizontally differentiated 
products markets where competition is based both on 
price and on product diversity, the inception of the SMP 
has generally led to increased price convergence. Where 
increased convergence has not been observed, as in many 
clothing and footwear categories and for products of 
boilermaking, this can be associated either to remaining 
policy barriers (harmonization of standards not achieved, 
insufficient mutual recognition or incorrect interpretation 
of standards and norms), or to behavioural/structural 
factors related to the organization of distribution. In the 
textiles and clothing markets, for example, differences in 
the organization of distribution across Member States are 
likely to explain the remaining high price disparities. 
(2) For vertically differentiated products/services the situation 
is more complex. In particular, in markets intensive in 
both research and advertising, price disparities are 
relatively high and stable over time, confirming the 
theoretical analysis according to which vertical 
differentiation and barriers to entry based on high levels 
of endogenous costs effectively hinder the arbitrage 
process. Examples of vertically differentiated markets 
intensive in both research and advertising are heavy 
household appliances, televisions, electronic equipment or 
optical instruments and photographic material. In these 
markets. the econometric analysis shows that the rate of 
Efficiency and competition effects 
extra-EU import penetration increases price dispersion 
(higher rates of extra-EU trade penetration being 
associated with higher coefficients of price variation), 
indicating that imports in these markets are generally of 
an intra-firm type and do not increase the competitive 
pressure. 
(3) On the contrary, vertically differentiated products markets 
that are intensive in research only show a low average 
price disparity, suggesting that huge investments in 
research and development not coupled with high 
advertising investments compel firms to adopt pan 
European strategies. Examples of such markets are tyres, 
inner tubes and other replacement parts for motor 
vehicles, other modes of transport (bicycles and 
motorcycles), and computers. These are all markets in 
which price disparities have been noted to be low, or 
declining. 
(4) Finally, in vertically differentiated markets in which high 
advertising to sales ratios reflect companies' strategies to 
raise barriers to entry and increase consumers' willingness 
to pay by shifting the emphasis of competition from price 
to quality, market fragmentation typically continues to 
exist, along with high price disparities, even after the 
removal of non-tariff barriers. Examples of such markets 
are food products such as edible oils and confectionery, 
and beverages such as tea and alcohol. In these markets, 
however, higher rates of import penetration are associated 
with lower levels of price disparities. The high level of 
price disparities in these markets compared with other 
markets largely reflects consumer inertia created by brand 
loyalty based on high advertising expenditures. Where 
some convergence is nevertheless observed between 1990 
and 1993, this likely suggests a switch to pan-European 
brands. 
This section has shown that the changes in the structures and in 
the degree of competition of European markets prompted by 
the implementation of the SMP have also resulted in increased 
price convergence across the EU between 1985 and 1995. For 
certain goods no additional convergence of prices is expected, 
since the existing levels of price dispersion are the result of 
structural sectoral characteristics which are fully compatible 
with the achievement of an integrated pan-European market. 
The increased convergence of prices for many products and 
services across the EU corresponds, at the detailed 
microeconomic level, to the process of convergence in inflation 
(disinflation) achieved in the EU over the last few years. The 
SMP effect on prices has facilitated the conduct of a stability 
oriented macroeconomic policy in making adjustments less 
painful. 
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Box 5: The econometric analysis of the factors underlying price 
convergence 
The objective of this econometric analysis is to shed some light on 
the relative importance of various factors in explaining the observed 
dispersion of prices across product categories. 
The dependent variable in the econometric regressions is the 
coefficient of variation of the price indices inclusive of taxes at the 
EU 9 level for the years 1980, 1985, 1990 and 1993. 
Three groups of explanatory variables are considered. 
The first includes a demand-side structural factor and two 
quantifiable policy factors affecting the arbitraging process: 
(a) The disparity of demand across EU countries. 
(b) The disparity in tax policy across EU countries. 
(c) The existence of non-tariff barriers (NTB). 
The second group of variables includes supply-side structural 
variables describing the nature of competition in each market (see 
Box 2). These variables, which are supposed to describe structural 
characteristics of the market, do not vary over time. This means that 
we do not take into account changes in these structural 
characteristics resulting from strategic adaptation to a new 
competitive environment. 
This second group of variables includes: 
(a) The importance of exogenous sunk costs. 
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(b) The importance of endogenous sunk costs. 
(c) The extent of vertical differentiation. 
The third group includes variables capturing changes in the extent 
of competition in each product category: 
(a) Intra-EU import penetration. 
(b) Extra-EU import penetration. 
(c) The share in total sales of the four largest firms, the share of the 
five leading firms in total sales and a proxy for concentration at 
the EU level I measured by the Herfindhal index at the NACE 
three digit level. 
(d) A proxy for multinationalization in a given industry/ is 
measured as the weighted average of the degrees of 
multinationality for constituent firms in each NACE three digit 
industry. 
See Davies, S. and Lyons, B. (1996), Indusrrial organiza1ion in Ihe 
European Union, Oxford University Press. 
See Davies, S. and Lyons, B., (op. cir). 
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Annex 1: The econometric analysis of firm size 
EAG ( 1996) estimates an econometric model of average 
business unit size. The authors identify the factors that 
determine the average size of business and analyse how a 
reduction in trade barriers affects the relationship explaining 
firm size. As with price convergence, the mechanisms by which 
the creation of a fully integrated internal market influences the 
achievement of economies of scale and scope depends crucially 
on the nature of competition in the markets (see Box 2 above). 
Moreover, the EAG report suggests that the type of competition 
would not change the variables entering the econometric 
model, but their effects on firm size. As a consequence the 
analysis of the determinants of firm size will be undertaken 
separately by type of industry. 
The specification of the econometric model may be 
summarized as follows. 
Market size. Under imperfect competition, firms would produce 
at less than the minimum point on the cost curve, and there is 
little we can say about how market size will affect the 
attainment of scale economies. This is because the balance of 
higher output per firm and new entry depends on consumer 
attitudes to more product variety versus lower prices. 
Nevertheless, Krugman (1979) has argued that at least some of 
the effect of an increase in market size is likely to manifest 
itself in higher output per firm. Market size is measured as total 
production within the EU by NACE industry. 
Minimum efficient technical scale (MES). If cost curves are L-
shaped, the average size of firms is likely to be positively 
associated with MES. The source for MES is Davies and Lyons 
(1996), where earlier work by Pratten on the collation of 
engineering estimates is applied and extended consistently 
across the NACE industrial classification. 
Pro-competitive effects of the SMP. EAG employs four 
industry-specific measures designed to capture different 
industry-specific aspects of intra-EU trade barriers. First, a 
dummy variable, PUB, which equals one if the industry is 
considered to be heavily influenced by public procurement. 1 
Second, another dummy variable, REG, which equals one if the 
industry is heavily influenced by national regulations.2 Third 
the so-called openness effect: the absence of trade may result in 
firms in a Member State being unable to achieve sufficient size 
to fully exploit economies of scale. This effect is measured by 
the sum of the import penetration and the export propensity 
ratios. Finally, the comparative advantage effect: high intra-EU 
' Sec Buigucs et al. ( 1990). 
Same source. 
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exports in a given industry accompanied by low intra-EU 
imports suggest that a Member State has a comparative 
advantage. This effect is represented by the difference between 
the export propensity and the import penetration ratios. 
The equation that explains the average size of business units 
prior to the advent of the SMP is: 
Xjk = f(MESj, market sizej, PUBj, REGj, openneSSjk, 
comparative advantagejk) (1) 
where j indexes industry and k country. 
We would expect two types of effects as firms respond to 
reduced or eliminated barriers to trade. First, a general move 
towards greater competition should affect all industries (e.g. 
due to the removal of border controls). We would expect this to 
have the greatest effect on unit size where average size has 
been lowest in relation to economies of scale. This initial 
disadvantage is measured as the average size of business unit 
relative to MES. Second, we expect to see stronger effects in 
those industries which were previously most affected by non-
tariff barriers to trade, represented by PUB and REG. 
The trade-based measures, however, incorporate direct 
measures of changes over time. Thus, an additional 
specification focuses on changes in average unit size between 
pre- and post-SMP measures is: 
dXjk = g(initial disadvantagejk, ilmarket sizej, PUBj, REGj, 
ilopenneSSjk, ilcomp. advantagejk) (2) 
Due to data limitations, these models are estimated on the basis 
of 3-digit NACE sectoral data for only Member States: 
Germany, France, Italy, UK, Netherlands, Denmark. Taking 
into account confidentiality and other data availability 
problems, this leaves 426 observations. Growth in mean size, 
growth in EU size and the initial disadvantage were each 
measured as the difference in the logs, and the change in trade 
ratios are simple differences. Since MES is measured in terms 
of sales (not value added), the initial disadvantage is measured 
as the difference between MES and mean size measured by 
sales. Given the institutional differences between Member 
States, separate public procurement and regulated industry 
dummies were used for each country. Finally, simple dummy 
variables for each country were included. the objective is to 
capture simple country effects, perhaps reflecting the way 
national business unit sizes are related to the size of the home 
market. Since the regressions are estimated with a constant. one 
country dummy has to be excluded to avoid perfect 
multicollinearity. Germany is the excluded country. so the 
coefficients on the remaining country dummies should be 
interpreted as measuring the typical difference in mean size of 
business unit, as compared with Germany. and having taken 
into account the other variables in the regression. All variables 
were then entered linearly into equations (1) and (2). The 
public procurement industries are all to be found in type I and 
type 2r sectors, while regulated industries are often associated 
with consumer protection and are concentrated in the type 2a 
and type 2ar sectors. 
Equation (I) is estimated using 1986 data, as the starting point 
highlighting sources of production inefficiency before the 
Single European Act was implemented. Equation (2) is 
estimated for changes between 1986 and 1991. As indicated 
earlier, the latter date is the last for which Eurostat data were 
available . Thus, the period of analysis is dictated entirely by 
data availability. This is very unsatisfactory, not least because 
the implementation of the internal market programme was not 
due to be completed before 31 December 1992, and some 
measures were still not implemented then . Thus, the changes 
equation can give little more than a glimpse at the effects of the 
internal market programme, picking up only the immediate 
effects of the first measures to be implemented, and the effects 
of finns with foresight anticipating later measures. 
Main findings 
Industries not competing in advertising nor in R&D 
(type 1, Table Al.1) 
By far the most significant variable is MES , which gives an 
ela~ticity of firm size with respect to MES of one third. It is 
striking to observe that there is no effect of the size of the EU 
market on mean unit size. Our measures of trade openness and 
comparative advantage have no effect on mean size, but public 
procurement does. In all countries, this bias tends to create too 
many small firms (as compared with the general relationship 
between average size and economies of scale), but the effect is 
quantitatively strongest in France and the Netherlands , 
followed by Denmark. Finally, all countries have a significantly 
smaller average size as compared with Germany, but there is no 
systematic relationship between the size of this effect and the 
size of the home market. Italy has many smallest size firms, and 
although Denmark is next smallest, Dutch firms are of similar 
size to those in France and the UK (once all other factors in the 
regression model have been taken into account) . 
Turning to the changes between 1986-91 , although there is a 
suggestion that EU growth feeds through initially into larger 
firms, there is no evidence of any early SMP effect. Industries 
with a larger initial disadvantage are not increasing in unit size 
any more than are others, there is still no trade effect, and nor is 
mean size being made up any faster in public procurement 
industries. The only systematic effect is that most countries, but 
particularly Italy and the UK, are falling even further behind 
Germany in terms of relative size of unit. As will be seen, the 
case of Italy's low and decreasing relative size of business units 
is quite pervasive. 
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Table Al.1 
Type 1 industries 
1986 1986-91 
Change in 
mean size mean size 
Constant 7.51 Constant 0.14 
(26.63)** (4.49)** 
MES 0.33 Initial disadvantage -0.01 
(14.05)** (-0.62) 
EU size -0.02 EU growth 0.23 
(-0.60) ( 1.63) 
Trade penetration 0.00 Change in -0.02 
trade penetration 
(0.06) (-0.61) 
Trade balance 0.07 Change in 0.10 
trade balance 
( 1.46) (0.79) 
PUB* D -0.21 PUB* D 0.01 
(-0.76) (0.10) 
PUB* F -0.83 PUB* F -0.08 
(-5.14)** (-1.15) 
PUB* I -0.20 PUB* I 0.00 
(-1.06) (0.11) 
PUB* UK -0.16 PUB* UK 0.01 
(-1.54) (0.14) 
PUB* NL -0.52 PUB* NL -0.00 
(-4.25)** (-0 .03) 
PUB* DK -0.28 PUB* DK 0.02 
(-2.06)* (0.14) 
F -0.50 F -0.09 
(-3 .87)** (-2.45)* 
-1.18 -0.26 
(I 0.02)** (-7 .15)** 
UK -0.57 UK -0.25 
(-4 .89)** (-5 .60)** 
NL -0.52 NL -0.08 
(-3.47)** (-2 .02)* 
DK -0.82 DK 0.05 
(-5.70)** (0 .86) 
R' 0.66 R' 0.30 
Number 248 Number 244 
of observations of observations 
I-rati os in parenthesis. based on Whi1e ·s adjustment for hetcroscedasticity 
** significantly different for zero at I% level (2-tail test) 
* significantly different for zero at 5% level (2-tail test) 
- significantly different for zero at 10% leve l (2-tail test). 
Industries competing in advertising (type 2a, Table 
Al.2) 
As expected, Table A 1.2 shows that in type 2a industries there 
is a quantitatively smaller relationship between mean size and 
MES, but now a positive relationship with EU size emerges. In 
fact, the effect of market size is three times as large as that of 
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Table Al.2 
Type 2a industries 
1986 1986-91 
Change in 
mean size mean size 
Constant 5.41 Constant 0.24 
(10.64)** (4.22)** 
MES 0.11 Initial disadvantage -0.01 
(2.0 I)* (-0.75) 
EU size 0.33 EU growth 0.41 
(4.64)** (2.63)* 
Trade penetration -0.05 Change in -0.36 
trade penetration 
(-0.60) (-1.88)+ 
Trade balance 0.26 Change in 0.31 
trade balance 
( 1.95)+ (0.90) 
REG*D -0.19 REG*D 0.06 
(-0.95) (0.75) 
REG* F 0.48 REG*F 0.05 
(2.97)** (0.51) 
REG* I 0.32 REG* I 0.14 
( 1.04) (l.83)+ 
REG* UK 0.56 REG* UK 0.05 
( I. 78)+ (0.49) 
REG* NL 0.64 REG* NL 0.06 
( 1.18) (0.38) 
REG* DK 0.24 REG* DK -0.26 
(0.65) (-4.47)** 
F -0.34 F -0.10 
(-2.03)* (-1.43) 
I -0.92 -0.33 
(-5.64)** (-4.10)** 
UK -0.13 UK -0.26 
(-0.49) (-3.91)** 
NL -0.06 NL 0.22 
(-0.21) (1.84)+ 
DK -0.29 DK 0.31 
(-0.72) (4.48)** 
R2 0.65 R2 0.70 
Number 60 Number 59 
of observations of observations 
t-ratios in parenthesis. based on White"s adjustment for hcteroscedasticity 
** significantly different for zero at 1 % level (2-tail test) 
* significantly different for zero at 5% level (2-tail test) 
. significantly different for zero at I0% level (2-tail test) . 
MES. This may reflect the fact that advertising spending is 
endogenous and becomes higher in larger markets (see Box 2) 
thus enables firms to increase output per business unit. There is 
only very slight evidence of comparative advantage allowing 
positive trade-balance locations to achieve greater scale, but as 
we have already stated, integration in type 2a industries tends 
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to come through multinational firms producing internationally, 
rather than through international trade. The effect of regulation 
is much weaker than was public procurement in type I 
industries. However, it is interesting to note that the 
predominant effect is now to raise mean size. Presumably, this 
reflects either the deliberate creation of national champions, or 
(more likely in these industries) the effective lobbying by 
market leaders to skew regulation to their own protection. The 
exception of the (insignificant) negative effect in Germany may 
be due to the way the beer industry was regulated there, with 
the opposite effect of protecting numerous small brewers. 
Finally, only Italy and France have significantly smaller 
average sizes than Germany. 
Turning to the changes regression for type 2a, EU growth again 
shows through as enhancing mean size with a particularly 
strong effect. The most interesting coefficients are on the 
national intercepts. Firms in the two smallest countries in the 
sample, Denmark and the Netherlands, are experiencing 
positive relative growth in this sector, even relative to Germany 
(the coefficient on REG*DEN should be ignored as there is 
only one Danish regulated industry in this sample). 
Industries competing in R&D (type 2r, Table Al.3) 
Type 2r industries display many similarities with type 2a. Mean 
size depends on both MES and EU size, though (rather 
surprisingly) the balance lies between type I and type 2a 
industries. The trade balance is also a significant determinant of 
mean size. This suggests that firms are drawn to the most 
efficient locations, and this helps them achieving larger 
production scale economies compared to firms in more 
disadvantaged locations. Public procurement tends to increase 
size in these industries, but this is a significant effect only in 
Italy and Denmark. The most striking finding is the strong size 
advantage that German firms have in these high technology 
industries, with large negative coefficients on all the national 
intercepts. 
The type 2r industries show by far most interesting changes 
regression. These industries show clear signs of an SMP effect 
raising average size systematically more in industries and 
locations where average size was initially smallest relative to 
MES (and even here, it is possible that there was some other 
cause, such as an increase in global competition). The rest of 
the story is consistent with the previous two industry groups. In 
particular EU growth affects significantly average size. Also. 
the national intercepts show increasing divergence from 
Germany; with the divergence trend smallest in the smaller 
countries (Netherlands and Denmark) and France, and greatest 
in Italy and the UK 
Table Al.3 
Type 2r industries 
1986 1986-91 
Change in 
mean size mean size 
Constant 4.59 Constant -0.01 
(8.75)** (-0 .12) 
MES 0.53 Initial disadvantage 0.07 
(9.96)** (2 .37)* 
EU size 0.24 EU growth 0.46 
(3.65)** (3.14)** 
Trade penetration 0.3 1 Change in -0.14 
trade penetration 
( 1.49) (-1.24) 
Trade balance 0.68 Change in 0.24 
trade balance 
(2.83)** (1.58) 
PUB * D -0.29 PUB* D -0.04 
(-0.98) (-0.54) 
PUB * F 0. 13 PUB * F -0.28 
(0 .34) (-1.96)+ 
PUB * I 0.7 1 PUB* I -0.09 
(2 .04)* (-0 .88) 
PUB * UK 0.30 PUB * UK -0.18 
( 1.02) (-1.29) 
PUB * DK 0.58 PUB *DK 0.05 
(4.91)** (0.24) 
F -0.69 F -0.15 
(-3.02)** (-2.79)** 
-1.37 -0.39 
(-5 .91)** (-5 .55)** 
UK -l.15 UK -0.27 
(-4.35)** (-2.63)* 
NL -1.19 NL -0.03 
(5 .18)** (-0 .13) 
DK -1 .08 DK -0.10 
(4.86)** (-l.13) 
R2 0.76 R2 0.47 
Number 80 Number 77 
of observations of observations 
t-ratios in parenthesis, based on White' s adjustment for heteroscedasticity 
** significantly different fo r zero at 1 % level (2-tai l test) 
. significantly different for zero at 5% level (2-tail test) 
significantly different for zero at 10% leve l (2-tai l test) . 
Industries competing in advertising and R&D (type 2ar, 
Table Al.4) 
The final, and smallest, group of industries is type 2ar. In these 
industries, the relationship between business size and technical 
economies of scale is much fuzzier, but there is a strong effect 
of EU size . In fact, the latter elasticity is not significantly 
different from unity . Only in this group does greater openness, 
Efficiency and competition effects 
Table Al.4 
Type 2ar industries 
1986 1986-91 
Change in 
mean size mean size 
Constant l.85 Constant 0.15 
( 1.54) (1.32) 
MES 0.22 Initial disadvantage -0.04 
(1 .50) (-0.76) 
EU size 0.80 EU growth 0.64 
(3 .84)** ( l.94 )+ 
Trade penetration 0.54 Change in trade pen . -0.04 
(2.62)* (-0.20) 
Trade balance -1.03 Change in trade bal. 0.69 
(-1. 94 )+ ( 1.36) 
REG*D -l.08 REG* D -0.01 
(-2.85)** (-0.08) 
REG* F -0.37 REG* F 0.10 
(-1.42) ( 1.06) 
REG* I -0.25 REG* I 0.21 
(-0 .73) ( 1.65) 
REG* UK 0.87 REG* UK 0.09 
(2.38)* (0.55) 
REG* NL l.78 REG* NL -0.35 
(3.16)** (-1.58) 
REG* DK 1.33 REG* DK 0.57 
(3 .14)** (2.31 )* 
F -1.21 F -0.11 
(2.88)** (-0 .79) 
-1 .72 -0.18 
(-4.50)** (-1.06) 
UK -l.75 UK -0.22 
(-4.18)** (-1.15) 
NL -3.26 NL -0.02 
(-4.47)** (-0.08) 
DK -2.45 DK -0.24 
(-4.77)** (-1.07) 
R2 0.65 R2 0.43 
Number 38 Number 37 
of observations of observations 
t-ratios in parenthesis, based on White 's adjustment for heteroscedasticity 
** significantl y different for zero at 1 % level (2-tail test) 
* significantly different for zero at 5% level (2- tail test) 
. significantly different for zero at 10% level (2-tail test). 
manifested in higher trade penetration , feed into higher 
business unit size . There is also an interesting pattern to the 
effects of regulation . In the larger countries, particularly 
Germany, regulation reduces mean size, while in the smaller 
countries (the Netherlands and Denmark), it raises size. This 
may be partially compensating for a very strong size 
disadvantage that the firms in the latter countries seem to have 
in relation to Germany. The changes regression for type 2ar 
tells no interesting story. 
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Conclusion 
The relationship between increases in size and the exploitation 
of economies of scale depends importantly on the prevalent 
type of competition in the industry. Overall, however, the 
analysis by EAG finds some strong national differences in the 
exploitation of economies of scale. Moreover, as predicted, 
governmentintervention in the form of public procurement bias 
and national regulations has a systematic effect on average size, 
tending to reduce it in type 1 industries but raise it in type 2. 
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The trade data reveal only a weak suggestion of trade barriers 
contributing to the under-exploitation of scale economies. As 
expected, 1991 was too early to see very much change as a 
result of the implementation of the SMP. Only in type 2r 
industries was there evidence to suggest that firms were 
increasing the size of business units most strongly where there 
was a significant size disadvantage, in anticipation of future 
competition. However, one clear picture did emerge from the 
analysis of changes: the size gap between German firms and 
those located in other Member States was positive and 
increasing across a wide range of industries. 
Annex 2: National concentration and EU-wide 
concentration 
With regard to the interpretation of concentration changes, 
there are two stages in the argument. First, in any given 
industry, EU concentration amounts to a weighted average of 
concentration within individual Member States, allowing for 
the possibility that some firms may be amongst the market 
leaders in more than one Member State. 
For example, suppose the EU comprises 12 equal-sized 
Member States, in each of which there are I O equal-sized firms. 
Assuming none of these firms operated in more than one 
Member State, the EU would comprise 120 independent firms 
in total. However, if each firm operated in, say, four of the 
Member States, then there would be only 30 genuinely 
independent firms in the EU as a whole. This idea underpins 
what Davies and Lyons refer to as their first core 
decomposition in their ( 1996) study: 
HEU= HNAT* SPEC * NM (1) 
where HEU refers to EU concentration in a given industry, 
HNAT refers to the weighted average concentrations in that 
industry in individual Member States, NM is a measure of the 
extent of production across Member States by firms (referred to 
as intra-EU multinationality), and SPEC reflects the 
distribution of Member State sizes in that industry. All indices 
are derivatives of the Herfindahl index (although similar 
decompositions are also easily derived for other measures such 
as the Entropy.) This decomposition tells us that, for a given 
industry and set of Member State sizes, EU concentration will 
be higher, (a) the more concentrated is the industry within 
individual Member States, and (b) the higher is intra-EU 
multinationality. 
The second stage to the argument focuses on concentration 
within individual Member States, and how it relates to average 
business size. Any measure of concentration depends on two 
aspects of the size distribution of business units: their number, 
and the inequality in their sizes. Concentration will be higher, 
Efficiency and competition effects 
(a) the fewer firms there are (that is, for a given size of 
industry, the larger is mean size), and (b) the more unequal are 
their sizes. In the case of the Herfindahl index, this relationship 
can be formalized as: 
H = (s/S).I (2) 
where s is mean business size, S is aggregate industry size, and 
I measures the extent of size inequalities (more precisely, one 
plus the square of the coefficient of variation.) 
Now, if (2) describes the level of concentration in an individual 
Member State, a weighted average thereof defines the HNAT 
term in (1). 
Re-expressing the two equations in terms of rates of change 
over a given time period, and substituting (2) into (1), we can 
write: 
d(HEU) = d(HNAT) + d(SPEC) + d(NM 
d(HEU) = d(s) - d(S) + d(I) + d(SPEC) + d(N 
(3) 
(4) 
where the d(.) notation defines proportionate growth over the 
period, and s, S and I should now be thought of as 
(appropriately weighted) averages across the Member States in 
the growth rates of mean business size, industry size, and size 
inequalities. 
In words, equation ( 4) tells us that, in a given industry, EU 
concentration will increase where 1: 
mean business size grows more rapidly than industry size 
in Member States 
business size inequalities within individual Member States 
increase 
specialization (by Member State within the EU) increases 
intra-EU multinationality increases. 
1 Moreover. the first two factors. but not the last. will also increase typical 
national concentration. 
147 
Economic evaluation of the internal market 
Annex 3: The econometric analysis of price-cost 
margins 
Through increased competition, the single mar~et is expec_ted 
to benefit consumers. Rather than the cost savings resulting 
from reductions in the cost of trade and exploitation of 
economies of scale being retained by firms, it is hoped that they 
get passed on to consumers in the form of lower prices. 
If the internal market programme has had a pro-competitive 
effect (bringing firms in different Member States into direct 
competition where previously non-tariff barriers prevented this) 
then we would expect price-cost margins to be reduced. Most 
theories of firm behaviour in oligopolies predict that cost-price 
margins are negatively related to the number of firms in a 
market; we can interpret market integration as the unification of 
previously distinct markets and so an incr~ase_ in the ~umber of 
competing firms , with a consequent reduction m margins. 
The data for this exercise was drawn from the Eurostat survey 
of industrial production for the EU 12 for the period 1980-.9~. 
This was available at a highly disaggregated level; the 3-d1g1t 
NACE classification has 115 sectors. This gave a data set of 
about 8 OOO observations. Unfortunately, Spain and Portugal 
had to be dropped from the analysis due to insufficient data . 
148 
Fuller details of the data and reports of relevant econometric 
results are given in London Economics (1996). 
The analysis of London Economics has been carried out for two 
definitions of price-cost margins: 
m I = (value added - labour costs)/ value added 
m2 = (value added - labour costs)/ sales 
The first definition is often used in empirical studies examining 
the link between profitability and concentration. The second 
definition has also been used in empirical studies but less 
widely . However, it conforms more closely to the theoretical 
notion of a profit/sales ratio in the economic literature: (p-c) / p. 
In general, the results are not very sensitive to which definition 
is used. 
The average level of margins in shown in Graph A3. l below. 
A table of summary statistics from which this is drawn is given 
in London Economics (op. cit.). 1 It may be seen that there 
' Jn particular the data for 1992 correspond only to France and Denmark. 
appears to be a positive trend for the early 1980s, though 
average margins have fallen relative to this trend in the late 
1980s. However, margins move in response to the state of the 
economic cycle: there was a major upturn in the mid 1980s, 
preceded and followed by major recessions. We correct for this 
effect later on. 
The two different definitions of margins have rather different 
overall average levels: 44% for the measure Ml and 15% for 
M2. There is also significant cross-country variation in average 
margins for the whole sample period. The summary data 
presented in London Economics (op. cit., Annex 2) show that 
we can group the countries in the following way: 
• high margins: 
• medium margins: 
• low margins: 
Italy, Belgium; 
France, Netherlands, UK, Ireland; 
Germany, Luxembourg, 
Denmark, Greece. 
Interestingly, there is evidence that the cross-country dispersion 
in margins reduced over the sample period. Graph A3 .2 shows 
a plot of the cross-country variance in margins using the two 
measures for the period 1980-91. We do not show 1992 due to 
Efficiency and competition effects 
lack of data. The decline in cross-country dispersion happens 
from 1987. 
This would be consistent with the internal market programme 
having an equalizing effect. London Economics gives a formal 
statistical test of this decline in variance , and shows a 
statistically significant fall in variance at the end of the sample 
period. We take this as evidence of.an impact of the internal 
market programme (even if slightly lagged), which we would 
expect to lead to more similar economic outcomes across 
countries. 
Evolution of margins 
This section presents a summary of the way in which margins 
have changed over the period 1980-92 by type of sector 
following the classification introduced by Buigues et al. 
( 1990). 1 To make sense of the data it is necessary to c01Tect it at 
1 Buigues et al. ( 1990) establi sh 40 sectors which were particularly sensitive to 
the SMP. Wi1hin !his group, four types of sectors are di stingui shed: Group I 
(high tech public procurement sec1ors) . Groups 2 and 3 (traditional or 
regulated public procurement sectors) and Group 4 (products with moderale 
non-tariff barriers). 
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least for the influence of the economic cycle and for country 
and sector specific effects. This was done using a random 
effects regression using time dummies; the details of this 
analysis are reported in London Economics (op. cit. Annex 3). 
Separate time dummies were included for each type of sector, 
so that the evolution of margins could be charted for each 
sector separately. The results are summarized in Graphs A3.3 
to A3.6 which show deviations from a trend that captures the 
effects of the economic cycle and certain country and sector 
specific effects. 
This preliminary analysis of the behaviour of margins over time 
suggests the following conclusions: 
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There has been a general trend upwards in margins for the 
non-sensitive sectors over the whole sample period, but 
there has been a decline from 1988 to 1991. 
The behaviour of all sectors in 1992 seems rather 
anomalous. There is very little data for this year compared 
with previous years, so not too much should be read into 
this. 
Group 4 (products with moderate non-tariff barriers) have 
margins which are falling relative to the non-sensitive 
sectors, with this relative decline accelerating since 1988. 
Group 1 (hi tech public procurement sectors) have 
margins which are generally falling relative to the non-
sensitive sectors, but most of this decline occurred before 
1987. Since 1987, margins have risen for this group 
relative to the non-sensitive sectors, but subsequently 
fallen. 
Groups 2 and 3 (traditional or regulated public 
procurement sectors) have margins which first fell relative 
to the non-sensitive sectors, but have since risen. 
Measuring the impact of the internal market 
programme 
We now consider whether it is possible to identify any impact 
of the internal market programme on margins from the data. 
This begs the question of how to model the impact of the 
internal market programme. Rather than being a ' step' change, 
the internal market programme has been a rolling sequence of 
incremental measures throughout the period 1986-92. Without 
identifying the time at which a particular measure became 
effective and which sectors it affected, we must use a simple 
proxy. 
We have investigated the use of two alternatives which are 
illustrated by (see also Graph A3.7): 
• a ramped policy variable with an impact starting in 1986; 
a 'delayed impact' policy variable with an impact starting 
in 1987. 
These policy variables were included in regressions along with 
variable for economic cycle, country specific effects and trend. 
The policy variables were interacted with dummies for each 
sensitive group and for 'non-sensitive' sectors, allowing the 
total impact of the policy to be assessed for each group. Sector 
specific effects were modelled in a number of alternative ways 
as fixed and random effects. The details of these regressions are 
shown in London Economics (op. cit. Annex 3). 
We find that we may draw the following conclusions from 
these regressions: 
• There is very significant evidence of the internal market 
programme reducing margins in the non-sensitive sectors 
and Group 4 even if we assume that there was a impact of 
the policy from 1986. 
There is even stronger evidence of a policy impact on the 
non-sensitive sectors and Group 4 if we suppose, as seems 
reasonable, that there was a short delay of one year before 
! the internal market programme affected firm behaviour. 
There is significant evidence that there was a larger policy 
impact on Group 4 than on the non-sensitive sectors using 
the definition of margins M 1, but not using M2. 
We would estimate (using the delayed impact) the overall 
impact of the internal market programme to be as given 
by the following table: 
Table A3.1 
Impact on price-cost margins 
Efficiency and competition effects 
The internal market programme does not appear to have 
affected margins in Groups 2 and 3: they rose at the time 
of implementation of the programme. This may be 
understandable if the measures affecting these groups 
where adopted relatively later in the sample period. There 
is significant evidence that there has been less policy 
impact for these sectors than for the non-sensitive sectors. 
The evidence for Group 1 is unfortunately lacking. The 
sign of the policy impact for this sector depends on the 
margin definition and is in neither case significantly 
different from zero. On the other hand there is no 
evidence that margins evolved differently for this group 
than for the non-sensitive sectors. We cannot determine 
with confidence what has happened to margins for Group 
1 on the basis of the available data. 
Analysis of advertising- and research-intensive 
industries 
The data allows the application of an alternative industry 
classification (see Box 2) which distinguishes between 
homogenous goods industries and those that are characterized 
by heavy expenditure on advertising and R&D. The regressions 
used the following dummy variables: 
A = advertising intensive dummy 
R = research intensive dummy 
AR= both advertising and research intensive dummy. 
The results show that advertising-intensive sectors have had a 
significantly smaller impact from integration than those sectors 
which are neither advertising- nor R&D-intensive. This finding 
is consistent with the hypothesis that in enlarged markets for 
differentiated goods such as branded consumer goods 
Average level of margin 
across EU in sample period 
Policy impact on 
non-sensitive sectors 
Policy impact 
on Group 4 
Margin definition MI 
Margin definition M2 
44.1% 
15.2% 
-0.7% per annum 
-0.2% per annum 
-0.9% per annum 
-0.2% per annum 
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advertising expenditure is a relatively more important strategic 
variable than in smaller more protected markets. In the sense 
that advertising spending can be considered endogenous sunk 
costs this requires increased margins. Alternatively this finding 
may indicate that markets served by advertising-intensive 
industries have become more concentrated and sustain higher 
price-cost margins. With both explanations, integration 
suggests a differential response in advertising-intensive 
industries which is worth taking note of. 
Summary 
The analysis of price-cost margins presented here shows a 
significant impact of integration. This is of considerable interest 
since it shows a direct measure of competition being affected 
by integration, rather than looking at indirect measures (such as 
trade flows, price dispersion, etc.). Although we cannot ascribe 
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the fall in margins for some sectors since 1986 to the effects of 
integration with certainty, the timing of this fall strongly 
suggests that integration measures are the cause: the response 
in margins followed with a short lag after the start of the 
internal market programme. 
Interestingly, not all sectors have been affected equally. The 
sensitive sectors in Group 4 have been most affected by 
integration, the non-sensitive sectors have been affected, but 
somewhat less. Groups 2 and 3 appear not to have been 
significantly affected by integration. The data does not allow us 
to identify what has happened to the Group I sectors. This 
accords with some, but not all, of the original expectations of 
Buigues et al. Group 4 includes sectors which are traded and 
had moderate non-tariff barriers, so should have experienced an 
impact from integration. The lack of an impact for Groups 2 
and 3 supports that the internal market programme has not 
affected public procurement markets, despite the expectations 
of Buigues et al. 
Annex 4: Price convergence in the EU 
4.1. Price convergence and exchange rates 
The first section of this appendix examines to which extent the 
convergence/divergence patterns observed for broad categories 
of products and services from 1990 to 1993 could have 
reflected the volatile developments occurring on the European 
exchange rates front in late 1992 and 1993. This period was 
characterized by the strong devaluation of the currency of five 
out of the I OEMS Members, most notably the peseta, the lira 
and the pound sterling, having as a consequence for the lira and 
the sterling their departure from the EMS system. In particular, 
it can be suggested that the price convergence trend observed at 
the EU level for certain goods could have been substantially 
driven by these currency devaluations as they might have 
pushed down prices from 1990 to 1993 in the countries where 
such devaluations occurred. 
In order to eliminate any possible exchange rate effects on 
price convergence/divergence trends, coefficients of price 
variation in 1993 were calculated using price indices from 
which the variation of EU countries' currencies against the ecu 
from 1990 to 1993 was excluded. This procedure was applied 
to all product/service categories for each of the 12 EU member 
countries in 1993. For example, price indices in 1993 for Italy 
were increased by 20.1 %, which represents the lira's 
deyaluation in percentage terms against the ecu from 1990 to 
1993. These price indices corrected for nominal exchange rate 
variations were then used to calculate new price dispersion 
coefficients in 1993. 
Table A4. l compares, for the broad product/service categories 
in 1993, the coefficients of price dispersion calculated in this 
report with the price dispersion coefficients adjusted for 
exchange rate fluctuations. It reveals that the price 
convergence/divergence patterns from 1990 to 1993 for broad 
categories were not affected by the adjustment procedure. 
Categories that were characterized by a price convergence still 
conform to that trend. The same holds for categories that have 
followed a price divergence pattern, i.e. the correction did not 
alter the trend. 
4.2. The econometric analysis of price convergence 
The impact of EU integration on price dispersion across 
countries is very complex. Not only structural but also 
behavioural and policy factors interact in determining the 
degree of price disparity at the EU level. 
The objective of this econometric analysis is to shed some light 
on the relative importance of various factors in explaining the 
observed dispersion of prices across product categories. 
Efficiency and competition effects 
Table A4.1 
Coefficients of price variation for selected groupings: actual 
versus adjusted for exchange rate movements, 1993 
1990 1993 1993 
(actual) (adjusted) 
EU6 
Consumer goods 13.5 12.4 13.0 
Services 20.0 21.3 21.5 
Energy 19.4 24.3 25.7 
Equipment goods 11.6 12.5 14.5 
Construction 14.0 19.1 16.2 
EU9 
Consumer goods 20.3 18.0 17.7 
Services 24.6 23.4 22.6 
Energy 24.7 30.6 29.0 
Equipment goods 12.2 12.9 14.6 
Construction 16.5 22.4 18.4 
EU 12 
Consumer goods 22.8 19.6 19.6 
Services 31.8 28.6 26.5 
Energy 28.0 31.7 29.7 
Equipment goods 13.1 14.5 18.0 
Construction 23.5 27.4 24.1 
Several hypotheses have been tested: 
(a) To what extent are the effects of the internal market 
programme already strong enough and sufficiently 
diffused as to induce a shift in the estimated parameters 
over the period 1980-93? 
(b) To what extent is the distinction between, on the one 
hand, markets characterized by exogenous sunk costs 
(homogeneous or horizontally differentiated product 
markets) and, on the other hand, markets characterized by 
endogenous sunk costs (vertically differentiated product 
markets) validated by the empirical estimation? 
(c) To what extent do markets characterized by moderate or 
high NTBs behave differently from markets characterized 
by low NTBs? 
(d) What is the respective role of barriers to the arbitrage 
process, of the nature of competition in the market and 
intensity of competition in explaining the observed 
dispersion of prices? 
The dependent variable in the econometric regressions is the 
coefficient of variation of the price indices inclusive of taxes at 
the EU 9 level. 
Three groups of explanatory variables are considered. 
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The first one includes the structural and quantifiable policy 
factors affecting the arbitraging process: 
(a) The disparity in fiscal policy across the EU countries 
(CV AT) is measured by the coefficient of variation of the 
VAT rates applied in each country. 
(b) The disparity of demand across EU countries 
(CWEIGHT) is measured by the coefficient of variation of 
the shares of national consumption of the product 
considered in total national consumption. 
(c) The existence of non-tariff barriers (NTB) is measured by 
a variable which takes the value O if non-tariff barriers are 
low, the value 1 if non-tariff barriers are moderate and the 
value 2 if non-tariff barriers are high. This information is 
available at the NACE three digit level. 1 
These three variables are expected to exert a positive impact on 
the price dispersion across countries. 
The second group of variables includes variables describing the 
nature of competition in each market. These variables, which 
are supposed to describe structural characteristics of the 
market, do not vary over time. This means that we do not take 
into account changes in these structural characteristics resulting 
from strategic adaptation to a new competitive environment. 
Furthermore, due to lack of data, we had, for some variables, to 
rely on national data. The hypothesis we have then to make is 
that the variation across product categories at the EU 9 level is 
the same as the variation observed at national level. 
This second group of variables includes: 
(a) The importance of exogenous sunk costs (Messize), 
measured by the extent of economies of scale relative to 
the size of the market. This proxy has been calculated, on 
the basis of UK data, as the share of the minimum 
efficient size in the value of production. The minimum 
efficient size is the average size of the largest plants 
accounting for 50% of the value of production. 
(b) The importance of endogenous sunk costs (ADY), 
measured by the ratio of advertising to sales in France in 
1990. 
(c) The extent of vertical differentiation (ASHCDV), 
measured for each product category by the EU 9 average 
in 1993 of the shares of vertically differentiated trade in 
intra-EU imports." 
1 This variable comes from Buigucs. P. and llkovitz, A. ( 1988), 'The sectoral 
impact of the internal market'. Commission of the European Communities 
document, vol. 2. No 335. 
This variable has been kindly supplied by CEPII. 
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The expected impact of the importance of economies of scale is 
ambiguous, as discussed in DRI (op. cit.). High economies of 
scale limit the number of firms active in a market. They can 
induce firms to standardize their production and increase the 
geographic market in which they sell in order to better exploit 
these economies of scale. However, when cooperative 
behaviour is sustained by high transport costs or by a protective 
regulatory environment, dispersion of prices between markets 
will persist over time. 
The expected impact of ADY is positive as it measures the 
extent of brand competition and hence consumer inertia 
between suppliers. 
The extent of vertically differentiated intra-industry trade 
(ASHCDV) is also expected to increase price dispersion across 
countries as it reveals competition based on quality rather than 
price alone. 
The third group of variables includes variables describing the 
extent of competition in each product category: 
(a) Intra-EU import penetration (INTRA) is the share of intra-
EU imports in total EU apparent consumption (sales 
minus exports plus imports) at the NACE three digit level. 
(b) Extra-EU import penetration (EXTRA) is the share of 
extra-EU imports in total apparent consumption. Measures 
of import penetration at the level of our product 
classification have been calculated as the ratio of imports 
for the relevant products divided by total consumption 
expenditures on these products (TMINTRA and 
TMEXTRA). However, without information on the share 
of imports which goes to final consumption, these ratios 
exceed the true penetration level in several cases, such as 
sugar, dried vegetables or fruits, fats, tyres, etc. These 
ratios even take values higher than 100 for some products. 
(c) C4FR is the share in total sales of the four largest firms in 
France in 1990 at the NAP600 level. 
(d) C5UK is the share of the five leading firms in total sales in 
the UK in 1990 at the NACE three digit level. 
(e) HEU is a proxy for concentration at the EU leveP 
measured by the Herfindhal index at the NACE three digit 
level. 
(f) A proxy for multinationalization in a given industry, 3 is 
measured as the weighted average of the degrees of 
' See Davies, S. and Lyons, B. (op. cit.). 
multinationality for constituent firms in each NACE three 
digit industry. 
INTRA and EXTRA are expected to decrease price disparity 
across EU countries as they reveal the extent of competitive 
pressure associated with the presence of foreign suppliers. 
The expected impact of national degrees of concentration is 
difficult to predict. Ideally, one should have introduced a 
variable measuring the disparity in national concentration 
degrees. Differences in the published indices at the national 
level (C4 in France, C3 or C6 in Germany, C5 in the UK) and 
in the classification used (NAP600 for France, SYPRO 4 digit 
for Germany and NACE 3 digit for the UK), however, 
prevented the construction of such a variable. 
The correlation coefficient between C4FR and C5UK is equal 
to .73, revealing that the ranking of product categories 
according to the degree of concentration is quite similar 
between these two countries. We tried both variables as C4FR 
is available at a more detailed level than C5UK. 
High degrees of concentration reveal the existence of potential 
market power in the national market and hence ability to price 
discriminate. High degree of concentration might, however, 
when preferences are biased towards national production, also 
increase the cost of entry for foreign suppliers. 
Concentration at the European level, on the other hand, 
suggests high mutual recognition between the players. 
As these concentration variables are measured in one specific 
year, we do not take into account consolidation processes 
which may have been under way in some markets, partly in 
anticipation to the single market. One example of such market 
restructuring is detailed in the white goods case study .1 
The extent of multinationality in a given sector reveals the 
ability of firms to organize themselves on a pan-European 
basis. The impact on price disparity can be positive or negative 
depending on whether firms choose to exploit the differences 
among markets (by selling the same product under different 
brand names) or to exploit the economies of scale by adopting a 
uniform marketing approach across the EU countries. 
Furthermore, an extensive presence of multinationals also 
questions the competitive pressure associated with the rate of 
import penetration, as these imports could mainly be intra-firm 
trade. 
1 Whilst 150 white goods producers supplied 3/4 of the market in 1985. 15 
international groups controlled 80'7c by 1990 and seven groups had 86% by 
1995. This consolidation which occurred essentially through acquisitions. is 
driven by economics of scale, just-in-time logistics and consolidation of 
component supply. 
Efficiency and competition effects 
Tests of the stability of the coefficients over time allow us to 
pool the data." This indicates that the completion of the internal 
market has not had such an effect as leading to coefficients 
significantly different in the more recent years as compared 
with the beginning of the period. Depending on the set of 
explanatory variables, the sample covers between 253 and 316 
observations concerning only consumer goods products.' About 
one third of the observed variance of the dependent variable is 
explained by the independent variables. 
Results of the econometric analysis 
Table A4.2. presents the results for the whole sample. Disparity 
in fiscal policies (CV AT) and in consumer preferences 
(CWEIGHT) as well as the existence of non-tariff barriers 
(NTBs) exert, as expected, a significant positive impact on 
price disparity across EU countries. The importance of 
disparity in consumer preferences is approximately twice as 
high as the importance of disparity in fiscal policies.4 
Among the variables describing the nature of competition, 
vertical differentiation (ASHCDV) exerts a significant positive 
impact on price disparity, whose importance is similar to the 
importance of the disparity in preferences variable. 
The coefficient of the economies of scale variable (MESSIZE) 
is also positive but not always significant. The importance of 
the advertising to sales ratio significantly leads to increased 
price dispersion across EU countries only when the import 
penetration variables are not included in the specification.5 
Among the variables describing the extent of competition, there 
are two which tend to decrease significantly the price disparity 
across the EU. These are the rate of import penetration, either 
from other EU countries (INTRA) or from countries outside the 
EU (EXTRA), as well as the extent of multinationalization (M). 
On the other hand, the degree of national concentration, 
measured either by C4FR or C5UK, exerts a significant 
positive impact on price disparity (implying that high degrees 
of national concentration are associated with high price 
disparities across the EU). 
According lo the specification, the F test lakes a value which varies between 
1.04 and 1.11. This value is well below the significance level, indicating that 
allowing the coefficients lo vary over time docs not improve significantly the 
results of the estimation. Distinguishing between 1980 and 1985, on the one 
hand. and 1990 and 1993, on the other hand. also leads lo the conclusion that 
the coefficients do not differ significantly between these two periods (F=l .33 
or 1.35). This is not really surprising as the speed of adjustments lo the 
internal market situation varies between markets. 
1 Price indices for equipment goods and construction goods are net of VAT. 
Furthermore. competition in these markets obeys different rules than those 
observed in consumer goods markets. due lo differences in the buying side of 
the market and in the importance of regulatory policies. 
' Except when TM INTRA and TMEXTRA are used as indicators of foreign 
competitive pressure. 
' Or when TMINTRA or TMEXTRA are used as indicators of import 
penetration ratios. 
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Table A4.2 
Regression analysis of price disparity across the EU 9 
(I) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Constant 2.0 2.8 5.9 5.1 1.9 2.4 6.3 5.3 0.73 1.07 
(0.8) (I.I) (1.9)* (1.9)* (0.8) ( 1.0) (2.2)* (2.1 )* (.3) (0.4) 
CVAT 0.058 0.065 0.053 0.052 0.080 0.080 0.080 0.076 0.096 0.097 
(3.8)** (4.4)** (3.4)** (3.4)** (4.7)** (5.0)** (4.4)** (4.4)** (5.7)** (5.8)** 
CWEIGHT 0.130 0.129 0.135 0.135 0.120 0.121 0.125 0.124 0.104 0.102 
(7.2)** (7.1)** (7.4)** (7.4)** (6.5)** (6.5)** (6.7)** (6.7)** (5.1)** (5.1 )** 
ASHDV 0.139 0.131 0.112 0.117 0.135 0.129 0.125 0.108 0.117 0.116 
(4.4)** (4.2)** (3.5)** (3.8)** (4.3)** (4.1)** (3.2)** (3.5 )** (3.5 )** (3.5)** 
MESSIZE 0.367 0.329 0.136 0.163 0.389 0.313 0.136 0.185 0.103 0.117 
(2.0)* ( 1.8) (0.8) (I.I) (2.2)* ( 1.8) (0.8) ( 1.2) (0.6) (0.7) 
ADY 0.217 0.218 0.138 0.155 0.179 0.194 0.123 0.146 0.463 0.445 
( 1.5) ( 1.5) (0.9) ( 1.0) ( 1.1) ( 1.2) (0.7) (0.9) (3.1 )** (3.0)** 
EXTRA -0.097 -0.115 --0.116 -0.126 
(-2.3)* (-2.9)** (-3.0)** (-3.3)** 
INTRA -0.203 -0.180 --0.221 -0.189 
(3.1 )** (-3.9)** (-3.4)** (-3.9)** 
TMEXTRA -0.009 
(-.23) 
TMINTRA --0.032 
(-.73) 
M -0.048 -0.061 -0.054 -0.049 --0.069 -0.082 -0.073 -0.065 -0.095 --0.095 
(-1.7) (-2.3)** (-1.9)* (-1.8) (-2.2)* (-2.7)** (-2.3)** (-2.2)* (-2.8)** (-2.7)** 
HEU -0.301 0.148 --0.280 0.208 
(-1.4) (0.5) (-1.3) (.7) 
C4FR 0.067 0.060 0.066 0.069 0.065 0.066 
(2.7)** (2.5)** (2.6)** (2.8)** (2.5)** (2.6)** 
C5UK 0.066 0.05 0.075 0.080 
( 1.8) ( 1.4) (2.2)* (2.5)** 
NTB 1.62 1.40 1.18 1.29 1.79 1.59 1.34 1.51 2.11 2.13 
(2.3)** (2.1)* (0.5) (1.9)* (2.5)** (2.3)** ( 1.8) (2.2)* (2.9)** (2.9)** 
N 310 310 308 308 298 298 296 296 253 253 
F 14.5 15.8 15.0 16.7 
ADJR2 0.30 0.30 0.31 0.31 
Source: DRI. 
In a second step, the sample has been split in two groups of 
markets. The first one includes the markets where non-tariff 
barriers have been estimated to be low (NTB=O) whilst the 
second group covers the markets where non-tariff barriers have 
been estimated to be moderate or high (NTB>O). 
F tests of homogeneity of the coefficients between the two 
subsamples show that these coefficients are significantly 
different between the two subsamples. 1 The results of the 
estimations in this case are presented in Table A4.3. 
1 These tests take values between 3.03 and 3.97, depending on the variables 
introduced in the specification, values which are largely above the 
significance level at 1 %. 
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13.9 15.2 14.2 15.7 12 12.1 
0.30 0.30 0.31 0.31 0.28 0.28 
The main differences between the two types of sectors are the 
following: in markets in which NTBs are low, disparity in 
preferences and the share of vertically differentiated intra-
industry trade in the EU exert a positive impact on price 
dispersion, whilst disparity in fiscal policies has a very low 
impact and national concentration no significant impact at all. 
On the other hand, in markets characterized by moderate or 
high NTBs, disparity in fiscal policies and national 
concentration both exert a significant positive impact on price 
disparity, whilst the coefficient of the disparity in preferences 
variable is not significant. 
This confirms that when non-tariff barriers are ineffective. 
national structures and regulations lose their effectiveness. 
Objective factors such as disparity in preferences or vertical 
Efficiency and competition effects 
Table A4.3 
Regression analysis of price disparity across the EU 9 
NTB=O NTB>O 
(I) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Constant 1.7 4.5 3.3 7.0 3.0 10.2 -0.01 2.9 
(0.5) ( 1.0) ( 1.0) ( 1.8) (0.7) (1.9)* (-0.02) (0.5) 
CVAT 0.039 0.035 0.046 0.042 0.134 0.120 0.189 0.183 
(1.8)* ( 1.6) (2.0)* (1.8)* (4.4)** (3.9)** (5.9)** (5.6)** 
CWEIGHT 0.154 0.159 0.142 0.147 0.018 0.036 0.004 0.007 
(6.9)** (7. I)** (6.4)** (6.5)** (0.5) ( 1.0) (0.1) (0.2) 
ASHDV 0.151 0.128 0.140 0.109 0.087 0.059 0.152 0.133 
(3.6)** (2.8)** (3.3)** (2.5)** ( 1.5) (0.8) (2.4 )** (1.9)* 
MESSIZE 0.332 0.107 0.473 0.201 -0.275 0.168 -0.237 -0.358 
(1.4) (0.6) (2.3)* (I.I) (-0.5) (0.3) (-0.5) (-0.6) 
ADY 0.036 0.006 -0.015 -0.046 0.517 -0.017 0.983 0.817 
(0.2) (0.1) (-0.1) (-0.2) (1.2) (-0.1) (2.4)** (1.8) 
EXTRA -0.101 -0.140 0.021 -0.015 
(-1.3) (-1.9)* (0.3) (-0.3) 
INTRA -.161 -0.203 -0.179 -0.096 
(-1.6) (-2.0)* (-1.7) (-0.9) 
M -0.049 -0.050 -0.045 -0.036 -0.007 -0.036 -0.071 -0.077 
(-1.1) (-1.1) (-0.9) (-0.8) (-0.1) (-0.8) (-1.7) (-1.7) 
HEU 0.487 0.775 0.586 0.909 -0.794 -0.436 -0.511 -0.205 
(1.3) ( 1.7) ( 1.5) (1.9)* (-2.1)* (-0.9) (-1.6) (-0.5) 
C4FR .033 .033 0.148 0.143 
( 1.0) ( 1.0) 
C5UK 0.070 0.070 
(1.4) ( 1.6) 
n r 184 184 176 176 
F 8.6 8.8 7.6 
adj R2 0.27 0.28 0.25 
Source: ORI. 
differentiation are then the driving factors explaining the 
observed price disparity. 
A third step has been to split the sample between homogeneous 
and horizontally differentiated goods and goods differentiated 
on the basis of intensity in R&D and advertising expenditures 
(as a proxy for vertically differentiated goods) (Table A4.4.). 
F tests of homogeneity of the coefficients between the two 
subsamples show that the coefficients are significantly different 
between the two subsamples. 1 
In this case, disparities in fiscal policy and in preferences exert 
the same positive effect on price dispersion in the two 
subsamples. ASHCDV, on the other hand, exerts a positive and 
1 These tests lake values between 1.85 and 2.55. depending on the variables 
introduced in the specification. values which arc above the significance level 
al I '7r for the specifications including C5UK and above the 5% significance 
level for the specifications including C4FR. 
7.7 
0.26 
(4.1 )** (3.7)** 
0.194 0.152 
(2.7)** (2.5)** 
126 124 122 120 
12.3 12.7 13.4 13.7 
0.45 0.46 0.48 0.49 
significant impact only in the markets that are not intensive in 
research or advertising. Markets which show a discrepancy 
between the observed and the estimated dispersion of prices 
higher than .10 in two years or more are the following: fresh 
and frozen fish, other seafood, books. 
Differentiating further among the markets of differentiated 
products by considering separately the markets which are both 
research and advertising intensive, 2 confirms the differences 
between these two types of markets (Table A4.5.). 
In markets which are both research and advertising intensive, 
more than 70% of the variance of the dependent variable is 
explained by the explanatory variables. However, severe 
multicollinearity problems·1 affect the standard errors of the 
' The F tests on the splilling in three groups lake values between 3.1 and 3.9. 
above the significance level al I '7r. 
' The correlation between INTRA and MESSIZE. INTRA and HEU and HEU 
and MESSIZE is higher than .90! 
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Table A4.4 
Regression analysis of price disparity across the EU 9 
Non intensive in R&D or ADV Intensive in ADV and/or R&D 
(l) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Constant -11.9 -10.4 -5.7 -8.7 1.58 8.36 5.0 11.7 
(-1.4) (-1.5) (-1.1) (-1.4) (0.3) ( 1.5) ( 1.3) (2.7)** 
CVAT 0.075 0.081 0.089 0.107 0.057 0.061 0.075 0.079 
(2.5)** (2.2)* (2.4)** (2.5)** (2.9)** (3.1)** (3.4)** (3.6)** 
CWEIGHT 0.060 0.064 0.069 0.063 0.133 0.138 0.126 0.132 
(2.0)* (1.9)* (2.1 )* ( 1.8) (5.5)** (5.7)** (5.1)** (5.3)** 
ASHDV 0.409 0.400 0.336 0.369 0.031 0.004 0.036 0.001 
(3.8)** (4.0)** (3.9)** (3.8)** (0.7) (0.1) (0.8) (0.1) 
MESSIZE 1.269 1.336 1.309 1.464 0.558 0.273 0.710 0.237 
(1.9)* ( 1.9)* ( 1.9) (2.0)* (2.0)* ( 1.1) (2.4)** (0.8) 
ADV -0.951 -0.892 -0.490 -0.650 0.271 0.125 0.165 0.027 
(-0.95) (-0.92) (-0.49) (-0.65) (1.58) (0.69) (0.94) (0.14) 
EXTRA 0.039 -.0020 -0.082 -0.145 
(0.37) (-0.02) (-1.36) (-3.20)** 
INTRA 0.044 0.099 -0.258 -0.336 
(0.31) (0.69) (-2.5)** (-3.9)** 
M 0.196 0.148 0.062 0.038 -3.780 -0.055 -0.062 -0.073 
( 1.2) ( 1.0) (0.5) (0.3) (0-.8) (-1.2) (-1.4) (-1.7) 
HEU -7.600 -7.140 -6.650 -8.180 -0.325 0.426 -0.192 0.703 
(-1.3) (-1.3) (-1.0) (-1.2) (-1.3) (l.Ol (-0.8) (1.9)* 
C4FR 0.056 0.073 0.059 0.036 
(0.5) (0.6) ( 1.9)* ( 1.2) 
C5UK 0.159 0.110 0.103 0.075 
(0.9) (0.7) ( 1.7) ( 1.4) 
NTB 1.500 1.110 0.870 -0.436 2.010 1.180 1.890 0.950 
(0.6) (0.4) (0.3) (-.0.1) (2.4)** ( 1.3) (2.2)* ( 1.0) 
N 108 108 104 104 202 200 194 192 
F 5.9 5.9 5.2 5.3 11.8 12.4 10.7 11.5 
ADJR2 0.31 0.31 0.29 0.29 0.35 0.36 0.34 0.35 
Source: DR!. 
estimates and hence the significance level of several 
coefficients. 
In markets which are either research or advertising intensive, 
disparity of fiscal policies is not significant but disparity of 
preferences exert a positive and significant impact, in line with 
the suggestion that some of these markets are horizontally 
differentiated markets. The coefficients of the import 
penetration variables, when significant, are negative. Among 
these markets, the following show a discrepancy between the 
observed and the estimated dispersion of prices higher than .10 
in two years or more: preserved milk, cocoa, condiments and 
sauces, mineral waters, alcoholic beverages. orthopaedic and 
therapeutic appliances and products. 
Disparity of fiscal policies and the rate of imports coming from 
extra-EU countries exert a significant positive impact on the 
price dispersion whilst economies of scale have a negative 
impact. On the other hand, disparity of preferences have no 
significant impact. The positive impact of imports corning from 
outside the EU suggests that, in these types of markets, imports 
being essentially of an intra-firm type do not increase the 
competitive pressure. The negative impact of economies of 
scale might reflect the incentive to adopt pan-European 
marketing strategies in order to exploit better these economies 
of scale. 1 
1 See 'The white goods', case study of DR! (volume II). 
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In conclusion, the results of the regressions suggest: 
(a) That objective factors, such as structural factors hindering 
the arbitraging process or leading to a competitive process 
based more on quality than on price, explain a significant 
part of the variation in price disparity in the EU 9 across 
product categories. Concentration in national markets 
Efficiency and competition effects 
Table A4.5 
Regression analysis of price disparity across the EU 9 
Intensive in R&D or ADY Intensive in ADY and/or R&D 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Constant -3.8 -3.8 13.7 16.8 18.2 35.9 18.2 8.1 
(-0.4) (-0.4) (2.3)* (2.6)** (0.6) ( 1.1) (2.7)** ( 1.3) 
CYAT -0.019 -0.016 0.030 0.052 0.202 0.219 0.217 0.235 
(-0.4) (-0.3) (0.6) ( 1.2) (8.4)** (9.0)** ( 10.8)** (11.3)* 
CWEIGHT 0.176 0.175 0.162 0.158 0.032 0.032 0.058 0.054 
(5.8)** (5.8)** (5.0)** (5.0)** ( 1.0) ( 1.1) ( 1.8) ( 1.7) 
ASHDV 0.046 0.040 -0.068 -0.117 0.010 -0.023 0.076 0.036 
(0.5) (0.4) (-0.9) (-1.5) (0.2) (-0.5) ( 1.6) (0.6) 
MESSIZE 0.357 0.179 1.222 0.448 -2.340 -5.68 -2.23 -3.200 
(0.8) (0.6) (2.7)** ( 1.1) (-1.3) (-2.5)** (-2.8)** (-2.9)** 
ADY 0.600 0.582 0.188 0.076 0.038 0.979 0.233 0.316 
(2.0)* (1.9)* (0.7) (0.3) (0.5) ( 1.2) (0.9) ( 1.1) 
EXTRA -.0680 -0.258 0.153 0.125 
(-0.6) (-2.7)** (2.3)* ( 1.9)* 
INTRA -0.071 -0.369 0.057 0.090 
(-0.4) (-2.9)** (0.6) ( 1.0) 
M 0.002 0.016 -0.168 -0.147 -.1510 -0.239 -0.242 -0.076 
(0.1) (0.1) (-1.5) (-1.3) (-0.5) (-0.8) (-4.5)** (-1.0) 
HEU 0.239 5.170 -0.559 1.990 0.186 3.460 0.075 1.168 
(0.3) (0.5) (0.6) (2.2)* (0.1) (1.8) (.21) ( 1.3) 
C4FR 0.007 0.032 0.083 0.059 
(0.1) (0.7) (2.3 )* ( 1.5) 
C5UK 0.228 0.235 0.098 -0.290 
(2.6)** (2.5)** (0.3) (-0.8) 
NTB -0.420 -0.680 -0.090 -1.100 0.950 4.050 0.706 3.680 
(-0.3) (-0.5) (-0.1) (-0.8) 
N 128 128 120 120 
F 8.1 8.0 6.2 
ADJR2 0.36 0.35 0.31 
Source: DR!. 
favours price disparity whilst internationalization of the 
markets either through import penetration or through the 
presence of multinational firms tends to decrease price 
disparity. Finally, the existence of high or moderate non-
tariff barriers leads to a higher dispersion of prices across 
countries. 
(b) That the effects of the internal market have either not been 
strong enough or have been too concentrated over a short 
period (or have not been realized yet) to translate into a 
significant shift in the estimated parameters over the 
period considered. 
(c) That the theoretical distinction between markets 
characterized by endogenous sunk costs and the other 
types of markets is validated by the data. 
(d) That markets characterized by moderate or high NTBs 
behave differently than markets where these NTBs are 
6.4 
0.31 
(0.4) (1.6) (0.4) ( 1.5) 
74 72 74 72 
18.1 20.5 20.2 21.2 
0.70 0.73 0.72 0.74 
considered to be low. National concentration increases 
significantly price dispersion only in the former. 
The completion of the internal market, following the 
elimination of non-tariff barriers between EU countries, will 
hence lead to a higher degree of price convergence between 
countries as far as it promotes the competitive pressure by 
imports and decreases the disparity in consumers preferences 
between countries. 
There are a number of remaining potentially important 
explanatory factors which could not be included in the 
estimation. With the exception of transport costs, the factors 
which could not be included are mainly behavioural and policy 
factors. Among the factors mentioned in the theoretical 
approach and in the case studies developed by DRI ( op. cit.), 
the following ones could play a significant role in explaining 
observed price disparities: asymmetries between firms, mergers 
and acquisitions, nature and evolution of the distribution 
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structure and disparity in policy regulations. Some of these 
have been examined in more detail through the case studies 
presented in DRI (op. cit.). 
Asymmetries between firms based on historical events (such as 
in the European cola beverages market) or on strategic 
behaviour (such as in the ready-to-eat cereals market) may 
prevent arbitraging from taking place. Strategic reactions, 
driven by the anticipation of the completion of the internal 
market and leading to the consolidation of market structures 
through mergers and acquisitions and the dominance by a few 
big players, could also decrease the ability for buyers to engage 
in arbitraging. Changes in the structure of distribution (mainly 
162 
through the creation of buying networks at the EU level) could, 
on the other hand, increase the power of retailers and allow 
them to profitably engage in arbitraging. 
The case studies undertaken by DRI (1996) suggest that there 
are remaining policy factors segmenting the markets, either 
because of differences in regulations (e.g. the product definition 
in the mineral water market varies between countries) or 
because of different degrees of stringency in their application 
( e.g. environmental regulation). Further harmonization of EU 
regulations and a stricter monitoring of implementation could 
help reduce such segmentation and favour pan-Europeanization 
of markets. 
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Chapter 6 
Income and employment effects 
6.1. Introduction 
The previous three chapters provided an analysis of the main 
ways in which the SMP impacted on different segments of the 
European economy . This predominantly microeconomic 
analysi s produced many interesting results which provide 
evidence about the changes to the EU economy set in motion 
by the SMP. In thi s chapter, we attempt to put together these 
different elements so as to furnish a coherent ex-post 
quantitative macroeconomic assessment of the SMP. 
Providing an ex-post quantitative macroeconomic assessment 
of the SMP is a difficult task for both methodological and 
empirical reasons. 
Quantification of the SMP effect raises the anti-monde 
problem, i.e. estimating what the world would have looked like 
in the absence of the SMP. There are several possible methods 
for tackling this problem , each with its own advantages and 
disadvantages. Based on the recommendation of Baldwin and 
Venables (1994 ), the method adopted here is the simulated 
anti-111011de, which involves simulating highly complex models 
oftthe economy. 
Two types of model s can be used for simulating the anti-
monde: macro mode ls and computable general equilibrium 
(CGE) models. The advantage of macro models for simulating 
the anti-111011de is that they are specially designed to evaluate 
macro variables such as income and employment. The inherent 
weakn ess of thi s approach , however, is the difficulty of 
introducing the firs t-round impact of a fundamentally 
microeconomic phenomena, such as the SMP, on intermediate 
macro variables. This entails the risk of inconsistency between 
model inputs. Macro models were used in the Cecchini report 
for estimating the ex-ante impact of the SMP. Using modified 
vers ions of the EC Hermes and OECD interlink models , the 
Cecchini report estimated that the completion of the internal 
market had the pote ntial of rai s ing, in the medium term 
(technically defined as six years), the level of GDP by 
somewhere between 3.2 to 5 .7% above the level that would 
prevail in the absence of the SMP. 
The main advantages of CGE models are that they are based on 
clear microeconomic foundations and trace the effects of policy 
changes on the whole economy in a consistent fashion. These 
mode ls take into account the cons traint imposed by the 
avail ability of factors of production on the sectoral allocation of 
resources . For instance , they recognize that the expansion of 
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economic activity which may be implied by the SMP in some 
sectors may be constrained by the availability of scarce 
production factors used in other sectors . On the other hand, the 
sectoral disaggregation of CGE models implies a heavy data 
requirement that may stretch actual availability. Computable 
general equilibrium models have become the main instrument 
in ex-ante evaluation of microeconomic policy reforms. They 
have been used by several authors (after publication of the 
Cecchini report) for estimating the potential effect of the SMP. 
Estimates for the level of GDP range between 0.5 and 1.5 % 
above the level in the anti-monde, i.e. in the absence of the 
SMP. The fact that this figure is substantially lower than in the 
Cecchini report is generally attributed to the general 
equilibrium nature of these models which imposes constraints 
on the use of limited resources. 
Another methodological problem relates to the fact that the use 
of simulated models (regardless of whether they belong to the 
macro or CGE variety) for assessing a regime change like the 
SMP suffers from the inherent difficulty of incorporating such 
change in the model. The normal practice is to represent the 
SMP via a modification in a small subset of model parameters. 
However, it may be that a regime change of the magnitude of 
the SMP involves a more fundamental modification in the 
model structure. In other words , the model builder may not be 
capable of adjusting his/her model to reflect a regime change 
like the SMP, in which case the results produced by the model 
would be of little utility. 
Besides these numerous methodological problems, the ex-post 
quantitative macroeconomic assessment of the SMP is also 
affected by empirical difficulties. The main problem lies in the 
fact that the analysis in Chapters 4 to 6 is largely qualitative, at 
least as far as the needs of the models are concerned. 
Translating such analysis into quantitative estimates to be used 
as inputs for a simulation model necessarily involves some 
dose of arbitrary judgment. 
For all these reasons, the as sessment provided in this chapter 
should be viewed more as a check on the coherence of the 
messages contained in the previous chapters than as an attempt 
to quantitatively estimate the macroeconomic impact of the 
SMP. 
6.2. The ex post experiment 
The policy change implied by the SMP comprises of the 
measures designed for removing physical , technical and fiscal 
barriers to the free circulation of goods , services and 
production factors within the EC. This policy change can be 
expected to affect GDP, the key macroeconomic variable , 
thanks to allocation and accumulation effects . The form er 
operates through improved specialization and greater 
competition , both of which imply a reallocation of resources, 
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increased trade and investment flows, and ultimately higher 
income thanks to greater efficiency. On the other hand, the 
accumulation effect results from higher investment (medium-
run growth effect) and from higher technical progress or total 
factor productivity (TFP) growth (long-run growth effect) that 
may be generated by the SMP through changes in the economic 
environment. 
Ideally, therefore, the evaluation of the SMP requires models 
that are able to trace the impact of the removal of barriers on 
GDP via intermediate variables - such as trade, investment, 
the degree of competition or TFP - reflecting the allocation 
and accumulation effects. 
In the present study, two models are used for the ex-post 
quantitative macroeconomic assessment of the SMP, both of 
which fall short of the ideal requirement. 
The first, called GEM-E3-IM, is a multi-country, multi-sectoral 
dynamic CGE model of EU 12 and the rest of the world. It 
comes close to meeting the ideal requirement in so far as it 
explicitly models the SMP barriers and allows for the 
endogenous determination of some intermediate variables (such 
as trade and investment). However, the degree of competition is 
exogenous. Technical progress is also exogenous since the 
model does not allow for endogenous growth, i.e. true, long-run 
growth effects. 1 
The second model, QUEST II, is a multi-country dynamic macro 
model of EU 15 and the rest of the world. The model embodies 
many desirable features (such as forward-looking behaviour by 
households and firms), but it does not explicitly incorporate SMP 
barriers nor does it allow for endogenous growth." 
Each of the two models is run twice. The first run creates a 
'baseline' which attempts to replicate the 'monde', i.e. the 
actual evolution of the European economy post-1987, the initial 
year of implementation of the SMP. The baseline is a 'dynamic 
calibration' of the (CGE or macro) model to the monde. The 
second run simulates a counterfactual scenario, the 'anti-
monde', that keeps the values of the exogenous variables at 
their observed levels as in the baseline, but modifies some of 
the parameters so as to eliminate the impact of the SMP 
measures. The effect of the SMP is obtained by comparing the 
values of the relevant variables (such as GDP) for the baseline 
monde and the counterfactual anti-monde. 
In view of the previous discussion, it is clear that the 
modification of the parameters needed to produce the 'anti-
monde' (i.e. the situation without the SMP) differs somewhat 
between the two models. Only GEM-E3-IM allows for a 
1 See Capros et al. (1996). 
See Annex I 
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modification of SMP barriers. On the other hand, both models 
incorporate a parameter describing the degree of competition 
and another one related to technical progress, both of which 
require modification in the anti-monde. 
In principle, the extent to which the relevant parameters ought 
to be modified in the counterfactual scenario ought to be 
dictated by the content of Chapters I (which deals with SMP 
barriers), 5 (dealing with competition) and 6 (dealing with 
growth). If this were the case, the comparison between the 
monde and the anti-monde would provide a truly ex post 
estimate of the SMP. In reality, as already indicated, much of 
the information contained in these chapters is of a qualitative 
nature. Consequently, we have quantitative estimates only for 
some of the parameters, the others necessitating 'informed 
guesses' as in an ex ante exercise. The upshot is a hybrid anti-
monde, part ex ante and part ex post. 
Given the structure of the model, the anti-monde produced by 
GEM-E3-IM is based on three sets of parameter change. It is 
assumed that in the absence of the SMP: ( 1) all SMP barriers 
would be reintroduced, thus raising trade costs; (2) the degree 
of competition (reflected in the degree of market integration) 
would be reduced, implying a reduction in the elasticity of 
substitution between EU and domestic products from a range of 
3 to 6 to a range of 1.5 to 2; and (3) TFP growth would be 
permanently reduced by one-tenth of a percentage point, a 
guestimate based on the results of Chapter 6. 
Similarly, given the structure of the model, the anti-monde 
simulation with QUEST II is based on two sets of parameter 
change. In the absence of the SMP: ( 1) the degree of 
competition would be reduced, as reflected by a permanent 
increase in mark-ups (the increase reaching half of a percentage 
point after five years, an estimate provided in Chapters 5) and 
(2) TFP growth would be permanently reduced by one-tenth of 
a percentage point. 
6.3. Results 
The two models are simulated so as to estimate the ex-post 
(remember that this is really a hybrid of ex post and ex ante) 
impact of the SMP. Both models produce estimates for the 
impact on GDP and employment. The focus is entirely on 
aggregate results for the EU as a whole. 
Income 
Based on the assumptions detailed at the end of the previous 
section, GEM-E3-IM estimates that the level of EU GDP in 
1994 was 1.1 % above the level that would have prevailed in the 
absence of the SMP. The similar estimate based on Quest II is 
1.5%. Given that, in 1994, the level of GDP for EU-12 was 
around ECU 5 500 billion, these estimates imply that the SMP 
produced, in 1994, a gain of GDP in the range of ECU 60 
billion to ECU 80 billion. It is as if an income the size of 
Portugal's (with a GDP of ECU 75 billion in 1994) had been 
added to the Union. 
Where do the gains come from? The two main components are 
the increase in competition/efficiency and the rise in total factor 
productivity, each accounting for about half of the total effect. 
The elimination of trade barriers reduces the degree of 
segmentation of national markets, thereby increasing the degree 
of competition, which leads firms to increase their level of 
output. The result is also a decrease in costs and in prices, with 
a decrease in price-cost margins. This is the allocation or 
efficiency gain which puts the economy on a higher trajectory, 
albeit at the same growth rate as in the absence of the SMP. On 
the other hand, the rise in TFP, associated with a decline of X-
inefficiency prompted by greater competition, induces a higher 
growth rate of GDP (the increment being of 0.1 % ). 
In GEM-E3-IM, the competition/efficiency and TFP effects 
lead to a gradual increase in investment and in intra-EU trade, 
reaching, in 1994 a surplus of, respectively, 2. 7 and 4% over 
the anti-monde levels. The result is a gradual rise in the GDP 
effect, from 0.6% in 1988 to 1.1 % in 1994 over and above the 
no-SMP levels. QUEST II produces a substantially different 
time profile. Here investment jumps, in 1988 (which is taken as 
the first year of the SMP implementation), by nearly 6.5% over 
the anti-monde level as economic agents anticipate the benefits 
of the SMP. This leads, in 1988, to a GDP effect of nearly 2% 
over the no-SMP level. This sharp rise in investment is 
followed by a fall below the anti-monde levels during the 
period 1990-92 as agents adjust their behaviour. However, 
GDP continues to be about I% above anti-monde levels. The 
initial boom in investment and GDP produced by QUEST II fits 
well with the patterns observed in the late 1980s for the EU. 
Employment 
According to Baldwin and Venables ( 1994 ), the impact of the 
SMP on unemployment is bound to be very slight. Their 
argument is that unemployment is, by definition, a failure of 
labour supply to match labour demand, a phenomenon which is 
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little affected by the SMP. The logical conclusion of their 
argument is that the ex-post evaluation of the SMP should 
ignore the employment/unemployment dimension. 
Despite this advice, both GEM-E3-IM and QUEST II compute 
the impact of the SMP on employment/unemployment. GEM-
E3-IM estimates that the EU employment level in 1994 was 
about 300 OOO units above the level that would have prevailed 
in the absence of the SMP. The similar estimate based on 
QUEST II is 0.7% or 900 OOO additional jobs. The divergence 
between the two models relates to their assumptions on the 
functioning of the labour market. GEM-E3-IM does not allow 
for open unemployment. In this model, the SMP has two 
effects on employment: a positive one, due to increased 
activity, and a negative one, associated with increased 
productivity. The net effect is positive, but only marginally so. 
By contrast, QUEST II allows for open unemployment. Here 
the state of the labour market is determined by a process of 
bargaining between workers and employers. In this model, the 
SMP increases the level of employment (and lowers 
unemployment) due to an increase in activity and a lowering of 
mark-ups. This finding is consistent with the result of Chapter 
5, which indicates that the SMP has positively contributed to 
employment by lowering inflation. 
Further analysis of the impact of the SMP on employment was 
undertaken with the help of E3ME, a multi-region, multi-
sectoral econometric input-output model of EU 12. 1 The model 
includes intra- and extra-EU trade equations which have been 
re-estimated to account for the SMP. The anti-monde 
simulation produced by E3ME is based on trade equations 
reflecting the absence of the SMP. The model estimates that the 
level of employment in 1993 was 0.4% above the level that 
would have prevailed in the absence of the SMP, which 
translates into 600 OOO additional jobs. This result confirms the 
order of magnitude provided by GEM-E3-IM and QUEST II, 
indicating a modest impact of the SMP on EU employment. 
In conclusion, the impact of the SMP on income and 
employment is far from negligible. There is little doubt that the 
effects will continue to grow as the SMP is further 
implemented and economic agents adjust to the new 
competitive environment of the European economy. 
See Cambridge Econometrics ( 1996). 
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Annex 1: Description of the QUEST II model 
Introduction 
We begin with a brief description of QUEST II, the 
macroeconometric model of the European Commission's 
Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs 
(DG II). The new QUEST model can be characterized as a 
modern version of the neoclassical-Keynesian synthesis. The 
behavioral equations in the model are based on microeconomic 
principles of intertemporal optimizing behaviour of households 
and firms and the supply side of the economy is modeled 
explicitly via a neoclassical production function. This feature of 
the model assures that its long-run behaviour resembles closely 
the standard neoclassical growth model. The steady state 
growth rate is essentially determined by the rate of (exogenous) 
technical progress and the growth rate of the population. Also 
the real rate of interest in the long run is determined by private 
savings behaviour, especially by the discount rate of private 
households. Similarly, the real exchange rate equilibrates the 
current account in the long run, i.e. it moves in such a way as to 
make the net foreign asset position of the country sustainable. 
In this type of model economic policy will not be able to 
change the long-run growth rate, unless it is able to affect the 
rate of time preference, the rate of technical progress or the 
growth rate of the population. It can, however, affect the long-
run level of output and thereby the growth rate of the economy 
over extended periods of time until the new (steady state) 
income level is reached. 
There are two major departures from the neoclassical model in 
the long run, however. Because firms are not perfectly 
competitive but can charge mark-ups over marginal cost, the 
long-run level of economic activity will be lower than that 
predicted from a model with perfect competition. Also, the 
model economy will not reach a steady state equilibrium with 
full employment, since we use a bargaining framework to 
describe the interaction between firms and workers. As will be 
described below, labour market rigidities, and therefore 
involuntary unemployment, will persist even in the long run. 
The short-run behaviour of the model will be influenced by 
standard Keynesian features since the model allows for 
imperfectly flexible wages and prices, as well as adjustment 
costs for labour and investment. 
For the purpose of evaluating the SMP, two different types of 
shocks were given to the model. In order to capture efficiency 
gains, it was assumed that total factor productivity growth 
would be permanently reduced by one-tenth of a percentage 
point. This was technically implemented by changing the 
variable Tin the production function (see equation (2)) which 
captures TFP in the model. A second effect is change in the 
degree of competition, introduced in the following way. The 
model assumes that firms behave in a monopolistic competition 
environment and charge a mark-up over marginal cost when 
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setting prices. This mark-up is represented by the Lerner index 
n in the model. For the simulations it was assumed that in the 
absence of the SMP, mark-ups would be permanently increased 
by half a percentage point after five years. The mark-up has 
two types of effects. First, a higher mark-up reduces demand 
for both capital and labour because firms take into account that 
an increase in production can only be sold at a lower price. 
Thus an increase n represents a downward shift in both the 
labour demand and the investment equation, as can be seen 
from equations (6), (7) and (9) below. There is also an 
additional labour market effect associated with monopolistic 
competition. In QUEST II it is assumed that wages are set in a 
bargaining framework between a trade union and firms and that 
trade unions are able to extract a fraction of the monopoly rent 
from the corporate sector. Thus an increase of mark-ups will 
have a positive effect on wage claims. As shown in the wage 
equation ( 10), an increase of n leads to a stronger indexation of 
wages to productivity. 
The following sections will give a more detailed description of 
the economic hypotheses underlying the model. Here we only 
describe the behaviour of the private sector. The government is 
introduced via a conventional government budget constraint. 
No specific behavioural assumptions are made, except for a 
debt rule which is required to make the evolution of the debt 
sustainable. The debt rule adjusts indirect taxes of the 
household sector in order to stabilize the debt to GDP ratio 
along a baseline path. 
Consumption and saving 
It is assumed that there are two types of households, namely 
those following a life cycle consumption pattern where 
consumption is based on financial wealth (FW) and life cycle 
income (LCI), and liquidity constrained households which base 
their consumption decision on disposable income (YDIS). The 
parameter le determines the fraction of liquidity constrained 
households 
(1) 
The life cycle component of consumption can generate 
important savings responses in the context of expected changes 
in income. If, for example, households expect an increase in 
their future net income because of better employment 
opportunities the current savings rate is likely to fall, i.e. 
consumption may already increase in the present period in 
anticipation of higher future income. 
Firm behaviour 
Firms operate in a monopolistically competitive environment. 
Private sector GDP (Y) is produced via a nested CES and Cobb 
169 
Economic evaluation of internal market 
Douglas production function F(.) with capital K, energy E and 
private sector employment N as inputs. The variable TKt 
represents an efficiency index for the fixed capital stock and the 
variable Tt represents technical progress. The following 
equation describes potential output of the corporate sector 
under the assumption that all factors of production are fully 
utilized. 
(2) 
Technical progress grows with an exogenous rate. The 
efficiency index captures embodiment effects resulting from 
current and past investment. More specifically, TKt is modelled 
as a function of the mean age of capital. Because prices adjust 
sluggishly, firms do not always operate at full or optimal 
capacity, therefore actual output can differ from potential 
output and we define 
(3) 
where UCt is the rate of capacity utilization. Capital stock (K) 
changes according to the rate of fixed capital formation Jt and 
the rate of geometric depreciation 6 
(4) 
Furthermore, it is assumed that the investment process is 
subject to rising marginal installation costs. Total real 
investment expenditures are equal to investment purchases Jt 
plus the costs of installation. The unit installation costs are 
assumed to be a linear function of the investment to capital 
ratio. Total investment expenditures It are therefore given by 
(5) 
The objective of the firm is to maximize the present value of its 
cash flow. The optimization problem yields the following 
investment rule 
(6) 
where q is the shadow price of capital and PI/P denotes the 
relative price of investment goods relative to the GDP deflater. 
The variable q can be interpreted as reflecting the present 
discounted value of the marginal revenue from current 
investment. This can also be written as a function of current 
and discounted future expected profitability, where profitability 
is expressed as the ratio between gross operating surplus (GOS) 
and the capital stock. Profitability is adjusted for monopoly 
rents. 
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qt= J [ (1-tc) ((1-T]) GOS/K) J exp(-kr+c)dj) ds. (7) 
As can be seen from this expression, the shadow price of 
capital is a complex expression and depends in particular on 
current and future real interest rates, profitability and effective 
corporate tax rates, but also on the mark-up level charged by 
the firm. 
Domestic prices 
It is assumed that firms set prices sluggishly and they especially 
respond to changes in the level of capacity utilization in the 
following form. 
log(P t> = padj*log(UCt/UC*) + Iitjlog(P t-i) with I1tj = I. (8) 
Notice, this rule together with the labour demand equation 
implies that prices are effectively set as a variable mark-up 
over unit labour costs and the mark-up depends on the degree 
of capacity utilization. 
Employment 
Labour is also a quasi fixed factor of production since it takes 
time for firms to reduce employment or fill existing vacancies. 
Therefore a distinction between short- and long-run labour 
demand elasticities must be made. Labour demand per 
employee is a positive function of output and is negatively 
related to total real wage costs. These include - on top of the 
gross wage rate per employee and social security contributions 
of employers (sec)- a premium which depends on search and 
vacancy costs of the firm vet. In addition, it is negatively 
affected by the mark-up the firm charges in product markets. 
(9) 
Wages 
A bargaining framework underlies our specification of the 
labour market. If workers and firms can agree on a particular 
job match, then they will both benefit relative to the alternative 
state of being unemployed (in the case of workers) and only 
receiving a reservation wage or having an unfilled vacancy (in 
the case of firms). The central idea of the bargaining model is 
that both workers and firms will share these individual profits 
between them, depending on their relative bargaining strength. 
As an outcome of the bargaining solution, a wage rule for total 
wage costs per employee (we) of the following form can be 
derived 
The parameter~ (0~~~1) is the bargaining strength of workers 
which determines the fraction of total profits from a successful 
job match going to workers, z are unemployment benefits and 1 
is the imputed value of leisure and tl is the labour tax rate. The 
term prob(.) denotes the probability of switching into 
employment (which depends on labour market tightness 
proxied by the unemployment rate ), q(.) gives the probability 
that a position becomes vacant because a worker quits the job 
and vc is the average cost of a vacant position. Gross wages are 
positively indexed to labour productivity. The degree of 
indexation depends on the bargaining power of workers. More 
precisely, in the case of perfect competition in the goods 
market and some market power of trade unions, wages are 
partially linked to the marginal product of labour, while in the 
case of imperfect competition and positive ~. there exists some 
rent sharing between workers and firms which is represented by 
the term ri( 1-a) in the wage equation. Wages also depend on the 
reservation wage which is composed of unemployment benefits 
and the value of leisure, which can be expressed as a function 
of household wealth and the average hours of work supplied 
per period. Provided workers have market power they can ask 
for real wages which exceed the reservation wage. Real wages 
also depend negatively on the unemployment rate, since a high 
unemployment rate has an adverse effect on the probability of 
finding a job. The wage equation here is stated entirely in real 
terms. In the model we also allow for some nominal rigidity by 
assuming that wage contracts have a duration of one year. 
Trade, current account and exchange rates 
The model is closed with respect to international trade. The 
model distinguishes 26 countries/regions altogether. Among 
these, the EU member countries individually as well as the US 
and Japan are modelled as described above. The rest of the 
world is divided into 10 different zones, represented by small 
trade feedback models. It is assumed that each country/region 
produces a product which is an imperfect substitute for the 
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products of other regions. This allows us to formulate import 
equations of the following form for each individual country 
IMt = IMS t * ( (PC t/PMt pm (C r+G i+I 1). (11) 
Imports are a function of total domestic demand defined as 
private and public consumption and total investment and 
relative prices expressed as the ratio between the domestic 
consumption and the import price deflator. The coefficient rrm 
is the price elasticity. To capture possible lagged adjustment of 
imports to price changes the relative price variable appears as a 
distributed lag. The income elasticity is restricted to one, i.e. 
we attribute all trend changes in the import share (IMS) to 
structural developments such as increased trade integration 
between countries and regions. Consistent with our 
specification of imports, we define exports of each region as 
(12) 
where PX is the export deflator, WPXS a competitor's price 
index (in dollars) and WDEM is an indicator of world demand. 
Also for exports we allow that they respond sluggishly to 
changes in relative prices, thus there will be a difference 
between short- and long-run price elasticities. The coefficient 
of the world demand variable is constraint to one. Net foreign 
assets (F) evolve according to the following identity 
(13) 
where the term FTR denotes net foreign transfers received. It is 
assumed in the model that exchange rates will eventually move 
in such a way as to stabilize the net foreign asset position of the 
country. The movement of exchange rates is further determined 
by the assumption of perfect capital mobility, thus (uncovered) 
interest arbitrage holds. 
(14) 
The second term on the right hand side denotes the expected 
depreciation of country j 's currency vis-a-vis the US dollar. 
The risk premium (RPREM) is currently not modelled 
endogenously. 
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Chapter 7 
Growth and real convergence 
effects 
7 .1. Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine what, if any, has been 
the impact of the SMP on growth and real convergence in the 
EU. It is divided into three parts. Section 2 sets out the stylized 
facts about growth and convergence in the EU . Section 3 
presents conceptual considerations for analysing the potential 
impact of the SMP on growth and convergence. Finally, 
Section 4 attempts to evaluate the actual impact observed 
during the period 1987-93. 
7.2. Stylized facts 
Growth. During the period 1975-87, GDP growth in 
EU 12 was 2.1 % p.a., well below the performance of the 
T~ble 1 
Gross domestic product at 1990 market prices 
Year B DK WD EL E F 
1975 -1.5 -0.7 -1.3 6.1 0.5 -0.3 
1976 5.6 6.5 5.3 6.4 3.3 4.2 
1977 0.5 1.6 2.8 3.4 2.8 3.2 
1978 2.7 1.5 3 6.7 1.5 3.4 
1979 2.1 3.5 4.2 3.7 0 3.2 
1980 4.3 -0.4 1 1.8 1.3 1.6 
1981 -1 -0.9 0.1 0.1 -0.2 1.2 
1982 1.5 3 -0.9 0.4 1.6 2.5 
1983 0.5 2.5 1.8 0.4 2.2 0.7 
1984 2.2 4.4 2.8 2.8 1.5 1.3 
1985 0.8 4.3 2 3.1 2.6 1.9 
1986 1.4 3.6 2.3 1.6 3.2 2.5 
1987 2 0.3 1.5 -0.5 5.6 2.3 
1988 4.9 1.2 3.7 4.5 5.2 4.5 
1989 3.4 0.6 3.6 3.8 4.7 4.3 
1990 3.4 1.4 5.7 0 3.7 2.5 
1991 2.2 1.3 5 3.1 2.3 0.8 
1992 1.8 0.2 1.8 0.4 0.7 1.3 
1993 -1.6 1.5 - 1.8 -I -1.2 -1.5 
1994 2.2 4.4 2.4 1.5 2.1 2.7 
1995 1.9 2.6 1.9 2 3 2.2 
Source: DGII 
Growth and real convergence effects 
US at 2.6% p .a. and of Japan at 3.9% p.a .. During the 
period 1987-95, growth in EU 12 was 2.2% p.a., almost as 
well as the performance of the US at 2.3 % p.a. and of 
Japan at 2.5% p.a. (see Table 1). 
Investment. During the period 1975-87, investment in 
EU 12 was on average 20.71 % of GDP, slightly ahead of 
, the US at 19.3% and well below Japan at 29.7%. During 
the period 1987-95, investment fell by one percentage 
point to 19.6%, well above the US at 16.8% but below 
Japan at 30.3% (see Table 2). 
• Real convergence. Measured as the standard deviation of 
(the logarithm of) per capita GDP (in purchasing power 
standards), real convergence among Member States of 
EU 12 did not progress during the period 1975-86. 
However, it improved substantially after 1986. 
Convergence among regions of EU 12 has also improved, 
but less substantially (see Table 3 and Graph I) . 
(A111111a l perce11rage change) 
IRL I L NL p UK EUR12 
5.7 -2.7 -6.6 -0.1 -4.3 -0.1 -0.8 
1.3 6.6 2.5 5.1 6.9 2.2 4.6 
8.1 3.4 1.6 2.3 5.5 2.2 2.8 
7.1 3.7 4.1 2.4 2.8 3.6 3.2 
3.1 6 2.3 2.2 5.6 2.8 3.5 
3.1 4.2 0.8 1.2 4.6 -1.6 1.4 
3.3 0.6 -0.6 -0.5 1.6 -1.3 0.1 
2.3 0.2 I. I -1.2 2.1 1.5 0.8 
-0.2 1 3 1.7 -0.2 3.6 1.6 
4.3 2.7 6.2 3.3 -1.9 2.5 2.3 
3.1 2.6 2.9 3.1 2.8 3.5 2.5 
0.3 2.9 4.8 2.8 4.1 4.4 2.9 
4.7 3.1 2.9 1.4 5.5 4.8 2.9 
4.3 4.1 5.7 2.6 5.8 5 4.3 
6.1 2.9 6.7 4.7 5.7 2.2 3.5 
7.8 2.1 3.2 4.1 4.3 0.4 3 
2.2 I. I 3.1 2.3 2.1 -2 1.7 
3.9 0.6 1.9 2 I. I -0.5 1 
3.1 -1.2 0 0.2 -1.2 2.2 -0.7 
6.7 2.1 3.3 2.7 I 3.8 2.6 
8.6 3 3.2 2.4 2.5 2.4 2.4 
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Table 2 
Gross fixed capital formation at current prices - total economy 
( Pern•111axe of gross domestic produ cr ar marker pric es) 
Year B DK WD EL E F IRL L NL p UK EURl2 
1975 22.5 2 1.1 20.4 25.6 26.4 24.1 22.4 25 25. 1 21.6 28.6 19.9 22.5 
1976 22. l 23.0 20. l 26. l 24.9 23.9 23.9 23.9 22.6 19.9 27.6 19.6 22 .1 
1977 2 1.6 22. l 20.3 28.3 23.9 22.9 23.8 23.5 22.7 21.6 29.2 18.6 21.7 
1978 2 1.7 2 1.7 20.6 29.5 22.6 22.4 26.5 22 .8 21.8 21.8 30.8 18.5 21.5 
1979 20.7 20.9 2 1.7 3 1.8 2 1.5 22.4 29.5 22.9 22.1 2 1.4 29.3 i 8.7 21.7 
1980 2 1.1 18.8 22.6 29.8 22.2 23.0 27.9 24.3 24.6 21.4 31.5 18.0 22.1 
198 1 18.0 15.6 2 1.6 27.4 2 1.9 22. l 28.3 23 .9 23 .0 19.6 34.0 16.2 21.0 
1982 17.3 16.1 20.4 24.6 2 1.6 2 1.4 25.3 22.4 22.7 18.6 34.3 16.l 20.2 
1983 16.2 16.0 20.4 25 .0 20.8 20.2 22.1 21.3 19.3 18.6 32.2 16.0 19.6 
1984 16.0 17.2 20.0 22.8 18.7 19.3 20.5 2 I. I 18.2 19.1 26.0 17.0 19.3 
1985 15.6 18.7 19.5 23.5 19.2 19.3 18.2 20.7 16.0 19.7 24.0 17.0 19.2 
1986 15.7 20.8 19.4 22.7 19.5 19.3 17 .5 19.8 19.6 20.4 24.4 17.0 19.1 
1987 16.0 19.7 19.4 2 1.1 20.8 19.8 16.4 19.8 22.3 20.8 27.0 17.8 19.4 
1988 17.7 18.1 19.6 2 1.4 22.6 20.7 15.7 20.1 24.3 21.3 28 .2 19.5 20.2 
1989 19.1 18. 1 20.2 22.5 24. 1 2 1. 3 16.9 20.2 23.1 21.5 27.5 20.5 20.8 
1990 20.3 17.4 20.9 23.0 24.5 2 1.4 18.0 20.3 24. 1 20.9 27 .3 19.6 21.0 
199 1 19.5 16.5 2 1. 3 22.5 23.8 2 1.2 16.6 19.8 25 .9 20.4 26.7 17.0 20.4 
1992 19. l 15.6 20.7 2 1.6 2 1.9 20.0 15.6 19.2 23 .4 20.0 26.7 15.7 19.5 
1993 17.8 15.0 18.9 20.7 19.9 18.6 14.9 16.9 24.0 19.3 25 .1 15.1 18.0 
1994 17.4 14.8 18.5 19.9 19.8 18. 1 15. 1 16.6 21.3 19.3 25 .5 15.0 17 .7 
1995 17.5 16. 1 2 1.7 20.2 20.8 18. 1 16.2 17.0 2 1.5 19.6 25.4 15.0 18.9 
Source: DG II 
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Table 3 
Gross domestic product at current market prices per head of population 
Year B DK WO EL E F IRL 
1975 105.6 108.2 114.1 63.3 78.2 112.9 62.4 
1976 106.8 110.3 115.9 63.7 76.6 112.5 59.7 
1977 104.6 109 116.5 63.3 76 112.8 62.2 
1978 104.4 107.3 116.9 64.9 74.2 112.9 63.9 
1979 103.3 107.4 118.1 64.4 71.3 112.5 62.9 
1980 106.6 105.7 117.6 64.3 71 112.6 63.5 
1981 105.8 105.1 117.9 63.9 70.4 113.6 65 
1982 106.7 107.8 116.2 63.4 70.7 115.2 65.4 
1983 105.7 109 117 62.4 70.9 113.8 63.9 
1984 105.7 111.5 118.3 62.5 70.2 112.4 64.8 
1985 104.1 113.7 118.3 62.7 70.2 111.4 65.1 
1986 102.7 114.6 117.8 61.9 70.3 110.7 63.6 
1987 101.9 111.8 116.4 59.9 72.2 109.7 64.7 
1988 102.7 108.7 115.5 60.1 72.9 109.8 65.2 
1989 102.8 106.1 115 60.3 73.9 110.4 67.6 
1990 103.5 104.9 116.4 58.6 74.8 110 71.2 
1991 103.8 105.6 119.1 59.6 77.2 110.1 72.6 
1992 106.8 103.3 119.9 60.8 75.4 108.7 75.6 
1993 110.6 109.8 118.2 63.2 76.3 107 78.6 
1994 110.7 112.1 119.4 63.6 74.5 105.3 83.4 
1991 106.9 108.8 105.9 61.4 79.5 113.4 74.8 
1992 109.5 105.9 108.1 62.3 77.2 111.4 77.5 
1993 112.9 112.1 108 64.6 77.9 109.3 80.3 
1994 112.7 114.2 109.9 64.7 75.9 107.2 85 
1995 112 114.2 109.4 64.3 76.3 106.8 90 
Source: DG II 
7.3. Growth and real convergence: conceptual 
considerations 
I 
95.5 
97.1 
97.6 
98.1 
100.5 
103.6 
104.3 
103.5 
102.6 
103 
103 
103.1 
103.4 
103.4 
103.1 
103.1 
103.8 
103.4 
101.4 
102.3 
106.9 
106 
103.5 
104.2 
104.8 
From an economic point of view, European integration consists 
in the gradual elimination of barriers to flows of goods, 
services, productive factors and information or technology 
among various national economies. Such a reduction of the 
institutional obstacles to economic activity will translate into a 
reallocation of factors within the EU and a change in the 
pattern of specialization of its various member economies 
producing static efficiency gains. These benefits of integration 
are typically rather small under the traditional neoclassical 
assumptions of perfect competition and constant returns to 
scale. Recent works have extended the analysis to take account 
of the influence of non-competitive market structures and 
economies of scale. In these models, integration can have an 
additional effect on aggregate output by allowing the size of 
productive units to come closer to the optimum. Moreover, the 
increase in competitive pressure could also lead to an increase 
in the expected benefits of integration. 
(PPS: EUR 12 = 100) 
L NL A p SF s UK EUR 12-
144.3 110 103.4 52.7 97.8 121.4 101.8 JOO 
143.8 I JO.I 103.9 52.6 93.2 117.3 99.9 100 
134 109.3 106 53.5 90.9 112.3 99.7 100 
136.7 108.1 103.2 53 90 110.8 100.4 100 
135.1 106.4 105 53.7 93.1 111.3 99.9 100 
134.7 105.8 107 55 96.7 111.8 97.2 100 
133.4 104.8 106.8 55.6 98.4 112 96.l 100 
135.7 102.6 107.2 56.3 100.5 112.4 97.2 100 
135.5 102.5 108.1 55.3 101.2 112.7 99.1 100 
137.9 103.2 107.3 53.1 101.5 114.8 99.2 100 
139.7 103.6 107.4 53.3 102.2 114.2 100.1 100 
144.2 103.1 105.7 54.1 101.5 113.5 101.5 100 
140.1 101.2 104.5 55.6 102.6 113.6 103.3 100 
143.5 99.2 104.4 56.7 103.3 111.3 104.1 100 
147.9 100.2 104.8 58.2 105.5 109.8 102.8 100 
145.3 101.2 105.4 59.4 102.6 107.5 100.4 100 
148.1 99.5 104.9 62.3 91.1 101.6 94.3 100 
150 99.7 106.1 64.5 85 96.7 95.2 100 
160.1 101.5 110.4 67.8 89.6 96.3 97 100 
159.9 101.9 111.5 68.4 89.1 95.7 96.8 100 
EU 12+ 
152.5 102.5 108 64.1 93.8 104.7 97.1 100 
153.8 102.2 108.7 66.1 87.1 99.1 97.5 100 
163.5 103.7 112.7 69.2 91.5 98.3 99 100 
162.9 103.8 113.6 69.6 90.8 97.5 98.6 100 
165.4 103.6 112.7 69.8 92.4 97.4 98.6 100 
On the other hand, there has always been some notion that the 
long-run impact of the internal market on growth could be 
rather more substantial than suggested by studies focusing on 
static effects. In particular, there are reasons to expect that the 
static effects will have a further positive effect on growth 
through induced changes in saving and investment behaviour 
leading to increased factor accumulation and faster technical 
progress. In recent years, the development of endogenous 
growth models has permitted to give a rigorous theoretical base 
to this possibility and, thereby, to try to quantify the growth 
effects of 1992. 
7.3.1. Growth and real convergence: Theory' 
The theoretical literature provides a large variety of plausible 
models with contrasting implications for the evolution of 
income levels and their distribution in a group of countries. An 
1 This seciion is based on Cambridge Economcirics (1996) and de la Fuente 
(1995). 
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important part of the growth literature focuses on two 
questions: the feasibility of sustained growth in income per 
capita, and the perspectives for income convergence across 
countries. The predictions of theoretical models concerning 
these two questions depend crucially on two technological 
assumptions: the existence, or not, of increasing returns to 
reproducible factors, including the stock of technical 
knowledge or 'technological capital', and the degree to which 
useful knowledge is a public good across countries. 
Following Solow (1956), traditional neoclassical models, based 
on the assumptions of decreasing returns to capital and free 
access by all countries to a common stationary technology, 
predict that growth cannot be sustained permanently but have 
optimistic implications from the point of view of convergence. 
In the absence of technical progress, decreasing returns imply 
that the marginal product of capital will fall with the 
accumulated stock, reducing both the incentive to save and the 
contribution of a given volume of investment to output growth. 
As a result, growth will gradually slow down and, under 
standard assumptions, will eventually stop. The same logic 
explains the convergence prediction: poorer countries will have 
a greater incentive to save and a higher rate of growth for a 
given rate of investment. Hence, they will gradually reduce the 
distance which separates them from richer countries. Moreover, 
this result will be reinforced by open-economy considerations, 
as factor flows and trade will both contribute to factor price 
equalization. 
The introduction of exogenous technical progress in this 
framework allows for sustained growth but does not modify the 
convergence result, under the assumption that technology is a 
pure public good in the sense that all countries have access to 
the same stock of useful knowledge. In fact, for the 
convergence prediction to survive, it is enough to assume that 
this is true in the long run. 
These considerations have traditionally served to justify a 
certain optimism regarding the long-run perspectives of the less-
developed countries. Even a quick look at the data, however, 
shows that the evolution of the world income distribution has 
not confirmed such expectations. This fact, together with the 
historically upward trend of average growth rates, has been one 
of the factors which have inspired the search for alternatives to 
the traditional neoclassical model, giving rise in recent years to 
the endogenous growth literature. The new literature has 
explored the implications of increasing returns and the 
determinants of the rate of technical progress, reaching in some 
cases predictions which are very different from those of the 
traditional models. Endogenous growth models seek to 
endogenize the sustained accumulation of factors, among 
which they also include human capital and knowledge capital. 
In particular, they focus attention on the micro-foundations of 
the accumulation process, that is, on the private and social costs 
and benefits of investing in physical capital, skill (human 
capital) or technological progress (knowledge capital). 
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Although the details differ among models, the key requirement 
is that if the investment rate is to remain constant in the long-
run, then the return to investment faced by self-interested 
investors has to be non-diminishing in the capital stock. The 
different strands of endogenous growth theory fall into two 
groups: the first, initiated by Lucas (1988), stressing the 
importance of the accumulation of human capital, and the 
second, initiated by Romer (1986), emphasizing the importance 
of sustained innovation. Both strands are characterized by some 
form of spillover. In the Lucas-type models, based on human 
capital, the individual's private effort to improve their own 
skills will also improve productivity of other workers and of 
physical capital. Similarly, in the Romer-type models, a firm's 
private effort to innovate to exploit temporary monopolistic 
rent will also increase the public stock of knowledge. The 
existence of these externalizes imply that the market allocation 
of resources may not be optimal, opening up the possibility of a 
justification for policy intervention. 
The existence of aggregate scale economies can invert the 
neoclassical predictions of a falling growth rate and 
convergence across countries. With increasing returns in 
reproducible factors the return on investment is an increasing 
function of the accumulated stock. As a result, in Romer-type 
models, the growth rate will increase in time and with the level 
of income. Similarly, positive growth rates may be sustained 
indefinitely in Lucas-type models where the rate of technical 
progress is determined endogenously and reflects private 
investment decisions in human or technological capital, 
provided such activities are not subject to diminishing returns 
due, for example, to the existence of learning effects. In these 
models, moreover, permanent differences in growth rates may 
arise as a result of differences across countries in economic 
policies, market size, or factor endowments. 
The preceding discussion has identified several factors of 
interest from the point of view of the convergence or 
divergence of per capita income levels across countries. The 
endogeneity of technical progress and the possibility of 
increasing returns may explain the apparent lack of a tendency 
for the growth rate to fall over time, as predicted by neo-
classical models, but they also suggest reasons why one might 
not expect convergence. In fact, these two factors may generate 
a tendency for initial advantages to increase over time, rather 
than decrease, giving rise to a process of increasing 
polarization consistent not only with the long-run persistence of 
large income differences across countries, but also with a 
tendency for such differences to increase. On the other hand, 
the possible importance of international technological 
spillovers, and the neoclassical logic of decreasing returns point 
in the opposite direction. 
7.3.2. Application to economic integration 
Analysis of the SMP effects on growth can be classified into 
two categories: static and dynamic effects. 
7.3.2.1. Static effects of integration 
As already discussed in Chapter 4, the SMP can be expected to 
result in a more efficient allocation of resources within the EU. 
This would raise the level of output per capita, but not its long-
run growth rate. However, during the transition period from the 
?Id (i.e. pre-SMP) to the new (i.e. post-SMP) equilibrium, there 
1s a short-term temporary acceleration of growth. 
7.3.2.2. Dynamic effects of integration 
Economic integration produces two types of dynamic effects: 
medium-run and long-run effects. 
Medium-run effects 
To the extent that static efficiency gains raise income and the 
rate of return on investment, they have a further effect by 
stimulating savings and capital formation. This is Baldwin's 
(1989, 1992a) medium-term 'growth bonus'. The medium-term 
growth bonus is a multiple of the initial efficiency gain, whose 
magnitude depends on the savings rate and technological 
coefficients. Even more than the short-term effect, the medium-
term effect will materialize only gradually over time. During 
the trans_ition period, there is a medium-term temporary 
accelerat10n of growth, but the long-run growth rate remains 
unchanged. 
Long-run effects 
In the endogenous growth framework, integration can boost 
long-run growth if it alters the private costs and benefits of 
investing in new innovations. 1 This research has highlighted 
several ways in which participation in a larger integrated 
economy can affect a nation's growth. Firstly, residents in an 
integrated economy can benefit from a higher level of technical 
knowledge than those living in relative isolation. Trade can 
facilitate the process of technological dissemination. Secondly, 
ex~osure t~ international competition may improve the quality 
of mdustnal research. A firm developing a product for a 
protected domestic market need only make use of technologies 
that are new to the local economy, whereas one that hopes to 
compete on the international market will be forced to generate 
1 In thi_s field the path-breaking work is due to Grossman and Helpman ( 1991 ). 
who 1mroduced trade into models with an endogenously determined growth 
rate. Smee then several articles have provided a broad perspective on how on-
going economic integration processes can affect the long-run growth rate. 
These include Rivera-Batiz and Romer ( 1991 ). who analysed the effect of 
integration across similar economies, and Baldwin ( 1992). 
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ideas that are innovative on a global scale. A third reason 
suggests that international integration may bolster industrial 
research by expanding the size of potential customer base. 2 
There is a fourth reason why integration can positively affect 
the long-run growth rate of the economies involved in the 
integration programme.J The market structure of an economy's 
research sector is an important determinant of the process. 
Import competition may stimulate growth by reducing the 
market power of domestic innovators. Specifically, import 
competition forces domestic innovators to choose to either 
9uicken their p~ce of innovation or be displaced by foreign 
mnovators. While some of the domestic innovators may be 
forced out of the market, the overall rate of innovation, and 
therefore the growth rate of output, increases. A specific, 
sectoral point is worth noting here. Even in the simplest growth 
models the growth rate depends on differences between the 
inter-temporal preference rate of individuals and the rate of 
return on investment. With an non-competitive financial sector, 
the margin between the return earned by investors and the cost 
of funds to investors tends to be large, either due to inefficiency 
or monopoly rents. Competition from foreign financial firms 
can act to reduce this margin, and hence increase the resources 
devoted to innovation and the output growth rate. 
N~vertheles~, it is quite possible that the internal market impact 
might negatively affect the incentives to invest in technoloaical 
. . b 
mnovat10ns and human capital accumulation and this may be so 
particularly for the relatively less developed countries. 
Grossman and Helpman ( 1991) give four reasons why this 
might be the case. First, more trade implies more competition 
and national firms might find that this reduces the anticipated 
profitability of their investment in knowledge. Second, opening 
up trade with a technologically advanced country may force the 
less advanced country to reduce investment in innovation. This 
might lead to a concentration of technological progress in a few 
regions that had an advantage in innovation production before 
economic integration. Third, countries with unskilled (manual) 
labour endowment may be forced by economic integration to 
specialize in commodities that are low in technological content. 
Fourth, countries that invested relatively more in human capital 
before economic integration will experience a higher reward 
after economic integration, reducing the incentives to invest in 
research and development. 
7.3.3. Empirical evidence 
7.3.3.1 Growth 
European integration can affect growth via its impact on three 
channels: physical capital formation (integration-induced 
Sec Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991 ). 
' Sec Baldwin ( I 992bJ. 
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investment-led growth); human capital formation (integration-
induced skills-led growth); or technical progress (integration-
induced technology-led growth). European integration can 
impact upon these three channels either directly through 
specific Community policies promoting investment and 
technology, or indirectly by changing the incentives faced by 
firms. 
An ex ante estimate of the potential growth effects of the SMP 
was obtained by Baldwin ( 1989) using the calibration 
methodology. Since then, several studies have attempted to 
estimate econometrically the ex post growth effects of 
European integration. Most studies have focused either on 
integration-induced investment-led growth or on integration-
induced technology-led growth. 
Studies on investment-led growth tend to rely on the cross-
section methodology introduced by Barro (1991 ). These studies 
generally find that lowering domestic trade barriers stimulates 
the investment-to-GDP ratios in a large sample of countries. 
However, Baldwin and Seghezza (1996) find no evidence that 
European integration stimulated investment and growth above 
and beyond the amount captured by a tariff-cutting measure. 
Studies on technology-led growth have adopted two different 
approaches. On one hand, Henrekson, Torstensson and 
Torstensson (1996) estimate the growth effect of European 
integration during the period 1976-85 using Barro' s model. The 
paper finds that the EU and EFT A have each added about one 
percentage point to Members' average growth rates. On the 
other hand, Baldwin and Seghezza (1996) extend the 
cointegration technique of Coe and Helpman ( 1995) for testing 
technical spillovers to the effect of European integration on 
productivity growth. The study produces weak evidence that 
EU membership has allowed Member States to enjoy a higher 
level of productivity growth than they would have otherwise. 
Johansson (1996) also examines technical spillovers for EU 
Member States, but distinguishes between intra-EU and extra-
EU trade flows as in Jacquemin and Sapir (1991 ). She finds 
that, over the period 1970-90, intra-EU imports had a 
significant and positive effect on productivity, while extra-EU 
imports had no such impact, therefore suggesting that European 
integration has been particularly beneficial for growth. 
The studies reviewed here suggest that European integration 
has been beneficial for growth in Europe. However, none of the 
studies tackles specifically the issue of the SMP. 
7.3.3.2. Convergence 
The impact of economic integration on income and welfare and 
their distribution across countries and regions is a complex one. 
Our understanding of the redistribution and reallocation 
processes which are set in motion by the SMP is incomplete, 
and the short time period which has elapsed since the start of 
the programme, together with the inevitable lags in data 
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collection, makes it extremely difficult to establish solid 
empirical evidence. Moreover, the empirical literature on 
economic growth and convergence, which did provide some 
indications as to where and how to look for convergence, has 
come under mounting criticism. It has been criticised for its 
lack of theoretical foundations, for not asking the right 
questions and for not using the available information to its full 
extent in trying to answer those questions. 
The main question on which the empirical literature has 
focused is whether poor economies tend to grow faster than 
rich ones. This is clearly a necessary condition for 
convergence, but it has been recognized in most of the 
literature that it is not a sufficient condition. Other influences 
than the starting level of income on its own may prevent 
economies from converging. In fact, one would want to know 
by which channels growth is affected and why some economies 
converge where others do not. This is particularly relevant 
within the context of the internal market. Economic integration 
may strengthen the forces which bring about convergence and 
act as a general catalyst, but in the short to medium term it is 
more likely that some channels will be opened earlier than 
others. Depending on the importance of such channels for 
individual economies, growth may pick up fast in some of the 
poor economies in the Community whereas others appear to 
stay poor. 
The recent empirical literature on convergence proposes to 
study the distribution of income over countries and regions and 
its evolution over time in its entirety, rather than focusing on 
the typical behaviour in a group of countries or regions found 
by regression analysis. This alternative approach has not yet 
resulted in a clear methodology, and it is possible to analyse 
some of the characteristics of the distribution by taking a closer 
look at the regression residuals. This has been done to some 
extent in the Cambridge Econometrics (CE) study of which the 
results are presented below. Even then. it may be too early to 
expect clear empirical evidence in terms of overall economic 
growth. The CE study also analyses the behaviour of different 
sectors of the economy. Additional insight could come from 
studies which investigate the impact of the internal market on 
the channels through which, according to economic theory, 
convergence is brought about. 
7.4. The SMP, EU growth and real convergence 
The purpose of this section is to analyse Europe's experience 
with respect to growth, and then to interpret it within the 
context of the literature discussed above. 
To begin with, an important caveat should be underscored. 
Within the context of the present exercise. there is a 
fundamental problem in attempting to evaluate the growth 
effect of the SMP due to a combination of two issues. On one 
hand, the period covered by the evaluation is extremely short, 
essentially 1987-93. On the other, genuine growth effects are 
basically long-run effects which are unlikely to have 
materialized during such short period. The upshot is that, 
probably, the only growth effects that can be detected by the 
present evaluation are allocation and medium-term effects, both 
level effects producing temporary acceleration of growth rather 
than genuine long-run growth effects. 
Section 7.4.1. is essentially descriptive in character, 
summarizing growth and convergence trends in the EU prior to 
and since 1987, adopted as representing the first year of 
possible SMP effects (allowing for some anticipation of the 
legislative measures). In the section, descriptive statistics 
(essentially estimates of average growth rates) are calculated 
and compared for the two periods, to set out the facts that need 
to be explained. 
While it is tempting to interpret any change in these statistics 
after 1987 as representing the effect of the SMP, there are 
various problems in doing so. Firstly, the theoretical 
understanding of what determines growth needs to be made 
explicit. For example, if these 'growth trends' are taken to 
represent steady-state rates, which are altered by the exogenous 
influence of the SMP, it should be recognized that this view of 
the world is quite different from the conventional neoclassical 
one, in which actual growth rates decrease as an economy 
catches up with a richer 'leader'. This is not necessarily a 
criticism, but it demonstrates that interpretation can only be 
undertaken within some kind of theoretical framework, explicit 
or implicit. 
Secondly, to attribute the change in growth trends post-1987 to 
the SMP would clearly be grossly simplistic given all the 
economic events that have occurred in the period (see 
Chapter 2). Obviously, the method adopted here, based on 
Italianer ( 1994 ), of controlling for growth trends over the same 
periods in Japan and the US is not sufficient to account for all 
these factors. 
One method of attempting to adjust for other factors affecting 
growth is to include them explicitly in an econometric 
equation, together with a variable to represent the 
implementation of the SMP. Section 7.4.2. applies the 
methodology developed by Barro, estimating a variety of 
econometric equations on cross-section data for average growth 
rates in per capita output for the periods 1975-86 and 1987-93. 
Since this method uses average growth rates for a whole period, 
the representation of the SMP is necessarily crude: 'off' in the 
first period, and 'on' in the second. Equations are estimated for 
data at the level of the Member States, and below national level 
for regions at the NUTS 2 level, at which Member States and 
German Lander are disaggregated in administrated units of the 
size of the departments in France and the provinces in Belgium 
and the Netherlands. In the analysis at Member State level, the 
number of observations is small ( 12 countries per period). It 
was therefore decided to pool the data for the two periods and 
Growth and real convergence effects 
to allow for changes in the coefficients of a selection of 
variables in the second period. In the analysis at regional level, 
this problem does not arise, and so separate equations were 
estimated for the two periods. 
Finally, given the criticism made of the Barro methodology on 
grounds of both econometric and economic theory, an 
alternative method is also applied to data at the regional level, 
providing an alternative set of results on evidence for 
convergence. 
7.4.1. Descriptive analysis 1 
7.4.1.1. Aggregate analysis 
Using the methodology of Italian er ( 1994 ), Table 4 shows the 
growth rate of per capita gross value added (GV A) in Europe, 
Japan and the US over two periods, 1975-87 and 1987-93. 2 
Average growth over any period depends on the levels for the 
years selected to mark the start and end of the period, which 
may be influenced by temporary shocks to the economy and 
therefore may provide a misleading indication of underlying 
average annual growth.1 (see Table 4). 
In terms of GV A per capita, comparison of columns 1-3 of the 
table shows that the EU 12 as a whole grew slightly faster in 
the second subperiod than it did in the first, Japan saw a still 
smaller improvement and the US saw slower growth post-1987 
than before. These differences are quite small, but the 
remaining columns of the table show that when the change in 
the average growth rate is compounded over time, there is a 
non-negligible impact on comparative per capita GV A. In 
1993, EU 12 per capita output was 1.1 % higher than it would 
have been if the European economy had grown at the pre-1987 
trend rate, while Japanese output was 0.2% higher and US 
output about 2% lower on the same basis. 
Table 5 shows that this impression of a relatively better EU 12 
performance is reinforced when the same analysis is carried out 
for GVA (as opposed to GV A per capita). The EU 12 
experienced a higher growth rate in the post-1987 period than 
earlier, whereas Japan and the US did not. These results, based 
1 This section draws on the results by Cambridge Econometrics ( 1996). 
' The year 1983 was adopted as the end-point of the SMP period for the sake of 
coherence with the rest of the report. 
' In order to minimize the role of period-end noise, GVA per capita growth has 
been estimated by fitting the trend growth curve log(Y) =a+ bt, in which Y is 
the variable whose growth rate is being estimated, bis the trend exponential 
growth rate. and t is time. The same methodology is applied in the sections 
below. 
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Table 4 
GVA per capita growth rates after 1987 compared with 1975-87 trend 
% pa pp Cumulative impact (per cent) 
1975-87 1987-93 Difference 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
B 1.59 2.12 0.53 0.32 3.29 4.81 6.17 6.52 6.49 2.90 
DK 2.15 0.95 - 1.20 - 1.98 - 3.02 -4.64 - 5.52 -6.94 - 8.02 - 8.98 
WD 1.90 2.60 0.70 -0.44 0.76 1.46 4.82 6.85 5.80 1.52 
EL 1.37 1.17 -0.20 - 2.03 0.83 3.20 0.26 0.94 -0.00 -2.27 
E 0.85 2.40 1.55 4.66 8.72 12.40 14.98 16.18 15.85 13.61 
F 1.64 1.42 -0.22 0.18 2.56 4.66 4.49 3.16 2.18 -0.93 
IRL 1.73 8.60 6.87 3.97 8.46 19.00 23.78 29.88 38.78 48.05 
I 2.41 1.50 -0.91 0.55 2.01 2.38 1.89 0.41 - 1.46 -4.75 
L 2.20 2.59 0.39 -0.05 3.10 6.43 6.08 6.16 5.02 2.90 
NL 0.88 2.00 1.12 -0.34 0.73 3.90 6.42 7.00 6.63 15.40 
p 1.74 3.55 1.81 3.08 4.89 7.96 15.39 15.96 15.00 11.70 
UK 1.82 0.38 - 1.44 2.63 5.54 5.59 3.86 -0.23 -2.88 - 3.00 
North Italy 2.53 1.67 -0.86 0.44 2.27 2.83 2.40 0.50 -0.92 -4.42 
South Italy 2.27 1.17 - 1.10 0.90 1.29 1.07 0.31 0.03 -3.24 - 5.91 
Non-objective 1 Spain 1.13 2.36 1.23 4.24 8.28 12.21 14.15 14.88 13.98 11.53 
Objective 1 Spain 0.64 2.45 1.81 5.03 9.02 12.34 15.52 17.15 17.34 15.26 
EU 12 1.72 1.78 0.06 0.84 2.98 4.31 5.25 4.75 3.59 1.06 
EU6 1.85 1.96 0.11 0.03 1.74 3.04 4.30 4.38 3.29 -0.14 
EU9 1.84 1.68 -0.16 0.54 2.47 3.52 4.15 3.42 2.13 -0.48 
1973 entrants 1.83 0.75 - 1.08 2.20 4.78 5.02 3.61 0.15 - 1.88 - 1.67 
New entrants 1.00 2.39 1.39 3.34 7.00 10.41 12.90 13.99 13.51 11.1 
Objective 1 1.05 2.87 1.82 3.38 7.09 10.96 13.62 15.08 15.32 83.96 
Japan 3.15 3.18 0.03 0.44 3.05 4.18 5.49 6.07 3.88 0.19 
us 1.53 0.72 -0.81 0.58 1.99 2.16 0.98 -2.78 -2.68 -2.03 
Source(s): CE's E3ME database, based on Eurostat Cronos, OECD 
Note: Great care should be applied in interpreting the results in this table as cycles tend to differ across Member States. 
on an admittedly simplistic methodology, broadly confirm the 
findings of Chapter 6 (see Table 5). 
Within the EU 12, analysis of the performance of Member 
States grouped by their date of entry into the EU adds useful 
insights. In terms of GV A, the EU 6 and EU 9 performed much 
the same as the EU 12 as a whole, but the 'new entrants', 
Spain, Portugal and Greece, saw a larger relative improvement, 
their overall GV A in 1993 being nearly 7% higher than it 
would have been had pre-1987 growth trends continued. These 
three countries plus Ireland form the group of the so-called 
'cohesion countries'. In this case the picture is even more 
striking, with an improvement of nearly 9.5% in 1993 relative 
to an extrapolation of pre-1987 trends. This reflects the rapid 
growth of the Irish economy since 1987. With an average 
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growth rate of about 8.5% per annum post-1987, compared 
with 2.7% per annum in the period up to 1987, Ireland's GVA 
in 1993 was about 40% higher than it would have been if its 
economy had continued to grow at the pre-1987 rate. 
Examining GV A per capita, the comparison of actual and 
extrapolated levels ceases to be positive for the original EU 6 
and EU 9, while the improved performance for the 'new 
entrants' and cohesion countries is even higher. 
Graph 2 shows population trends in the period 1975-93 in 
Ireland, Greece, and Spain (1975= I 00). After having 
experienced higher population growth than the EU 12 average 
in the early years, growth generally slowed. 
Growth and real convergence effects 
Table 5 
GVA growth rates after 1987 compared with 1975-87 trend 
% pa pp Cumulative impact(%) 
1975-87 1987-93 Difference 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
B 1.65 2.43 0.78 0.34 3.59 5.42 7.02 7.63 7.84 4.48 
DK 2.23 1.13 -1.10 -1.94 -3.00 -4.66 -5.47 -6.69 -7.60 -8.40 
WD 1.82 3.39 1.57 -0.34 1.56 3.37 7.25 10.48 10.35 6.82 
EL 2.19 1.71 -0.48 -2.65 -0.4 1.45 -1.76 -0.78 -2.17 -4.90 
E 1.57 2.62 1.05 4.07 7.66 10.83 12.88 13.53 12.76 10.09 
F 2.10 2.02 -0.08 0.15 2.55 4.70 5.11 3.81 2.90 -0.17 
IRL 2.68 8.48 5.80 3.08 6.47 15.33 18.80 24.59 32.35 40.58 
I 2.68 1.71 -0.97 0.45 1.84 2.10 1.56 0.08 -1.85 -5.19 
L 2.43 3.46 1.03 0.56 3.77 8.00 8.77 9.43 8.84 7.01 
NL 1.46 2.70 1.24 -0.28 0.87 4.09 6.74 7.54 7.34 6.23 
p 2.67 2.74 0.07 2.58 3.83 6.31 8.02 7.50 5.90 2.2 
UK 1.91 0.69 -1.22 2.85 5.92 6.19 4.67 0.78 -1.64 -1.52 
North Italy 2.63 1.75 -0.88 0.31 2.04 2.50 2.09 0.24 -1.20 -4.73 
South Italy 2.84 1.60 -1.24 0.87 1.23 0.87 -0.08 -0.45 -3.87 -6.65 
Non-objective 1 Spain 1.52 2.56 1.04 3.96 7.87 11.57 13.31 13.80 12.79 10.19 
Objective 1 Spain 1.62 2.69 1.07 4.2 7.46 10.05 12.44 13.28 12.77 10.03 
EU 12 2.02 2.18 0.16 0.77 2.98 4.46 5.40 5.11 4.10 1.68 
EU6 2.07 2.50 0.43 0.04 1.98 3.63 5.23 5.72 4.95 1.78 
EU9 2.05 2.15 0.10 0.57 2.68 4.01 4.92 4.53 3.51 1.13 
1973 entrants 1.97 1.02 -0.95 2.34 4.99 5.32 4.04 0.75 -1.13 -0.76 
New entrants 1.77 2.48 0.71 2.77 5.93 8.82 9.98 10.58 9.63 6.84 
Objective I 1.83 2.95 1.12 2.79 5.96 9.25 10.57 11.55 11.29 9.44 
Japan 3.89 3.54 -0.35 0.22 2.54 3.37 4.30 4.46 1.87 -2.22 
us 2.56 1.60 -0.96 0.52 1.90 2.06 0.31 -3.40 -3.39 -2.83 
Source(,): CE's E3ME database, based on Eurostat Cronos, OECD 
Note: Great care should be applied in interpreting the results in this table as cycles tend to differ across Member States. 
It is, of course, difficult to disentangle the effect of the SMP 
from other effects that could be responsible for these changes. 
For example, the fast growth of the Irish economy has been 
driven by foreign investment (notably from the US and Japan) 
and this reflects active domestic policies to attract foreign 
investors, not just the attractions of the single market. On the 
other hand, it is clear that foreign investors located in Ireland 
supply the European market. 
Despite the caveats that must be noted with respect to causality, 
there is therefore a broad indication that some of the 
predictions of the simple neoclassical model have been 
validated, with a faster growth in per capita income in the 
poorer economies. These mechanisms seem to have been 
enhanced during the period of the single market. 
An examination of investment trends in the EU, Japan and the 
US, helps to reinforce the point. Graph 3 shows the aggregate 
investment to output ratio in the EU 12 compared with 
cohesion countries, the US and Japan. At the EU 12 level, it is 
evident that the ratio rose in the boom post-1987, and then fell 
sharply. Comparison with the US experience is of some 
interest. The EU 12 investment to output ratio is higher in 
1975, falls steadily until 1985, when it is equal to the US ratio, 
and then has risen above the US ratio again. However, the 
Japan ratio remains well above the EU average. Both the 
improvement after 1987 and the fall over 1991-93 are much 
more marked for cohesion countries. Graph 4 shows this 
indicator for the countries separately, and shows that the largest 
effect is in Spain and Portugal. In both cases, however, the 
turning point seems to be 1985, when they joined the EU. On 
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Table 6 
Average investment to output ratio 
1975- 1987 1987- 1993 Diffe rence 
B 18.39 19.69 1.30 
DK 19.88 17.88 - 2.00 
WD 2 1.20 20.87 - 0 .33 
EL 27.'12 22 .68 - 5.04 
E 22.75 26.08 3.33 
F 21.38 2 1.71 0 .33 
IRL 26.59 19.62 - 6.97 
I 23.24 22 .85 -0.39 
L 23. 18 28.57 5.39 
NL 20 .58 20.57 - 0 .01 
p 27. 11 3 1.43 4.32 
UK 17.03 18.53 1.50 
North Italy 17.6 1 19.96 2.35 
South Italy 40.30 3 1.57 - 8.73 
EU 12 20.96 2 1. 32 0 .36 
EU 6 2 1.57 2 1.53 - 0.04 
EU 9 20.66 20.84 0 . 18 
1973 ent ra nt s 17.6 1 18.50 0 .89 
New entrant s 24.02 26.03 2.01 
Objec ti ve I 24. 19 25.55 1.36 
Japan 29. 10 32. 13 3.03 
us 18.53 18.01 - 0.52 
Source(.,'): CE's. E3 ME database. based on Eurostat Cronos. OECD 
Note I: Defined as the ratio of total gross domestic fi xed capital fonnation to GDP 
Note 2: Great care should be ap plied in interpreting the result s in thi s table as 
cyc les tend to differ across Member States. 
184 
the other hand, Ireland saw a slight decline in its investment to 
output ratio , becau se it s outpu t growth has been so rapid: 
Ire land· s share of EU aggregate investment has ac tually 
increased since 1987, but not as fas t as it s share of output. 
Table 6 shows the average investment to output ra tio in the 
different countries pre-1987 and shows the improvement in 
Spain and Portugal. Comparison with Figure 45 shows that the 
lower inves tment to output ave rage ra ti o in Greece in the 
second period is due to the decline over 1975-87, which was 
actually reversed after 1987. 
The ave rage R&D spending (see Table 7) to output ra tio 
increased slightl y in the second period (by about 0.4 pp) in 
EU 12 as a whole, more in the EU 9 (0.4 pp) than in the 'new 
entrants' group (0.2 pp). The performances of the UK (0.5 pp) 
and, indeed, of the group of countries which entered the EU in 
1973 (0.5 pp) have been slightly stronger than the average . The 
difference between the old and new entrants suggests that it 
may take several years before the R&D capacity is increased in 
response to a market enlargement. 
7.4.1. 2. Broad sectoral analysis 
The Cecchini report expec ted that the impac t of the single 
market would not be uniform across sectors. In particul ar, it 
expec ted the major benefit to be in high-tech sec tors where 
potential dynamic scale economies are higher, in industries 
Growth and real convergence effects 
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Table 7 
Average R&D spending to output ratio 
1975-1987 1987-1993 Difference 
B 1.21 1.76 0.55 
DK 0.57 0.96 0.39 
WD 1.68 2.10 0.42 
EL 0.49 0.67 0.18 
E 0.48 0.84 0.36 
F 1.17 1.52 0.35 
IRL 1.77 2.30 0.53 
I 0.47 0.89 0.42 
L . 0.74 1.11 0.37 
NL 0.93 1.10 0.17 
p 0.50 0.94 0.44 
UK 1.40 1.94 0.54 
EU 12 1.14 1.55 0.41 
EU6 1.17 1.55 0.38 
EU9 1.20 1.62 0.42 
1973 entrants 1.32 1.85 0.53 
New entrants 0.48 0.82 0.34 
Objective I 0.57 0.93 0.36 
Source(s): CE's, E3ME database, based on Eurostat Cronos, OECD 
Note 1: Defined as the ratio of R&D spending to GDP 
Note 2: Great care should be applied in interpreting the results in this table as 
cycles tend to differ across Member States. 
Table 8 
more dependent on public procurement, and in sectors such as 
air transport and financial services where competition from 
foreign firms was still limited by domestic regulations. It also 
noted that high tech fast-growing industries (like office 
automation, data-processing, electronics, electric tools) were 
far better represented in Japan and the US than in Europe. 
As a first stage in analysing sectoral performance, we consider 
the data for very broad sectoral groups: manufacturing, market 
services and construction. While it is common to focus on 
manufacturing industry, sometimes identified with the goods 
sector, the SMP was specifically designed to address service 
sectors where little liberalization has occurred. 
Note that the analysis only covers the period to 1991 because 
pan-EU sectoral data are less reliable thereafter. Hence the two 
subperiods in the analysis here are 1975-87 and 1987-91. 
Table 8 shows the GV A growth rate pre-1987 and post-1987 in 
the manufacturing sector for each country and for different 
groups of European countries against the average growth rate in 
the US and Japan. The overall growth effect of the single 
market on EU 12 manufacturing does not appear to be strong. 
European manufacturing output grew faster after 1987 than it 
did in the earlier period (by about 1.4 pp per annum on 
average), and the cumulative gain by 1991 is about 6%, but this 
GVA growth rates after 1987 compared with 1975-87 trend - manufacturing 
% pa pp Cumulative impact(%) 
1975-87 1987-9 l Difference 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
B 2.60 3.56 0.96 - 1.27 1.46 3.97 5.97 1.75 
DK 3.06 1.86 - 1.20 -4.63 -6.14 -6.45 - 7.41 -9.89 
WD 0.73 2.73 2.00 -2.06 - 0.11 2.27 4.58 5.80 
EL 3.99 3.79 -0.20 - 1.94 1.05 1.74 -0.46 - 1.73 
E 0.75 2.25 1.50 4.14 7.63 10.27 10.19 10.53 
F 0.95 2.57 1.62 - 1.12 2.59 5.67 6.56 5.23 
IRL 3.37 11.49 8.12 2.22 9.02 26.78 28.12 37.59 
I 1.53 2.78 1.25 2.16 7.08 9.07 9.54 7.48 
L 1.57 4.5 2.48 - 2.38 5.35 10.73 9.44 8.74 
NL 0.47 3.72 3.25 -0.60 0.85 6.19 9.80 11.57 
p 2.20 4.50 2.30 0.89 2.00 6.43 9.35 9.29 
UK 0.44 -0.05 -0.49 2.25 8.27 9.82 5.99 1.36 
EU 12 0.98 2.41 1.43 0.11 3.69 6.27 6.82 5.90 
EU6 1.03 2.81 1.78 -0.69 2.46 5.14 6.72 6.31 
EU9 0.97 2.39 1.42 -0.21 3.40 5.97 6.56 5.52 
1973 entrants 0.76 0.69 -0.07 1.67 7.10 9.20 5.90 2.27 
New entrants 1.6 2.59 1.53 3.47 6.70 9.45 9.61 9.85 
Objective I 1.22 3.38 2.16 3.39 6.91 10.88 11.20 12.38 
Japan 5.23 7.50 2.27 2.09 6.10 8.85 11.23 12.32 
us 2.83 0.73 -2.10 1.65 4.03 2.14 - 1.09 -6.13 
S011rce(.1·): CE's E3ME database, based on Eurostat Cronos, OECD 
Note: Great care should be applied in interpreting the results in this table as cycles tend to differ across Member States. 
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Table 9 
GV A per worker growth rates after 1987 compared with 1975-87 trend - manufacturing 
% pa pp Cumulative impact (per cent) 
1975-87 1987-91 Difference 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
B 5.68 3.80 -1.88 -2 .14 -0.57 -3 .03 -3 .71 -9.46 
DK 2.62 5.77 3.15 -2.59 -1.80 -0.52 8.97 9.02 
WD 1.16 1.46 0.30 -2.58 -0.73 0.00 -0.63 -1.04 
EL 2.14 3.82 1.68 1.86 8.64 9.19 8.71 10.75 
E 3.50 0.77 -2.73 -1.94 -2.92 -5 .98 -11.48 -11.18 
F 2.88 3.02 0.14 -0.48 3. 13 4.10 2.67 0.76 
IRL 4.39 8.88 4.49 3.57 7.41 19 .04 15.53 24.90 
I 2.85 2.84 -0.01 1.72 4.01 4 .29 3.48 2.18 
L 4.22 4.05 -0.17 -2.42 2.66 5.44 1.45 -1.90 
NL 2.15 1.41 -0.74 -4.02 -4.87 -2.80 -6.48 -6.77 
p 2.34 3.51 1.17 3.19 6.15 8.55 9.86 7.56 
UK 3.94 2.54 -1.40 -3 .20 -0.87 -1.57 -5 .81 -7.43 
EU 12 2.69 2.43 -0.26 -1.59 0.38 0.60 -I.OS -2.00 
EU6 2.23 2.27 0.04 -1.11 1.10 1.77 0.71 -0.57 
EU9 2.71 2.60 -0. 11 -1.75 0.30 0.79 -0.59 -1.67 
1973 entrants 3.92 3.20 -0.72 -3.02 -0.82 -0.82 -3 .94 -4.70 
New entrants 2.60 1.46 -1.14 0.69 2.00 0.63 -2.75 -2.48 
Objective 1 2.73 2.18 -0.55 0.81 2.36 2.11 -1.18 0.03 
Japan 4.80 5.41 0.61 3.87 6.12 7. 15 8.35 6.61 
us 3.00 1.44 -1.56 1.08 1.04 -1.36 -3 .04 -4.62 
S011rce(s): CE's E3ME database. based on Eurostat Cronos. OECD. 
Note: Great care should be applied in interpreting the results in thi s tabl e as cyc les tend to differ across Member States. 
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is less than for Japan and the short period considered after 1987 
does not justify any firm conclusion. Graph 5 shows that a 
modest acceleration after 1987 was subsequently reversed with 
the onset of the recession . Productivity growth (Table 9) 
actually slowed slightly after 1987. 
Graph 6 shows the profile of manufacturing GV A for Spain, 
Portugal , Greece and Ireland . The dramatic increase in 
Ireland 's growth rate after 1987 is apparent: growth over the 
period 1987-91 was over 8 pp higher than in the previous 
period. Portugal and, to a lesser extent, Spain also saw their 
growth rates increase by more than did that of the EU 12 as a 
whole, while Greece maintained a higher than average growth 
rate (about 4% p.a. in the period before 1987 and slightly less 
afterwards). Hence, on average, cohesion countries saw an 
acceleration in the growth rate of manufacturing after 1987, but 
with an uneven distribution (with Ireland strongly favoured). 
In market services the picture is quite different. While Japan 
and the US saw slower growth in the second period than in the 
first, the EU 12 saw an increase as Graph 7 shows, and in this 
case the EU 6 Germany, Italy , France and Benelux saw the 
biggest increase. The cumulative gain with respect to Japan and 
the US is more than 5% in 1991 for the EU 12 and more than 
7%, Table 10). The ' new entrants ' countries seem to have seen 
slower growth after 1987, although the Spanish data are suspect 
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and require further analysis. Certainly Portugal and Ireland saw 
a relative improvement, shown in Graph 8. 
In conclusion, market services have seen an improved 
performance in terms of output during the post-1987 period, 
affecting not only the poorest countries, but also the most 
developed countries in Europe. Only the UK saw a weaker 
performance in the second period (2.5 % per annum versus 
3.5% per annum). The tentative conclusion could be that the 
favourable impact of the SMP has been felt primarily in the 
services sector in the older Member States and in both the 
manufacturing and the services sector in the new entrants. 
Construction has seen the most marked increase in output , 
particularly in Spain, Portugal and Greece. The EU 12 average 
growth rate in construction output was around 0.1 % per annum 
in the first period and about 3.6% per annum in the second. 
Graph 9 shows the coincidence in timing between the 
acceleration in construction output and the start of the SMP. 
There was also a marked increase for the 'new entrants '. Graph 
I O shows the performances of Spain, Portugal , Greece and 
Ireland, with Spain and Portugal seeing the largest effects . 
Clearly the fact that EU regional funding is mostly related to 
infrastructure work is a factor that needs to be distinguished 
from private sector investment stimulated by the SMP. 
Growth and real convergence effects 
Table 10 
GVA growth rates after 1987 compared with 1975-87 trend - market services 
% pa pp Cumulative impact (per cent) 
1975-87 1987-91 Difference 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
B 2.22 3.76 1.54 1.60 4.90 7.17 6.57 8.85 
DK 2.09 2.36 0.27 0.87 0.96 0.11 0.77 2.46 
WD 3.29 5.69 2.40 0.37 2.30 3.62 7.51 10.63 
EL 2.83 3.45 0.62 -3.01 -0.97 0.57 -0.58 0.26 
E 1.77 -1.75 -3.52 3.16 6.33 -5.15 -6.23 -7.30 
F 3.00 2.99 -0.01 1.07 2.05 3.82 2.66 1.00 
IRL 3.77 8.38 4.61 3.72 4.27 11.15 16.18 22.74 
I 2.69 3.33 0.64 0.71 2.14 2.87 3.54 3.52 
L 4.44 6.75 2.31 3.34 4.3 1 10.46 13.60 11.62 
NL 2.57 4.38 1.81 5.23 5.46 6.13 11.22 11.97 
p 2.06 5.28 3.22 6.18 9.08 11.92 18 .36 18.45 
UK 3.54 2.46 -1.08 4.10 6.73 8.45 5.85 -0.44 
EU 12 2.94 3.45 0.51 1.81 3.61 4.10 4.72 4.14 
EU6 2.95 4 .15 1.20 1.09 2.55 3.87 5.37 6.14 
EU9 3.05 3.81 0.76 1.68 3.35 4.74 5.41 4.83 
1973 entrants 3.39 2.61 -0.78 3.77 6.12 7.74 5.65 0.46 
New entrants 1.86 -0.68 -2.54 3.11 6.19 -3.17 -3.38 -4.19 
Objective 1 1.95 -0.09 -2.04 3.16 6.12 -2.33 -2.17 -2.42 
Japan 4.62 4.52 0.10 -0.88 -0.02 1.79 1.03 -1.33 
us 3.27 2.14 -1.13 0.95 2.09 1.75 -0.81 -3.07 
Source( e'): CE's E3ME database. based on Eurostat Cronos. OECD 
Note: Great care should be appl ied in interpreting the resu lts in thi s table as cycles tend to differ across Member States. 
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7.4.2. Econometric analysis 
The Cambridge Econometrics (CE) study tries to assess the 
different aspects of convergence, using mainly regression 
analysis. The analysis is applied to the national data pooled for 
the EU 12, and the set of regional data obtained by pooling the 
regional data across the 12 Member States. In accordance with 
the common practice in Barro-type growth regressions, the 
average growth of gross value added per capita over the period 
is regressed on the logarithm of the level of GV A per capita at 
the start of the period, and variables such as the investment to 
output ratio , the R&D to output ratio , changes in the 
participation rate and a proxy for human capital. 
In order to allow for the possible impact of the internal market 
on growth and the speed of convergence, the period 1975-93 is 
split into the period up to and including 1987 and the post-1987 
period. Dummy variables are used to proxy the impact of EU 
membership and to represent the differential impact on 
subgroupings of the Member States. Southern Italy and the part 
of Spain which receives Objective I support are added to the 
list of countries in some of the regressions because of their 
entitlement to structural funds and the possibility that the 
effects of the internal market in these regions, which are larger 
in size than many of the individual Member States, are different 
from those in the rest of the country. 
Growth and real convergence effects 
The basic neoclassical model of Solow assumes the existence 
of a common steady state of GV A per capita to which each 
country is converging. A country's growth rate depends on how 
far the economy is from this steady state. The coefficient of the 
log of the starting level of GV A per capita determines the speed 
of convergence. A negative coefficient means that, apart from 
the influence of other variables, a process of convergence has 
been proceeding over the period . An interaction term is 
included to allow this coefficient to change for the two 
different subperiods. A negative coefficient on this term means 
that the convergence process accelerated from 1987 onwards. 
7.4.2.1 . The results without conditioning variables 
A simple regression with the average growth rate on the left-
hand side and the starting level of GV A per capita on the right-
hand side was estimated separately for the two time periods 
The estimate of the coefficient of the starting level of per capita 
GV A (beta) turns out to be positive for the pre-1987 period and 
negative for the SMP period, but in neither case it is significant. 
Controlling for Ireland, by introducing a dummy, dramatically 
improves the goodness of fit. It also improves the statistical of 
the negative beta-coefficient for the second period (see 
Table 11). 
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Table 11 
Unconditional beta-convergence 
Explanatory variables 1975-87 1987-93 1975-87 1987-93 1975-87 1987-93 
Constant 1.218 6.09 1.183 3.74 1.273 3.77 
( 1.85) (2.17) ( 1.64) (3.13) ( 1.80) (3.00) 
gvapv 0.214 - 1.64 0.228 -0.824 0.196 -0.820 
(0.67) (- 1.33) (0.65) (- 1.59) (0.58) (- 1.57) 
ire 0.099 6.402 0.062 6.365 
(0.17) (7.12) (0.11) (7.09) 
sita 0.705 -0.986 
( 1.25) (- 1.11) 
spa - 1.152 0.045 
(- 1.99) (0.05) 
R-BAR * 0.06 * 0.85 0.20 0.82 
Note(s): Figures in parentheses denote I-statistics. 
The symbol * denotes negative R-BAR. 
See Annex Table A I for variables. 
Source: Cambridge Econometrics (1996). 
Table 12 
Growth regression: OLS estimates (EUR 12) 
Explanatory variables 
Constant -0.08 -0.52 3.15 7.57 
(-0.03) (-0.16) (0.89) (2.62) 
pogvapc -1.450 -0.78 -3.58 -2.55 
(-1.75) (-0.51) (-1.76) (-2.45) 
accel -1.04 6.33 3.74 
(-0.53) (2.15) (2.16) 
poedu 1.81 1.79 3.00 0.17 
(0.69) (0.66) ( 1.23) (0.13) 
poavlab 0.167 0.132 0.223 0.2155 
(0.98) (0.70) ( 1.34) (2.41) 
poinv 0.0700 0.0601 0.187 0.1656 
(0.74) (0.61) ( I. 78) (2.56) 
porsd 1.702 1.710 1.787 0.741 
( 1.82) (1.78) (2.26) ( 1.58) 
poaveu 0.68 -0.03 -0.81 --4.91 
(0.34) (-0.01) (-0.39) (-1.64) 
poim 0.516 2.73 -15.19 -8.48 
(0.66) (0.64) (-2.19) (-2.06) 
poire 4.84 
(2.01) 
intire 1.02 
(0.38) 
poobl -3.44 -6.48 
(-1.64) (-2.53) 
intobl 7.95 7.58 
(2.89) (2.42) 
R-BAR 0.205 0.168 0.434 0.863 
Note(s): Figures in parentheses denote I-statistics. 
See Annex Table A I for variables. 
Source: Cambridge Econometrics (1996) 
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Table 13 
Growth regression: IV estimates (EUR 12) 
Explanatory variables 
Constant -8.074 -8.072 2.624 7.889 
(-1.345) (-1.4354) (0.649) (2.217) 
pogvapc -1.360 -1.362 -5.707 -2.720 
(-1.321) (-0.7053) (-2.108) (-1.877) 
accel 
poedu 2.472 
(0.733) 
poavlab 0.062 
(0.282) 
poinv 0.346 
( 1.736) 
porsd 2.471 
( 1.950) 
poaveu 1.674 
(0.653) 
poim 0.428 
(0.438) 
poire 
intire 
poobl 
intob 1 
R-BAR * 
Note(s): Figures in parentheses denote !-statistics. 
The symbol * denotes negative R-BAR. 
See Annex Table A I for variables. 
Source: Cambridge Econometrics ( 1996) 
The same regressions were run for the set of 'countries' 
including southern Italy and Objective 1 Spain. This did not 
improve the convergence result. Southern Italy appears to have 
performed better than average in the first period, given the 
starting value of its GV A per capita, but worse in the second. 
The opposite appears to be the case for Objective I Spain. 
7.4.2.2. The results when other variables are introduced 
The next thing is to add possible explanatory variables which 
could be subject to change as a consequence of the internal 
market. The data for the two subperiods are now pooled. Zero-
one variables are introduced for EU membership and the 
internal market. The investment to output and the R&D to 
output are used as additional right-hand side variables. A 
dummy for Greece, Spain, Ireland and Portugal was introduced 
to represent the Objective I status of these countries (see 
Annex Tables A 1 and A2 for the list of variables and see 
Tables 12 and 13). 
0.002 8.853 4.027 
(0.0007) (2.369) (1.584) 
2.472 4.276 0.286 
(0.7156) ( 1.446) (0.209) 
0.062 0.168 0.217 
(0.2632) (0.871) (2.359) 
0.346 0.388 0.184 
( 1.7942) (2.172) ( 1.429) 
2.471 2.211 0.759 
(1.8916) (2.295) ( 1.224) 
1.675 -0.574 -5.312 
(0.5239) (-0.244) (-1.305) 
0.424 -21.070 -9.143 
(0.0777) (-2.402) (-1.513) 
5.189 
( 1.546) 
0.623 
-5.905 (0.159) 
(-2.038) -6.982 
10.635 (-1.696) 
(2.960) 8.169 
( 1.622) 
* 0.272 0.862 
The results suggest that there are strong interactions between 
the SMP impact and the changes in the investment and R&D 
variables. The coefficient on the starting level of GV A per 
capita is negative, but not significant. The coefficient of the 
SMP dummy is positive but not very robust to alternative 
specifications. Removing the investment and R&D terms 
increases the significance of the SMP term without surpassing 
the critical value for the t-statistic. This finding seems to 
conform with the observation of Baldwin and Venables (1995) 
that in most studies employing Barro-style regressions the 
proxy for integration proves to be insignificant because of the 
presence of the investment to output stands in the way of 
finding a positive impact of economic integration on 
convergence (see Table 14). 
The regressions do not show a significant increase in the speed 
of convergence due to the SMP. Again the coefficient of the 
interaction term is not robust to the specification, and it is 
positive when significant. That is in the case where dummies 
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Table 14 
Growth regression: OLS estimates (EUR 12) 
Explanatory variables 
Constant 2.02 1.25 4.33 4.44 
( 1.44) (0.63) ( 1.06) (1.43) 
pogvapc -1.473 -0.76 -1.88 -1.08 
(-1.70) (-0.48) (-0.96) (-1.07) 
accel -1.10 4.21 0.91 
(-0.55) (1.38) (0.57) 
poedu 4.00 4.06 4.05 -0.28 
( 1.76) (1.75) (1.83) (-0.21) 
poavlab 0.169 0.127 0.253 0.181 
(0.98) (0.66) ( 1.33) (1.76) 
poinv 
porsd 
poaveu 0.66 -0.05 -0.84 -0.62 
(0.32) (-0.02) (-0.35) (-0.21) 
poim 1.156 
( 1.64) 
poire 
intire 
poobl 
intobl 
R-BAR 0.168 
Note(s): Figures in parentheses denote I-statistics. 
See Annex Tahle A I for variables. 
Source: Cambridge Econometrics ( 1996) 
for Objective 1 status and the exceptional Irish performance are 
added to the regression. The overall internal market impact 
then appears to be strongly negative, but this is compensated by 
the addition to growth in the non-Objective I countries. If there 
is an increase in the speed of convergence, this appears to be 
due to the faster post-1987 growth in Ireland and the other 
cohesion countries. 
The coefficient for the Objective I countries is negative in the 
first period and positive and significant in the second period. 
This implies that Objective I countries have not been growing 
as fast as would have been expected on the basis of their GV A 
per capita level in the pre-SMP period, but they have been 
growing significantly faster in the SMP period. The estimated 
SMP effect on the overall speed of convergence suggest a 
slowdown. The CE study comes forward with the tentative 
explanation that the convergence between the richer Member 
States did not go on after 1987, whereas the Objective I 
countries started to catch up. 
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3.53 -9.65 -1.68 
(0.81) (-1.34) (-0.44) 
1.25 
(0.53) 
5.57 
(2.33) 
-1.42 -1.60 
(-0.75) (-0.78) 
5.64 1.50 
(2.07) (0.60) 
0.105 0.233 0.862 
An important question is whether the catch-up process of the 
poorest Community countries is explained by their accession to 
the EU or by their participation in the internal market. It is 
difficult to disentangle the two effects because of the temporal 
coincidence between the accession of Spain and Portugal to the 
EU and the implementation of the SMP. The EU entry dummy 
receives a very low coefficient, suggesting that the SMP effects 
is more important. The coincidence of strong growth in Ireland 
with the implementation of the SMP supports this interpretation 
(see Tables 15, 16 and 17). 
If growth in the poorer economies accelerated in the second 
period, this does not seem to be true for the rest of the 
European countries. This result seems to be robust to changes 
in the specification and the use of alternative regression 
techniques. Distinguishing Objective I Spain and southern Italy 
in the sample does not change this result either, but there are 
indications that the convergence of southern Italy has been 
reversed in the SMP period, whereas it has not changed for 
Objective I Spain. 
Growth and real convergence effects 
Table 15 
Growth regression: OLS estimates (EUR 12 +2) 
Explanatory variables 
Constant -0.04 -0.23 2.17 3.33 -0.58 -0.28 
(-0.01) (-0.08) (0.54) (1.78) (-0.18) (-0.09) 
pogvapc -1.270 -0.92 -3.30 -2.14 -0.54 -0.85 
(-1.77) (-0.77) (-1.24) (-1.64) (-0.40) (-0.67) 
accel -0.56 4.36 1.30 -1.08 -0.71 
(-0.36) ( 1.24) (0.77) (-0.62) (-0.42) 
poedu 0.71 0.57 1.70 -1.09 0.68 0.78 
(0.29) (0.23) (0.66) (-0.75) (0.24) (0.28) 
poavlab 0.159 0.140 0.243 0.1332 0.122 0.125 
( 1.04) (0.85) (1.39) (1.57) (0.69) (0.70) 
poinv 0.0676 0.0594 0.130 0.0550 0.0550 0.0651 
(0.76) (0.64) (1.20) (1.02) (0.57) (0.65) 
porsd 1.793 1.819 1.668 0.366 1.803 1.760 
(2.01) (1.99) (1.86) (0.83) ( 1.90) ( I. 79) 
poaveu 0.86 0.58 1.48 1.95 0.12 0.35 
(0.52) (0.31) (0.67) ( 1.61) (0.05) (0.17) 
poim 0.304 1.47 -10.14 -2.62 2.72 1.83 
(0.44) (0.45) (-1.26) (-0.67) (0.72) (0.50) 
posspa -0.68 
(-0.39) 
intsspa 0.46 
(0.20) 
posita 1.07 
(0.63) 
intsita -1.79 
(-0.82) 
poire 0.134 
(0.14) 
intire 6.99 
(6.17) 
poobl -1.80 -1.308 
(-0.96) (-1.51) 
intob 1 4.17 0.37 
( 1.61) (0.29) 
R-BAR 0.223 0.188 0.226 0.838 * * 
Note(s): Figure in the parenthesis denote t-statistics. 
The symbol * denotes negative R-BAR. 
Italy and Spain are divided into their Objective I and non-Objective I parts. 
See Annex Table A I for variables. 
Source: Cambridge Econometrics ( 1996) 
7.4.2.3. OECD control group 
An interesting extension of the exercise and a check on the 
results is provided by the use of the full data set on GDP per 
capita in all the OECD countries. As in the previous section, 
the possibility of unconditional beta-convergence across OECD 
countries was investigated by estimating growth equations 
without additional explanatory variables. The equations were 
estimated separately for the two periods. Zero-one variables for 
EU membership, Objective 1 status and the exceptional 
performance of Ireland were included (see Tables 18 and 19). 
The positive coefficient on the starting level of GDP per capita 
(see first column of Table 18) indicates that convergence was 
not a feature of growth across OECD countries over the period 
1975-92. By contrast, the convergence coefficient obtained by 
estimating the same equation over the second period is 
significantly negative. 
This result simply reflects that, within the group of OECD 
countries, the poor countries showed faster growth than the rest 
in the SMP period, whereas the opposite was the case in the 
period before the start of the SMP. EU membership appears to 
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Table 16 
Growth regression: IV estimates (EUR 12 +2) 
Explanatory variables 
Constant -9.269 -8.409 0.839 3.614 -9.317 -7.600 
(-1.381) (-1.4665) (0.182) (1.838) (-1.5584) (-1.3091) 
pogvapc -1.274 -1.644 -6.239 -1.557 -1.390 -1.413 
(-1.399) (-1.0551) (-1.778) (-0.938) (-0.7639) (-0.8938) 
accel 0.601 8.105 0.569 0.288 0.244 
(0.2937) (1.756) (0.267) (0.1221) (0.1159) 
poedu 1.872 1.863 2.634 -1.504 2.228 1.924 
(0.556) (0.5502) (0.857) (-0.889) (0.5919) (0.5513) 
poavlab 0.046 0.075 0.230 0.139 0.058 0.057 
(0.219) (0.3540) (1.175) (1.596) (0.2520) (0.2603) 
poinv 0.377 0.364 0.353 0.015 0.383 0.342 
(1.722) ( 1.8257) ( 1.922) (0.170) (1.8655) (1.7932) 
porsd 2.515 2.479 2.177 0.284 2.447 2.400 
(2.049) (2.0105) (2.026) (0.582) (1.8468) (1.8670) 
poaveu 2.434 2.614 3.834 1.442 2.370 1.878 
( 1.050) (1.0155) ( 1.320) (0.947) (0.7904) (0.7141) 
poim 0.253 -1.009 -18.781 -0.935 -0.189 -0.241 
(0.287) (-0.2326) (-1.775) (-0.190) (-0.0369) (-0.0532) 
posspa -1.360 
(-0.6258) 
intsspa 1.307 
(0.4599) 
posita 
0.901 
intsita (0.4077) 
-1.360 
poire 0.370 (-0.4760) 
(0.344) 
intire 6.962 
(5.964) 
poobl -3.837 -I.OOO 
(-1.553) (-0.970) 
intobl 6.635 -0.095 
(2.013) (-0.063) 
R-BAR * * 0.025 0.832 0.127 0.101 
Note(s): Figure in the parenthesis denote !-statistics. 
The symbol • denotes negative R-BAR. 
Italy and Spain are divided into their Objective I and non-Objective I parts. 
See Annex Table A I for variables. 
Source: Cambridge Econometrics (1996) 
have made little difference in the first period, but is estimated 
to have had a significantly positive influence in the second 
period. This suggests that the greater degree of convergence 
after 1987 is, at least in part, due to the internal market 
initiative in the Community (see Table 20). 
Conditioning the regressions on other variables and pooling the 
data over the two periods, shows that the investment variable 
and the Irish performance have been the dominating influences 
on the pattern of economic growth among the OECD countries. 
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The internal market variable acts as an acceleration term to EU 
membership, but within the larger group of OECD countries 
the estimation does not confirm that the internal market has had 
an effect which is more important than EU membership. 
Apart from the last result, the findings using the OECD data 
set, which has a broader geographic coverage for a more 
limited selection of variables and which uses different sources, 
confirms the earlier analysis which was based on data for the 
Community alone. 
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Table 17 
Growth regression: OLS estimates (EUR 12 +2) 
Explanatory variables 
Constant 1.85 1.47 3.39 3.80 1.00 1.58 
( 1.53) (0.84) (0.80) (2.10) (0.51) (0.86) 
pogvapc -1.245 -0.94 -1.91 ' -1.40 -0.56 -0.83 
(-1.65) (-0.76) (-0.81) (-1.38) (-0.40) (-0.64) 
accel -0.49 2.89 0.37 -1.01 -0.82 
(-0.31) (0.93) (0.28) (-0.57) (-0.48) 
poedu 3.34 3.31 3.62 -1.28 3.37 3.39 
(1.73) (1.68) ( 1.84) (-1.16) ( 1.50) (1.65) 
poavlab 0.163 0.143 0.256 0.1371 0.121 0.120 
( 1.04) (0.83) (1.37) (1.65) (0.66) (0.66) 
poaveu 0.79 0.59 0.46 1.369 0.17 0.27 
(0.48) (0.33) (0.23) (1.45) (0.08) (0.13) 
poim 0.942 1.97 -6.23 -0.38 3.24 2.73 
( 1.51) (0.58) (-0.86) (-0.12) (0.84) (0.74) 
posspa -0.82 
(-0.46) 
intsspa 0.03 
(0.01) 
posita 1.07 
(0.60) 
intsita -1.93 
(-0.84) 
poire 0.396 
(0.44) 
intire 7.17 
(6.84) 
poobl -0.77 -0.899 
(-0.45) (-1.19) 
intobl 3.16 -0.28 
( 1.33) (-0.26) 
R-BAR 0.141 0.105 0.119 0.842 0.046 0.33 
Note(s): Figure in the parenthesis denote t-statistics. 
The symbol * denotes negative R-BAR. 
Italy and Spain are divided into their Objective l and non-Objective l parts. 
See Annex Table Al for variables. 
Source: Cambridge Econometrics ( 1996 J 
7.4.2.4. Results on regional convergence across the 
Community 
The CE study contains a similar analysis of convergence and 
growth among the regions of the Community. The data set for 
this exercise is much larger, and contains information on 169 
regions at the NUTS 2 level. Tables 21 and 22 give the 
estimated effects of the straightforward regression of 
unconditional convergence and the changes in the result when 
explanatory variables are added one by one or all together. The 
comparison of the last two sets of results provides an indication 
of the robustness and the interaction of the estimated 
coefficients. 1 
1 A comparison with the estimated convergence rate of the Member State 
regressions can be made by calculating the beta-coefficient as -100*(1-e·hT)ff. 
where b is the estimated coefficient of lgvapc and T the length of the period 
under consideration. For all practical purposes, this can be approximated by 
-1 OO*b when b is small (see again Tables Al and A2 for a glossary of the 
variable names). 
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Table 18 
Unconditional beta-convergence over the period 1975-87 (OECD countries) 
Explanatory variables 
Constant 
gvapc 
aveu 
Obi 
Ire 
R-BAR 
-0.97 
(-0.47) 
0.324 
( 1.38) 
3.8 
Note(s): Figures in parentheses denote t-statistics. 
See Annex Table A I for variables. 
Source: Cambridge Econometrics ( 1996). 
Table 19 
-0.89 
(-0.43) 
0.322 
(1.35) 
-0.153 
(-0.49) 
0.4 
-0.34 
{-0.13) 
0.262 
(0.90) 
-0.147 
(-0.46) 
-0.177 
(-0.37) 
* 
0.16 
(0.06) 
0.211 
(0.72) 
-0.248 
(-0.76) 
-0.466 
(-0.86) 
0.993 
(1.13) 
* 
Unconditional beta-convergence over the period 1987-93 (OECD countries) 
Explanatory variables 
Constant 
gvapc 
10.74 
(2.34) 
-1.016 
(-2.01) 
6.84 
(1.56) 
-0.667 
(-1.41) 
4.54 
(0.89) 
-0.417 
(-0.75) 
6.35 
( 1.33) 
-0.614 
(-1.19) 
aveu 
Obi 
Ire 
R-BAR 11.6 
Note{s): Figures in parentheses denote t-statistics. 
See Annex Table A I for variables. 
Source: Cambridge Econometrics (1996). 
Analysis at the regional level suggests that there was a faster 
rate of 'unconditional' convergence (i.e. simply comparing 
growth rates with starting per capita income levels) post 1987. 
This appears to be due to an improved performance by the 
regions which were lagging behind (border regions, Objective I 
and Objective 2 regions are distinguished in the analysis). 
Convergence was proceeding at a slightly faster rate and these 
regions were no longer performing below par, in the sense that 
their growth rates were higher than what could have been 
expected on the basis of their starting level of per capita 
income. The estimated equations suggest that, other things 
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1.504 
(2.55) 
29.4 
1.304 
(2.06) 
0.870 
(0.88) 
28.6 
1.293 
(2.21) 
-0.11 
(-0.11) 
3.21 
(2.14) 
39.5 
being equal, the poorer regions would have experienced faster 
growth than the rich ones. 
The favourable effect of the internal market on border regions 
is particularly evident. There is also some indication that the 
internal market played a role in turning around the convergence 
behaviour of peripheral regions and Objective l and 2 regions. 
Previous to the SMP, growth in these regions was slower than 
what could have been expected from applying the neoclassical 
hypothesis to their starting level of income per capita. After 
1987, that negative effect has disappeared. 
Growth and real convergence effects 
Table 20 
Growth regression: OLS estimates 
Explanatory variables 
Constant -0.92 -1.83 -1.82 -2.14 
(-0.30) (-0.56) (-0.52) (-0.64) 
pogdppc -0.097 -0.002 -0.028 -0.030 
(-0.35) (-0.01) (-0.08) (-0.10) 
acccl -0.598 2.39 -0.01 
(-0.82) ( 1.60) (-0.01) 
poinv 0.1273 
(2.65) 
poaveu 0.735 
( 1.60) 
poim 0.913 
(1.82) 
poire 
intire 
poobl 
intobl 
R-BAR 20.8 
Note(s): Figure in the parentheses denote !-statistics. 
See Annex Table A I for variables. 
Source: Cambridge Econometrics ( 1996). 
7.4.2.5. Empirical results on regional convergence within the 
Member States 
The equations estimated above impose the restriction that the 
rate of within-country regional convergence is the same in all 
Member States and that there is no country-specific influence 
on regional development other than the one captured by the 
differences in the explanatory variables. As a catch-all for 
possible country-specific influences which are not reflected in 
the explanatory variables, zero-one variables representing the 
country have been introduced in the regression of the regional 
data. A comparison of the results with and without country 
dummies may give an indication of differences in the within-
country rates of regional convergence (see Tables 23 and 24 ). 
For the period 1987-93, the estimated overall rate of 
convergence does hardly change in size, although the 
coefficient becomes statistically insignificant if country 
dummies are included. For the pre-SMP period, the conclusions 
are different. The overall rate of convergence was insignificant 
in the earlier period, but the use of country dummies makes it 
highly significant and increases the estimated speed of 
0.1299 0.1394 0.1543 
(2.69) (2.96) (3.43) 
0.763 0.802 0.740 
(l.65) ( 1.79) (1.70) 
6.20 -21.3 0.7 
(0.95) (-1.57) (0.04) 
1.17 
(0.95) 
2.41 
( 1.25) 
-0.205 -0.493 
(-0.31) (-0.70) 
3.58 0.77 
(2.20) (0.38) 
20.2 25.8 33.6 
convergence. Regional convergence within the Member States 
before 1987 is estimated to have taken place at a rate of 1 % per 
year on average. The difference between the estimates for the 
two periods suggests that, with respect to regional convergence, 
it has become less important to which Member State the region 
belongs. After 1987, regional convergence appears to have 
become a feature of the Community rather than a national 
characteristic. 
7.5. Growth and convergence in the less-developed 
regions 
This section focuses on the SMP effects in the less developed 
cohesion countries of the Union, namely, Ireland, Portugal, 
Spain and Greece. While the elimination of barriers to the 
movement of products and factors of production fostered by the 
SMP produced welfare gains for the Union as a whole and for 
the less developed regions as a group (7.4.2.1. - 7.4.2.5. above), 
the results for the latter group are greatly influenced by the 
impressive growth performance of Ireland and to a lesser extent 
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Table 21 
Regressions based on 1987-93 growth (without country dummies) 
Explanatory Unconditional Conditional 
Variables Direct 
effects Total effects 
Constant 0.02590 0.029549 0.03963 0.02557 0.02975 0.02577 0.02424 0.02717 
(6.076) (2.661) (4.401) (5.975) (3.882) (6.039) (5.892) (6.259) 
Igvapc[87] 0.00471 0.006634 0.00964 0.00574 0.00633 0.00452 0.00507 0.00363 
(2.371) (1.707) (2.724) (2.502) ( 1.883) (2.266) (2.652) (1.722) 
luxdij -0.000960 -0.00483 
(-0.282) (-1.728) 
es[75] 0.006548 0.00873 
(0.632) (0.919) 
ps[I] -0.001050 -0.00203 
(-0.269) (-0.605) 
ps[2] -0.003306 -0.00235 
(-1.232) (-0.893) 
bordcr[93] 0.005703 0.00641 
(2.962) (3.911) 
heap -0.000564 -0.00085 
(-0.861) (-1.433) 
Moran'sl 0.2129 0.1363 0.1948 0.2093 0.2086 0.2115 0.1469 0.1977 
(7.96) (5.90) (7.51) (7.95) (7.92) (7.93) (5.73) (7.76) 
Note(s): Figures in the parentheses denote I-statistics. 
See Annex Table A2 for variables. 
Source: Cambridge Econometrics ( 1996). 
Portugal. A more careful analysis indicates that the SMP 
effects have been very different from one country to another. 
Moreover, given that the launch of the SMP was accompanied 
by a significant Community regional policy package which 
ensured large flows of structural funds to the less-developed 
regions, it is useful to try to distinguish the effects of structural 
funds spending on the favourable growth performance post 
1987 from the SMP effects. 1 
1 Some of the results in this section arc based on two background studies 
prepared for the report, namely ESRI et al. (1996) and CERES et al. (1996). 
200 
7.5.1. Effects of economic integration 
The variety in the impact of the SMP among cohesion countries 
can be attributed to the structural characteristics of each of 
these economies before 1987 and the share in output and 
employment of the sectors that were more sensitive to the SMP. 
Despite a number of shared characteristics compared to other 
EU countries, like the relative importance of agriculture. the 
relative underdevelopment of physical infrastructure. the size 
and structure of enterprises, etc., these countries had a different 
structure of manufacturing and service sectors before 1987 and. 
therefore, it was expected that their economies would react 
differently to the SMP. With the opening up of markets, the 
tractable components of these economies became bigger as 
successful sectors expanded through capturing increased 
market share in the EU market, while unsuccessful ones 
Growth and real convergence effects 
Table 22 
Regressions based on 1975-87 growth (without country dummies) 
Explanatory Unconditional Conditional 
Variables Direct 
effects Total effects 
Constant 0.02485 0.05059 0.04140 0.02454 0.03717 0.02419 0.024795 0.02520 
(6.734) (5.033) (5.171) (6.570) (5.577) (6.613) (6.652) (6.610) 
Igvapc[75] 0.00282 0.01281 0.00952 0.00347 0.00880 0.00214 0.002834 0.000252 
(1.463) (2.981) (2.612) ( 1.542) (2.534) (1.116) (1.463) (1.207) 
luxdij -0.00546 -0.00627 
(-1.654) (-2.322) 
es[75] 0.00654 0.00529 
(0.656) (0.577) 
ps[l] -0.00608 -0.00709 
(-1.623) (-2.209) 
ps[2] -0.00595 -0.00561 
(-2.304) (-2.234) 
border[93] -0.00199 0.000187 
(-1.071) (0.114) 
heap -0.00080 -0.00022 
(-1.267) (-0.386) 
Moran's! 0.1451 0.1355 0.1555 0.1515 0.1612 0.1411 0.1457 0.1392 
(5.53) (5.84) (6.05) (5.84) (6.16) (5.40) (5.68) (5.60) 
Note(s): Figures in the parentheses denote t-statistics. 
See Annex Table A2 for variables. 
Source: Cambridge Econometrics ( 1996). 
contracted due to loss of market share in the domestic market. 
Moreover, the degree of openness of each of these economies 
pre-1987 was different, with Ireland being already a more open 
economy and Spain being the least open one in the group. With 
the SMP, the dependency of these economies on the economic 
performance of the rest of the EU increased substantially as the 
periphery economies are, to a much greater extent than the core 
EU countries, price-takers in their export markets. 
Overall, the SMP has triggered, through changes in trade, 
production and investment patterns, a series of static economic 
efficiency effects which produced one-off changes in the level 
of output in most periphery countries. On the other hand, the 
dynamic, long-term growth effects which depend on the 
accumulation of physical and human capital and on technical 
progress, are much more difficult to identify at this stage, partly 
due to the short time period that has elapsed since the 
implementation of the SMP. 
Ireland, the country that has experienced above-average growth 
rates and better convergence within the EU in the period after 
1985, has some unique features in its economic structure and 
economic history which have greatly influenced the adjustment 
process of its economy to the SMP shock. The first, is the large 
and growing presence of multinational corporations (MNCs). 
The second, is the close trade relation of Ireland with the UK 
and the fact that free trade with the UK has been in place for 
much longer than with the rest of the EU. 
The large presence of multinational corporations determined 
the developments in both the volume and the structure of trade 
in Ireland. Manufacturing exports to the EU grew substantially 
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Table 23 
Regressions based on 1987-93 growth (with country dummies) 
Explanatory Unconditional 
Variables Direct 
effects 
Constant 0.02985 0.028185 0.026810 
(3.229) (2.421) (2.527) 
Igvapc[87] 0.00517 0.006536 0.004211 
(1.375) ( 1.429) (1.031) 
luxdij 0.007376 0.002336 
( 1.544) (0.587) 
es[75] 0.05444 
(0.531) 
ps[l] -0.005350 
(-1.466) 
ps[2] -0.002796 
(-1.166) 
border[93] 0.001902 
( 1.069) 
Moran's! -0.0001 -0.0213 -0.0018 
( 1.54) (0.90) ( 1.55) 
Note(s): Figures in the parentheses denote I-statistics. 
See Annex Table A2 for variables. 
Source: Cambridge Econometrics ( 1996). 
post SMP for the majority of sectors but mainly for sectors with 
a high level of MNCs activity (although there are interesting 
exemptions of sectors dominated by domestic firm activity). 
Similarly, the process of inter-industry specialization away 
from traditional labour intensive sectors into high tech, capital 
intensive activities which started in the early 1980s and has 
been strongly influenced by MNC investment, continued in the 
post SMP period. 
The flows of new greenfield investment and FDI in the country 
has also been influenced by the behaviour of multinational 
corporations. Ireland experienced strong growth in FDI flows in 
the early 1980s while post 1987, FOi decreased both in 
absolute and relative terms. Flows in the post-1987 period are 
mainly originating in the US and Japan. FDI data, however, do 
not capture the reinvested profits of the MNCs already 
established in the country, which are among the major factors 
behind the increased physical and human capital accumulation 
observed in this country. 
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Conditional 
Total effects 
0.029850 0.03540 0.029787 0.028855 
(3.220) (3.294) (3.219) (3.103) 
0.005585 0.00748 0.005097 0.005108 
( 1.400) (1.680) (1.354) (1.359) 
0.002863 
(0.326) 
-0.00324 
(-1.012) 
-0.001748 
(-0.773) 
0.001640 
(0.979) 
-0.0014 -0.0069 0.0005 -0.0022 
( 1.52) (1.30) ( 1.58) (1.51) 
Portugal has also experienced healthy growth rates above the 
EU average in the period 1985-92 and has increased 
convergence with the EU. As the SMP coincided with the 
accession of Portugal to the EU it is however very difficult to 
disentangle the two effects. 
The annual inflow of FDI more than doubled as a percentage of 
total investment compared to the l 981-85 period and this has 
been a major factor behind both physical and capital 
accumulation for all regions and sectors. Contrary to Ireland 
however, the largest increases in FDI flows occurred in the 
non-tradable sectors, such as construction and public works. 
banking and insurance, wholesale trade and market services. 
indicating that the majority of foreign firms aimed at taking 
advantage of domestic market opportunities. On the other hand. 
there has been selected FDI in industrial sectors with a strong 
export orientation, like food and beverages. electrical 
engineering, motor vehicles and components. which have 
affected the specialization structure of Portuguese 
manufacturing. 
Table 24 
Regressions based on 1975-87 growth (with country dummies) 
Explanatory Unconditional 
Variables Direct 
effects 
Constant 0.04403 0.05256 0.05087 
(5.971) (6.020) (6.064) 
Igvapc[75] 0.01017 0.01655 0.01278 
(2.768) (3.800) (3.127) 
luxdij 0.00233 -0.00582 
(0.582) (-1.678) 
es[75] 0.00958 
(1.127) 
ps[l] -0.01049 
(-3.578) 
ps[2] -0.00595 
(-2.976) 
border[93] -0.00026 
(-0.174) 
Moran's! -0.0092 -0.0413 -0.0278 
( 1.16) (0.26) (0.47) 
Note(s): Figures in the parentheses denote l-statistics. 
See Annex Table A2 for variables. 
Source: Cambridge Econometrics ( 1996). 
Trade creation was strong in most sectors (accounting for most 
of manufacturing output and exports) and high import 
penetration lead to exit of inefficient producers and triggered 
higher investment by 'survivors' as a response to the new 
competitive environment. The impact was negative mainly for 
the medium-quality products, which represent over half of the 
Portuguese trade, but has produced limited improvements for 
low- and high-quality products. A process of specialization 
started developing in textiles, clothing and footwear, non-
metallic mineral products, timber and furniture, electrical 
engineering and motor vehicles, the latter mainly due to foreign 
investment discussed above. 
Greece's economic performance has been very erratic in the 
post SMP period and is the country that has converged less 
with the EU in the period under examination. 
The Greek economy was characterized by a weak 
manufacturing base with over half of manufacturing output 
concentrated in very few sectors of low/moderate demand 
Growth and real convergence effects 
Conditional 
Total effects 
0.04363 0.05724 0.04210 0.04368 
(5.922) (7.284) (5.758) (5.853) 
0.01170 0.01716 0.00905 0.01013 
(2.974) ( 4.016) (2.511) (2.749) 
0.00965 
(1.252) 
-0.00995 
(-3.846) 
-0.00471 
(-2.375) 
0.00050 
(0.340) 
-0.0037 -0.0476 -0.0095 -0.0110 
( 1.42) (-0.38) ( 1.16) (1.14) 
growth and low technological content (namely, food, textiles 
and minerals extraction). Moreover, three quarters of industrial 
production were concentrated in only three (out of a total of 
eleven) regions. Intra-industry trade was at very low levels and 
Greek exports drew their competitiveness from static 
comparative advantages such as cheap labour and the 
availability of raw materials. 
The SMP induced a strong (the strongest from the cohesion· 
countries) structural shock in the Greek economy as a large 
number of sectors, representing a substantial part of output and 
employment, were exposed to competition. For the majority of 
manufacturing sectors intra-industry trade increased post 1987 
but remains still at lowest level among the EU countries. Trade 
creation effects were accompanied by an increase of exports to 
non-EU countries but overall no important specialization trends 
have emerged over the examined period. With few exceptions 
the bulk of trade continues to concentrate in activities of low 
technology and weak international demand. 
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Contrary to Portugal and Spain the flows of FDI increased only 
slightly post SMP and were mainly concentrated in one region. 
There are few indications of a physical and human capital 
accumulation effects. 
Spain's economic performance in the post-1987 period has 
been stable with annual growth above the Community average 
but a slow convergence progress with the rest of the EU. 
Expectations of the effects of the SMP were moderate in 
comparison to the rest of the cohesion countries. Spain, as the 
largest of the periphery economies, had a productive structure 
with a high level of sectoral diversification and the relative 
weight of sectors sensitive to the SMP was much lower than in 
Portugal and Greece. Overall the impact of accession which 
coincided with the SMP was more influential for the economic 
developments in Spain than the SMP. The structural shock was 
much more limited even when one examines the impact in the 
less-developed objective 1 regions of the country. 
at the expense of trade with non-EU countries. The overall 
impact from the SMP at the regional level was not of a large 
enough scale so as to alter substantially the regional ranking of 
sectoral concentration. 
FDI flows increased post 1986 and it is interesting to note a 
convergence in the share of FDI attracted by the various 
regions in the country. Contrary to the past, less attractive 
regions attracted increasing shares of FDI. 
7.5.2. Distinguishing the effect of structural funds 
Intra-industry trade intensified particularly in products of 
medium and low quality and in sectors with strong or medium 
Community demand. The strong trade creation affects were not 
Building on the econometric analysis used in section 7.4.2. 
above, Cambridge Econometrics estimated a selection of 
equations including a variable which measures structural fund 
spending per capita by region for the four cohesion countries 
over the period 1989-93. The results, both with and without 
national dummies, for the post-SMP period show that the 
replacement of the objective 1 dummy by the structural funds 
spending variable makes very little difference to the model 
parameter estimates presented in Tables 21 and 23 above. 
Cross-region structural fund variations are not significant, 
Table 25 
Regressions based on 1987-93 growth (without country dummies) 
Explanatory 
variables Direct 
effects 
Constant 0.029714 
(2.61) 
lgvapc[87] 0.6752 
( 1.65) 
luxdij -0.000990 
(-0.29) 
es[75] 0.006670 
(0.65) 
obl_ecu -0.001705 
(-0.26) 
ps[l] 
ps[2] 0.003315 
(-1.23) 
border[93] 0.005716 
(2.97) 
heap -0.000550 
(-0.85) 
Sec Annex Table A2 for variables. 
Source: Cambridge Econometrics (1996). 
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All regions 
Total 
effects 
0.02980 
(3.55) 
0.00637 
(1.73) 
-0.00317 
(-0.54) 
Direct 
effects 
0.029775 
(2.60) 
0.006745 
( 1.64) 
-0.000929 
(-0.27) 
0.006547 
(0.63) 
-0.000873 
(-0.09) 
-0.000651 
(-0.11) 
-0.003318 
(-1.23) 
0.005711 
(2.95) 
-0.000562 
(-0.85) 
Total 
effects 
0.02999 
(3.55) 
0.00644 
(1.74) 
-0.00073 
(-0.07) 
-0.00168 
(-0.28) 
OBI regions 
Direct 
effects 
0.03658 
( 1.09) 
0.00727 
(0.58) 
-0.00895 
(-0.80) 
0.00247 
(0.08) 
-0.00027 
(-0.02) 
0.01557 
(2.02) 
0.01557 
(2.02) 
Total 
effects 
0.0333 
( 1.65) 
0.00846 
(0.98) 
-0.00426 
(-0.24) 
Growth and real convergence effects 
Table 26 
Regressions based on 1987-93 growth (with country dummies) 
Explanatory All regions OBI regions 
variables Direct Total Direct Total Direct Total 
effects effects effects effects effects effects 
Constant 0.026763 0.03378 0.027424 0.03499 0.03684 0.04743 
(2.27) (3.15) (2.33) (3.32) (1.10) (2.40) 
lgvapc[87] 0.005761 0.00680 0.006318 0.00731 0.01817 0.01810 
( 1.26) ( 1.54) ( 1.37) (1.63) (0.96) ( 1.42) 
luxdij 0.006015 0.007529 0.01139 
( 1.30) (1.57) (0.95) 
es[75] 0.05305 0.005982 -0.01205 
(.51) (0.58) (-0.30) 
obl_ecu -0.007427 -0.0487 0.006270 0.00452 0.00184 0.00296 
(-1.00) (-0.73) (0.45) (0.38) (0.09) (0.15) 
ps[l] -0.00797 -0.00512 
(-1.16) (-0.77) 
ps[2] -0.02633 -0.002815 
(-1.10) (-1.17) 
border[93] 0.001917 
( 1.07) 
See Annex Table A2 for variables. 
Source: Cambridge Econometrics (1996). 
indicating that variations in structural fund spending did not 
have a significant effect on regional growth variations (see 
Tables 25 and 26). 
The above indication that there is no direct relationship 
between the amount of structural funds transfers to a region and 
its convergence performance does not however exclude the 
possibility of positive structural funds growth effects for the 
recipient countries. Structural funds transfers in the objective 1 
regions, and in particularly in the four cohesion countries, are 
of a scale that their effects can be assessed by macroeconomic 
model simulations of an anti-monde. Community transfers are 
combined with national funding for the financing of 
multiannual development programmes called Community 
support frameworks (CSFs). Using the (new) Quest II model, 
DG II has estimated the structural funds impact on output for 
the period post 1989. The main characteristics of the model are 
the incorporation of forward-looking expectations, under which 
households base their savings/consumption decisions on their 
current and future expected net income as they try to smooth 
consumption over time. As a result the demand effects are more 
front-loaded than they would have been with a conventional 
Keynesian model. The supply-side is explicitly modelled, 
assuming increasing returns to investment in infrastructure and 
human resources. Finally, interest and exchange rates are 
determined endogenously, an aspect that is crucial for this 
analysis as it influences the saving and investment decisions. 
0.001907 -0.00589 
( 1.07) (-0.69) 
For the period 1989-93, an ex-post, anti-monde simulation is 
made by taking off the CSF spending from the baseline. The 
results of the simulation estimate the impact of the total public 
CSF expenditure, i.e. EU transfers and domestic public 
co financing. 
GDP% EL IRL p E 
difference 
1989 1.79 0.76 1.39 0.76 
1990 3.09 1.09 1.90 0.54 
1991 1.53 1.32 1.76 0.40 
1992 1.73 1.22 1.48 0.55 
1993 1.63 1.27 1.45 0.54 
In the short-term, demand effects are predominant since it takes 
a number of years for investment in infrastructure and 
education to pay off in terms of higher productivity. In the 
medium term, the favourable impact of the structural fund 
spending wears off due to the increase in real interest rates 
resulting from the stimulated demand effects which is 
anticipated by private investors. In the long term, GDP growth 
is picking up again due to positive supply side effects, which 
are of a more permanent nature and continue beyond the period 
of structural fund payments. 
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A different approach has been taken in a study by ESRI, which 
uses a model without a monetary/financial sector to estimate 
the CSF effects. In their simulations all structural funds 
assistance is combined into one policy shock that starts in 1989. 
The supply-side is modelled, assuming increasing returns to 
investment in physical infrastructure, human resources and 
from production/investment aid to the private sector. In the 
following simulation the assumption is made that there are no 
externalities associated with the CSF expenditures, i.e. any 
build-up of stocks of infrastructure or of stocks of trained 
labour which do not have additional impacts over and above 
the standard ones. Moreover, this simulation does not include 
the effects of the increased FDI observed in Portugal and Spain 
post 1987. The study estimates the effects of total CSF 
expenditure, i.e. EU transfers, domestic public cofinancing and 
domestic private cofinancing. The following percentage 
deviations from the no-CSF baseline projection have been 
estimated for 1995: 
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GDP% 
difference 
1995 
EL IRL 
6.16 1.65 
p E 
8.15 1.94 
The results for the four cohesion countries are of a larger scale 
than the ones estimated by the Quest II model and depend 
largely on the size of the transfer, (and the accompanying 
public and private sector cofinancing) as well as the public 
investment multiplier effect. A major factor behind the 
diversity of the results is the lack of a financial sector in the 
Hermin model. 
Both exercises demonstrate that the effects of the structural 
fund transfers can be very different across countries and, more 
important, that the estimations from such simulations are 
largely dependent on the properties of the models used in each 
case. 
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E-ma,I query@bernan.com 
URL: www.bernan.com 
MEXICO 
Mundl-Prensa Mexico, SA de CV 
Rio Panuco. 141 
Delegac16n Cuauhtemoc 
ME-06500 Mexico OF 
Tel. (52-5) 553 56 58160 
Fax (52-5) 514 67 99 
E-mail: 104164.23compuserve.com 
REPUBLIQUE DE GOREE 
Kyowa Book Company 
1 F1. Phyung Hwa Bldg 
411 -2 Hap Jeong Dong. Mapa Ku 
121 -220 Seoul 
Tel. (82·2) 322 6780/1 
Fax (82-2) 322 6782 
E-mail kyowa2@ktnet.co.kr 
ANDERE LANDER/OTHER COUNTRIES! 
AUTRES PAYS 
Bltte wenden Sle slch an eln BOro lhrer 
Wahl I Please contact the sales ottice of 
your choice I Veuillez vous adresser au 
bureau de venle de votre cholx 
12196 
II I Ill I IIII Ill I I IIIII 
9 789282 787311 > 
